1 Thursday, 5 October 2017 2 (9.30 am) 3 MR TONY GLAZEBROOK (continued) 4 Examination by MR MACKENZIE (continued) 5 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Good morning. You're still under 6 oath. 7 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. 8 Good morning, Mr Glazebrook. 9 A. Good morning. 10 Q. I would like you to turn to a document dated March 2008, 11 so just two months before the Infraco contract closed. 12 The reference number is CEC01526381. Go to page 6 13 of this document. I think we'll find this is Project 14 Manager's report, completed by Damian Sharp. 15 We see at the top, “Project Manager Period Progress 16 Report, Project Manager: Damian Sharp”. It's period 1. 17 I think that's period 12 of 2007. 18 I would like you then, please, to go to the next 19 page, page 7. If we can turn the document round, we 20 will see under "Project Risk ID": 21 "List the 5 most relevant to your work stream 22 (owned by Project Manager)." 23 If we see along those risk 52, then please go to 24 page 12 to see what that relates to. If we can blow the 25 top half of this page up, please, we can see the top 1 1 right-hand corner, risk ID 52. We can see "Area of Risk: 2 7.3 Infraco", and the Event, which I understand to be 3 the risk, is: 4 "Amendments to design scope from current baseline 5 and functional specification." 6 Now, we see your name, Mr Glazebrook, as owner of 7 that event or risk. Were you aware of that at the time? 8 A. Yes, I believe so. 9 Q. Do we see then under "Effect", we see: 10 "Programme delay as a result of re-work; Programme 11 delay due late receipt of change requirements and lack 12 of resolution; Scope/cost creep (dealt with through 13 change process); Project ultimately could become 14 unaffordable." 15 Under "Cause" we see: 16 "Political and/or Stakeholder objectives change or 17 require design developments that constitute a change of 18 scope; Planning Department requires scope over and above 19 baseline scope in order to give approval (may be as 20 a result of lack of agreement over interpretation of 21 planning legal requirements)." 22 The significance is high. We then see under 23 "Assessment Matrix", we see under the CAPEX Cost, the 24 capital expenditure cost, we see current figures of 25 essentially nil. Under "Programme", we see, under 2 1 number of weeks, 16.25. We then see under "Model 2 Notes": 3 "CEC to ... project scope and funding availability. 4 Capex change will now be dealt with through Change 5 Process therefore capex impact is nil. Late changes 6 will result in delay to programme." 7 Under "Probability" we see current remote 8 20 per cent. Planned residual nil. 9 Now, do you know, Mr Glazebrook, what is meant by 10 the sentence there: 11 "Capex change will now be dealt with through Change 12 Process therefore capex impact is nil." 13 A. Yes, Capex is capital expenditure. As to what the 14 sentence means, I don't particularly recognise that. 15 That's not to say it's a problem, but it wouldn't have 16 affected what I did because my prime role was the 17 resolution of problems in design. 18 Q. It may be we have to ask other witnesses who were 19 involved in the risk register, but in short, does that 20 sentence mean that there was no allowance made in the 21 quantified risk assessment for this risk? 22 A. I don't know. 23 Q. If we can scroll back up towards the top of the page, 24 please, and focus again on event, what this risk is, if 25 you had been asked for your views around this time -- 3 1 this is around March 2008 -- on the risk of amendment to 2 design scope from current baseline and functional 3 specification, what would you have replied? 4 A. I would have said the very last thing you want to do is 5 to introduce any more change at all. 6 Q. But in terms of that risk, and whether that remained 7 a risk, what would you have replied? 8 A. It's always a risk in any project, whether small or 9 large. People will want to change things, not because 10 of badness, but because they believe the present scope 11 is either wrong or inadequate, and sometimes that's only 12 revealed when design is in progress. 13 Q. Given the incomplete design and the outstanding 14 approvals and consents, given the problems with 15 misalignment between SDS design, the employer's 16 requirements and Infraco proposals, was there a fixed 17 baseline for design scope and functional specification? 18 A. Yes, I think so. The only reason I'm hesitating is that 19 because of the welter of documents comprising that 20 scope, sometimes it would not necessarily be apparent 21 until, as I said before, design had started, what the 22 actual full meaning and intent of a piece of scope might 23 be. 24 In other words, it's not always possible 25 unequivocally to say exactly what a piece of scope 4 1 means. 2 Q. If design is approximately 60 per cent complete, is 3 there a fixed baseline? 4 A. A fixed baseline of programme or design content or 5 scope? 6 Q. I'm just trying to understand what this risk relates to. 7 Amendments to design scope from current baseline and 8 functional specification. 9 A. I think what it's meaning here is -- and I wasn't the 10 person who wrote these words, they were risk people who 11 wrote these words. I think what it's trying to say is 12 that it's inevitable in all projects that things will be 13 very likely to change or people will want to change 14 them. 15 So in any project this sort of thing is always one 16 of the top risks. 17 Q. How about in a project where it is going to award the 18 construction contract for design on one view about 19 60 per cent complete? 20 A. It's unwise to proceed with awarding a contract with 21 such incomplete design and with such a high risk, 22 because clearly if the progress is well behind schedule, 23 then the risk can be none other than higher than it 24 would otherwise be. 25 Q. Thank you. Put that to one side now, please, and revert 5 1 to your statement, please, at page 31. In question 55, 2 towards the bottom, if we blow that up, we can see this 3 refers to a report. You won't have seen this at the 4 time. It's to the Council's Internal Planning Group on 5 16 April, and it sets out the position with the planning 6 prior approvals and technical consents. 7 In this report we can see the bottom of the page the 8 words in bold, the sentence: 9 "There is potential for the approvals to cause 10 a delay to the construction programme." 11 If we then go over the page, please, we asked you 12 various questions about this. In sub-question 1 -- we 13 asked: 14 "What was your understanding of, and views on, these 15 matters?" 16 You said: 17 "This was hardly surprising. For all of the reasons 18 already included in my answers, this result was 19 inevitable." 20 As I understand it, that is in response to the 21 sentence in the report that there is potential for the 22 approvals to cause a delay to the construction 23 programme; is that correct? 24 A. That's correct. 25 Q. I would like now, please, to move on to events around 6 1 the time of financial close. So on 14 and 15 May 2008, 2 the Infraco contract was awarded and certain other 3 agreements were entered into. 4 Could we start, please, at page 32 of your 5 statement, and in question 56, under sub-question 1, we 6 asked: 7 "What was your general understanding at that time of 8 the extent to which design was incomplete and/or that 9 completed design was liable to change?" 10 You say you don't recall the detail, but I think we 11 can help with that by going to another document, namely 12 the SDS Novation Agreement. One of the schedules tells 13 us the state of design at that time. 14 So if we could go, please, to CEC01370880. We can 15 blow this up, we can see this is the Novation of Design 16 Services Agreement between tie, Infraco and 17 Parsons Brinckerhoff. If we then please go to page 81, 18 we can see this is Appendix Part 4 of the Agreement. If 19 we can go to page 84, please, we can see in paragraph 1, 20 "Introduction", it tells us at the top: 21 "This document defines the status of the SDS 22 Agreement between tie and SDS at the point of Novation. 23 The report details: The status of deliverables completed 24 to date ..." 25 If we then, please, go to page 85, we can see we are 7 1 told under, firstly, 5.1.2, the detailed design packages 2 status as at 13 May 2008 of a total number of packages 3 of 329, the total delivered are 296 and the total 4 remaining to be delivered are 333. 5 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: No, 33. 6 MR MACKENZIE: Sorry, my Lord. Total remaining is 33, yes. 7 Thank you, my Lord. 8 Just to pause there, Mr Glazebrook, just checking 9 back, we saw earlier -- we looked at November 2007, an 10 email had told us the status then. I think at that 11 point, 227 out of 344 had been delivered. So there's 12 certainly been further progress between the 227 in 13 November 2007 and the 296 delivered as at this date, but 14 for some reason, the total number of packages has fallen 15 from, in November, 344 down to 329 in May 2008. 16 Do you know why the total number of packages fell? 17 A. No. No, I don't. 18 Q. It may or may not matter. I don't know. 19 A. It's probably because of definition rather than because 20 of actual content. The overall content would have been 21 the same, but perhaps they were packaged slightly 22 differently. 23 Q. I understand. Under 5.1.3, "Prior Approvals", we see 24 out of a total number of approvals of 63, 22 have been 25 approved and 41 are remaining. 8 1 Lastly, under 5.1.4, under "Technical Approvals", we 2 see out of 128, 30 have been approved and 98 are 3 remaining. 4 To pause there, Mr Glazebrook, am I right in my 5 understanding that technical approvals mainly concern 6 roads approvals and structures? 7 A. Yes, that's correct. 8 Q. Presumably with roads approvals, the final approval will 9 depend on the results of final traffic modelling; is 10 that correct? 11 A. I don't know about that. That's the first time I have 12 heard such a statement. 13 I think it's important to recognise that technical 14 approvals and prior approvals are only part of the 15 overall approval process. 16 In the design management plan we laid out with the 17 agreement of SDS that as well as those approvals, we 18 needed to have this thing called a design assurance or 19 design verification statement in which the design was 20 described and matched against the overall requirements, 21 and indeed the closure of risks, to show that the whole 22 package or packages complied with all reasonable 23 requirements, and there was a demonstration within that 24 design assurance statement from SDS that that was the 25 case. 9 1 But at this point, none of those design verification 2 statements had been offered nor accepted. So this is 3 a misleading picture. 4 Q. In what way is it a misleading picture? 5 A. It's misleading because it doesn't show the whole 6 picture. It doesn't give any indication of what could 7 change in addition to these things because, as you can 8 imagine, in a place like Edinburgh, particularly with 9 street running, the risks are very considerable. Safety 10 risks to people. All of those risks had to be evaluated 11 and closed with the assistance of the independent 12 competent person who was the person that really 13 represented the Government, and said that the way in 14 which the design had proceeded and had been done not 15 only complied with the specification, but was safe and 16 fit for purpose to be approved to run in public service. 17 So this picture here includes none of those 18 activities at all. And those activities took up a lot 19 of time. 20 Q. In terms of -- I think you said, it doesn't give 21 indication of what could change in addition to these 22 things. So what could change? Do you mean the existing 23 design could change? Do you mean existing approvals 24 could change? Or what? 25 A. All of those things. I mean, an instance might be 10 1 Carrick Knowe viaduct, where there was a lot of 2 discussion about things like drainage to avoid problems 3 with foundations. There were issues subsequent to this 4 around public access. There were issues around things 5 as simple even as the parapet design, and all of those 6 things or -- and more would have taken place after this 7 date. 8 Q. So in short, when you say these three paragraphs, 5.1.2, 9 5.1.3, 5.1.4, when you say these paragraphs give 10 a misleading picture, do you mean by that that things 11 are more fixed than are shown or things are less fixed 12 than are shown? 13 A. Less fixed. 14 Q. I understand. Thank you. 15 If we could then please revert back to your 16 statement, please, to page 32. In question 56, back to 17 answer 1, you explained that: 18 "Any informed person would have foreseen the 19 problems that would arise in proceeding headlong with 20 incomplete design." 21 Just for clarification, by "proceeding headlong", do 22 you mean by awarding an Infraco contract? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Could I then please take you to another document at this 25 time. It is USB00000032. It will come up in a second, 11 1 but this is the pricing schedule to the Infraco 2 contract, Schedule Part 4. 3 Now, did you see this document at the time in 4 May 2008? 5 A. No, never saw that. 6 Q. Presumably you had no involvement in the negotiation or 7 drafting of this document? 8 A. Specifically excluded from such things. 9 Q. Now, I think you have -- you were sent it by the 10 Inquiry, I think; is that correct? 11 A. Pardon? 12 Q. You were sent it by the Inquiry as part of taking your 13 statement? 14 A. Possibly. I don't recall looking at it because, having 15 not seen it before, there would perhaps have been no 16 point looking at it now. 17 Q. Okay. Could we then please go to page 3. Under 18 clause 2.3, you will see a reference to the base date 19 design information means: 20 "... the design information drawings issued to 21 Infraco up to and including 25 November 2007 listed in 22 Appendix H to this Schedule Part 4." 23 Then please go to Appendix H at page 53 of this 24 document. If we blow up the top of the page, we see the 25 drawings aren't listed, but instead simply one sentence: 12 1 "All of the Drawings available to Infraco up to and 2 including 25 November 2007." 3 If we then please go back to your statement at 4 page 33, in sub-answer 5, we asked in short why Appendix 5 H didn't contain a list of drawings comprising the base 6 date information. You replied: 7 "Another example of commercial ignorance and 8 impracticality, tabled solely to maintain a programme 9 and the impression of robust progress, but inevitably 10 leading to financial disaster." 11 Are you able to expand upon that a little? 12 A. Not really. I mean, I do clearly recall that on many 13 occasions, the commercial people again specifically 14 excluded us from the provision of data, information or 15 involvement. 16 So if things were given to others without our 17 knowledge, I would not only have no knowledge of them, 18 but I wouldn't be able to underwrite them or make any 19 comment on them. But it happened time and time again. 20 So that's why I wrote that rather emotive comment, 21 because it was, in my experience, in my judgment, a very 22 foolish thing to do. 23 Q. Now, go back, please, to the Infraco Schedule Part 4, 24 please, to page 5. There's one last part I would like 25 to put to you for your views. 13 1 It's USB00000032 at page 5. 2 At the bottom we see, under 3.4: 3 "Pricing Assumptions are ..." 4 We see 1. 5 So in short, Mr Glazebrook, imagine that on this one 6 occasion, the commercial team did involve you. Let's 7 say they come to you in early May and say: we plan to 8 put this into the contract, what's your understanding of 9 it? I'll just give you a couple of minutes to read 10 what's on the screen, please. (Pause) 11 It goes over the page, when you're ready. 12 A. Can I just comment on that, first of all. Pricing 13 assumptions, section 1, the first thing I notice is the 14 use of the word "normal". There was nothing normal 15 about this project whatsoever. So any assumptions about 16 what might happen on a normal project were invalid in 17 terms of this one. 18 Again, just quickly looking through, it would be 19 completely unreasonable to expect that there was 20 anything fixed about the design at all. The reason for 21 that was there were so many disputes between the various 22 parties involved, not because of design incompetence but 23 because of different views about scope, content, detail, 24 everything else, it was just not the case that design 25 was at all fixed. It just couldn't be. 14 1 The key thing is it's -- again, to use my favourite 2 word, it's foolish to regard this as a normal project 3 and to proceed along lines as if it is, when it clearly 4 isn't. 5 Q. Perhaps go over the page so you can see the rest of this 6 clause. Blow up 1.3 and then the paragraph below that. 7 That completes this pricing assumption. 8 A. Yes, I mean, that statement is the sort of thing that 9 would apply again on a normal project that was 10 proceeding to programme with the right degree of 11 teamwork, collaboration involvement, but that was not 12 the case. 13 So sort of boilerplate text like this is not 14 a reasonable thing to base a contract on, in my opinion. 15 Q. Just to test this, Mr Glazebrook, take this out of the 16 context of the tram project. Let's say this was 17 a normal project. On that hypothesis, if you had been 18 asked for your view on this pricing assumption, and in 19 particular if you had been asked: do you understand, as 20 somebody involved in design and as Engineering Director, 21 what this means; what would you have said? 22 A. If it were a project where design was well founded, the 23 scope was well understood, the parties were all engaged 24 and collaborating, this would be a valid comment. 25 Every project, however well founded, will inevitably 15 1 have some sort of development. But because in real life 2 projects, sometimes it's not until you start to build 3 that you discover some problems, that might be due to 4 things in the ground. It might be due to adjacent 5 buildings. It might be kinetic envelope. It could be 6 a multitude of things which are not always absolutely 7 possible to pin down. 8 So every project has some, as they say here, 9 development, but this project was not one of those. 10 Q. Taking us back to this project, if you had been asked 11 for your views in early May 2008 about in some way 12 fixing the price to the design available as at 13 November 2007, what would you have said? 14 A. I would have said I don't see how you could possibly do 15 that, other than price in a giant amount for risk which 16 may or may not arise; risk in that context meaning the 17 risk of the design proceeding in a way that couldn't 18 have been foreseen. 19 Q. Finally on this point, we are likely to hear evidence 20 that tie understood that the contractor had accepted 21 responsibility for normal design development. If that 22 had been suggested to you at the time, would you have 23 had any views on that? 24 A. I think I would have been surprised, but having worked 25 in contracting myself, I know that sometimes you have to 16 1 do that to win a contract that you want or need, and the 2 only defence for the contractor in a situation like that 3 is to make pricing provisions to cover all reasonable 4 outcomes. But it's very difficult to do so, especially 5 when your design is so far from completion. 6 Q. By making pricing provisions, is that essentially to 7 allow for risk premium? 8 A. Exactly so. 9 Q. Thank you. I would like to move on from that document, 10 please, and look at the question of the development of 11 design and the problems experienced after May 2008, 12 after financial close. 13 If we can go, please, back to your statement at 14 page 33. In question 58, towards the bottom, we had 15 asked by way of overview, in relation to the design work 16 carried out after Infraco contract closed and SDS 17 novation, in sub-question 2, we asked: what were your 18 duties and responsibilities after close. You said: 19 "Unchanged, because by then Mr Sharp was the SDS 20 project manager. My role was to review and accept 21 offered design packages ..." 22 Your use of the word "offered", Mr Glazebrook, did 23 that in any way reflect the changed role of tie, in that 24 obviously after novation, the contractor were now the 25 client under the SDS contract? 17 1 A. No, I didn't mean it in that context. 2 What I mean in this case by the use of the word 3 "offered" is that is a design package which is offered 4 for acceptance along our design management plan process. 5 In other words, it's one that is offered for the risks 6 to be shown to have been closed, and all the provisions 7 of the design assurance statement to have been completed 8 satisfactorily. 9 Q. Now, we, I think, had seen yesterday -- I took you to 10 the clause in the SDS contract which dealt with the 11 client representative, and one of the duties was to 12 supervise the day-to-day service provided by SDS. 13 Presumably that would now be the role of the contractor, 14 Bilfinger Berger Siemens consortium. They were now the 15 clients. It was now their role. They were now the 16 client representative under the contract; is that 17 correct? 18 A. I can't answer that question. I just don't know. 19 Q. Sorry? 20 A. I don't know. 21 Q. But is it your understanding that the effect of the 22 novation of contract was that the Bilfinger consortium 23 stepped into the shoes of tie as client under that 24 contract? 25 A. That's not how it worked. 18 1 Q. How did it work? 2 A. It continued as before, where tie, that is me and my 3 group, were the people -- as far as I was aware, and it 4 never changed, we were charged with a duty to review 5 design and ensure that it met the provisions of the 6 design assurance statement process. 7 There was never any suggestion that that would 8 change. Nobody wanted it to change. It didn't change. 9 And it worked or was starting to work satisfactorily. 10 Q. Now, you say that is not how the contract novation 11 worked, and that Bilfinger consortium didn't step into 12 the shoes of tie. Was your understanding that is how it 13 was supposed to have worked? 14 A. I don't know. At no time was I told that the way in 15 which we worked was going to be different. So we not 16 unreasonably carried on as we always had been. 17 I don't really see how, with the organisational 18 arrangements at that time, tie could have just been, if 19 you like, abolished and the consortium put into the 20 position of accepting themselves all offered design, 21 because a contractor can't be a client. 22 Q. So at the time after novation in May 2008, no one spoke 23 to you and said: right, let's all change, here is the 24 new set-up. 25 A. They didn't, but I don't see how it could be, because 19 1 the client still has to be the one that takes the risk, 2 as I understand it, for the design being correct and 3 safe and operable. 4 Q. Now, moving on to this question, we know that there 5 continued to be delays in completing design and 6 obtaining all of the approvals and consents. In a word, 7 why? 8 A. I think in any situation where substantially things 9 haven't changed in terms of processes, procedures, 10 attitudes, organisational arrangements, it's inevitable 11 that the problems that occurred before will continue. 12 It was apparent to me that once Infraco had come on 13 board, they had a genuine and evidential desire to bring 14 to a close the many outstanding design issues, and my 15 recollection is that they were very helpful in trying to 16 bring that resolution about. 17 Q. I think we know, come Mar Hall, in March 2011, even at 18 that stage design wasn't complete. Not all approvals 19 and consents had been obtained. For somebody outside 20 the project, it may seem quite remarkable that almost 21 three years after novation, design was still incomplete. 22 Do you have any comments on that? 23 A. It was remarkable to me as well. But at that time, that 24 was the time, that was a point where I left in 25 March 2011, and Mar Hall, I think, was around that time. 20 1 I would say the relationship, contractual 2 relationship had become toxic. I would strongly 3 emphasise that the engineering relationship was anything 4 but toxic. It was almost as if there were two projects. 5 There were those who wanted it to proceed, who wanted to 6 complete design, and there were those who seemed, for 7 reasons I don't understand and still am amazed at, 8 seemed to direct their energies into confrontation, 9 rather than collaboration. It was almost as if the 10 project had become two. 11 Those who wanted to succeed and those who didn't. 12 Q. So if the engineers worked well together, why couldn't 13 the engineers discuss and agree the remaining design 14 issues? 15 A. Because of the lack of co-ordination within the project 16 as a whole. So we could decide things and then it 17 seemed that others could countermand them and say no, 18 stop progress in that direction. 19 Q. So just to be absolutely clear, who were these other 20 people you were talking about, who would countermand 21 these things? 22 A. Well, we never really knew. It was -- it might appear 23 that from one week to the next what you thought you'd 24 agreed the previous week was not now happening, but the 25 reasons why were never apparent to me. 21 1 The organisation by then had grown quite large 2 within tie, and quite complex, and even more 3 uncoordinated, and as I mentioned, it was as if the 4 imperative was all about money and contractual 5 conditions, rather than actually getting fixation on the 6 design. 7 But as to who caused these and why they caused them, 8 I have no idea. We just found it increasingly 9 frustrating to maintain progress. 10 Q. It's quite a serious allegation to make, Mr Glazebrook, 11 that the engineers are trying to agree design and some 12 other people, who are unnamed, are trying to 13 deliberately stop that. 14 So I think out of fairness to those unnamed 15 individuals, you'll have to try and say who they are. 16 Otherwise they won't have a right of reply? 17 A. I'm not saying anybody deliberately tried to mess things 18 up, but that certainly seemed to us to be the result. 19 It was very frustrating. But there were so many people 20 involved in some of these issues, to attempt to say who, 21 when and why, would be impossible for me. Because 22 I just didn't know. 23 Q. Well, in what way were things countermanded? Was it by 24 email? Was it verbally, or what? 25 A. You have to remember that our -- my role was to help to 22 1 resolve engineering problems and to accept design 2 offered for final resolution to show risks and so on had 3 been closed. 4 So that being the case, that being our focus, the 5 very last thing we would have had time to do or the 6 desire to do would be to delve into the reasons why 7 things on week 2 were not as we thought they might have 8 been on week 1. 9 Q. I don't think I asked the reasons; I think I just asked 10 how were things countermanded. Was it by email, 11 verbally, how it was done? 12 A. It was not apparent to me. We just discovered that 13 things were changing. 14 Q. So you're unable to be any more specific about these 15 matters? 16 A. I can't be any more specific because I just don't know. 17 Q. If we can please go back to your statement, to page 34, 18 towards the bottom, sub-question 6, please, we asked: 19 "More generally, what difficulties and delays were 20 experienced in the completion of design after ... 21 novation?" 22 You responded: 23 "Infraco changed many designs apparently to suit 24 their own design and risk agenda. This resulted in 25 further cost and time escalation." 23 1 Can you give examples even by general areas where 2 Infraco changed many designs? 3 A. I think this related to some of the structures outwith 4 the road running section, street running section. 5 I can't recall the detail because it's so long ago, but 6 I do recall that there were cases where previously 7 offered design had become changed. 8 Now, possibly where in this sentence here I have 9 used the words "to suit their own design and risk 10 agenda", I think the reason I used those words is 11 possibly because that is the impression I got from 12 others within the commercial group out at 13 Edinburgh Park. Because at that time there were lots of 14 people saying lots of things about everything under the 15 sun, and there seemed to be this aura around that things 16 were being changed not because they necessarily needed 17 to be, but because Infraco might have, for instance, 18 believed that ground investigation for a particular 19 structure was inadequate, and it had to be done again or 20 done more of, which might have led to, for instance, 21 larger foundations or bigger things to reduce the 22 likelihood of any physical problem arising later on. 23 Q. I understand. If we go back to your statement, please, 24 to page 34 and to sub-question 7, we had asked: 25 "What were the main reasons for these difficulties 24 1 and delays?" 2 You responded: 3 "Finished design was sometimes rejected by the 4 Infraco themselves; they appeared to distrust existing 5 SDS design." 6 Is this a similar point to the one you have just 7 made or is this a new point? 8 A. It's really a similar point. The reason I put that in 9 is that sometimes I'd -- I'd go down outwith a meeting, 10 go down and talk to SDS designers, and sometimes there 11 appeared to be a slight sense of frustration that they 12 thought things had been fixed and they weren't. But as 13 to why, I don't know because that interface was directly 14 between Infraco and SDS. 15 Q. Now, on this issue of Infraco being able to change SDS 16 design after contract award, presumably if the SDS 17 design had been complete before contract award, and if 18 it had been aligned with the employer's requirements and 19 the contract, then presumably Infraco would have been 20 obliged to construct according to that design and there 21 would have been little scope for Infraco to change that 22 design? 23 A. Exactly so. 24 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Can I just go back and ask you about 25 the contractor having some concerns about the adequacy 25 1 of ground investigations for a structure. 2 If a contractor thought that, what would normally 3 happen? 4 A. In such case they would want to do more, and the reason 5 for that is, I guess any designer would be risking their 6 reputation, and indeed risking the safety of the 7 delivered product, if they proceeded where there were 8 elements of the design that they were not sure of. It's 9 as simple as that really. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So the contractor would then 11 presumably speak with the client and express its 12 concerns about the adequacy of ground investigations. 13 A. Possibly. Such -- yes, that's a fair comment. Such 14 discussions I don't recall taking place with the 15 engineering team. They may well have taken place within 16 the commercial team who might have been presented, if 17 you like, with a bill for some more ground 18 investigation. They might have said why, and the 19 designer, the Infraco might well have said something 20 like: well, there were 20 holes, but we have reason to 21 believe from observation of the pools of water on the 22 ground that we need 30 holes, sort of thing. 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: This is boreholes? 24 A. Yes. 25 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 26 1 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. 2 Go to another document, please, now. TIE00500425. 3 Now, this is the minute, you can see from the top -- 4 blow up the top, perhaps. “BSC/SDS Design Assurance, 5 16 September 2008”. You were one of the people present, 6 Mr Glazebrook. 7 If we then scroll down to purpose, and we see the 8 purpose of this meeting was: 9 "To enable tie/CEC to understand how SDS will issue 10 complete, coherent, assured design which will be 11 ultimately acceptable. This is against the background 12 of: Continuing programme slippage; IFC design preceding 13 full IDC and DAS processes." 14 I think is IDC interdisciplinary check? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. And DAS must be design assurance statement? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. Then: 19 "The plethora of CEC comments still arising on 20 approvals submissions ..." 21 I just take you to this document, Mr Glazebrook. 22 I wonder whether this may be an example of the sort of 23 issues and difficulties still being experienced with 24 design after financial close; is that correct? 25 A. Absolutely. 27 1 Q. I don't think the document itself has any particular 2 value. 3 If we could then please go to March 2011, the 4 Mar Hall mediation. I don't think you had any part in 5 the mediation; is that correct? 6 A. I didn't have any part at all. I didn't even know it 7 was happening. 8 Q. If we then please go to another document which reports 9 on progress after the agreement reached at mediation; 10 the document is CEC02083973. 11 We can see the top right-hand corner, this is 12 a report on progress since completion of Heads of Terms 13 to 8 April 2011. 14 If we scroll down, we can see all the logos of the 15 Council, Bilfinger, Siemens. We can see the report is 16 prepared by Colin Smith of HG Consulting, and at the 17 bottom right-hand corner, it's been reviewed by 18 Martin Foerder and Mr Brandenburger for the BBS 19 consortium. 20 If we go, please, to -- essentially this is, as it 21 states, reporting on progress since the Heads of Terms 22 agreed at Mar Hall. 23 If we go, please, to page 118 and see what it tells 24 us about design. 25 Over the page, please. Sorry, I think it was 28 1 page 118. Could we blow up the page, please. 2 So this is an email from Andy Conway, 5 April 2011, 3 sent to Sue Bruce and others, subject, "Tram - CEC 4 Approvals". 5 Mr Conway is giving an update. Scroll down to the 6 table. I think we'll see something quite dramatic. 7 So we can see as of 24 March 2011, the open or 8 outstanding technical approval comments were 2,782. 9 Within about two weeks, by the bottom of the table, 10 5 April 2011, that was down to 85. So what appears to 11 have happened is that, in short, all these outstanding 12 matters have been cleared within about two weeks. 13 Did you play any part in that process, 14 Mr Glazebrook? 15 A. That was just about exactly the time when I left the 16 project. I recall that Andy, who was a very 17 well-intentioned and effective person for CEC, had begun 18 to galvanise his team and enlarge his team to address 19 all the comments and try and close the issues, and 20 I don't personally recall being involved in that, but 21 I know there was a lot of CEC activity around that time, 22 which was very encouraging and was the right thing to 23 do. It was a shame it hadn't happened a lot earlier, 24 but at least it happened then. 25 That appears to show the success of what I said 29 1 yesterday many times, which is that when people engage 2 and collaborate, this is exactly the sort of 3 dramatically beneficial result that ensues. 4 Q. Is there any reason why the sort of clearance we see in 5 this table couldn't have happened much earlier? 6 A. The only reason would be, as I said, the lack of 7 engagement, possibly of lack of experience. What I mean 8 by that is that in any acceptance scenario, it's very 9 hard to get a complex design which could possibly fulfil 10 all specification criteria. It's almost impossible. 11 What is needed in such a case is for people like 12 Andy, in the case of the Council, who have many years' 13 experience of looking at stuff and understanding, 14 I guess, you could say what really matters and what 15 matters less and can be tolerated; and certainly his 16 involvement around then increased, and his skill and 17 experience and judgment and ability to balance the 18 opposing factors of: yes, maybe that's what we want, but 19 we have to accept this slight deviation from that for 20 practical progress reasons; and it probably reflects his 21 involvement, and as I say, the galvanising of his team 22 into problem resolution mode, rather than rejection 23 mode. 24 Q. Yes. I may have to ask others, but the answer may be 25 very simply that direction came from the top: sort this 30 1 out. 2 A. Could well be, yes. 3 Q. Then just to complete this document, at page 120, 4 please, we can see just really to note this. If we blow 5 up this page a little, if we can. We see under "Design 6 Issues": 7 "Timelines for close out of design." 8 Then: 9 "CEC have stated that timeline for Airport to 10 Haymarket is 7 April 2011 which concurs with Infraco 11 understanding; however, CEC believe deadline for 12 remainder of route is 1 September 2011. Infraco 13 understand that deadline is end of April 2011 and are 14 aiming for this date. To date, CEC and Infraco working 15 very well together to close out remaining issues." 16 I think in short there seems to have been an 17 intention to close out any and all outstanding design by 18 either 7 April or, at the latest, 1 September 2011. 19 Again, in short, is there any reason why that 20 couldn't have happened much earlier? 21 A. The Airport to Haymarket section of course is not street 22 running. So it's in acceptance and risk terms, it's 23 somewhat easier than the street running bit from 24 Haymarket to York Place. 25 The majority of planning, Historic Scotland's public 31 1 realm drainage, those sort of issues, they occurred on 2 the section from Haymarket to York Place. So that was 3 always a harder section to get to closure on. 4 Q. Thank you. We can put that document to one side. 5 Just a few final questions arising from your 6 statement, Mr Glazebrook. I'm not going to ask you 7 about MUDFA and MUDFA design, because I think you have 8 said your role in that was peripheral, and that was for 9 others to manage; is that correct? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. Perhaps, I think, Graeme Barclay was tie's MUDFA 12 manager. Is he the main witness we should ask MUDFA 13 questions to? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. So finally the question of management and governance. 16 If we go, for example, to page 44 of your statement, and 17 towards the bottom, question 81, we had asked, in the 18 first sub-question: 19 "Did you have any concerns, at any stage, in 20 relation to TIE's management of the tram project?" 21 You said: 22 "The Chairmen and Board were distant and 23 disconnected." 24 Pause there to clarify one thing. A number of times 25 in your statement, Mr Glazebrook, you refer to the Board 32 1 as having either done something or ought to have done 2 something. By the Board, do you mean the Board of tie 3 ltd or the Tram Project Board or what? 4 A. I think by that comment, I really mean the people above 5 the Project Director. So my use of the word "Board" is 6 a general term. 7 Q. Well, tie Ltd or also the Tram Project Board? 8 A. I think in answer to that particular question, probably 9 both. 10 Q. When you say: 11 "The Chairmen and Board were distant and 12 disconnected. Their focus became one of keeping the 13 media happy, without necessarily finding out what 14 actually was happening." 15 Does that comment relate to before May 2008 contract 16 closed, also to after then, or what? 17 A. Throughout. At no time did I see any meaningful 18 presence on site or discussing with people like myself 19 and my team, or indeed with sitting down with SDS or 20 Infraco in a fact-finding sense. 21 That just didn't happen. It's always -- it's 22 inevitable that if you have a project which is managed 23 by email and meeting, it will cause decisions to be made 24 on the basis of presented words, rather than necessarily 25 actual fact. 33 1 Q. Now, when you say a project managed by email and 2 meeting, how do you say a project ought to be managed? 3 A. I'm sorry? Say that again? 4 Q. I'm sorry. You say that when you have a project which 5 is managed by email and meeting. I'm just wondering how 6 else should one manage a project that's not by email and 7 meeting? 8 A. If it's evident -- if I were a chairman of a board or 9 whatever, and whenever I have been in charge of 10 significant-sized organisations, when things start to go 11 wrong, you have two choices. You can just listen to the 12 things that are presented to you or you can actually 13 take the trouble to go out and find out from the front 14 line, from the coalface, metaphors such as that, what 15 actually is happening from the people who are facing the 16 day-to-day issues. But that was entirely absent. 17 Q. So that's the key to it? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. It's not the board and chairmen meeting their more 20 senior staff. It requires the board and the chair to go 21 and speak to the people at the coalface? 22 A. Yes, not to do so is foolish, in my opinion. 23 Q. You also say in your answer that: 24 "The senior project team enjoyed flexing their egos 25 and didn't understand teamwork." 34 1 What do you mean by that sentence? 2 A. I don't think I can really add to that. It's 3 self-evident that had the teamwork been effective, a lot 4 of these problems would have been managed out, designed 5 out, would have disappeared. But they didn't. It just 6 seemed to be the case that the ethos got more and more 7 toxic and less and less effective and focused on 8 problem-solving. 9 Q. I understand the reference to teamwork. I think I'm 10 less sure by what you mean by "flexing ... egos"? 11 A. I'm sure that you can imagine that if you have a senior 12 team full of people who have lots of diverse experience 13 and, indeed, their own personalities, that sometimes it 14 can be the case that personalities supplant other 15 behaviours. 16 Q. Again, for the avoidance of doubt, who do you mean by 17 the "senior project team"? 18 A. The people at my level, in other words, underneath the 19 Project Director. It was very frustrating at that time. 20 Exceptionally frustrating. 21 Q. Sorry, do you say "the people ... in other words, 22 underneath the Project Director"? 23 A. Pardon? 24 Q. Did you say "the people ... underneath the Project 25 Director"? 35 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. So can you give us any examples? 3 A. I would prefer not to. 4 Q. The difficulty I think is, Mr Glazebrook, when you make 5 essentially allegations against people without naming 6 them, it's very hard for them to have the right to reply 7 because they don't know if they're among the people 8 being accused of something or not. 9 A. Yes, I understand that remark. What I'm trying to 10 convey here is my feeling. The question is: did you 11 have any concerns? And I'm trying to answer that 12 question. 13 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So you are saying that your feelings 14 in this regard relate to managers at the same level as 15 you? 16 A. Yes. 17 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Is that all of them or is it -- are 18 there any exceptions? 19 A. I think the best way I can answer that is to say that, 20 again, it's sort of self-evident that -- the word 21 I would use is the toxicity of the relationship at that 22 time between the main parties, being tie and Infraco, 23 had become so bad that progress was painfully slow, 24 very, very difficult. Again, I feel that it's -- the 25 results speak for themselves. Had it been 36 1 a relationship founded on a more professional, objective 2 rather than subjective approach to collaborating, the 3 results would have been such that, for instance, the 4 Mar Hall mediation would not have been required. 5 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Well, I can understand that, but 6 you're speaking about the egos of individuals somehow 7 inhibiting progress here, and is it possible to 8 elaborate upon that? 9 A. I would prefer that my words stand as I've written them 10 there. As I say, this is the impression. It's an 11 impression based on my day-to-day experience which was 12 exceptionally frustrating and made me frankly glad to be 13 relieved of continuing on the project from that point 14 onwards. 15 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. Just finally in this answer, 16 Mr Glazebrook, you say that it seemed to you as though 17 the commercial team were focused on numbers arising from 18 stuff they didn't understand. By the stuff they didn't 19 understand, by that do you mean engineering and design 20 matters. 21 A. Exactly so. 22 Q. Thank you. I think finally, if I could then please go 23 to page 45 of your statement. We asked you some final 24 thoughts in question 84. 25 Just before I put these matters to you, could I ask 37 1 you this question. Which body or organisation did you 2 understand was in charge of the tram project? 3 A. tie. 4 Q. Was that throughout your involvement? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Then under question 84, we asked for any final comments 7 you had, and one, how your experience of the tram 8 project compared with other projects you had been 9 involved in. I think we can see what you say there. 10 Then in sub-question 2 we asked: 11 "Do you have any comments, with the benefit of 12 hindsight, on how the design difficulties and delays 13 might have been avoided or reduced ..." 14 You say: 15 "Clear specification." 16 Does that come back to what we discussed earlier as 17 the Council requiring to give clear specification, or is 18 it a reference to something else? 19 A. It's principally the Council's requirements, yes. 20 Q. Organisational clarity, I think we can understand. 21 You refer to experienced people. In which roles? 22 A. In all roles involving design principally, but actually 23 in all roles generally. 24 I think if people are experienced in major complex 25 multi-disciplinary projects generally, they inherently 38 1 will understand better who should do what and why it's 2 better that they do so. In other words, to reduce the 3 risk arising of pots being stirred, if you like, by 4 people where the results will be less beneficial. 5 Q. Did you consider that experience was in any way lacking 6 within tie? 7 A. Absolutely. 8 Q. Any particular posts or is it a comment on the 9 organisation in general? 10 A. It's a general comment. 11 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. I have no further questions. 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: It might be suggested that some of 13 the people in tie had experience of being involved in 14 other contracts, but is the point that you're making 15 that it's not a case of finding a group of individuals 16 who have been involved in a project. What you're 17 looking for is a team who have experience as a team of 18 working in a project of this sort? 19 A. Yes. Yes, I agree with that. 20 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 21 I don't think anyone else has any questions. So 22 thank you very much, Mr Glazebrook. You're free to go. 23 Technically you're still subject to a citation and may 24 be recalled, but I hope that's not necessary. Thank you 25 very much. 39 1 A. That's fine, thank you. 2 (The witness withdrew) 40 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR TONY GLAZEBROOK (continued) .......................1 4 5 Examination by MR MACKENZIE (continued) .......1 6 7 MR DAMIAN SHARP (affirmed) ..........................40 8 9 Examination by MR LAKE .......................40 10 11 Examination by MR MACKENZIE ..................74 12 13 Questions by CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY ...........196 14 15 MR JIM HARRIES (affirmed) ..........................198 16 17 Examination by MR MACKENZIE .................198 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 208