1 Wednesday, 4 October 2017 8 (2.00 pm) 9 MR MACKENZIE: My Lord, the next witness is Tony Glazebrook. 10 MR TONY GLAZEBROOK (sworn) 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You will be asked questions. If 12 I could ask you to speak clearly into the microphone so 13 everyone can hear what you're saying, and also speak 14 relatively slowly so the shorthand writers can keep up 15 with you. 16 Examination by MR MACKENZIE 17 MR MACKENZIE: Good afternoon, Mr Glazebrook. Could you 18 state your full name, please. 19 A. It's Anthony Glazebrook. 20 Q. And your current occupation? 21 A. Is consultant engineer. 22 Q. Thank you. I would like to start with your CV, please, 23 Mr Glazebrook. It will come up on the screen. It's 24 CVS00000059. Go to the last page, please, page 6. We 25 can see halfway down you set out your qualifications. 119 1 In short you have a degree in electronic engineering and 2 then we see your membership of various professional 3 bodies. 4 Just working backwards, please, if we can go to 5 page 5, we can see just by way of overview that from 6 about 1970, you were employed in various roles by 7 British Rail, in the area of signal engineering; is that 8 correct? 9 A. Yes, that's correct. 10 Q. Again, similarly, at page 4, I think we can see that as 11 well. Similar type roles with British Rail. Obviously 12 getting increasingly senior. 13 Then please at page 3, we can see that you worked 14 for other companies, again in signalling and controls; 15 is that correct? 16 A. Yes, that's correct. 17 Q. Thank you. Page 2, we can see a reference to Head of 18 Engineering Compliance with Thameslink 2000 project for 19 Railtrack. We can see various other roles there as 20 well. And we can see that from February 2007 you formed 21 your own engineering company, and I think above that we 22 see your involvement with the Edinburgh Tram Project as 23 Engineering Services Director between 16 February 2007 24 to 31 March 2011. Is that correct? 25 A. Yes, that's correct. 120 1 Q. Thank you. So that's all just by way of overview. 2 Then please go to your statement you provided. 3 I think you have a hard copy before you, and a copy also 4 on the screen. The reference is TRI00000039_C. 5 I should please go to page 46 of the statement. 6 We see a signature dated 19 June 2017. Could I ask 7 you to confirm, please, that that is your signature and 8 that this is the written statement you have provided to 9 the Inquiry? 10 A. Yes, it is. 11 Q. Thank you, Mr Glazebrook. I should say that your 12 evidence to the Inquiry will comprise both written 13 statement and the evidence you give at these hearings. 14 Thank you. 15 What I would like to do is simply go through your 16 statement and look at your various responses and ask 17 various questions in clarification or expansion, from 18 time to time breaking off to look at other documents. 19 Starting at page 1 of your statement, please, we can 20 see in question 2, about halfway down, actually if we go 21 back to the main question 2, halfway down the page, we 22 asked in sub-question 1 the circumstances of you joining 23 tie. You explained you had been approached, I think, by 24 David Crawley; is that correct? 25 A. Yes, that's correct. 121 1 Q. You explain that your job title was Engineering Services 2 Director from beginning of February 2007 to end of 3 March 2011. Just pausing there, Mr Glazebrook, I assume 4 you were a consultant rather than an employee of tie? 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q. I think you job shared with Mr Crawley, at least during 7 2007; is that correct? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. How many days a week did you work on the project on 10 average? 11 A. Initially it was three days a week, and then it became 12 four days as the years progressed. 13 Q. I understand. Did you have an overlap day with 14 Mr Crawley? 15 A. Pardon? 16 Q. Did you have one-day overlap with Mr Crawley? 17 A. Usually, yes. 18 Q. Did you work these days in the tie office in Edinburgh 19 or at home? 20 A. During 2007 it was always in the tie offices. 21 Q. Thank you. I think we have heard from Mr Crawley that 22 he ceased acting in the role of Engineering Director in 23 about February 2008. Does that tie in with your 24 recollection? 25 A. Yes. Yes. 122 1 Q. So from about February 2008 you would have been the only 2 Engineering Services Director? 3 A. Correct. 4 Q. We also see in sub-question 3 we asked your main duties 5 and responsibilities, and you explained they were: 6 "Throughout the project to ensure that the overall 7 system design met all engineering acceptance and 8 approvals criteria." 9 We can see below that that you reported to the Tram 10 Project Director; is that correct? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Was that Matthew Crosse? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. At least during 2007? 15 A. Yes, that's right. 16 Q. Could we please look at a separate document, 17 CEC01785249. If we could blow up the top half of the 18 page, what this is, Mr Glazebrook, in, I think, 19 March 2007, Mr Crawley had been asked to set out the 20 duties of the Engineering, Assurance and Approvals Team, 21 and he had produced this document in response. So we 22 can see the first four bullet points at the top of the 23 page. Do you agree those set out the role of the team 24 at that stage? 25 A. Yes, that's correct. 123 1 Q. Of those four bullet points, are there any points that 2 you had particular responsibilities for? 3 A. The first three. 4 Q. The last one, about Value Engineering, was that 5 a different part of tie dealing with that? 6 A. Not really. That just came later. 7 Q. I see. By later, when do you mean? 8 A. Probably 2008 or 2009, thereabouts. Around the time of 9 Infraco contract let. 10 Q. So that time in 2008 or 2009, about the time the Infraco 11 contract was let, did you have responsibilities for 12 value engineering savings? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. I should just say, May 2008 was when the Infraco 15 contract was let. Fix that date in time. Thank you. 16 Could I also please ask what were the roles and 17 duties of Steven Bell during 2007? 18 A. He was my boss. I reported to him. I gave him monthly 19 reports and we had occasional meetings. 20 Q. Now, I think in 2007 Mr Bell's job title was Director of 21 Engineering and Procurement. We know that in early 2008 22 Mr Bell became the Tram Project Director. So I'm 23 wondering, during 2007, when Matthew Crosse was Tram 24 Project Director, and Mr Bell was Director of 25 Engineering and Procurement, did you say you reported to 124 1 Mr Bell as your boss? 2 A. No, I'm sorry, I was incorrect there. I reported to 3 Matthew, but I talked to Steven from time to time on 4 particular issues. 5 Q. Yes. Do you know what Mr Bell's duties were during 2007 6 and responsibilities? 7 A. Well, I assume he was Matthew's boss, and involved with 8 the Infraco procurement. 9 Q. So it was your understanding in 2007 that in terms of 10 seniority, Mr Bell was above Mr Crosse? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Does that seem odd that the Director of Engineering and 13 Procurement is above the Tram Project Director? 14 A. That's how I understood it to be, yes. 15 Q. Could I separately please ask you about the Design and 16 Procurement and Delivery Sub-Committee. Is that 17 a committee you were familiar with? 18 A. Not really, no. I don't recall it particularly. I know 19 it was there. There were many committees there, but 20 I don't recall specifically what it was or what it did. 21 Q. That's certainly not a committee you sat on? 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. Do you consider you ought to have sat on that, given you 24 were Engineering Director for the tram project? 25 A. It would probably have been useful, yes. 125 1 Q. Do you know why you didn't sit on that committee in 2 2007? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Presumably you weren't asked to? 5 A. Pardon. 6 Q. Presumably no one asked you to sit on it? 7 A. That's correct, yes. 8 Q. Thank you. 9 Moving on in your statement, please, go back to 10 page 2, if we may. We had asked for the overview of the 11 design problems, and in particular if we could go at the 12 bottom third of the page, in the sub-question 1 towards 13 the bottom, we had asked: 14 "By way of overview: What was your understanding of 15 the main difficulties and delays encountered in carrying 16 out the design work?" 17 You replied: 18 "The poor relationship that SDS had with tie, 19 utility companies and CEC, largely through inadequate 20 specification compounded by constant meddling, delayed 21 problem clearance, unclear/missing/duplicative roles and 22 responsibilities." 23 Now, there are a number of items or things in that 24 answer. Could you explain each of these factors, 25 please, Mr Glazebrook? 126 1 A. Yes. The specification was very, very complex, 2 comprised thousands of pages. It was evident to me, and 3 indeed it was evident to many of us, that the 4 specification of the different elements had not 5 necessarily been correlated, shall we say. So there 6 were either duplications or gaps which had to be 7 resolved. 8 In terms of constant meddling, it seemed to me that 9 the way the organisation was arranged and the way people 10 seemed to take their responsibilities meant that, 11 certainly to my recollection, there was a belief that 12 anyone could input, criticise, comment, continually, 13 which rather than solving problems, actually compounded 14 the problems. 15 On the subject of delayed problem clearance, very 16 quickly we became aware that there were quite a lot of 17 critical issues. I think there was 80 something, which 18 had been around for some time, some years in some cases. 19 So one of our first priorities, that is David and I and 20 our team, was to resolve those as far as we could. 21 In terms of the last line, I think that reinforces 22 what I said just now. The roles and responsibilities 23 within tie not only were, but increased, in their 24 duplication. Now, whether that duplication was by 25 design or by assumption, I don't know. But certainly 127 1 many people felt they had the right to comment on 2 everything under the sun rather than use their energies 3 and their brains to resolve problems. 4 Q. Thank you. 5 The question of the duplication within tie you just 6 mentioned, can you identify between the different 7 individuals or teams? 8 A. Yes. This became worse once the Infraco contracts had 9 been let, and we all moved to Edinburgh Park. 10 As well as my team, there was a team -- I forget the 11 name of it, but it was under Bob Bell. And there were 12 project managers assigned to each engineering 13 discipline, and the unfortunate consequence of that, 14 compounded by the cost management people, was that we 15 now, instead of having one or maybe three lots of 16 people, the three being CEC, other parts of tie and 17 ourselves, commenting on design, there were two new 18 groups of people commenting on design, and further 19 compounding the problem, none of whom to my recollection 20 or impression seemed to want to solve problems, merely 21 to raise problems. 22 So those particular new duplicative roles were the 23 project manager roles under Bob Bell and the finance -- 24 I can't remember what they were called. Sort of cost 25 management people, that were floating around also 128 1 commenting on everything under the sun. 2 Q. Thank you. You also earlier in your answer mentioned 3 gaps in specification. Can you indicate which areas 4 there were gaps? 5 A. Probably the key areas. If we take, for instance, 6 planning, planning is one of these things, which, being 7 subjective, is not particularly well specified. So that 8 caused problems, an example being the long wall at 9 Murrayfield practice pitches, where agreement on what 10 pattern or patterns should be in the stone work was 11 first amusingly and then irritatingly delayed because of 12 the subjective nature of it. 13 There were a lot of cases, I can't give you chapter 14 and verse, where there seemed to be conflictions. 15 What I mean by that is it's the nature of a city 16 that's trying to fit a trail way, meaning track poles, 17 signs, alignment of roads to avoid bicycles going down 18 the rails, instead crossing at 90 degrees, as well as 19 the general public realm issues, there were so many 20 factors, some of which conflicted, that it was very hard 21 to resolve all of those in a way that didn't pop up some 22 other problem like the proverbial balloon being poked. 23 That's really a key area where I would have thought 24 and would have expected and wished that CEC, instead of 25 being in a clipboard role, would have been in 129 1 a problem-solving role, but they seemed reluctant to do 2 that. 3 Q. What do you mean by CEC in a clipboard role? 4 A. Criticising rather than solving. 5 Q. Finally, I think you had also mentioned the question of 6 constant meddling. Was that meddling from people within 7 tie? Was that the various interested parties or both or 8 what? 9 A. My recollection is it was principally within tie 10 actually. 11 Q. Does that come back to your explanation about in 12 particular after Infraco let, there being other people 13 involved and commenting on design? 14 A. Yes, that made it worse. It was there before. 15 Q. Thank you. 16 We go back to your statement then. We had asked in 17 sub-question 2 what were the main reasons for these 18 difficulties and delays. And you had answered: 19 "Poor Utility performance due to their inadequate 20 records and processes." 21 I think that's perhaps self-evident. Then: 22 "CEC "we won't tell you exactly what we want but 23 when you make us a proposal we'll tell you what's wrong 24 with it" approach. 25 Tie organisational confusion - it was as though 130 1 everyone was encouraged to meddle with every conceivable 2 aspect of design, regardless of their role, knowledge 3 and experience. 4 Sometimes inadequate SDS resource." 5 Then lastly: 6 "Poor tie/SDS liaison leading to mutual distrust." 7 Were these various factors in your view present 8 throughout your involvement with the tram project? 9 A. Yes. I would like to just explain a wee thing. Where 10 I have put "sometimes inadequate SDS resource", 11 I wouldn't regard that as a blaming statement. I think 12 that was because, if I had been in charge of SDS, and 13 I had seen the amount of meddling, delay and lack of 14 problem solving, I would have probably wanted to assign 15 expert resource on to other things until the problems 16 had been resolved. So that's what I mean by that. 17 Q. Thank you. Of these various factors you have listed, 18 are there any that you wish to expand upon or do you 19 consider them largely as self-evident? 20 A. I think the utility one, as you say, is self-standing. 21 CEC, we have commented on that just now. 22 tie organisational confusion, again, I have made 23 some words a little while ago. 24 I think the last thing I would say is poor tie/SDS 25 liaison. It seemed incredible to me at the point 131 1 I joined, after a lot of years running and being 2 involved with projects before, it was incredible to me 3 that nobody seemed to have taken the lead to sit down 4 with SDS and find out what was wrong. 5 Instead, the imperative seemed to be to call in 6 people from London, from the United States, rather than 7 sit down with the actual people on the job to find out 8 simply what was causing the delay. 9 Q. What became your understanding for what was causing the 10 delay? 11 A. Really, it was a combination of the reasons above, that 12 problems with specification, the lack of people wishing 13 to help, but rather wishing to criticise. Those were 14 the two principal causes. 15 Q. Thank you. Going back to your statement, in 16 sub-question 3, we asked what steps were taken and when 17 to address these matters. You explain: 18 "When Matthew Crosse was the Project Director he 19 supported our process improvements." 20 Just in summary, Mr Glazebrook, what were the 21 process improvements? 22 A. Yes, the main one was -- the two main ones, rather, were 23 the introduction of the critical issues resolution 24 process and the second one was to draft, discuss, agree 25 and work to a design management programme. 132 1 Q. What were the main features of that design management 2 programme? 3 A. To say who did what, to provide some timescales, to 4 provide some quite detailed content information, in 5 particular on a thing we called either a design 6 assurance statement or a design verification statement, 7 and the purpose of that was to elicit from SDS a package 8 of information that really described why the design was 9 fit for purpose and approvable. 10 Q. Had there been a design management programme in place 11 before your arrival? 12 A. Sorry, had there been? 13 Q. Had a design management programme been in place before 14 your arrival? 15 A. Not to my recollection, no. That's why we made it 16 a number 1 priority. 17 Q. Is that something that tie required to put in place or 18 is that something the designer required to put in place? 19 A. It's something we saw as absolutely necessary to attempt 20 to improve the relationship between tie and SDS and to 21 reduce the risk of design rejection. 22 Q. Thank you. Back to the statement. 23 In subparagraph 4, question 4, we asked: 24 "Were these steps successful (and, if not, why 25 not)?" 133 1 You replied: 2 "Initially, yes. Had assigned management roles been 3 followed they would have remained so. But the tie 4 organisation grew and became confused, thereby negating 5 and reversing many previous improvements to overall 6 performance." 7 During what time period approximately was there an 8 improvement? 9 A. From my recollection, it was from the point where we did 10 the critical issues process and introduced the design 11 management plan until the Infraco came along, not that 12 it was their fault per se, but because the other 13 organisational changes and enlargements at the time 14 brought along many more people, all of whom started 15 meddling. 16 Q. You had mentioned earlier the question of the CEC 17 approach, of we will not tell you exactly what we want, 18 but when you make a proposal, we will tell you what is 19 wrong with it. Had that approach improved during 2007? 20 A. Not really. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I just go back a few minutes 22 and ask about the design management programme. Is that 23 something that you would always expect to be in place in 24 a contract of this -- 25 A. Yes, without something like that, nobody knows exactly 134 1 what to do, to what standard and when it should be 2 produced. 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Whose primary responsibility would it 4 be to have such a system in place? 5 A. The informed client, I think would be my answer. In 6 this case it was tie. 7 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 8 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 9 Then back to your statement, please, Mr Glazebrook. 10 Over the page at page 4, please, in question 6 we had 11 asked questions in relation to the SDS provider. In 12 question 6(1), we had asked for your views in general 13 upon the performance of Parsons Brinckerhoff and their 14 sub-contractor, Halcrow, and you replied: 15 "Aside from intermittent resource issues they were 16 adequate. Because of the constant delays and rework, it 17 was difficult for SDS and Halcrow to maintain unchanging 18 resource." 19 In terms of time period, again, does this apply 20 throughout your involvement in the tram project? 21 A. My remark there relates to earlier stages, in other 22 words of my involvement from 2007, probably through to 23 when Infraco were installed, because what happened, at 24 the point where Infraco came along and we all moved to 25 Edinburgh Park, SDS became implanted in the buildings 135 1 there, and I think the general relationship was better 2 because the lines of communication were slightly less 3 confused. 4 Q. I think it might be the case that in fact there was 5 co-location with SDS staff later on in 2007. Might that 6 be correct? Or is your recollection it was after the 7 Infraco contract was let? 8 A. I can't recall the exact dates. My rough recollection 9 is that they were with us in CityPoint for about a year 10 before they moved out to Edinburgh Park, which would 11 have taken it into 2008, but maybe that's a flawed 12 recollection. 13 Q. Then in sub-question 2, we asked: 14 "What were your views on the extent to which the 15 delay in producing ... design was due to the SDS 16 provider?" 17 You replied: 18 "SDS had to contend with unclear/inadequate 19 specifications, inadequate utility performance and 20 constant interference in the acceptance and approvals 21 process." 22 Can you just explain each of these factors, please. 23 A. Each of them? 24 Q. Yes. 25 A. I've already referred to those things in general. 136 1 I mean, if one were to assemble on a table the pile 2 of pages, detailed pages of specification, that would be 3 quite a substantial pile. What we found was it's 4 impossible for individuals to assimilate all that stuff. 5 It's inevitable, in any engineering design, that 6 sometimes people will design things to some extent based 7 on good practice, or their experience, which may 8 slightly conflict with some subparagraphs somewhere 9 lurking in a specification. The owner of the 10 specification, that's usually the point at which they 11 pop up and say, no, that's not what I wanted at all. 12 But it's also the nature of specifications that it's 13 very hard to make them specific. They're almost always 14 full of equivocation or with some equivocation in them. 15 The utility performance, that really, in my view, in 16 my recollection, delayed everything. It was hard to get 17 information from utilities. Invariably, when the street 18 was dug up, it was different to how it was portrayed on 19 drawings. 20 There were also issues with betterment and 21 restoration of utilities which delayed things. 22 Yes, the constant interference. I mean, that 23 just -- that seemed to progress to a, in my view, level 24 hitherto unknown to me. I have never seen so much 25 interference and it fatally flawed the process of 137 1 getting some sort of fixed design by the point at which 2 Infraco came along. 3 Q. Again, is the reference to the interference after award 4 of the Infraco contract you mentioned, I think, Mr Bell 5 and his team and project managers. 6 A. They were just some of them, yes. I mean, CEC were 7 possibly -- I don't know if I should accuse CEC of 8 interfering. One of the parts of the design management 9 plan, the design management process was that we had 10 round table discussions on things, and that was an 11 attempt to try and focus the resolution of problems in 12 a controlled manner such that the people round the table 13 were the people who could make decisions. 14 But it was hard to get decisions out of CEC, even 15 then there would be perhaps a reversion to the role of 16 criticising or saying, you know: go away and do it again 17 and then we will look at it again; which wasn't helpful. 18 Design does not progress with that sort of way forward. 19 Q. Thank you. Then in question 7 of your statement -- it's 20 on the screen just now -- we simply note in a number of 21 documents, note your concerns in relation to the 22 performance of tie. Then if we can go, please, to the 23 next page, we ask a question and see your reply. Top of 24 the page, sub-question 1, we asked if you raised your 25 concerns. We asked: 138 1 "Did you have any concerns ..." 2 You explain you raised them with Matthew Crosse who 3 was sympathetic: 4 "Subsequent Project Direction and Executive action 5 confused or even countered any improvement and caused 6 further organisational confusion and project delay." 7 Now, I think Matthew Crosse was Project Director 8 until early 2008. So is it that period you're referring 9 to when Mr Crosse was sympathetic? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. When you refer to subsequent Project Direction and 12 Executive action, are you referring to after Mr Crosse 13 had left in early 2008? 14 A. Exactly so. 15 Q. I understand. 16 Then if we could please look at question 8. We go 17 on to the question of CEC and third parties, and in 18 sub-question 1 we had asked for your views in general on 19 input of the Council in design process, and you 20 explained: 21 "CEC had much valuable and transferable experience. 22 However, instead of using that to lead the design 23 through clear and practical specification (ie leaving 24 scope for sensible SDS interpretation), it directed its 25 energies into constant interference and rejection of 139 1 offered design." 2 Are you able to give any examples, either broadly, 3 or particular examples? 4 A. It varied from things like the wall, as I mentioned, at 5 Murrayfield through to the position of litter bins and 6 the clearance for pavements. 7 Edinburgh is an exceptionally difficult city to fit 8 things into because of its historical nature. The 9 geometry of junctions has arisen through history and 10 landownership and so on, so nothing was in our favour. 11 But it was apparent to me that the people in CEC really 12 do know what they were doing, and if only they could 13 have been part of the team which helped us to resolve 14 things, it would have been so much more productive. 15 You know, in defence of CEC, this was their first 16 project ever with the tram. They had no experience of 17 that sort of thing at all. So with the benefit of 18 hindsight, it would have been good if they had either 19 decided themselves or been told to be part of the 20 problem solving process, rather than just the reviewing 21 process. 22 But for reasons which frustrated me constantly, they 23 saw their role to be purely part of the acceptance 24 process. Very few things were accepted. Almost 25 everything was rejected. So it was a very inefficient 140 1 and thoroughly impractical process. 2 Q. We know in other planning areas there is a plethora of 3 guidance available to particular developments, and the 4 designer can then have a look at that guidance and 5 develop a design that complies with it. So presumably, 6 in short, what was required at the outset here was 7 guidance from CEC on the sort of design that was 8 required? 9 A. Yes, exactly. I mean, in any piece of road design, if 10 they had sat down with the designers or even had points 11 during the design development process where they 12 imparted their knowledge and their views, it would have 13 made the whole process so much more effective and 14 streamlined, rather than waiting until much further on 15 and then saying, no, this is all wrong. 16 Q. Now, I think in terms of guidance, the Council did issue 17 a tram design manual around December 2005 or 18 January 2006. I'll give the reference without going to 19 it. CEC00069887. I think when one looks at it, it's 20 a very high level document. Do you remember looking at 21 that at all? 22 A. I recall it. I mean, it's in the nature of high level 23 documents that if they're going to be useful, people 24 have to recognise there has to be flexibility in the 25 result of their application. 141 1 But it seemed to me there was inflexibility in that 2 result. A high level thing by its very nature has to be 3 equivocal. It can't be otherwise. So to then bring in 4 unequivocation is not reasonable. 5 Q. I think in one area more detailed guidance was given 6 later. If we can go, please, to another document, 7 PBH00018590. We can see this is a letter from the Head 8 of Planning and Strategy at City of Edinburgh Council. 9 Top right-hand corner we can see the date, 10 10 April 2008. 11 Just to pause here, we know that the preliminary 12 design was delivered in June 2006 by the designer, and 13 this document is coming almost two years after that. 14 We can see it's directed to Mr Bell at tie, and the 15 heading is "TRAM PUBLIC REALM DESIGN WORKBOOK". We can 16 see the opening paragraph: 17 "I am writing to suggest a way of ensuring that the 18 designs for the tram project fit with the Council's 19 wider aspirations for public realm." 20 Then please scroll down to the bottom paragraph on 21 this page. It provides that: 22 "The public realm consultants have since engaged 23 with the Tram Design Working Group and assisted the 24 Council in its formal responses to the designs being 25 presented by SDS. In tandem with this, specific design 142 1 discussions and consultations have taken place directly 2 with SDS as part of the formal consultation process with 3 the Council on various tram issues. An important aspect 4 of the public realm work has been to define more clearly 5 the Council's guidance on design approaches to 6 surfacing, materials and construction details, thereby 7 developing a clear design philosophy." 8 Just to pause here, presumably this is the sort of 9 thing that would have been helpful at a much earlier 10 stage? 11 A. Yes, and it's also interesting. It's the first time 12 I have seen this document. Its implication is it's 13 a very helpful thing. 14 I think in the very last paragraph on that page, 15 where it says about approaches to surfacing, materials 16 and construction details, what we found was that that 17 would have been insufficient to complete an unequivocal 18 guidance to designers as to how to get things to be 19 approvable at the first go. 20 In other words, there's more to planning acceptance 21 than just those things there. But it's a very good 22 practical letter. It's a shame that it wasn't brought 23 to my attention. It's a shame I knew nothing of it, we 24 knew nothing of it. It's a shame it didn't come to more 25 because it would have been a very helpful imperative, 143 1 and as you say, it should have been really right at the 2 outset, not in 2008, which is way too late. 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: What other issues would you expect 4 guidance to cover? 5 A. Okay. I mean, two examples I can give you. One is the 6 tram electrification poles. When they were first 7 presented, they were just in effect rods sticking out of 8 the earth, and then not accepted by the planners, and it 9 ended up with the spike on the top that we see now. 10 That's one classic sort of thing I'm fairly sure would 11 not have appeared in there. The sort of thing that was 12 specified might be that they would be painted or 13 galvanised, that they would be subject to maximum and 14 minimum-sized dimensions and height, but things like the 15 spike on the top were not specified and were part of the 16 subjective nature of the planning approval, as was 17 the -- whether to have saltires on the wall at 18 Murrayfield, issues like that. 19 It's very hard to specify things which are made 20 subjective, which perhaps begs the question as to why so 21 many things are subjective and why can't they be 22 accepted as presented if they are fair and reasonable. 23 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 24 Just to complete this document, if we could go over 25 the page, please. In the third last paragraph, about 144 1 halfway down, we see the letter states: 2 "I therefore enclose the Tram Public Realm Design 3 Workbook ..." 4 I think it's explained elsewhere in the letter it is 5 a working draft: 6 "The Design Workbook is divided into sections along 7 the tram routes from Haymarket to Constitution Street 8 and Leith Docks." 9 In short, there's a separate chapter in each part of 10 this document dealing with Haymarket, West Maitland 11 Street, Coates to Atholl Crescent et cetera. So each 12 part of the on-street works are dealt with separately. 13 Then the paragraph carries on: 14 "The Council require that the information provided 15 in the document should be considered as supporting 16 detail to the supplementary guidance already in place, 17 ie the Tram Design Manual and the Edinburgh Standards 18 for Streets." 19 You have also mentioned, Mr Glazebrook, that even 20 a document such as this can't perhaps provide the amount 21 of detail that is required, but presumably if one sets 22 out principles to some degree of detail, any missing 23 detail can be covered by discussions between the Council 24 and the designer? Does that seem correct? 25 A. It's a very good initiative. It's an extremely good 145 1 one, as I said, looking at the date, it seems to be 2 several years too late. As to why I know nothing of it, 3 I can only assume there was so much other flak going 4 around that this perhaps was buried in the flak. 5 Q. So is it your position you don't remember actually 6 seeing this Tram Public Realm Design Workbook? 7 A. I don't recall it. 8 Q. I think just to add something else to that picture, 9 there was some resistance at fairly senior levels in tie 10 to receiving this document so close to the integral 11 award of the contract. That may not be something that 12 you were aware of. 13 A. Even if it had been close to the Infraco award, that 14 would have been a shame to have withheld it because it 15 appears to me to be a very practical way forward. Okay, 16 too late, but even if things are a bit late, they can 17 still be useful. Because the design was so far from 18 completion at the point of Infraco let, that this would 19 have been very beneficial in my view. 20 Q. Do you know whether the designs produced by 21 Parsons Brinckerhoff from this time on did have regard 22 to the -- this design workbook? 23 A. I'm afraid I don't know the answer to that. 24 Q. Going back to your statement, please, page 5. At 25 question 8, sub-question 2, we had asked for your views 146 1 on the extent to which the delay in producing, 2 et cetera, design was due to the Council, and in your 3 view it was a very significant factor. 4 Just to pause here and try and put what I think the 5 Council's position is, I think Council witnesses either 6 have said or may say that the Council devoted 7 a considerable amount of time and resources to 8 discussing with SDS what was required, but that was not 9 reflected in design submissions. Do you have any views 10 on that suggestion? 11 A. I don't believe it. 12 Q. So you wouldn't agree with that? 13 A. No. 14 Q. It may also be said on behalf of the Council that the 15 Council had a duty to ensure that design was of 16 a sufficiently high standard and quality, and that their 17 efforts have been reflected by the design quality of the 18 tram system that has been built. Do you have any 19 comments on that suggestion? 20 A. I guess it's self-evident that the thing as built, the 21 system as built, is excellent and complies as far as is 22 reasonably practicable with every possible specification 23 element, safety element, risk element and so on. 24 Because I left in 2011, when only some construction had 25 been done, possibly the performance of CEC afterwards 147 1 became more direct and more proactive and improved that. 2 But I can't really comment on what happened after 3 I left. 4 But up to the point I left, it was certainly still 5 in my recollection exceptionally difficult to get input 6 from CEC at the right point to avoid rework and wastage 7 of time and resource. 8 Q. It may also be said on behalf of the Council that if 9 they were to specify in detail in advance exactly what 10 they required, they would then be fettering their 11 discretion when they came to formally consider an 12 application for an approval or consent? 13 A. I think that's unlikely. I think it would have been on 14 the balance of probabilities way more helpful to have 15 helped rather than to remain unfettered. 16 Q. We've discussed how in an ideal world, the Council could 17 have provided guidance and relatively detailed guidance 18 for the designers. During 2007 do you think the Council 19 knew what they wanted? 20 A. Hard question to answer. Possibly on the basis that 21 this was the first tram installation in Scotland in 22 modern times, it's the case that sometimes you don't 23 actually realise what you want until you see some of the 24 steps leading towards it. 25 I think it's for that principal reason that had 148 1 I been CEC, I would have said to myself: words are 2 insufficient. What we want is people round tables, so 3 we can together find out what the issues are, what the 4 conflicts are, and resolve those into an acceptable 5 design. 6 Q. In terms of this being the first tram, presumably it 7 should be easier for CEC, if the extension is to be 8 built, because they have a tram they can go and look at 9 and they have a design showing how the tram system 10 integrates with the city landscape; is that correct? 11 A. It would be wise for any subsequent extension in 12 Edinburgh if the parties involved recognised the 13 difficulties, the extreme difficulties in programme and 14 cost in getting the present part built, and adopted 15 a different, more collaborative approach to delivering 16 the extension. I think in my view it would be extremely 17 unwise not to do so. 18 Q. Thank you. 19 Then back to your statement, please, to page 8. 20 I should say, to put this in context, previous pages had 21 dealt with various documents relating to resolving the 22 critical issues which had arisen, and on page 8, in the 23 sub-question 2, we had asked: 24 "What was your understanding when you joined tie of 25 the main reasons for the delay in progressing Detailed 149 1 Design?" 2 You referred to: 3 "Distrust and confusion between SDS, tie and CEC." 4 What was the distrust and how had it arisen? 5 A. Well, the distrust was palpable. There were words said 6 about each parties, both ways, that were not the sort of 7 things you would expect to hear, and they really were 8 symptoms of the disease, the disease being the failure 9 to engage effectively with each other, and instead to 10 point fingers and in the case of -- this is my personal 11 view -- in the case of senior management, to, rather 12 than perhaps dive down to the coalface, to try and 13 project themselves even higher in the sky, even further 14 from reality and truth, to say: you need to change 15 something; without the slightest understanding of what 16 the causes were, which is a flawed process. 17 Q. Who do you mean by "senior management"? 18 A. I would say everyone above me. 19 Q. Sorry? 20 A. Everyone above me. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: That was the position from the point 22 of view of tie, but I got the impression that you were 23 speaking about this being a reciprocal issue between 24 tie, CEC and SDS. 25 A. Yes. SDS were deeply frustrated. I think that's the 150 1 one word I would choose to use. Deeply frustrated. 2 They found it hard to understand why everything was so 3 difficult and why everyone wanted to put obstacles in 4 their way, rather than guide them into a successful 5 resolution of anything at all. 6 In the case of CEC, I felt that their main 7 contribution was really purely in finger pointing. Why 8 is it so late? Why is everything so difficult? Rather 9 than, as I suggested, sitting down, as we did, my team 10 did, that was our role, to sit down with the designers 11 and probe what the issues were and progressively to 12 solve those. 13 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: tie was a wholly owned company of 14 CEC. Do you say that this attitude from CEC applied to 15 them as well? 16 A. It was everywhere, yes, it was ridiculous. 17 MR MACKENZIE: Back to page 8, please, Mr Glazebrook. We're 18 still dealing with the question of resolving the 19 critical issues, and we see in the sub-question 4, we 20 see what you say there. 21 Come back, please, to sub-question 5 and then 6. So 22 resolution of the critical issues was successful, and 23 you go on in sub-question 6 to say: 24 "The majority of issues were resolved fairly quickly 25 and ways forward determined once the improved process 151 1 was introduced. However, the nature of the 2 tie/TSS/CEC/TEL organisational and role confusion meant 3 that people felt able to reopen otherwise closed issues 4 repeatedly for their own reasons." 5 In terms of the reopening of issues and the time 6 period, is this in relation to later in 2007, 2008 or 7 what? 8 A. It was -- it seemed to come to the fore after Infraco 9 had been appointed. 10 Q. Thank you. 11 I would like to move on in your statement, please, 12 to page 9. In sub questions 1 and 2 you say: 13 "CEC believed that tie should be doing all review, 14 yet they repeatedly stepped in with rejections of 15 usually incomplete design detail. As if it wasn't 16 complex enough with tie's own apparent practice of 17 "anyone can comment", the various organisational 18 elements within CEC were uncoordinated and produced 19 a rising tide of rejective comments." 20 Is there anything you want to add to that or is that 21 fairly self-explanatory? 22 A. Nothing to add. 23 Q. Then sub-question 2. We'd asked to what extent the 24 Council had been involved in the changes made to the 25 process for the production and review of design, and you 152 1 replied: 2 "Fully involved, but there seemed to be an agenda 3 against 'we'll tell them clearly what we want' possibly 4 because they believed that their powers had to remain 5 unfettered, hence they could not be seen to 'lead' any 6 design work. They seemed to believe that tie had been 7 set up specifically to stop all problems arising." 8 Again, if we can scroll further down this page in 9 your statement, please, on to question 11 at the bottom 10 of the page, sub-question 2. This is events in roughly 11 April 2007, and in answer to sub-question 2 you say: 12 "Repeated discussions with SDS revealed the 13 ineffectiveness of the tie/CEC/TEL/TSS approach, but by 14 the time David Crawley and I were engaged, the die was 15 firmly cast of behaviours, expectations and results. 16 These were very hard to challenge because everyone 17 seemed to believe that they had a right - duty even - 18 to comment on everything, thereby contributing to the 19 environment of confusion." 20 Now, when you say everyone seemed to believe that 21 they had a right or a duty to comment on everything, do 22 you mean within tie or do you mean all of the interested 23 parties? 24 A. Everywhere. I think some people misunderstand the 25 meaning of the phrase or words "constructive challenge". 153 1 If an organisation gives to another organisation the 2 responsibility to do something, then you would think 3 that that person that had been given the responsibility 4 would equally be given the freedom to lead, direct and 5 approve that process, but that was not the case. 6 Q. What you've been describing so far, Mr Glazebrook, 7 sounds like a very dysfunctional process? 8 A. Exactly so. 9 Q. Is that a fair way to describe it? 10 A. Yes, exasperatingly so. 11 Q. Did that ever improve while you were with tie? 12 A. No, it got worse. 13 Q. For the reasons you have mentioned earlier? 14 A. Mm-hm. 15 Q. Could you then please go back to your statement at 16 page 10. Question 13, I think in April 2007 you took 17 over the role of SDS Project Manager from 18 Ailsa McGregor; is that correct? 19 A. Mm-hm, yes. 20 Q. It might be helpful just to pause now to look at an 21 aspect of the SDS contract. If we could bring up, 22 please, CEC00839054. 23 So this is the 2005 contract between tie and 24 Parsons Brinckerhoff. We can go to, please, page 39. 25 At the very bottom of the page, under clause 10, 154 1 management of the services, states: 2 "The Client's Representative shall ..." 3 Over the page at the top: 4 " be responsible for the day-to-day supervision 5 of the Services to be performed by the SDS Provider." 6 To pause there, was it the case, Mr Glazebrook, that 7 tie's SDS Project Manager was also tie's client 8 representative under this contract? 9 A. Probably. I don't recall that particular detail. At 10 the point where I took over, there was no briefing or 11 anything like that as to what I was to do. I don't 12 actually recall seeing this document. I may well have 13 done but it's a detail thing. I don't recall that. 14 I think the reason possibly why I do not recall it, 15 and it wasn't briefed, and I might not have followed it 16 to the letter, was that in my long experience, when you 17 have a situation which is almost completely chaotic, 18 when the objective is to resolve design, that is where 19 you direct your energies. 20 If that meant that I was deficient in following the 21 strict duties of the SDS Project Manager, then I would 22 still assert that my approach was the correct one to 23 take in the circumstances at the time, because all these 24 sort of documents are drawn up on the basis that you 25 have a free flowing, steady flowing orderly project 155 1 which was not the case. 2 Q. So do you know who was the tie's client representative 3 in terms of this contract in June 2007, for example? 4 A. No, because you would imagine that a client's 5 representative would know exactly what their powers 6 were, and I don't recall that being the case. It may be 7 that somebody emailed me this document. I don't recall 8 it specifically, but, as I say, my experience indicated 9 to me that what I should be directing my energies into 10 was the resolution of the principal problem, which was 11 the progression of design. 12 Q. Regardless of the terminology being used, whether it's 13 client's representative or SDS Contract Manager, as 14 a matter of fact was anyone in tie in 2007 supervising 15 on a day-to-day basis the services performed by SDS? 16 A. My role as the Director was to try and resolve the 17 problems and to maintain progress. Indeed, to improve 18 progress. 19 So in that context I was in daily contact, frequent 20 contact each day, with SDS to see what the blockages 21 were and find ways of resolving them. 22 Q. I understand. 23 If we can go back to your statement, please, to 24 page 13, and question 19, halfway down the page, we see 25 reference to an email from Trudi Craggs in June 2007. 156 1 Then we asked for your views on these matters, and you 2 explained that: 3 "From the time of my involvement in this major 4 project, it was self-evident that the processes employed 5 were ill thought out and were failing. In addition, the 6 determination and allocation of organisational roles and 7 responsibilities either was flawed or was not applied 8 and followed. The mutual distrust led to mutual blame 9 and little evidence of a concerted approach to working 10 together as a team to resolve the problems. As the 11 problems mounted and became more numerous, time and the 12 will to do anything other than firefighting disappeared. 13 The overall imperative was proceed to timescales, 14 sometimes seemingly regardless of common sense. No one 15 had the courage to stop, examine, discuss, resolve, 16 agree a better way forward!" 17 Now, is this a view you held at the time, round 18 about June 2007? 19 A. It probably took me about six weeks to realise the 20 appalling situation the project was in, and to start 21 asking myself the question that any reasonable person 22 would ask that has been involved with real projects at 23 the front line, which is: why don't we stop and move 24 forward better? Why do we proceed and make things 25 worse? To this day I don't understand the answer to 157 1 that question. 2 Q. Did you discuss that option of stopping or pausing with 3 anyone else in tie at the time? 4 A. Matthew. 5 Q. Mr Crosse? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. When was that, approximately? 8 A. Probably from the point where I realised the enormity of 9 the problem, which would have been probably six to eight 10 weeks from my starting. I was located physically close 11 to him in the office, just by chance. So it was easy to 12 get his attention and to say: Matthew, this is the sort 13 of thing that suggests we should be doing something 14 different; and he was always very receptive to useful 15 discussions backed up by evidence and fact. 16 Q. What was Mr Crosse's response to the suggestion that 17 things should stop or pause? 18 A. Well, I don't exactly recall, but I know that his sort 19 of body language and general demeanour suggested that he 20 thought the same, but that perhaps organisationally or 21 through his responsibilities was prevented or felt 22 prevented from doing so. Because clearly had he been 23 able to do so, he would have done. 24 Q. In short, do you know why there wasn't a pause to allow 25 design to catch up? 158 1 A. I think when so many -- this is my personal view, based 2 on many years' project experience. When a sufficiently 3 large number of senior people are determined on a course 4 of action and ill-informed through lack of contact with 5 people that actually know, they will inevitably make the 6 wrong decision. 7 Q. You also say in this answer that: 8 "The overall imperative was to proceed to 9 timescales sometimes seemingly regardless of common 10 sense." 11 Where did that imperative come from? 12 A. Well, not from me. From other parts of the tie 13 organisation, I guess, and maybe CEC. It's hard for me 14 to answer that question because there were so many 15 people wanting the thing to be done to a particular 16 timescale. The press, the politicians. It seemed that 17 everyone wanted progress regardless of what that 18 progress meant in practical terms. I think it's very 19 hard when people don't take the trouble to find out what 20 feet are doing under the surface to assume from the 21 sereneness above the surface that nothing is happening, 22 whereas in fact a lot is happening. 23 Q. In that regard, when you say that people don't take the 24 trouble to find out what is under the surface, is that 25 again a reference to, you would say, anyone above you in 159 1 tie? 2 A. Yes, more or less. I mean, whenever I was -- if ever 3 I was invited to a meeting at a higher level, which was 4 extremely rare, which taking a much earlier point you 5 made, I found quite surprising, that as the person 6 charged with making the process work, and indeed project 7 managing SDS, I would have thought that I would have 8 been involved in many significant decisions, the like of 9 which might have been: is it wise to take this course of 10 action or that? But I never was. 11 Q. Finally, this point. You say no one had the courage to 12 stop, et cetera. 13 A. Mm-hm. 14 Q. Why would that have required courage? 15 A. Well, I guess the results speak for themselves. If you 16 end up with a project which has only delivered 17 approximately half the infrastructure for 50 per cent 18 more cost, the nature of hindsight, I concede, is to say 19 we should have done this rather than that. 20 But these are all experienced people. These are all 21 senior people, and the role of senior people sometimes 22 is to take the courageous decisions that others are not 23 empowered to take. 24 Q. Thank you. Moving on to another matter. I would like 25 to ask, in June 2007, Audit Scotland conducted an audit 160 1 or review of the tram project? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Did you have any input into briefing Audit Scotland? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Do you know what, if anything, Audit Scotland were told 6 about the design difficulties and delay? 7 A. I have no idea. 8 Q. If you had been asked by Audit Scotland in June 2007 9 about any design difficulties and delay, what would you 10 have told them? 11 A. I would have told them the situation as I understood it 12 to be at the time. Unembellished. 13 Q. Along the lines that you have explained to us today? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. If in June 2007 Audit Scotland had asked you whether the 16 design was likely to be produced in accordance with the 17 design programme, what would you have said? 18 A. It would be impossible. 19 Q. Again, for the sorts of reasons you discussed with us? 20 A. Mm-hm. 21 Q. Thank you. Going back to your statement, please, to 22 page 14 -- 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You said you had no input into 24 briefing Audit Scotland. I have inferred from the 25 subsequent answers that you were never interviewed by -- 161 1 A. I don't recall any involvement with them at all. We all 2 knew they were around and I think we were all concerned 3 that it might produce a further turbulence in the 4 progress of the project, but I have no recollection 5 whatsoever of anyone coming to me and saying: right, 6 Tony, what's going on? 7 MR MACKENZIE: Then in your statement at page 14, can we 8 please look at answer 1. We had asked about why it 9 hadn't been possible to produce 18 batches of 10 self-assured design and it was decided instead to 11 produce 63 batches. You explained: 12 "The sheer volume of detail in a tram project! To 13 produce a completely self-standing package of assured 14 design based on 1/18th of the entire project, let alone 15 the activity needed to review and accept it, proved to 16 be unrealistic. In addition, it was unrealistic to 17 expect a project to deliver even a single element of 18 unequivocal design in an environment of organisational 19 and specification unclarity, together with inadequate 20 processes." 21 Then in sub-question 3, please, at the bottom, we -- 22 an email we looked at this morning, by Mr Conway of the 23 Council. But more importantly, over the page, please, 24 page 15 at the top, this perhaps reflects the answer you 25 have just given me in relation to Audit Scotland. We'd 162 1 asked here: 2 "In general, how confident were you around that 3 time..." 4 This is July 2007: 5 "... that design would be produced in accordance 6 with the design programme, and would be of the required 7 quality?" 8 You explained: 9 "The working and organisational environment at the 10 time rendered it impossible." 11 Just for completeness, is that a view you held at 12 the time? 13 A. Absolutely. 14 Q. Did there ever come a time throughout your involvement 15 in the tram project when you considered that design 16 would be delivered to programme? 17 A. No. 18 Q. For the various reasons you've discussed? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Thank you. 21 A separate point, please. Page 15 of your 22 statement, question phase 1b designs. Page 15, and in 23 question 23, in sub-question 1 we asked: 24 "Was design work [this is July 2007] still being 25 carried out on Section 3 (ie phase 1a) and, if so why?" 163 1 You said: 2 "No one had given a clear directive otherwise." 3 Who within tie would that directive have required to 4 have come from? 5 A. Probably the Project Director, but the reason why work 6 was still being carried on was that there was -- in some 7 respects that part of the route, namely along an old 8 British railways route, was less affected by the myriad 9 of complexities around streets, street design and so on. 10 So not surprisingly, the designers drew the conclusion, 11 with my agreement, that if you have a situation where 12 you want to employ people gainfully, and the project 13 says you can do so, it's better to do the things which 14 are easy than to waste time on the things which are 15 unresolvable. 16 Q. Thank you. 17 Now, if all of the resources and every 18 organisation -- so that's including SDS, tie, TSS, the 19 Council and the utility companies -- if all of these 20 resources had been concentrated on the design of 21 phase 1a only, is the design for phase 1a likely to have 22 been completed earlier? 23 A. Possibly, but it would have needed a change in attitude 24 and organisational roles and responsibilities for that 25 to have happened. 164 1 Q. Again, we're back to the problems and difficulties you 2 have referred to earlier in your evidence. Thank you. 3 Again, going back to your statement, page 15, 4 please. Question 24. We had referred in the question 5 to minutes of the DPD Sub-Committee on 2 August 2007, 6 where Mr Crawley had explained the concept of "just in 7 time" delivery and the fact "there is no margin for 8 error". 9 Can we go then to page 16. In sub-question 2, the 10 question was: 11 "What was your view at that time as to whether 12 version 17 of the design programme was realistic and 13 achievable?" 14 You say: 15 "It was highly risky." 16 The next answer, please, to sub-question 3. We 17 asked: 18 "What was your view at the time as to whether it was 19 reasonable to base the design (and procurement) 20 programme on design being produced "just in time" with 21 "no margin for error"?" 22 You answered: 23 "It was exceptionally risky. At that point - indeed 24 at others before - the ship should have been hove to in 25 order to get resources and processes in order and for 165 1 a practical course to be charted. But senior management 2 seemed intent on maintaining course regardless, probably 3 because they absented themselves from the real action 4 and appeared to manage by meeting and email." 5 Why do you say, Mr Glazebrook, that this approach 6 was exceptionally risky? 7 A. Well, it was like the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster 8 at Felixstowe. If a ship sets off with its bow doors 9 open but the captain has no idea, it will fill with 10 water and capsize, which is exactly what happened. It's 11 the same sort of thing. 12 If you keep ploughing on, regardless of the reality 13 staring you in the face, you will manage yourself into 14 a foolish result. 15 Q. Now, you say if the captain has no idea, I suppose 16 a question to be asked here is whether the senior 17 management at tie and others at a senior level involved 18 in the project were aware of the difficulties that 19 you've discussed with us? 20 A. In the four years I worked for tie, I had 20 minutes' 21 discussion with Richard Jeffrey and that was the 22 totality of my involvement with the top people. That 23 was the only time I was asked and it was cut short 24 because of other greater priorities which, as I recall, 25 were dealing with the press, rather than finding out the 166 1 facts. 2 Q. Mr Jeffrey, I think, was appointed the Chief Executive 3 of tie, was it 2009? 2009, I think. I can't entirely 4 remember. But certainly 2007 he wasn't there? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And he wasn't there in 2008. 7 So did you have any discussions in 2007 or 2008 with 8 any senior tie individuals other than Matthew Crosse? 9 A. No. I was never asked. 10 Q. Presumably the route for you to get your concerns known 11 to those higher up was through Mr Crosse? 12 A. That's how it appeared to me. 13 Q. And was Mr Crosse aware of your concerns? 14 A. Yes, I think he shared the same concerns. It's hard to 15 recall in detail, but I found Matthew to be a practical, 16 reasonable person. But I did get the impression that 17 his hands were tied and that the imperative to meet 18 dates superseded or supplanted or certainly was a higher 19 priority for various reasons than finding a way to plot 20 a course that might have taken longer, but in the event 21 less long than it actually took in the reality of the 22 situation. 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Mackenzie, will you find 24 a convenient -- 25 MR MACKENZIE: Yes, my Lord. 167 1 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Is this convenient? 2 MR MACKENZIE: Yes. 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We are going to break for just over 4 15 minutes to give the shorthand writers a break. We 5 will resume again at 3.35. 6 (3.16 pm) 7 (A short break) 8 (3.35 pm) 9 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You're still under oath, 10 Mr Glazebrook. 11 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. 12 Mr Glazebrook, could I clarify one matter you spoke 13 of before the break. 14 I'd asked you about who Mr Crosse reported to during 15 2007. I think you said your understanding was he had 16 reported to Steven Bell, and I had queried that because 17 I said, well, Mr Crosse was the Tram Project Director, 18 was it really the case that he reported to Mr Bell, who 19 was the Director of Engineering and Procurement? 20 I think you said that was your understanding in 2007; is 21 that correct? 22 A. I reported to Matthew. I assume that Matthew reported 23 to Steven. That seemed to be how the way things worked, 24 but maybe I was wrong. I don't recall an organisational 25 structure that clarified that. 168 1 Q. If the Inquiry were to hear evidence from Mr Crosse that 2 he in fact reported to Mr Gallagher, I take it you would 3 accept that? 4 A. Sure, yes. 5 Q. Now, returning, please, to your statement, if I may, to 6 page 17, in question 27 concerns an email in August 2007 7 in relation to value engineering. We had asked for your 8 views on these matters, and in sub-question 1 you 9 replied: 10 "To have decided to do value engineering in an 11 already chaotic project was ill advised. It diverted 12 attention from matters of real importance and should 13 have been priority 10, not priority 1. It demonstrates 14 a detachment from reality." 15 Now, those are quite strong words, Mr Glazebrook. 16 A detachment from reality on the part of who? 17 A. Well, as I have said before, many people that -- I don't 18 know how to express it best -- maybe absented themselves 19 from front line realities. Whoever it was decided to 20 proceed with VE, it was, as I have said here, the words 21 are exactly as I feel they are now. It was an 22 ill-advised decision. We should have directed our 23 attention to solving problems, not creating new ones. 24 Q. Thank you. Again, a point of clarification. Please, at 25 page 20 of your statement, on a different matter. 169 1 Page 20. In paragraph 32, where you refer to tie's 2 Design Management Plan. Now, we asked various questions 3 about it, and you replied: 4 "It was an all too rare example of a properly 5 thought-through process, which other parts of tie could 6 have used as an exemplar, but didn't." 7 For the avoidance of doubt, which other parts of tie 8 are you referring to? 9 A. All the other parts of tie. I mean, the beauty of not 10 having a process is that nobody can tell you're not 11 following it. 12 Q. Again, please, at page 21 of your statement, in 13 paragraph 35, we see a reference to Damian Sharp joining 14 tie in October 2007. I think Mr Sharp became the SDS 15 Project Manager, so he relieved you of that role. But 16 you say: 17 "I don't know why he was engaged." 18 Were you or Mr Crawley ever consulted about the 19 appointment of Mr Sharp? 20 A. Well, I wasn't. I don't know if David was. 21 Q. Did you consider there was a need for such a post? 22 A. It actually helped me in some ways because I'd become 23 aware by then there were elements of the project 24 management role which really were -- perhaps I could 25 say -- misuse of my skill and experience. Damian had 170 1 a more commercial approach or more commercial experience 2 which was one thing that was needed, and it enabled me 3 to concentrate on the engineering elements of the 4 project. 5 Q. Now, we may hear from Mr Sharp that he reported to 6 Steven Bell. Is that correct? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. Did he report to you or Mr Crawley? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Because on the face of it, it may seem odd, if Mr Sharp 11 is being employed as SDS Project Manager, and he's not 12 reporting to the Heads of the Engineering, Assurance and 13 Design team. Do you have any comment on that? 14 A. It's perhaps another example of organisational 15 confusion. 16 Q. Did that cause any difficulties as far as you were 17 aware? 18 A. As I have said here, it created another interface, but 19 my recollection was that Damian did that part of the 20 project thoroughly. 21 Q. And what do you mean by "another interface" to be 22 managed? 23 A. Because just occasionally -- it's hard to recall the 24 detail, but SDS might have said something like: Tony, 25 you're telling me to do this, but Damian is telling me 171 1 we've got to do that. That was not through malice or 2 anything like that; it was perhaps just a lack of 3 co-ordination. 4 Q. Thank you. Back to your statement, please, to page 23. 5 In question 40 it refers to an email on 21 November 2007 6 from Carla Jones of Parsons Brinckerhoff, attaching 7 a weekly deliverables tracker which noted that (out of 8 a total of 344 design deliverables), 283 had been planned 9 for delivery by that date and 227 had been delivered. 10 So I think it would be fair to say that shows that 11 there was some progress being made with design, but 12 still some slippage? 13 A. Yes, that's a fair remark. 14 Q. And simply a snapshot in time, I think, 227 deliverables 15 that had been delivered out of a total of 344 is about 16 two-thirds of the detailed design. Does that generally 17 accord with your recollection from that time? 18 A. I don't recall that detail. I mean, a lot of the design 19 deliverables that had been delivered were around utility 20 design. But there were many others, for instance, the 21 easier parts of the track design, the easier parts of 22 the structures design, which enabled work to progress by 23 Infraco quite early on. Specifically areas like the 24 busway, the guided busway, the track out in the 25 countryside towards the airport, Ingliston Park and 172 1 Ride, and major structures like the bridge at 2 Edinburgh Park, the big bridge over the Network Rail 3 route. 4 Q. Okay. Then over the page we asked certain questions. 5 Page 24, please. 6 In sub-question 1 we asked if you had any general 7 comments on the documents, and you stated: 8 "In a welter of detail the essential underlying 9 causes of problems often lie buried out of sight. The 10 majority of the tie/CEC organisations seemed always to 11 be pre-occupied with monitoring numbers rather than what 12 actually was happening and proactively and 13 collaboratively tackling the causes of why some of it 14 wasn't happening." 15 So is that really, Mr Glazebrook, a note of caution 16 to say that: despite the numbers of design deliverables 17 I have referred to, there may be underlying causes 18 buried out of sight? 19 A. Yes. Throughout the project there seemed to be this 20 preoccupation with numbers and dates and things. 21 I mean, one could equally argue in project management 22 that if you progressively and proactively solve issues, 23 the programme will inherently be correct. If you merely 24 follow numbers, without finding what the underlying 25 issues are and resolving them, it will almost inevitably 173 1 drift, which is exactly what happened. 2 Q. Then in sub-question 2, we asked what your views were in 3 late 2007 on whether the design programme would be met. 4 And you replied: 5 "It was unlikely to happen without significant 6 project cultural change and organisational clarity. The 7 Titanic 'deckchair' metaphor springs to mind." 8 Just for the avoidance of doubt, could you explain 9 that metaphor, please, in terms of how it applied to 10 this project at this point in time? 11 A. The ship sinking. Rather than investigate the causes or 12 get everyone into lifebelts, we fiddle around with the 13 deck chairs on deck. 14 Q. Then, please, on a separate question of the procurement 15 of the Infraco contract, I think at pages 11 and 12 of 16 your statement, you said you were not involved in the 17 Infraco evaluation or procurement. Is that correct? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Why weren't you involved in that? 20 A. I don't know. 21 Q. Did you consider you ought to have been involved in 22 that? 23 A. Part of me thought yes, because just as in any major 24 project, if you like, early contractor involvement 25 between client and contractor is a good thing. That 174 1 would have been a good thing. But the other part of me 2 said that on the basis of all the problems that we have, 3 it seemed to me that what was going to happen would be 4 a huge commercial battle, a battle to assign pounds to 5 perceived risks, and it would further divert my energies 6 and expertise away from engineering problem solving. 7 So on balance, I'm glad I wasn't involved. 8 Q. Putting the tram project to one side, and looking at 9 what might be usual practice in industry, would it have 10 been usual practice for someone in your role as Director 11 of Engineering to have had some involvement in the 12 infrastructure procurement process? 13 A. It would be very unwise not to do so. 14 Q. Why? 15 A. Because if it's an engineering infrastructure project, 16 then to exclude the person who knows about engineering 17 infrastructure is folly. 18 Q. Yet that seems to have happened in the case of this 19 project; is that correct? 20 A. Mm-hm. Yes. 21 Q. Are you able to explain why that happened in this 22 project? 23 A. I don't know. It's possible that people above me 24 believed that they had sufficient knowledge of the 25 issues that they needed no support. But again, I think 175 1 the results speak for themselves. 2 Q. Did you ever say to Mr Crosse: it was folly not to 3 involve you and Mr Crawley in the Infraco procurement. 4 A. No, I don't recall saying such a thing, because it was 5 presented as a fait accompli. 6 Q. Presented by whom? 7 A. Well, I just found out that that's what the result would 8 be, that we wouldn't be involved. 9 Q. How did you find out? 10 A. It's hard to recall. Probably just by observing that 11 Infraco were coming in and out of the building and we 12 weren't involved at all, and when asked the question: 13 isn't that strange; the answer was: we don't need you. 14 Q. In terms of the employer's requirements and the Infraco 15 civil proposals, are these the sorts of documents or 16 issues that engineering input is needed on? 17 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? 18 Q. Sorry, it was a bad question. 19 Is engineering input required on the employer's 20 requirements and in considering the civils proposals? 21 A. I'm sorry, I still don't quite understand what you're 22 getting at. 23 Q. Part of the Infraco procurement process must involve 24 considering the employer's requirements; is that 25 correct? 176 1 A. Yes, certainly. 2 Q. And also considering the civils proposals by the 3 bidders; is that correct? 4 A. Absolutely, yes. 5 Q. Does one require engineering expertise and experience to 6 consider the employer's requirements and the civil 7 proposals? 8 A. Any one tendering for such a contract would need to have 9 that knowledge and experience to do it robustly, yes. 10 Q. But you've explained that yourself and Mr Crawley were 11 not involved in these matters? 12 A. Yes. I don't know why that was, and it was a foolish 13 thing to do perhaps. 14 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I think the question was maybe viewed 15 from the other side. You say anyone tendering for the 16 contract would have to have engineering experience, but 17 I think the question was really directed to the people 18 evaluating the tender. 19 A. Well, exactly. A project such as this, which is 20 nine-tenths engineering, I would have thought there 21 would have been an element of evaluation from the 22 engineering team, but there was none whatsoever. 23 Absolutely zero. 24 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 25 MR MACKENZIE: I just wonder, Mr Glazebrook, to what extent 177 1 were you not asked to be involved and to what extent did 2 you try on purpose not to be involved? 3 A. Oh, crumbs. I certainly didn't try on purpose not to be 4 involved, no way. But why we weren't, I have no idea. 5 Q. Thank you. Then page 24 of your statement, please. In 6 question 41, I'll give you a minute just to read what's 7 set out there, but in short it's to do with 8 a misalignment. 9 In question 1 at the bottom of the page, we say: 10 "We understand that concerns in relation to the 11 Employer's Requirements were expressed on a number of 12 occasions in 2007 ..." 13 Then we ask on the next page, 25: 14 "When did you first appreciate that there was 15 a misalignment between the SDS Design, the Employer's 16 Requirements and BBS's offer?" 17 You replied: 18 "This had been the case from the outset, but was 19 ignored for reasons unknown to me." 20 Are you able to explain how that misalignment came 21 about? 22 A. No, it's possible that from the outset, SDS were told 23 that the employer's requirements would be any or all of 24 simplified rationalised conflicts removed, and I do 25 recall that at various points, SDS suggested that they 178 1 would be prepared to help in that process. 2 That may sound a bit unusual, but because the 3 employer's requirements had been written for a project 4 of which -- it had not happened in Edinburgh, it was 5 almost inevitable that some of the employer's 6 requirements either would be unnecessary or conflicting. 7 So it was always apparent they needed to be brought 8 into a set of coherent requirements. 9 But that never happened. I recall they were very 10 large. It was a huge document, and there's probably 11 some sort of mathematical relationship between the 12 number of pages of document and the likelihood of it 13 being equivocal, rather than unequivocal. 14 But unfortunately never were they -- was that 15 exercise done to improve and finalise the employer's 16 requirements. I don't know why that was. 17 Q. What sort of problems can arise if there's 18 a misalignment between the SDS design, the employer's 19 requirements and the civils proposals in an offer? 20 A. Gaps and conflicts. 21 Q. And what are gaps and conflicts -- 22 A. Gaps where something has assumed to be specified but 23 isn't, and that only becomes apparent when the design is 24 rejected for reasons which are not specified. 25 Conflicts, because, again, in a huge welter of 179 1 specification detail, it will naturally arise that some 2 things are in conflict with others. 3 An example might be clearances in the street. It 4 might be impossible to achieve certain clearances and 5 some leeway is necessary. One specification might say 6 this. Another one might say that. 7 So one might say that wires at a voltage higher than 8 earth shouldn't be closer than X from a building. 9 Another one might actually countermand that by saying 10 they had to be further from some other obstacle or 11 thing, which means you just cannot place the wire, for 12 instance. 13 Q. What problems might any such gaps and conflicts give 14 rise to? 15 A. Well, that's a classic case where in a collaborative 16 project, such solutions can be, if you like, negotiated. 17 Q. If it was simply a collaborative project, what problems 18 might arise from gaps and conflicts of the type you've 19 mentioned? 20 A. The designer can't win. 21 Q. What do you mean by that? 22 A. Whatever is proposed, somebody will say is unacceptable. 23 Q. So in short, any such gaps and conflicts should be 24 addressed to the extent possible? 25 A. Exactly so. Led by the client in such a case. 180 1 Q. Presumably before an infrastructure contract is let? 2 A. Definitely. 3 Q. Why do you say definitely? 4 A. If you don't resolve such conflicts before, it will 5 either produce a change or it will have been priced in 6 as a risk, which may or may not arise, and if it doesn't 7 arise, then I have never known a project where you get 8 a refund. If it does arise it's just absorbed in the 9 risk budget. So the client loses. 10 Q. Thank you. 11 We should go to another document. CEC01601660. 12 Now, if we look at page 2, please, we can blow up, 13 please, a third of the way down the page. 14 This is an email from yourself, Mr Glazebrook, dated 15 25 April 2007 to Mr Crawley, Jim Harries of Transdev and 16 Gavin Murray of tie, on the question of employer's 17 requirements. You say: 18 "Just to advise you that since "Engineering" is the 19 designated owner of this document, Martin and I have 20 today agreed a process whereby this document gets put 21 right, for subsequent interaction with the Infraco 22 bidders to ensure that what actually gets built is 23 rather closer to what everyone actually needs." 24 So on the face of it, this point in time, 25 April 2007, it looks as though you did have 181 1 a responsibility for the employer's requirements; is 2 that correct? 3 A. Well, presumably so. I don't recall that particular 4 thing. In hindsight it's a little hard to see how 5 engineering could be the owner of the entirety of 6 employer's requirements, which covered commercial things 7 as well as engineering things, unless I remember it 8 incorrectly. 9 I do recall this sort of discussion. Martin Donohoe 10 is a very practical person with a great deal of 11 experience. I don't know what happened after that, but 12 I do know there was activity. There were lots of people 13 saying, yes, we'll revise the employer's requirements, 14 SDS were very helpful in wanting us to do that, but 15 I don't recall the reasons why that came to grief. 16 I have no recollection why that was the case at all. 17 Q. But is it your evidence that as a matter of fact, you 18 were not involved with the employer's requirements 19 document throughout 2007 and early 2008? 20 A. There are things that existed when we came along. 21 I don't know who would have decided or assigned the 22 responsibility of them to us, but without looking 23 through them again and reminding myself of the content, 24 I'm a little surprised that engineering alone would have 25 been the designated owner for such an all-embracing 182 1 document. Looking at the date, April 2007, I had not 2 been there very long. So that would be four, five, six, 3 seven, eight, nine, ten weeks or so. Possibly 4 I misunderstood the way in which things should be done. 5 It was early in my time and I guess I came with a hope, 6 a feeling, an expectation that issues around 7 specification would be relatively easy to resolve. 8 Unfortunately that didn't prove to be the case. 9 Q. Certainly looking at the project from the outside, 10 I think one can see the logic as to why the engineering 11 department of tie would be the designated owner of the 12 employer's requirements document, but it may be that 13 that didn't reflect the reality of what happened later 14 on in 2007 and into early 2008? 15 A. Maybe. I can't recall the detailed content of those 16 requirements. So I can't really comment. 17 Q. Okay. Back to your statement, please, at page 25. 18 We'd got to sub-question 2, towards the top of the 19 page. We are still on the question of the misalignment 20 between these three elements. We had asked how it had 21 arisen, et cetera. You replied: 22 "It is inevitable that in any complex major project 23 there will be a multiplicity of requirements. The fatal 24 flaws were to proceed before these were established and 25 to fail to have in place a culture and process which 183 1 accepts that requirement/specification change are 2 inevitable, but has practical and effective processes to 3 deal with such changes." 4 Why do you use the words "fatal flaws"? 5 A. I think from observation of the result. 6 Q. So that's an example of -- with the benefit of 7 hindsight? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Albeit if you had been asked for your views at the time 10 on whether any problems might arise because of -- if 11 there was a misalignment between the SDS design, 12 employer's requirements and the civils proposals, 13 I assume you would have given an answer in similar terms 14 you've given us a few minutes before? 15 A. Indeed, and everybody was saying that. It's a mystery 16 to me why it wasn't proceeded with to clarify, close 17 gaps, and to remove conflictions. 18 Q. Which individual or individuals in tie had 19 responsibility for resolving that issue? 20 A. It's a general project issue because it involved not 21 just engineering, but everything. I mean, it's one of 22 those situations where a large engineering project can 23 have everything dumped on to engineering. But as I say, 24 without relooking at the engineering -- the employer's 25 requirements, I can't recall in detail the content of 184 1 every provision in it. But my recollection is that it 2 was more than just engineering. 3 Q. Thank you. 4 Back to the statement, please. Again, sticking at 5 page 25 and question 42. I won't read it out, but this 6 refers to an email on 30 November 2007 you sent to 7 Steven Bell. You refer to there being widespread 8 unclarity as to who does what in tie, et cetera. 9 A paragraph down, you refer to it having come to 10 light that tie's procurement team had been receiving 11 documents direct from SDS which were not lodged within 12 tie's document control system. You say: 13 "The result is that I and my team, and doubtless 14 others, are working on duff gen and making duff 15 decisions. This is incredible." 16 Then in your answer to sub-question 1 you say you 17 cannot add to those words which express clearly not only 18 your frustrations, but also some positive suggestions 19 for improvement elsewhere. They were unheeded. They 20 arose because of the organisational problems within tie 21 that were never effectively addressed. 22 So is that essentially a reference to the 23 procurement team working without proper reference to the 24 engineering team, and doing things which may impact upon 25 the engineering team's work? 185 1 A. Yes, it was not just the procurement team. It was 2 general. All the people involved with the project, 3 really. 4 As I said in that -- in the second part of the 5 email, well, the one numbered 2, there was widespread 6 unclarity and I do recall that when we produced our list 7 as to who does what, everyone said: this is a great 8 idea, we should all do this; but they didn't. 9 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Murray's email just above your 10 first answer, is that an example of meddling? 11 A. An example of what, sorry? 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: People meddling. 13 A. Exactly so. 14 MR MACKENZIE: I think I had suggested to you before, 15 Mr Glazebrook, that the design process seemed 16 dysfunctional, but from what you are saying, would it be 17 fair to say that tie as an organisation seemed 18 dysfunctional? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Now, you sent this email to Mr Bell rather than to 21 Mr Crosse, who was the Tram Project Director. Do you 22 recall why that was? 23 A. No, I don't recall. I don't know whether this was an 24 answer to a question. I have no idea why I wrote it. 25 Q. Thank you. 186 1 Another matter, please, at page 26 of your 2 statement. Towards the bottom of the page, question 45, 3 we set out an email you weren't involved in, and I'm 4 just interested in your views. 5 We see an email of 14 December 2007 from 6 Duncan Fraser in the Council. He asked certain 7 questions about the quantified risk allowance, including 8 querying the provision made for the likely change in 9 scope, given the incomplete/outstanding design, 10 approvals and consents. 11 Mr Fraser had stated: 12 "The scope of the works is not clear to CEC ... 13 hence the scope is likely to change, hence provision 14 should be made for this." 15 Geoff Gilbert replied on behalf of tie. If we go 16 over the page, please, at the top of the page, at the 17 end of his reply, Mr Gilbert stated: 18 "The overall scope of the scheme is surely now 19 fixed, is it not?" 20 Then we asked your views on that, and you explain: 21 "This appears to reflect the gulf between what some 22 people wished to believe and the chaotic reality. There 23 always seemed to me to be a significant gulf between the 24 so-called "Commercial" people and those of us charged with 25 delivering the project. From my viewpoint, their ever 187 1 increasing numbers achieved nothing except to add fuel 2 to the fire of confusion." 3 Mr Glazebrook, if you had received in this email 4 from Duncan Fraser at the time and if he had asked 5 exactly the same question: is the scope likely to 6 change, and if so, should provision be made for that; 7 what would you have replied? 8 A. I'm not sure if "scope" is the right word. I'm not sure 9 if Duncan actually meant the detail of the works. The 10 overall scope was understood. I'm not sure where he's 11 coming from here. 12 But one thing I'm sure of is to expect to get price 13 certainty in the situation the design was at at the time 14 was completely unrealistic. 15 Q. Why was that? 16 A. If the design is incomplete and the processes are 17 flawed, it's inevitable that there's no way that any 18 contractor could possibly know what they're letting 19 themselves in for with any degree of certainty. It's 20 just impossible, and that's exactly what happened. 21 Q. Thank you. 22 Now, go back again to your statement, please, at 23 page 28. It concerns question 48, towards the top of 24 the page. 25 Again, in sub-answer 1, I think you touched upon 188 1 this. We asked for your views on these matters and you 2 said: 3 "It would have been remarkable to expect price 4 certainty when design was unfinished and approvals and 5 acceptance not completed." 6 Then in answer 2 we had asked: 7 "If final design packages were not expected until 8 late 2008, what was your understanding in relation to 9 how BBS could undertake due diligence on the design and 10 provide a fixed price?" 11 You replied: 12 "I have no idea. At the time I was astonished to 13 hear this." 14 Just for clarification, what was it you were 15 astonished to hear at the time? 16 A. That anyone could expect to produce a fixed price on an 17 incomplete design. The only way in which you can end up 18 with a fixed price in that situation is to price in 19 a load of risk. 20 Q. But presumably that wasn't a matter you were dealing 21 with, as in the engineering team? 22 A. Exactly so. 23 Q. Did you ever express your views in that regard to anyone 24 else in tie? 25 A. Without a doubt. 189 1 Q. To who? 2 A. Within my team, probably or possibly to Geoff, 3 Geoff Gilbert. I mean, the nature of some of the 4 communications in the project was that it was not always 5 easy to get time with people that were making some of 6 these decisions. 7 Secondly, the decisions were often made -- and again 8 it was a fait accompli. There was no reversion, no 9 possibility of going back. 10 So sometimes I would have drawn the conclusion that 11 it was almost a waste of energy to say anything because 12 nothing would change. 13 Q. Thank you. 14 Again, just sticking with your statement, in 15 sub-question 3, we asked: 16 "What was your understanding in relation to whether 17 changes to programme or scope were likely post Infraco 18 financial close/SDS novation?" 19 You replied: 20 "Whatever the Board thought, it was absolutely 21 inevitable that changes would occur. It could hardly 22 have been otherwise when the design was incomplete and 23 in virtually constant flux due to the ineffective 24 organisational arrangements." 25 Do you wish to add anything to that or does that 190 1 essentially sum up your views at that time? 2 A. Nothing to add. 3 Q. Can I take you, please, to a separate document. The 4 document is DLA00006338. This is a document produced by 5 Bilfinger Berger, a "Design Due Diligence Summary Report 6 from February 2008. 7 Do you recall seeing this document at the time? 8 A. No. No recollection of seeing that. 9 Q. I think you were sent it by the Inquiry as part of our 10 questions, I think; is that correct? 11 A. Possibly. I don't recall it. 12 Q. What I would like to do, please, is go to page 3. Now, 13 I'm not going to read this out because we looked at this 14 document this morning with Mr Crawley. But you'll see, 15 Mr Glazebrook, from the first paragraph, if we can blow 16 that up, we can see from the last sentence that this due 17 diligence process was based on relevant design 18 information received by BBS on 14 December 2007. 19 In the paragraph beneath that, in the last sentence, 20 in the paragraph, a reference to: 21 "According to the SDS document tracker, more than 22 40% of the detailed design information has not 23 been issued to BBS at all by the above-mentioned cut-off 24 date." 25 Would you have been in general agreement with that, 191 1 if you had seen this document at the time? 2 A. Most probably it looks about right, yes. 3 Q. Then what I would like to do, Mr Glazebrook, is just 4 give you a minute to read through the rest of page 1 and 5 I'll ask you whether, if you had seen this document at 6 the time, you would have been in broad agreement with 7 what's set out. 8 So maybe we can blow up the page so you can see it 9 better. 10 I'll give you a minute just to read on. (Pause) 11 A. Yes, I think that's a fair statement. My recollection, 12 though, is that there was a lot of ground investigation 13 and GI information available, because I do recall being 14 surprised that, as I remember, Bilfinger Berger 15 commented that there was insufficient GI to enable them 16 to proceed without risk on the basis of existing SDS 17 designs. And I was surprised at that, but how that was 18 resolved, I don't know. 19 But it looks like a fair comment, the whole page, 20 yes. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Can I just clarify, there's reference 22 in that page to pavement design. When you speak 23 about -- when we speak about pavement design, are they 24 in fact speaking about what we could call the road? 25 A. Well, it was more than that. The road bit was probably 192 1 the most complex, not necessarily for ground type 2 reasons, but because of trying to fit everything in 3 without too many conflicts. There are always conflicts. 4 So you have to make some derogations from specification. 5 But, I mean, in general, this is a fair statement, 6 I think. 7 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: No, I'm just seeking clarification as 8 to whether, when reference is made to the pavement, it's 9 not the pavement as the layman would think of it, rather 10 the road? 11 A. Well, actually seeing these words, full pavement 12 reconstruction, I recall now there was some issue around 13 should it be full reconstruction or should the pavements 14 be left and just do the works in the road. I don't 15 know -- I don't quite now how that arose or how it was 16 resolved, but I recall it as an issue. But it wasn't 17 one that we dealt with. I think that was one that the 18 Council dealt with. 19 Had there been full reconstruction, it would have 20 been clearly more costly, of the pavements. So it was 21 probably a balance between cost and practicality. In 22 other words, if you're doing a lot of work in the road, 23 it's highly likely you will damage or interfere with 24 pavements. 25 So it's equally likely that some elements of the 193 1 Council might have said: you've got to reconstruct from 2 building wall to building wall; whereas other elements 3 might have said: to minimise costs we will just do the 4 road and accept repairs on the pavement. But I don't 5 recall how that was resolved. I was not involved. 6 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 7 MR MACKENZIE: Mr Glazebrook, in the paragraph stating: 8 "Over a large extent of the project, the tram line 9 runs at grade on existing roads ..." 10 It then goes on to refer to: 11 "... retain as much existing road construction as 12 possible. However, the necessary pavement surveys have 13 not been carried out. Therefore, the current design 14 does only allow for full pavement reconstruction and no 15 overlay." 16 I think the chair is suggesting that in that 17 paragraph, we see reference to "pavement", we should 18 read that as "road", "road surveys". So: 19 "... the necessary road surveys have not been 20 carried out. Therefore, the current design does only 21 allow for full road reconstruction and no overlay." 22 What is your views on that suggestion? 23 A. I'm afraid I don't know quite what that particular 24 sentence is getting at. I don't know what it meant by 25 "overlay", for instance. 194 1 Q. Does overlay usually refer to roads or to pavements? 2 A. I don't know, but probably more likely roads. 3 Q. Thank you. 4 Move on, please, if we may, to page 9. We see under 5 the conclusion a number of paragraphs. Could I again 6 please just ask you to read that to yourself and then 7 I'll ask you again at the end whether you broadly agree 8 with what -- sorry, if you had seen this document at the 9 time, if you would broadly have agreed with what's set 10 out. 11 A. Sure. (Pause) 12 That looks like a fair statement in all respects. 13 Q. Thank you. 14 Now, I think your position is that you were not sent 15 or shown this document at the time; is that correct? 16 A. I don't recall seeing it. 17 Q. I think that was Mr Crawley's position as well. 18 Now, do you consider that the tie commercial and 19 procurement team were in a position to know whether what 20 was contained in this report was correct or not without 21 checking with you and Mr Crawley? 22 A. Well, that's exactly the question. You would have 23 expected them to, but I don't recall that ever happening 24 and I don't understand why it didn't. 25 Q. But in answer to the question, do you consider that 195 1 tie's commercial and procurement team were in a position 2 to know whether what was contained in this report was 3 correct or not without checking with you and Mr Crawley? 4 A. I don't see how they could have done. 5 Q. Back to your statement, please. If we can go to 6 page 29. In question 50, a slightly different matter. 7 We had referred to an email in February 2008 from 8 Andy Steel of TSS in relation to the design review 9 process and the problems. In sub-question 2 we had 10 said: 11 "Had the design that had been completed by this time 12 been properly reviewed? Was it ever properly reviewed?" 13 You explained: 14 "Much design was reviewed. In engineering terms 15 much was acceptable. The principal causes of rejection 16 arose from CEC who claimed that it was not to standard, 17 didn't meet planning "requirements" (the latter 18 seemingly driven by subjective, not traceably objective, 19 judgment), conflicted with street features etc etc 20 . Effective specification and teamwork would 21 have prevented this situation arising." 22 Why did you put the word "requirements" in quotes 23 after "planning"? 24 A. If things are subjective, it's hard to see how they are 25 requirements. They might be called requirements by 196 1 somebody, but really a requirement is something which is 2 stated, rather than not stated and then rejected. 3 I think the frustrating thing to me and my team was 4 that, you know, it was evident to us that in CEC there 5 were many really good people, really, really good 6 people, in planning and in roads. I mean, one I would 7 name immediately, Andy Conway, whose name has come up, 8 he was absolutely superb, and he was exactly the sort of 9 person who, if he had been given the freedom to 10 collaborate with his great skill and judgment and 11 experience of resolving conflicts and subjective issues, 12 he would have been able to bring to closure very quickly 13 design issues, but I don't know whether he was prevented 14 from doing that. But certainly when he contributed to 15 discussions, he was exceptionally helpful. 16 It's just a shame we couldn't have had more of that 17 level of collaboration throughout the project, and 18 indeed, when we had planners in to talk to them, to try 19 and break this cycle of submission, rejection, 20 submission, rejection, they too were extremely helpful. 21 But we weren't able to sort of harness that positive 22 problem solving on a consistent and frequent basis. 23 Q. I suppose the question there, Mr Glazebrook, is whether 24 CEC knew what they wanted at the outset, but felt they 25 couldn't specify that perhaps for reasons of fettering 197 1 discretion, or whether at the outset, CEC weren't 2 entirely sure of what exactly they wanted and that's why 3 they couldn't say to the designers? 4 A. Absolutely. But in a situation like that, the way to 5 resolve that, to square that circle, is to say to the 6 designers: do something, don't complete it, don't submit 7 it, and then let's have a chat about it, and then you 8 can square off the corners very quickly. That would 9 have been an effective way of doing it. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Do you know the extent to which other 11 agencies were involved in the planning process, such as 12 Historic Scotland, for instance? 13 A. I know they were involved and the cycle lobby and ADM 14 and Forth Ports and so on, but I don't recall that they 15 came up with issues that were either insurmountable or 16 resolvable in some way. I don't recall there being 17 particular problems on that score. 18 I know that one example with Historic Scotland was 19 building fixings, but that was fairly reasonably and 20 easily resolved between my team and them. 21 So I don't see that they were -- I don't recall that 22 they were an inhibiting factor of any significance. 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I'm just wondering whether the 24 involvement of an organisation such as Historic Scotland 25 might inhibit Edinburgh planners from agreeing something 198 1 in advance, as it were. 2 A. That's certainly possible. I don't recall it coming up 3 as a specific issue, but that could be, yes. 4 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. On that issue, Mr Glazebrook, 5 I think it's right to say there were a number of 6 locations along the tram route where third parties may 7 have not been entirely clear as to what they wanted at 8 the outset. So by way of example, Forth Ports, 9 Haymarket, SRU at Murrayfield, the question of the rail 10 interchange out at Gogar was something new, and also the 11 RBS Gogarburn tram stop and airport. Is that fair to say 12 that in these locations the design was dependent on 13 third parties? 14 A. Exactly so, yes. I think in general the third parties 15 were not too hard to deal with. I mean, I remember one 16 big critical issue right at the outset when we were 17 involved was the alignment around Balgreen Road to 18 Murrayfield, in particular whether it should be at low 19 level adjacent to house gardens or whether it should be 20 high level adjacent to Network Rail, and it was 21 presented to us as an absolutely fundamentally 22 insurmountable issue. 23 But in fact it took just one meeting with 24 Network Rail in Glasgow to resolve the issue. So that 25 was one example of why it seemed hard to understand why 199 1 these critical issues had become so critical when, if 2 the right people got together and talked, the answer 3 emerged quite easily. 4 Q. Thank you. On to page 30 of your statement, please. At 5 question 52, we set out certain emails. And the top one 6 is an email dated 26 March 2008. You advised that: 7 "The sole item to be discussed at a forthcoming 8 meeting with BBS in relation to Design Construction was 9 "Jointly to answer the question: how will BBS construct 10 where design has not yet been design-assured by SDS?" 11 And a couple of paragraphs down, Ralf Honeck from 12 BBS noted: 13 "We confirm again that BBS will not start 14 construction without having a design approved by 15 relevant authorities and issued for construction." 16 Then in sub-question 1, we asked for your views on 17 these matters, and you said: 18 "It is self-evident that to start construction with 19 incomplete design is unwise." 20 To pause there, what would have been your view at 21 the time on awarding a construction contract with 22 incomplete design? 23 A. Foolish. It can't be absolutely 100 per cent complete. 24 It never can be. But when it was so far from 25 100 per cent completion was deeply unwise. 200 1 Q. Then going on in your response, you say: 2 "Effective teamwork would have smoothed this 3 turbulence. The absence of these factors allowed the 4 Infraco to claim endlessly for changes. The disconnect 5 between the commercial and engineering teams, together 6 with further escalating role unclarity and ad hoc and 7 on the hoof staffing and organisational changes further 8 contributed to the fires of confusion and cost 9 escalation." 10 Now, you say there was a disconnect between the 11 commercial and engineering teams. Do you know how had 12 that arisen? 13 A. I don't know how it had arisen. It's possible -- I have 14 been thinking about this recently. It's possible that 15 the commercial teams either were -- didn't want to -- 16 I don't mean this sarcastically -- display their lack of 17 understanding of engineering issues and thought that 18 disputes could be resolved just by sort of finance 19 person talking to finance person. Because quite a few 20 finance people came on late, maybe they didn't 21 understand, you know, who did what and who to go and 22 seek advice from. But we have the situation where there 23 was an engineering team, my engineering team, Bob Bell's 24 project management team, as he called it, and the 25 finance team. So there were three teams, all sort of 201 1 vying for some sort of completion of each element of 2 design. 3 In the case of finance, they might have just had an 4 imperative, which would not be unreasonable, to just 5 minimise the cost. In the case of project management, 6 it might have been an imperative to get the thing done 7 to programme. 8 In the case of engineering, our imperative was to 9 get the right thing done in the right way so the thing 10 would actually last, the constructed elements of the 11 project would last, for the intended timescale without 12 having to be re-engineered or anything like that. 13 So inevitably, in an incomplete design, there will 14 be those conflicts between cost, programme and content, 15 and that's exactly what transpired. 16 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I ask you, looking at this page 17 up on the screen, you're speaking above the question, it 18 refers to an email dated 28 March, presumably from you, 19 where you're seeking guidance from Mr Bell. And you 20 noted that you were not party to recent discussions with 21 Bilfinger Berger and Siemens in relation to the SDS 22 novation. And were "left with the feeling that BBS has 23 some undeclared agenda within their stance on this 24 issue". 25 What did you mean by that? 202 1 A. Yes. That's not my -- that's not because I came to that 2 conclusion. There seemed to be a sort of rising tide of 3 the embattled positions perhaps on both sides, on the 4 tie side that BBS were playing some sort of game. As 5 I say, this wasn't from me, this was words and vibes 6 that I picked up from being within the buildings down in 7 Edinburgh Park, and that's more or less what I'm saying 8 there. I was left with a feeling, it wasn't my 9 generated feeling, it was things that people said, that 10 led me to the unfortunate conclusion that sort of battle 11 lines were being drawn where they needn't have been. 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So you're really quoting what you 13 have heard and -- 14 A. Yes. 15 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Taking it on board? 16 A. Yes. I was sad to hear that, very sad, because 17 certainly at the level I worked with, the engineers in 18 Siemens and Bilfinger Berger, they were excellent. 19 There was no -- I perceived no funny agenda or desire to 20 inflate prices at all. None of that at all. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Is this a convenient -- 22 MR MACKENZIE: Perhaps I should clarify one matter, my Lord, 23 before finishing this, if I may. You referred to Bob 24 Bell's project management team. I don't think we have 25 heard about that team before. Did that team come in 203 1 after the award of the Infraco contract? 2 A. Yes, I think so. I can't recall the exact time. I do 3 recall though when somebody came and told me, it might 4 have been Bob himself, that there were going to be these 5 project managers for each engineering discipline. 6 I recall saying: but why? 7 Q. That was my next question. 8 A. What benefit will that bring? And the answer would have 9 been along, as I recall, along the lines of: well, 10 that's to look at -- just, Tony, to keep the programme 11 on track. 12 But in fact I think it's the nature of -- if 13 somebody has an expertise, and they come on to deliver 14 an element of the project, in this case project 15 management on behalf of tie, they might see something 16 that they think is suboptimal and have a desire from 17 their experience to change it, without perhaps realising 18 that the very thing that they're doing is to actually 19 affect the programme that we're supposed to be managing. 20 It's just how people work. If they're given that sort 21 of freedom and nobody stops them, that's what they will 22 do. 23 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. That may be an appropriate place 24 to pause, my Lord. 25 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We will adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow 204 1 morning. Ms Fraser will explain to you when to come to 2 the building. 3 A. Fine. Can I leave my papers here? 4 (4.35 pm) 5 (The hearing adjourned until Thursday, 5 October 2017 at 6 9.30 am) 7 205 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR DAVID CRAWLEY (affirmed) ..........................1 4 5 Examination by MR MACKENZIE ...................1 6 7 Questions by CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY ...........116 8 9 MR TONY GLAZEBROOK (sworn) .........................119 10 11 Examination by MR MACKENZIE .................119 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 206