1 Thursday, 5 October 2017 23 MR MACKENZIE: My Lord, the next witness is Mr Jim Harries. 24 We certainly won't finish him today, but we can deal 25 with the preliminaries. 197 1 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes, I understand he's keen to get 2 started. 3 MR JIM HARRIES (affirmed) 4 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I ask you to speak clearly into 5 the microphone so everyone can hear you, and also 6 relatively slowly so the shorthand writer can keep up 7 with you, and to answer the question as directly as 8 possible before adding any qualifications. 9 Examination by MR MACKENZIE 10 MR MACKENZIE: Good afternoon, Mr Harries. Thank you for 11 waiting. Can you state your full name, please. 12 A. James Richard Harries. 13 Q. And your current occupation? 14 A. I'm the Director of a company called Mondalus. 15 Q. Now, you have provided a helpful CV to the Inquiry. 16 I would like to go to that. It's CVS00000045. If we 17 can please go to page 3, we can see in the left-hand 18 column, you set out that you have an engineering degree 19 and you're a chartered engineer and your membership of 20 various professional bodies. 21 Then just starting then at the right of the page and 22 working up, we can see you have experience with 23 British Rail, with Freightliner in Manchester, and then 24 up we see Greater Manchester Metro, you were Engineering 25 Director and Engineering Manager between 1990 and 1996. 198 1 We can then go to page 2, please, to continue this. 2 We can see you were then the Managing Director for the 3 Greater Manchester metro between 1996 and May 1998. We 4 can see one of the bullet points under that, if I may. 5 We can see third bullet from the bottom, you delivered 6 the tender for the fund, design, build, operation and 7 maintenance of the extended Metrolink system. 8 If we then go up the page, we can see John Mowlem & 9 Co London. You were Assistant Director for railways 10 between May 1998 and August 1999. We can see the first 11 bullet point there states you were responsible for 12 commissioning the Lewisham extension of the Docklands 13 Light Railway and it opened early. Then one up, we see 14 in Nottingham for Bombardier Transportation, you were 15 the Operations Manager for the Nottingham tram system 16 between August 1999 and November 2004. 17 We see the first bullet point, you were responsible 18 for the commissioning and acceptance of the tram system. 19 So clearly you have considerable experience in light 20 rail and trams; is that correct, Mr Harries? 21 A. I believe so. 22 Q. Then one up we see your involvement in the Edinburgh 23 problem for a company called Transdev. You were Project 24 Engineer between November 2004 and February 2008, and 25 I'll come back to your role in that shortly. 199 1 On page 1 we can see under "Metrolink Transport for 2 Greater Manchester", you were Engineering Manager 3 between February 2008 and June 2014. We can see the 4 text states you led the engineering team with 5 responsibility for the rapidly changing and developing 6 Metrolink system. Changes include tripling the size of 7 the system, procuring a fleet of 104 new trams, 8 replacing the signalling, et cetera. 9 Then one up, please, under your current role as 10 Director of Mondalus Limited from June 2014 to present, 11 we can see involvement in various rail matters, 12 including the first bullet point, Network Rail, 13 supporting the Sheffield tram-train project, and down 14 below that, Balfour Beatty, in the commissioning of the 15 extension to the Midland Metro system in Birmingham. 16 Then third from the bottom, Nottingham Trams 17 Limited, et cetera. Are there any UK tram schemes you 18 have not been involved with, Mr Harries? 19 A. Oh, yes. 20 Q. There are some others not on the list? 21 A. Oh, yes, there are, plenty. 22 Q. Thank you. So that's your CV. 23 You have also provided a statement to the Inquiry. 24 I think you should have a hard copy before you and 25 a copy will also come up on the screen. The reference 200 1 is TRI00000128. I should just formally ask you to go to 2 the last page of the statement at page 26. Page 26 will 3 come up on the screen in a second. We can see 4 a signature dated 25 July 2017. Could I ask you to 5 confirm, please, that is your signature and this is the 6 written statement you have provided to the Inquiry? 7 A. It is. 8 Q. Thank you. So, Mr Harries, your evidence to the Inquiry 9 will comprise both that written statement and the 10 evidence you give at the hearings. 11 If I could now please go to page 2 of the statement, 12 to look at the role of Transdev. 13 So on page 2 of the statement, towards the bottom, 14 on question 2, we stated that: 15 "On 20 April 2004 the TIE Board endorsed the 16 recommendation to approve Transdev plc as the preferred 17 bidder and tram operator under the Developing Partnering 18 and Operating Franchising Agreement ..." 19 We asked: 20 "What was the role of Transdev in the Edinburgh tram 21 project?" 22 You answered: 23 "To provide TIE with operational and technical 24 advice in the development of the system, and then to act 25 as the operator of the system once built." 201 1 We then asked you: 2 "Do you know why Transdev's contract was terminated 3 in August 2009?" 4 You say: 5 "Yes. I left Transdev and the Edinburgh tram 6 project in February 2008, so I have no direct knowledge 7 on this matter. My understanding from discussing the 8 matter with others is that TIE felt that they could 9 operate the system at a lower price by using alternative 10 arrangements with Lothian Bus." 11 It may be helpful here just to jump to page 22, 12 please. We can see in question 33 we state: 13 "By letter dated 21 August 2009 TIE gave Transdev 14 plc notice of their intention to terminate the DPOFA." 15 And we give a reference for that. We can leave 16 that, thank you. 17 If we can go back to page 5 of the statement, 18 please, on the question of design. 19 About 5(c), halfway down the page, we asked: 20 "What was your understanding of the main 21 difficulties in carrying out the design work ..." 22 For the tram project, and you replied: 23 "It was challenging to meet the 24 requirements/aspirations of all the parties involved. 25 Edinburgh as a city is the most challenging environment 202 1 that I have experienced. A core issue here was the lack 2 of an integrated approach from both TIE and Edinburgh 3 CEC/Lothian Bus. This was compounded by the 4 difficulties presented by the multiple stakeholders who 5 tended to be very demanding." 6 When you say "Edinburgh as a city [was] the most 7 challenging environment that I have experienced", why do 8 you say that? 9 A. There were several factors to that. First of all, 10 Edinburgh is a -- it's a wonderful historic city and it 11 wasn't laid out with trams in mind. 12 So putting a tram system through narrow streets in 13 a very densely populated area will be challenging. 14 It's also a very historic city, with lots of 15 wonderful buildings and heritage that we do not wish to 16 disturb. 17 The people of Edinburgh, compared with a lot of 18 other cities, are probably more demanding and overall 19 perhaps more educated than perhaps is elsewhere. 20 When you put those factors together, and it results 21 in very challenging environment for a tram project. 22 Q. You also referred in this answer to a core issue being 23 the lack of an integrated approach from both tie and 24 Edinburgh CEC/Lothian Bus. What did you mean by that 25 sentence? 203 1 A. In other projects I've been involved with, the ultimate 2 client and the contract chain are all absolutely behind 3 the delivery of the project. 4 I did not feel that either CEC or Lothian Bus were 5 pushing for the delivery of the project as I believed 6 they -- well, I had hoped they would. 7 There were tensions between tie and Edinburgh CEC, 8 even though one organisation is a subsidiary of the 9 other. 10 Q. Just the last sentence, for the avoidance of doubt, you 11 refer to multiple stakeholders who tended to be very 12 demanding. Who did you have in mind there? 13 A. Almost everybody. Pressure groups. I went to several 14 public meetings, and it was -- it was hard work to 15 convince everybody that we were doing the right thing. 16 Q. Did you also mean by that a reference to multiple 17 stakeholders, third parties with an interest in the 18 project. I'm thinking of Forth Ports, the SRU, 19 Edinburgh Airport Authority, these sorts of bodies? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. And also the utility companies? 22 A. I didn't have any direct understanding of the utilities 23 companies' input to the project. 24 Q. Thank you. 25 Going back to your statement, please, in the next 204 1 question and answer, (d), we asked: 2 "What steps were taken to address these 3 difficulties?" 4 You say: 5 "Transdev attempted to escalate these concerns, but 6 there were no easy answers and ownership of these issues 7 within TIE was variable." 8 What do you mean by saying "ownership of these 9 issues within tie was variable"? 10 A. I say elsewhere that tie was a large organisation and 11 ownership of issues within tie was something that I had 12 difficulty understanding. 13 I suppose the apparent lack of structure and 14 ownership was what I was trying to get at in my answer. 15 Q. Finally, in terms of a last general question I would 16 like to ask today, if I may, on page 7, please, page 7 17 is headed "Risk", and in question 7(d), we had asked: 18 "Do you consider that risk management was effective 19 and can you give the reasons for your view?" 20 You replied: 21 "The cost increases seem to indicate that the risk 22 management process did not work effectively. TIE lacked 23 the will to accept that the emerging costs and risks 24 should be recognised." 25 Can you explain that last sentence, please? 205 1 A. Whilst I was there, it was clear that there were 2 problems with the delivery of the project and that costs 3 and risks would escalate in my personal view. 4 I did attempt to escalate those concerns within tie 5 and within my own involvement with Transdev. 6 Q. Now, in terms of your attempt to escalate these matters 7 within tie, between the period 2004 to February 2008, 8 when you stopped being involved, can you remember when 9 during that period did you attempt to escalate these 10 matters within tie? 11 A. I cannot remember, but the documentation, particularly 12 the monthly reports that were in the pack of the 13 documentation, shows what was done there. 14 Q. What do you mean by monthly reports? Monthly reports by 15 Transdev or -- 16 A. Yes. The contractual arrangements between Transdev and 17 tie were we provided a monthly progress report, and some 18 of those reports are in the evidence pack. 19 Q. I see. So if we go to these monthly progress reports, 20 that's where we will find you trying to escalate your 21 concerns? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Who were these reports sent to within tie? 24 A. These reports were formally issued to tie's Transdev 25 Contract Manager who was their Operations and 206 1 Maintenance Director. 2 Q. Do you remember the name of that individual over the 3 period 2004 to February 2008? 4 A. Alastair Richards. 5 Q. Thank you. My Lord, I'm about to move on to 6 a particular document. This may be an appropriate time 7 to stop for the day? 8 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Well, Mr Harries, sorry you've been 9 kept waiting, but we'll adjourn until tomorrow at 9.30. 10 Ms Fraser will speak to you about arrangements for 11 coming to enable us to start at that time. 12 We will adjourn until tomorrow morning. 13 (4.31 pm) 14 (The hearing adjourned until Friday, 6 October 2017 at 15 9.30 am) 16 207 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR TONY GLAZEBROOK (continued) .......................1 4 5 Examination by MR MACKENZIE (continued) .......1 6 7 MR DAMIAN SHARP (affirmed) ..........................40 8 9 Examination by MR LAKE .......................40 10 11 Examination by MR MACKENZIE ..................74 12 13 Questions by CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY ...........196 14 15 MR JIM HARRIES (affirmed) ..........................198 16 17 Examination by MR MACKENZIE .................198 18 19 208 1 Friday, 6 October 2017 2 (9.30 am) 3 MR JIM HARRIES (continued) 4 Examination by MR MACKENZIE (continued) 5 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Good morning, you're still under 6 oath. 7 A. I am. 8 MR MACKENZIE: Good morning, my Lord. 9 A. Good morning. 10 Q. I would like to take you to a document from 11 January 2007. It will come up on the screen. The 12 reference number is CEC01811257. 13 Now, these are the slides of a review by 14 David Crawley in January 2007, and if we go over the 15 page, please, we can see from the first bullet point 16 that the scope of Mr Crawley's review was the design 17 review process. If we can go to page 11, please. 18 If we can see your name at the top, Mr Harries, do 19 you remember this interview at all? 20 A. I have a vague recollection of somebody sitting down 21 with me and saying: be completely blunt and honest and 22 we'll write it down. 23 Q. Just -- 24 A. But I can't remember who that was. 25 Q. Indeed. Take a minute yourself just to read the various 1 1 bullet points here. (Pause) 2 A. I have read it. 3 Q. Does that generally ring any bells? 4 A. I think every single bullet point rings a bell. 5 Q. Does that reflect how you felt about the project at the 6 time? 7 A. Yes, in terms of the areas that we needed to improve. 8 Obviously it doesn't touch on the areas that were going 9 well. 10 Q. I understand. Just for the avoidance of doubt, which 11 areas were going well at this time? 12 A. The interactions between individuals within the 13 engineering team and with the related counterparts in 14 CEC. 15 There was a really good common understanding about 16 what we needed to do technically. 17 Q. Technically; is that in relation to the engineering 18 aspects and perhaps the structural aspects, as opposed 19 to the planning approval side of things? 20 A. Yes, this is just within the technical assurance and 21 design process. 22 Q. I understand. In relation to the points on this slide, 23 I won't read each of them in the interests of time. 24 Can we see about four bullet points up: 25 "Chance of meeting the programme overall? "zero"." 2 1 Do you remember, was that in relation to the design 2 programme, the overall programme for the project, or 3 both? 4 A. I cannot recollect. 5 Q. I understand. 6 In terms of the two solutions that you appear to 7 have suggested, the first one was to align tie across 8 the middle managers. Anyone external to the project 9 should not see the join between people from tie, TSS, 10 SDS and Transdev. Do you recall suggesting that as 11 a solution? 12 A. I don't recall suggesting it, but it is the sort of 13 thing I would have expected myself to have said in those 14 circumstances. 15 Q. Why is that? 16 A. Because unless tie as a whole, which obviously includes 17 TSS, SDS and Transdev, is seen as having a common view, 18 the chances of other people being able to interact 19 effectively with tie is very slim. 20 Q. So essentially tie, TSS, SDS and Transdev required to 21 take an integrated one team approach? 22 A. Absolutely. I'm not quite sure why I didn't put CEC on 23 that bullet point as well. 24 Q. I understand. Then the last -- second suggested 25 solution: 3 1 "Enforce the discipline of change control." 2 What does that relate to? 3 A. When a design is developed, if something comes along 4 that causes a change to that design to be necessary, 5 it's absolutely vital that all of the consequences of 6 that change are understood before that change is agreed. 7 There was a lack of understanding of the 8 consequences of change, both technically, commercially 9 and in terms of programme, and without the discipline of 10 a proper process to assess change, the risk is that 11 changes will not be for the better. 12 Q. Would it be fair to suggest that at this time, there 13 were too many changes occurring in an uncontrolled 14 manner? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Changes from or by whom? Who were making these changes? 17 A. There was input from all sorts of people, from CEC, and 18 from different parts within tie, because tie itself 19 wasn't a very joined-up organisation, and I think 20 I mentioned silos somewhere. Not in this, but 21 elsewhere. 22 So tie did not always have a common view on changes. 23 Q. Yes. I think in the third bullet point from the bottom 24 you say: 25 "Tram project culture? "not unified, even within 4 1 tie where silos exist”." 2 Again just for clarification, what were the 3 different silos, what teams or different departments 4 comprised these different silos? 5 A. That's quite a hard question for me this time after the 6 event. But within tie there was a procurement team, 7 a project delivery team, an engineering team, an 8 approvals team, and those teams didn't always work well 9 together and have common goals. 10 Q. Thank you. I would like to put that document to one 11 side now, please, and turn to another issue. 12 We've heard some evidence in relation to 13 a misalignment between the SDS design, the employer's 14 requirements, and the bidders' civils proposals. 15 Is that an issue you have any recollection of? 16 A. Yes. Very much so. 17 Q. Can you explain, please, what the issue was, how it had 18 arisen and what the effects of it were? 19 A. So SDS were developing a design for the system, and tie 20 was developing a document called employer's 21 requirements, which was sent to the bidders for them to 22 price against. 23 The concept was that the SDS design was going to be 24 novated to the contractor. So the contractor then would 25 have two different designs, one as required by the 5 1 employer's requirements, and one as delivered by SDS. 2 If these two did not align, I felt that the 3 contractor would have a potential claim against tie in 4 order to make them align. 5 The development of the employer's requirements from 6 recollection when we started to see them, they were not 7 well structured. They were difficult to understand. We 8 were asked to review them, and I found documents that 9 show that we -- I think I -- the Transdev team had over 10 700 comments at one stage on the employer's 11 requirements, which gives us a flavour of a lack of 12 alignment. 13 Q. Did matters improve at all during 2007? 14 A. From my -- I cannot really recollect what happened, but 15 from looking at the documents, there was certainly work 16 done on trying to align the SDS, the contractor and the 17 employer's requirements. 18 I can remember spending a lot of time and getting 19 very frustrated by the process, but I cannot recollect 20 where it ended up. 21 Q. Thank you. We will go to some documents in that regard 22 shortly. 23 If I could first go back to your statement on this 24 issue. It's TRI00000128, and page 13, please. 25 In question 19, middle of the page, you refer to an 6 1 email, 14 February 2007, from David Powell in tie, and 2 Mr Powell wrote that the problem was that it was 3 difficult to see how the ERs, the Parsons Brinckerhoff 4 design and the Infraco bidders' proposals relate to each 5 other, and we had asked you: 6 "What was the problem? How had it arisen?" 7 You replied: 8 "This was due to TIE adopting an approach that was 9 not fully integrated across the ERs, PB's design and the 10 bidders' proposals. If I recollect correctly, the 11 engineering team had little input into the Ers, and the 12 Infraco procurement exercise was also done somewhat 13 remotely from the engineering team." 14 We asked: 15 "What effect would this have on the project?" 16 You replied: 17 "Cost and delay would be incurred in order to align 18 the three strands." 19 To pause there, Mr Harries, should that alignment 20 have taken place before or after the Infraco contract 21 was awarded? 22 A. That's a very key question. There are two competing 23 issues. There is we need to get this project over the 24 line and get it done because we are running late, and 25 the alternative then is to delay the project in order to 7 1 get greater alignment first. 2 I'm a simple engineer. So I like things to be clear 3 and set and decided. That was not the approach that tie 4 took. And it was one that at the time I was 5 particularly concerned about. 6 Q. Why were you concerned about it? 7 A. Because of the consequential cost and risk implications 8 to the project. 9 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: What would be the normal order of 10 events? Would the employer's requirements be prepared 11 with an engineering input prior to procurement, prior to 12 the contract? 13 A. In the ideal world, that's one of the first things you 14 do when you set up a tram project. We decided exactly what 15 we want, and then you develop the design up to a point 16 where you can then go to the market to get someone to 17 build it. 18 What we were doing here is developing effectively 19 two different concepts and trying to sort them out after 20 the event. 21 MR MACKENZIE: And presumably, in terms of an ideal world, 22 once the bidding process has been triggered, and that 23 would take perhaps a number of months, presumably in an 24 ideal world one would also wish to ensure that the 25 design and employer's requirements continued to be 8 1 aligned; is that correct? 2 A. Well, in the ideal world they would be aligned before 3 you went to the market and they then would not get 4 changed. In the real world there are always changes 5 that happen. 6 Q. Why do these changes happen in the real world? 7 A. Because of unforeseen events, new requirements, and 8 that's where you need to have a risk element in the 9 contract so that those changes can be adequately funded. 10 Q. I understand. Back to your statement in sub-question 11 (c), we asked: 12 "Was the issue resolved?" 13 And you said: 14 "I do not believe that this issue was resolved prior 15 to me leaving the project in February 2008." 16 I would like, please, to look at some emails. 17 Before we do that, if we go to page 14, please, of your 18 statement. 19 At the bottom of the page, question 23, there's 20 reference to an email you sent to Alastair Richards on 21 3 April 2007. If we could go to that email, please, at 22 CEC01644493. We can see this is an email from yourself 23 to Mr Richards on 3 April 2007. You explain: 24 "The most recent progress in developing the 25 Employer's Requirements came to a close on Friday 9 1 30 March. We understand that issue of these to the two 2 Infraco bidders is ongoing." 3 Then the third paragraph: 4 "It is clear that since our previous comments, tie 5 has many changes to the Employer's Requirements. It is 6 apparent that some of these changes have been made 7 without a process to check that all changes that have 8 been made are appropriate in the overall context of the 9 document." 10 Two paragraphs down: 11 "We must state therefore that we are unable to 12 endorse the document as it now stands ... We do 13 recognise that the document is significantly improved." 14 Down a bit more, please. The bottom paragraph 15 states: 16 "We believe therefore that it would be appropriate 17 for Transdev to review the Employer's Requirements 18 complete, from scratch, yet again." 19 Put that to one side, please, and go back to your 20 statement, please, at page 15. Top of the page, you 21 say: 22 "The ERs were a document that should reflect the 23 overall project requirements, but as stated in [the 24 email we just looked at] it was not adequately 25 controlled and managed. Ownership of the document was 10 1 with TIE. Transdev were asked to review it at various 2 times, but due to the structure of the document, reviews 3 were only partially effective." 4 Then below that we asked you about your concerns at 5 the time, and you explained: 6 "My main concern was that the ERs did not fully 7 integrate with the emerging design. From recollection, 8 the ERs were the basis of the Infracos' bids. Cost and 9 time would be required to converge the two. I think 10 I left the project prior to this being resolved." 11 If we then look, please, at another email, the 12 reference number is CEC01630498. This is just to get 13 a flavour of your concerns at the time. 14 If we could go, please, to page 3, we can see, top 15 of the page, email from yourself, Mr Harries, dated 16 25 April 2007. Subject matter is, "Transdev Review of 17 4th Infraco Information Release on 30 March", sent to 18 Geoff Gilbert and others in tie. 19 You say: 20 "Fellow team members, we have now concluded our 21 review of the Infraco 4th Information Release ... 22 that has been issued to the Infraco bidders ... 23 We are concerned that, yet again, very poor quality 24 information has been released to Infraco bidders with 25 insufficient checks prior to its release. Our reviews 11 1 of previous Infraco documentation releases are 2 summarised below ..." 3 Then scroll down the page, please, to that table 4 headed "Key Issues", and key issues in outline. We see 5 the first one on the left-hand column is: 6 "The documentation cannot have been checked prior to 7 issue to Infraco and ownership of the documentation 8 within tie is not clear to us." 9 There is a reference to a set of generic 10 presentational issues. 11 Go over the page, please. About three boxes down 12 states: 13 "There are many instances of internal conflicts 14 within the package and inappropriate duplication of 15 information. It is the large number of these instances 16 that is of particular concern." 17 The importance column to the right is "H"; is that 18 high? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Then scroll down, please, to the box saying: 21 "The complete range of elements that make up the 22 total project are unevenly described. Inconsistent and 23 variable level of detail from different authors within 24 the package is evident. This reflects a lack of overall 25 editorial ownership and understanding." 12 1 Then below: 2 "Still not aligned to what SDS is doing. Novation 3 risk will fall on tie. There is the separate issue of 4 alignment with the Functional Specification." 5 Then two down: 6 "We wonder to what extent Transdev's previous 7 comments on this section have been considered by tie." 8 I go to that, Mr Harries, just by way of 9 illustration of the sort of problems there seem to have 10 been at that time. Is that a fair illustration of these 11 matters? 12 A. I believe so. 13 Q. To what extent, if at all, did these matters improve 14 during the course of 2007? 15 A. I honestly can't recollect. I have referred back to the 16 reports that Transdev gave to tie and this issue was 17 still raised towards the end of 2007. 18 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: The impression gained from that might 19 be that tie were rushing to get documents out without 20 properly ensuring that they were accurate and -- 21 A. Yes. I think that's -- that's true. They were being 22 driven by programme requirements in order to get 23 information out there so that the procurement could be 24 undertaken, but in doing so, issuing documents of this 25 sort of standard actually introduces future cost and 13 1 risk. 2 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes, you have explained that there 3 may well be a future problem about aligning that 4 document further. 5 A. That was my concern. 6 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: And that would necessarily, or would 7 probably, rather, result in a contractors' claim. 8 A. Absolutely. 9 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. 10 If we then please jump to December 2007, to document 11 CEC01480075. 12 We can see from the top of the page this is an email 13 from Andy Steel of TSS dated 3 December 2007, and it's 14 sent to Geoff Gilbert, somebody else in TSS, Mr Crawley, 15 Damian Sharp, Susan Clark and Roger Jones of Transdev. 16 So I think this email wasn't sent to you, 17 Mr Harries, but I think Mr Jones, was he just below you 18 in the Transdev team? 19 A. I worked with Roger Jones, yes. 20 Q. Thank you. I think you were aware of these issues 21 because you have just described them to us. 22 This email, Mr Steel at the top said: 23 "Geoff, I am afraid I find myself at odds with both 24 the philosophy and practicalities of the majority of the 25 clauses of the extract you sent us below. Please see my 14 1 comments in red text." 2 We see the subject matter was SDS novation plan. 3 If we go down and look at Mr Gilbert's email of 4 3 December 2007, he had sent this to Toby, Andy, David, 5 Damian: 6 "Please could you get together and review section 9 - 7 Technical below (this is an extract from the SDS 8 Novation Plan as drafted by tie based on discussions 9 with BBS) ..." 10 I'm interested in Mr Steel's comments in red, if we 11 could scroll further down under 9.1, technical, it has 12 been stated in a tie document: 13 "The Infraco Employer's Requirements, Infraco 14 Proposals, Tram Vehicle Employer's Requirements, Tramco 15 Proposals and SDS Design ... must align with each other 16 at novation. This does not mean that each must contain 17 the same statements but that the documents must not 18 conflict with each other." 19 To which Mr Steel has replied: 20 "This is a practical impossibility. To begin with 21 BBS have not used SDS design in its entirety either in 22 terms of principles or details. tie has accepted these 23 deviations where they have been declared. However SDS 24 design has moved on at varying rates and with equally 25 variable levels of information being shared with tie. 15 1 This has produced further deviations only some of which 2 are necessarily opaque if not invisible to tie and BBS. 3 Therefore the best that will be achieved is alignment 4 between ERs and Infraco Proposals." 5 Can you recollect whether that would have concurred 6 with your understanding of matters at the time? 7 A. Generally, yes. Andy Steel and myself held pretty 8 common views and we worked together a lot. 9 Q. I understand. I think we may hear evidence that the 10 employer's requirements were based on the preliminary 11 design in late 2006 and were issued to the Infraco 12 bidders, but at the same time as that procurement 13 process was taking place, SDS were advancing and 14 changing the design from the preliminary design. So we 15 may hear evidence that there were perhaps two processes 16 taking place, the SDS progression of their design and 17 then the procurement exercise with the discussions and 18 changes between the tie procurement team and the Infraco 19 bidders. 20 Would that accord with your general recollection or 21 were these really not matters you were involved with? 22 A. Generally, yes. 23 Q. Just also at 9.2, the first two bullet points, 24 Mr Gilbert's document stated: 25 "Alignment of the SDS design and Employer's 16 1 Requirements means ..." 2 First: 3 "The SDS design should not conflict with the 4 Employer's Requirements." 5 Mr Steel replied: 6 "They do and will as SDS are continuing to design 7 taking no account of the Infraco Proposals." 8 The next bullet point states: 9 "That the SDS designs completed to date will deliver 10 the requirements of the Employer's Requirements." 11 To which Mr Steel had replied: 12 "This is a definite non starter for the reasons 13 given at 9.1 above." 14 I won't read out the various other bullets. We can 15 read them for ourselves. But if you go over to page 3, 16 please, in paragraph 9.5, Mr Gilbert's document stated: 17 "It is not expected that these changes will be 18 extensive." 19 To which Mr Steel had replied: 20 "Hm!" 21 Which I think detects perhaps a degree of scepticism 22 on Mr Steel's part, is that correct? 23 A. That would be a fair interpretation of his comment. 24 Q. Would that have reflected your views at the time as 25 well? 17 1 A. Yes, but I'm naturally pessimistic when it comes to 2 these matters. 3 Q. Why are you naturally pessimistic? 4 A. Say again? 5 Q. Why are you naturally pessimistic in these matters? 6 A. I suppose it's my engineering background. If things can 7 go wrong, they will. 8 Q. Very finally, a very short document on this matter, if 9 we may. The document is TIE00039586. This is the 10 document -- email from yourself dated 24 December, 2.23, 11 Christmas Eve, subject, "Design Review - Systems and 12 Communications". This is sent to Tony Glazebrook and 13 Damian Sharp, and you have said: 14 "Tony and Damian, just to support Roger's thinking, 15 Given that 1. BBS's offer is not aligned to SDS's 16 design in respect of Systems and Communications; 2. tie 17 is amending the Employer's Requirements such that BBS's 18 design is compliant with the ERs and 3. SDS's design is 19 not fully aligned with this version of the ERs, we need 20 proper direction from tie on how to address SDS's 21 design." 22 So I think to pause there, that I think summarises 23 the -- where things stood at that time and the problem; 24 is that a fair way to put it? 25 A. Yes. I can see this email, but I cannot recollect the 18 1 circumstances in which it was sent. 2 Q. I understand. 3 Then below that you say -- you said: 4 "Without this direction, we risk: 1. Wasting 5 precious time for SDS, Tie, TSS, CEC and Transdev; 2. 6 Wasting CEC's money; 3. Generating confusion and the 7 consequential potential for future "changes" with both 8 SDS and BBS; and 4. Procuring a system that does not 9 work effectively. 10 I think we need to "park" all of SDS's work on this 11 subject, and constrain SDS's work to the Civil 12 Engineering interfaces of this design." 13 Then in the last paragraph you say, in the last 14 sentence, second-last sentence: 15 "This is a matter that needs joined up thinking 16 across the project. There are other aspects of the 17 design that need similar consideration (power, overhead 18 line equipment, and track form come to mind)." 19 So that's where things stood at December 2007; is 20 that correct? 21 A. As I understood it at the time, yes. 22 Q. I think we know that you left the project in 23 February 2008, and you said in your statement by that 24 stage you understood there continued to be 25 a misalignment? 19 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Just pausing, are you aware why there continued to be 3 a misalignment when you left in February 2008, given 4 that the issue had been identified at least one year 5 before that? 6 A. To have a strategic review and work out an appropriate 7 contractual management process to resolve this matter 8 would have been a large task and it would probably have 9 involved stopping the procurement process for a while 10 until that could be resolved. 11 I suspect the pressure on tie was to carry on 12 regardless and the consequences of that decision would 13 be addressed later. 14 Q. Putting the tram project to one side for a moment, and 15 considering what should happen either in an ideal world 16 or as a matter of good practice, you have mentioned 17 before at the beginning making sure the design and 18 employer's requirements align. 19 Would it be correct to say that obviously the design 20 will change and things will change, but that one should 21 have several stages throughout a design process where 22 one should have agreed baselines before going on to the 23 next stage? 24 A. Yes, normally the design process is that you develop an 25 initial design and then you develop into a preliminary 20 1 design and then it's developed into a detailed design, 2 and then you go out and build it. At each of the stages 3 it is reviewed by those people who need to review it, so 4 that you have a series of agreed stages in the 5 development of the design, and that process reduces the 6 risk of having to do a lot of rework. 7 Q. Because at each stage of the process, all interested 8 parties have agreed and therefore bought in to that 9 particular baseline? 10 A. Yes. And having agreed, you can't change that. 11 Q. I understand. 12 Going back now to your statement, page 14, in 13 question 21, I apologise if we've covered this already, 14 but we had referred to a number of emails in 15 February 2007, and in question b. Were these issues 16 addressed, you said: 17 "I cannot recollect ..." 18 But it's the next sentence: 19 "In my view, the key message is a lack of overall 20 project management by TIE." 21 Could you explain that a little? 22 A. Whilst I cannot recollect exactly what the key issues 23 were, many of them are ones which should have been in my 24 view resolved earlier so that there was a clear way 25 forward reducing the overall level of risk. 21 1 Why that didn't happen, I suspect, is because of 2 the -- my perception of the silos within tie where 3 different groups didn't have clear ownership of certain 4 issues. 5 Q. Looking at that a little, presumably it would be for the 6 individual in charge of these different groups to sort 7 that issue out? 8 A. Yes. I do have recollections of going to see relatively 9 senior people within tie and expressing my concern on 10 these, but it was a very frustrating process, and 11 getting someone to say: yeah, I understand that, I will 12 sort it, but I would like you to help me by doing 13 whatever; just didn't seem to happen. 14 Q. When I refer to the individual in charge of these 15 different groups, I was thinking of the Tram Project 16 Director, but we know in this project that there were 17 a number of Tram Project Directors. I think Mr Kendall 18 was Tram Project Director in the job roughly March/April 19 2006; and Andie Harper was interim Tram Project Director 20 until, I think, December 2006; and then Matthew Crosse 21 was Tram Project Director throughout 2007 until roughly 22 February 2008; and then Mr Steven Bell was Tram Project 23 Director. I just wonder whether having all these 24 different individuals as Tram Project Director, might 25 that cause any problems? 22 1 A. It might do. I know all of those individuals and I've 2 worked with and spoken with them all during my time with 3 tie. 4 It is always good to have a degree of continuity at 5 the top because then it's very clear where the 6 responsibilities lie. But that did not happen in this 7 case. 8 Q. Thank you. Again, sticking with your statement, please, 9 at page 18, if I may, in question c., towards the 10 bottom, we had asked: 11 "What was your understanding of how the Infraco 12 contractor could provide a fixed price, and how design 13 risk could be transferred to the private sector, given 14 the delay in design, approvals and consents ..." 15 You replied: 16 "Infraco would be likely to either add a generous 17 risk premium to their offer, or rely on TIE issuing 18 changes to address any changes that develop after the 19 contract is put into place. The former approach would 20 make their offer less attractive to TIE, so I would have 21 expected Infraco to adopt the latter approach." 22 What I wondered was whether -- is that answer based 23 on the benefit of hindsight, knowing what happened in 24 the tram project, or is that answer based on your 25 general experience in the industry? 23 1 A. General experience and common sense. If you ask someone 2 to deliver something to you and it's clear that there 3 are going to have to be a number of changes, then you 4 either put your price up and say: I will absorb the 5 changes, and give you a fixed price; or I'll give you 6 a low price in the anticipation of being paid for the 7 changes. 8 Q. Thank you. Another matter, please, in your statement, 9 sticking at page 18, at the very bottom, we asked: 10 "Were you involved with the value engineering 11 process on the tram project?" 12 You replied: 13 "Sadly, yes." 14 Why do you say: 15 "Sadly, yes." 16 A. The value engineering workstream came very late on in 17 the overall design development process. Value 18 engineering as a concept can bring value to a project if 19 it is done in the right way and at the right time, and 20 the right time is early in the project, and the right 21 way of doing it is to make sure that you fully 22 understand the implications of the changes that you wish 23 to make. 24 I have my doubts on both of those aspects in terms 25 of what happened within tie. 24 1 Q. Can you expand upon that a little? What are those 2 doubts? 3 A. In terms of timescale, in my view it was too late. So 4 much work had been done on developing the design, that 5 then doing value engineering would result necessarily in 6 having to redo the design. 7 And the process by which value engineering 8 opportunities were identified from my perspective with 9 my perfect world engineering hat on was not one that 10 fully and properly considered the overall implications 11 on the project as a whole in terms of not only just 12 capital cost, but programme issues and ongoing 13 maintenance costs and safety and reliability, et cetera. 14 Q. When you say in an ideal world, value engineering should 15 be done at an earlier stage, do you mean during the 16 preliminary design stage? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Over the page in your statement, please, at page 19, we 19 can read for ourselves your answer in b., and also 20 under c. as well. We can read that for ourselves. The 21 one query I had under c. was the middle paragraph in 22 blue, where you say: 23 "The value engineering process appeared to have 24 a life of its own and it was understood to be 25 inappropriately incentivised." 25 1 What do you mean by that, inappropriately 2 incentivised? 3 A. I got the feeling that the process was being driven 4 forward regardless of anything else. It seemed to have 5 a life of its own, rather than being an integrated part 6 of the tie's management of the project. And I was 7 wondering why that might be. 8 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: A view has been expressed that value 9 engineering was used at a late stage to try to amend 10 structures or what have you, to endeavour to keep the 11 project within budget; is that the impression that you 12 had or was that a different -- 13 A. Yes, it was an attempt to reduce cost, and that is 14 a good thing. But it is making sure that those changes 15 are fully and properly understood in the complete 16 context of the project as a whole that I felt was 17 missing. 18 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: This was the consequences of the 19 change, you say, weren't really taken into account. 20 A. I mean, you can save money by taking the overhead line 21 out of the tram system, by not having to build it, but 22 then you can't run your trams. That's a simple example 23 of having to properly think through the entire 24 consequences of any change. 25 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I think an example that I have seen 26 1 in some document or other was if, for instance, 2 you narrowed a bridge, the consequence of that might 3 be -- have safety implications for people if the 4 original bridge had a walkway to keep people clear of 5 the trams operating across the bridge. 6 Is that a fair example? 7 A. That would be a very good example, where clearly, by 8 removing the walkway, you're going to save capital cost, 9 but the consequences of that need to be thought through. 10 It might be the right thing to do. It might not. 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 12 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 13 Then please go to page 22 of your statement. In 14 question b), towards the top, we asked: 15 "What were your views on the tram project when you 16 left in February 2008?" 17 You replied firstly: 18 "The project would not be delivered to the intended 19 programme." 20 Can you just sum up your reasons for having held 21 that view? 22 A. I think we've probably touched on those adequately so 23 far, unless there's anything that you feel I should be 24 adding to that. 25 Q. No, I understand. 27 1 Second view: 2 "Costs would escalate and be out of control." 3 Can you expand upon your reasons for saying that 4 a little? 5 A. Cost escalation, we have touched on a potential reason 6 for cost escalation. To be out of control, that's 7 probably saying a bit too much really, because you can 8 have escalating costs and have them under control. And 9 the last line, I think, stands for itself. 10 Q. I'm not sure it does. What sort of retribution were you 11 thinking of? 12 A. We are here today. 13 Q. Yes: 14 "... and the victims would include the innocent." 15 Who did you mean by innocent, whether individuals or 16 parties or organisations? Who were the innocent? 17 A. When a project goes wrong, regardless of how the various 18 parties and individuals behave within that project, they 19 are all tarred with the same brush, regardless of their 20 efforts and what they did during the project. 21 Q. Also, to use the word "innocent" suggests there are 22 guilty parties. Did you have anybody in mind in terms 23 of the guilty? 24 A. Absolutely not. 25 Q. Thank you. 28 1 Now, another matter, a document I would like to put 2 to you I think you haven't seen before, and you had no 3 involvement in it, but I'm interested in your views as 4 a very experienced engineer, and your understanding of 5 this clause. 6 Can we go, please, to USB00000032. This is Schedule 7 Part 4, the pricing schedule of the Infraco contract 8 dated May 2008. 9 I don't think you've seen this before, Mr Harries, 10 have you? 11 A. I don't recollect seeing it. 12 Q. Just simply three pages I would like to take you to. 13 Firstly, page 3, please. In paragraph 2.3 we see 14 a reference to the base date design information: 15 "... means the design information drawings issued to 16 Infraco up to and including 25 November 2007 ..." 17 So keep that date in mind. 18 Then, please, go to page 5. I would like to show 19 you one of the pricing assumptions under the contract. 20 Paragraph 3.4, towards the bottom, in short, this 21 document sets out 40 pricing assumptions upon which the 22 Infraco price was based. The first pricing assumption 23 concerns design. What I would just like you to do is 24 take a couple of minutes to read the first part of this 25 pricing assumption which is set out on this page, and 29 1 when you've finished reading that, let me know and we 2 will go on to the second part, which is over the page. 3 What I would like to ask you at the end is whether 4 you have an understanding as to what this means. 5 (Pause) 6 A. Okay. 7 Q. Over the page, please. If we can highlight the first 8 numbered paragraph and then the paragraph below that, 9 thank you. (Pause) 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. If it helps, Mr Harries, I think we can place both parts 12 together on the one screen. Would that help? 13 A. It would. 14 Q. Can we do that, please. Are you able to read that okay, 15 Mr Harries? It's quite small. 16 A. Just about. 17 Q. So having read that pricing assumption, what's your 18 understanding of what it means? 19 A. Okay. I'm no lawyer. I'm reading it not necessarily in 20 context. But it seems to me that the Infraco is 21 accepting risk of change as a result of requirements by 22 approval bodies and third party agreements, which is 23 a brave thing for the contractor to do. 24 Q. If you had been asked at the time as an experienced 25 engineer whether you had a clear understanding of what 30 1 this meant, would you be able to say a clear 2 understanding? 3 A. I'm sorry, but I would need to look at the whole 4 document in greater depth. 5 Q. I understand. Okay. We can put that to one side. Back 6 to your statement to finish off with one or two 7 questions, please. At page 22, under the heading, 8 "PROJECT MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE AND MAIN CONTRACTORS", 9 in relation to tie we had asked: 10 "What were your views on TIE as project managers?" 11 You responded: 12 "Mixed. There were some very good people, but the 13 organisation was too big, poorly regulated and unwieldy. 14 Integration across the organisation was poor, silos 15 existed, and some members of TIE appeared to be there 16 solely for their own ends." 17 In terms of members being there solely for their own 18 ends, what's that a reference to? 19 A. There were constant changes in tie. People came and 20 went. From my perspective it was never really clear to 21 me who did what. Couldn't lay your hands on job 22 descriptions easily. And I was just generally confused 23 by what some individuals were there to do. 24 Q. Thank you. Then the question d. at the bottom, we 25 asked: 31 1 "How did TIE's project management of the tram system 2 compare with the project management of other projects 3 you had worked on?" 4 At the top of page 23, please. You responded: 5 "TIE had a very challenging task in a challenging 6 city. Lack of alignment with CEC created difficulties. 7 CEC appeared not to want the tram system. TIE was 8 a huge organisation when compared with other tram 9 promoters in the UK. TIE was immature in its systems 10 and in its approach." 11 In relation to "CEC appeared not to want the tram 12 system", is that something you've covered already in 13 your evidence or is there more to tell us? 14 A. I don't think I said much about that, other than when 15 a tram project is delivered, the people who are the 16 promoters are normally absolutely 100 per cent behind 17 the delivery of the scheme. There were tensions between 18 CEC and tie which led to that not appearing to be always 19 the case. 20 Some people in CEC were absolutely 100 per cent 21 behind the scheme and would move mountains to help the 22 scheme forward, but I felt that in some cases, their 23 hands were tied because CEC was expecting tie to serve 24 the tram system on a plate to CEC, but actually CEC has 25 real knowledge and value that it can add to the 32 1 development process. Getting that knowledge and value 2 into the scheme was hard work. 3 Q. In the other tram projects you've been involved in and 4 have experience of, did the promoter deliver the project 5 themselves or set up a body like tie to deliver it on 6 its behalf? 7 A. Manchester, Transport for Greater Manchester, basically 8 set it up itself, but Transport for Greater Manchester 9 is run by all the authorities in Greater Manchester 10 coming together as a whole. So public sector 11 organisation letting contracts to help promote the 12 scheme, and it has worked really well. 13 Nottingham, similarly, the local authorities in 14 which the tram operates come together, set up a separate 15 organisation, which in Nottingham is very lean and mean, 16 to deliver both phase 1 and phase 2 of the Nottingham 17 system. 18 Birmingham is similar to Manchester. And -- well, 19 Sheffield is a long time ago. 20 Q. In terms of Nottingham setting up a separate 21 organisation which is very lean and mean, could that be 22 perhaps a slimmed down version of tie? 23 A. It could be a very slimmed down version of tie, but they 24 tend -- they have awarded their contracts in a different 25 manner. Phase 1 was a PFI project, very hands off by 33 1 the promoter: deliver us a tram scheme, it's all yours; 2 we will help you in terms of planning approvals; here is 3 the specification. 4 And that was issued and really did not change 5 throughout the construction of the system. 6 Q. Presumably even in a non-PFI model, the local authority 7 or groups of local authorities could set up a delivery 8 vehicle like tie, but keep it reasonably small and rely 9 on external experts, for example in project management, 10 to project manage the project. That would be another 11 option? 12 A. tie did do some of that. They brought Transdev in to 13 help in a particular area. They brought SDS in to help 14 in a particular area. And as I have said before, 15 Edinburgh is an exceptionally challenging environment. 16 Q. But I think in Edinburgh the actual project management 17 of the tram project, I think, was undertaken by tie 18 itself, rather than appoint an external consultancy to 19 do it; is that correct? 20 A. I believe so, yes. 21 Again, I'm not fully familiar with what tie did 22 after I left. 23 Q. Yes. You also said in this answer: 24 "TIE was immature in its systems and in its 25 approach." 34 1 Could you explain that, please? 2 A. When you have an organisation with a large number of 3 people, it's very important that there's a good 4 understanding about how information flows and matters 5 are managed within that organisation. 6 Those procedures and processes which I regard as 7 basic requirements were not well embedded. In terms of 8 roles and responsibilities, organisational structure, 9 change control, for example, I didn't feel were 10 adequately documented and understood across the 11 organisation. 12 Q. Presumably all of these factors are essential 13 ingredients or requirements for good project management? 14 A. That's generally understood as good practice, yes. But 15 that is very hard when you are starting with a brand new 16 organisation. Unless you resource up to put those 17 processes in place right from day 1, it's very hard to 18 play catch-up after the event. 19 Q. Thank you. 20 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Do you have any experience of other 21 tram systems contracts where a completely new 22 organisation was set up and diverse people were brought 23 in? 24 A. I suppose I do. Manchester, the first project was set 25 up by what was then the Passenger Transport Executive, 35 1 and they had a very small group, again, of people who 2 led that process. Probably 20 tops. 3 That was to build the tram system that was not 4 20 miles long, 32 trams. So similar in terms of overall 5 scale, through the city centre of Manchester, which 6 isn't as challenging as Edinburgh, but still had its 7 challenges. 8 Nottingham, as I have said before, very lean and 9 mean organisation at the client end. But you have to 10 set that organisation up to deliver the type of contract 11 that you want to deliver and the more that you need to 12 do to manage the contractor, the more resources you need 13 to do that. 14 Whether tie got the balance right or not is probably 15 a question that needs to be asked of people who are more 16 senior than I am. I just genuinely don't know. 17 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. Back to the statement, please, 18 Mr Harries. In question c., in the middle of the page, 19 we asked: 20 "Did you have any concerns at any stage in relation 21 to the performance of the Tram Project Board ..." 22 You replied: 23 "I recollect that there was an absolute requirement 24 in TIE that information provided to the Tram Project 25 Board had to support the ongoing project. Consequently 36 1 matters such as programme slippage and risk may have 2 been reported in such a way that did not give the 3 fullest picture to the Tram Project Board." 4 We can check ourselves the reports to the Tram 5 Project Board to see the extent to which these matters 6 were reported, but I'm interested in the first sentence, 7 where you say: 8 "I recollect that there was an absolute requirement 9 in TIE that information provided to the Tram Project 10 Board had to support the ongoing project." 11 What's the basis of that sentence? 12 A. It's probably the case on any project that within the 13 organisation, the organisation there is to deliver the 14 project. Therefore, it has to deliver the project. And 15 there is always a degree of suppressing bad news. 16 I'm not saying that's happened more in tie than 17 elsewhere. It is just a cultural thing across that type 18 of organisation. 19 Q. I think we have seen previously some OGC guidance on 20 project management and it's referred to the need for 21 independent assurance. Was that something you were 22 aware of? 23 A. It's outside my knowledge. 24 Q. I understand. 25 A separate matter, please. Back to your statement 37 1 at page 24. At the top of the page, we had asked 2 a question in relation to -- we had asked: 3 "What were your views on decision taken around July 4 2007 that Transport Scotland should play a lesser role 5 in the governance of the project ... not be members of 6 the Tram Project Board?" 7 You replied: 8 "At the time I was surprised. I felt that 9 Transport Scotland were distancing themselves from 10 a project that was not going well. In my view, their 11 experience in governance of major transport projects 12 would have helped in forcing key issues to be 13 addressed." 14 What were the sorts of key issues that you consider 15 required to be forced to be addressed? 16 A. I think we've talked a lot about the accuracy of the 17 employer's requirements. It's issues like that, where 18 a third party asking the right questions might have 19 caused the project to maybe have that pause and 20 say: we're going to sort this out, we're going to get it 21 right, and then we're going to move on and we will take 22 the pain and consequences of the delay. That might have 23 been a better course of action. 24 I don't know if it would have been a better course 25 of action. But it may be that an organisation like 38 1 Transport Scotland could have influenced that. 2 Q. Presumably they would have had the clout both in terms 3 of their experience, but as the major funder? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Again, page 24 of your statement, please. Question 6 38a, we asked about your views on the governance 7 arrangements, and in your reply, towards the end, you 8 said: 9 "The governance process did not ... take appropriate 10 control of TIE's ever expanding organisation and enforce 11 appropriate rigorous processes within TIE to deliver 12 basic project management tasks such as the management of 13 change and have an integrated approach across the 14 project." 15 I think you explained your views on these matters 16 already; is that correct? 17 A. I believe I have nothing to add to that. 18 Q. The next question, please, on this page, under b., we 19 had asked: 20 "Do you consider that the duties, responsibilities 21 and reporting requirements of the different bodies were 22 sufficiently clear?" 23 I think that first paragraph of those in black text, 24 I think that is your reply; is that correct? 25 A. It looks like it. 39 1 Q. You say: 2 "With hindsight, if CEC as the most significant 3 client, did not provide clear leadership and had not 4 consistently shown that CEC wanted the tram system ..." 5 I wonder if maybe you were -- it's a halfway drafted 6 reply, perhaps? 7 A. It looks as if there's an extra word in there: 8 "With hindsight CEC as the most significant client 9 did not provide clear leadership ..." 10 Q. I see. In the last sentence you say: 11 "Much of this relates to having a lack of 12 experienced people in senior positions who understand 13 the complex nature of interfaces on a tram project." 14 The question of senior positions, is that in tie or 15 is that in various of the organisations involved? 16 A. That was within tie. Tram projects are genuinely really 17 complicated. It's a bit like putting a new railway 18 project, which is in itself hugely complicated, and then 19 putting that on the city streets, where you have to deal 20 with pedestrians, people, planning, buildings, and all 21 of the issues that go with running a city. They are one 22 of the most complicated projects that you can have. 23 And having people who actually understand those 24 matters at a senior level throughout the senior team, 25 I believe, reduces the risk of things going wrong, and 40 1 the overall level of understanding of tram projects that 2 was there, obviously it improved during the time there, 3 but early on some of the basics that I thought should 4 have been there in terms of knowledge clearly weren't, 5 and Transdev and my colleagues in SDS did spend quite 6 a lot of time trying to bring that understanding up to 7 date. 8 Q. Thank you. Go back to your statement, please. Top of 9 page 25. We asked, d.: 10 "Which body or organisation do you consider was 11 ultimately responsible for ensuring that the tram 12 project was delivered on time and within budget?" 13 You say: 14 "TEL, in my view." 15 A. That is clearly an error. I don't know how I managed to 16 write that. I intended to say "tie". 17 Q. I understand. Then back to the statement, please, again 18 at page 25, we'd also in question 39 asked for your 19 views on the main contractors in the project, and under 20 39a you replied: 21 "SDS performed well in a difficult environment of 22 a fluid project with multiple difficult stakeholders. 23 There were issues with programme delivery, process and 24 quality, but these were addressed and have been 25 addressed in the above questions." 41 1 The rest we can take as read. 2 Then finally, please, we see final thoughts towards 3 the bottom of the page, and we had asked how your 4 experience in Edinburgh compared with other projects you 5 had worked on, and you explain the other projects you 6 have worked on. 7 You then said that Edinburgh Trams looking back was 8 generally different in the following ways. 9 I think we can -- you explain that in most of these 10 matters already. 11 The second last bullet point: 12 "Lack of feeling been effectively led ..." 13 Which body or bodies would have required to have 14 provided that leadership? 15 A. Well, that leadership, I would have expected to come 16 from tie. When Mr Crawley appeared, we suddenly had 17 someone who was taking control and leading the 18 engineering team really effectively, and he was a very 19 welcome addition to the team with Mr Glazebrook. 20 But apart from that, up to that point I would have 21 expected to be sort of driven in a project management 22 sense to say: have you reviewed that; what are you doing 23 next week; show me, show me. 24 But it was not present to the extent that I had 25 expected. 42 1 Q. In the last bullet point you say: 2 "Lack of understanding of tram projects at a senior 3 level within the client body ..." 4 Just for clarification, who do you mean by "the 5 client body"? 6 A. tie in particular. You can't expect City of Edinburgh 7 Council to have a lot of understanding about trams, but 8 tie should be there to help CEC in the same way that CEC 9 should be there to help tie in terms of the interfaces 10 with the city. 11 Q. Sorry, if we turn over the page we see there's a comma 12 there, and over the page, we do see the word "tie". 13 So that was the right answer. 14 Then finally, under question b., we asked: 15 "Do you have any views on what were the main reasons 16 for the failure to deliver on time ..." 17 We can read that for ourselves. Just the last 18 bullet point, though: 19 "Lack of integrated programme management by TIE." 20 Can you explain that a little? 21 A. The overall visibility of the programme for what tie was 22 doing was not clear to me. It might have been there, 23 but it wasn't something that was obvious, and without 24 that detailed programme in terms of the steps on a month 25 by month and a week by week and a day by day basis, 43 1 there is a serious risk that things are just not going 2 to happen. 3 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions. 4 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I -- 5 A. Can I just add something? 6 MR MACKENZIE: Please. 7 A. I believe that what Edinburgh has now is an excellent 8 tram system. It operates well. It's reliable. And 9 technically it is good. So I think Edinburgh is in 10 a good place now. 11 So I like to think I have been party to helping that 12 along the way. 13 Questions by CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY 14 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I ask about two things. 15 First of all, you said towards the end that you 16 thought that tie was ultimately responsible for ensuring 17 that the tram project was delivered on time and within 18 budget. Can I just be quite clear about your thinking 19 in that regard. Is that simply because tie had or was 20 supposed to have the technical expertise that the city 21 fathers didn't have, or why do you not say that the city 22 was ultimately responsible? 23 A. That is also -- ultimately it's the funders who need to 24 be sure the project is a success. 25 Then there is a series of steps down until you get 44 1 to tie. tie was set up with the expertise and the 2 systems to be able to deliver it. So in my simple world 3 it was up to tie to deliver it with appropriate guidance 4 and monitoring by CEC. 5 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: The other thing I wanted to raise 6 with you, if you're able to comment on this, you will be 7 aware that there is in prospect an extension of the 8 tramline -- 9 A. Yes. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: -- to Newhaven. To what extent would 11 the integration of a new line depend upon using the same 12 system such as Siemens' systems? Or could they have 13 other systems that would fit in? 14 A. Certainly the easiest thing to do is to buy more of the 15 same because the alternative might be to have to throw 16 away everything you've got in that area and replace it, 17 and that is always very, very hard to do. 18 So sticking with the same control system is probably 19 the preferred engineering option. 20 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Is that preference increased or 21 reduced if, as part of the settlement, the city were 22 required to buy GBP19.5 million of equipment that 23 Siemens had pre-purchased? 24 A. I really don't want to be drawn on that. That's a very 25 difficult question to put to me at short notice. 45 1 But, as I said before, I do believe that the system 2 that you have now is sound and a good basis for 3 expansion. You do have sufficient trams to put on the 4 route. You know the route. A lot of the utilities 5 works has been done. So it should be a straightforward 6 process. 7 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: That may be a question properly for 8 somebody else, to ask about the prudence of that part of 9 the settlement. 10 I don't think anyone else has -- 11 Examination by MR DUNLOP QC 12 MR DUNLOP QC: My Lord, an issue does arise from an exchange 13 between my learned friend and the witness about half an 14 hour ago, not prefaced in the witness statement. 15 It relates to this. The witness was asked about his 16 understanding, admittedly not as a lawyer, of Schedule 17 Part 4. To be absolutely fair to the witness, he did 18 say: I'm not a lawyer and (b) I need to look at the 19 document as a whole. But the answer which he gave might 20 be thought to be potentially misleading. I'm either 21 content to leave it on the basis that your Lordship 22 would have to look at the document himself, but if 23 your Lordship is minded to pay any heed to what the 24 witness said as to what he as an engineer would have 25 made of the document, then in my submission it would be 46 1 helpful to spend a couple of minutes taking the witness 2 through the points of the parts that matter. 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I don't think you need bother 4 yourself about that, Mr Dunlop. I would anticipate that 5 in closing submissions, Counsel may well address that 6 matter, and certainly I will have to consider the 7 interpretation of the contract. 8 MR DUNLOP QC: Indeed so, I'm obliged. 9 A. I did feel uncomfortable when I was put with that 10 question. 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We don't want you to be 12 uncomfortable, Mr Harries. Thank you very much indeed 13 for your attendance. I'm sorry it spilled over to into 14 a second day. You're still technically under citation 15 and may be recalled if it was required, but I don't 16 anticipate that. 17 A. Thank you, my Lord. 18 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you very much for your help. 19 (The witness withdrew) 47 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR JIM HARRIES (continued) ...........................1 4 5 Examination by MR MACKENZIE (continued) .......1 6 7 Questions by CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY ............44 8 9 Examination by MR DUNLOP QC ..................46 10 11 MR ALEXANDER MACAULAY ..............................48 12 13 Examination by MR MACKENZIE ..................48 14 15 MS TRUDI CRAGGS (affirmed) ..........................93 16 17 Examination by MR MACKENZIE ..................93 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 197