1 Wednesday, 11 October 2017 3 (3.52 pm) 4 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Mackenzie. 5 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. The next witness is 6 Steve Reynolds. 7 MR STEVE REYNOLDS (affirmed) 8 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Have a seat, Mr Reynolds. I'm sorry 9 you've been delayed in the start. The other -- the 10 previous witness took longer than scheduled. 11 A. Not a problem, thank you. 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: If you just listen to the questions 13 and answer them as directly as possible, and if it's 14 capable of a yes answer or a no answer, then that should 15 be the answer, subject to any qualifications you might 16 then want to add. 17 Could I also ask you to speak clearly into the 18 microphone and reasonably slowly, because the shorthand 19 writers have to keep up with you. 20 A. Okay. 21 Examination by MR MACKENZIE 22 MR MACKENZIE: Good afternoon. 23 A. Good afternoon. 24 Q. Could you state your full name, please? 25 A. My name is Stephen Christopher Reynolds. 172 1 Q. And your current occupation? 2 A. My current occupation is retired from my full-time role 3 with WSP, but I'm currently on a zero hours contract 4 with WSP for consultancy services. 5 Q. Now, you have provided a CV to the Inquiry. That will 6 come up on the screen in a second. The number is 7 CVS00000035. We can see at the very top paragraph, it 8 sets out in summary your profession. You're a Chartered 9 Electrical Engineer, with specialisation in business 10 management and programme management. 11 This must be your former position in the firm; is 12 that correct? 13 A. Correct, yes. 14 Q. As Director of Major Projects and Commercial Services. 15 Now, you referred to WSP. Did they take over 16 Parsons Brinckerhoff in some way or what? 17 A. Yes. As it says in the paragraph there, following the 18 acquisition of Parsons Brinckerhoff by WSP in 2014. So 19 that was November 2014 that WSP acquired 20 Parsons Brinckerhoff. 21 Q. We also see years of experience, 39 years of experience, 22 27 of which were with Parsons Brinckerhoff. 23 If we could then please go over the page to page -- 24 sorry, this page, go down a little bit. Scroll down. 25 We'll see that there we see you were a Director 173 1 responsible for light rail major projects between 2007 2 and 2013. 3 If we then go over to page 2, we'll see that in this 4 role, the second bullet point states you were Project 5 Director for the Edinburgh Tram Network Systems Design 6 Services Contract. 7 I think in short when we come on to look at your 8 statement, you fulfilled that role from around 9 February 2007 to around May 2008 full time, and then on 10 a part-time basis; is that correct? 11 A. Yes, that's correct. 12 Q. Thank you. Back to page 1, please. We can also see the 13 very last bullet point on the page that you were 14 Principal-in-charge of the Metrolink Delivery Partner 15 Contract with Transport for Greater Manchester. I'll 16 come back and look at your statement to see the 17 differences between Manchester and Edinburgh. 18 Put that to one side, please. Thank you. 19 Now, you have provided, Mr Reynolds, two statements 20 to the Inquiry. If we can go first, please, to 21 TRI00000124. This is stated to be -- you can see the 22 Burness Paull logo, witness statement of Steve Reynolds. 23 In short this was a voluntary statement provided back in 24 October 2005. 25 If we can go to page 40, we can see a signature and 174 1 a date, 8 October 2015. 2 I should ask you to confirm, please, is this your 3 signature and is this a written statement you have 4 provided to the Inquiry? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Thank you. 7 Now, second -- put that to one side. The second 8 statement provided will come up. It's TRI00000124_C, 9 and this one was provided in answer to the Inquiry's 10 various questions, and if we can please again go to the 11 last page, to page 196. Could I again just formally ask 12 you to confirm, please, that is your signature. We see 13 the date, 4 May 2017, and that this is a written 14 statement you have provided to the Inquiry? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Thank you, Mr Reynolds. 17 So your evidence to the Inquiry will comprise both 18 of these written statements, together with the evidence 19 you give at these hearings. Thank you. 20 Now, I would like to stick with this statement and 21 go to page 1, please. We will start by getting an 22 overview of your role in the Edinburgh Tram Project. 23 So in paragraph 1 in this statement, you explain 24 your immediate predecessor was David Hutchison who was 25 the Project Director up until your appointment in early 175 1 February 2007. 2 You refer to Parsons Brinckerhoff experiencing 3 commercial difficulties in the project. I'll come back 4 to ask about that later. 5 We can see what is said there. 6 We then go back, please, to the bottom of this page, 7 paragraph 3. You refer to Jason Chandler. I think he 8 was the Project Manager; is that correct? 9 A. Correct, yes. 10 Q. And Alan Dolan was the Deputy Project Director; is that 11 correct? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Did both report to you? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. And was Mr Dolan beneath Mr Chandler in terms of 16 seniority? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Thank you. 19 I would like then, please, to go to page 4 of this 20 statement. In paragraph 11 you explain a few lines 21 down, you focused full time on Edinburgh from 2007 until 22 contract novation in July 2007. At that point you'd won 23 the contract in Manchester, and you say: 24 "During May 2008, following novation in Edinburgh, 25 I took on the Principal in Charge role for Manchester. 176 1 My time, at that point, in Edinburgh was reduced to part- 2 time." 3 Page 5, please, of the statement. In paragraph 16 4 you explain your day-to-day involvement in the Edinburgh 5 Tram Project ended in early 2011. You explain after 6 novation, you were probably only spending a couple of 7 days a week on the Edinburgh Tram Project. 8 Could I also just ask, in the period between 9 February 2007 and May 2008, during that period was your 10 principal place of work in Edinburgh? 11 A. Yes, it was. 12 Q. Did you actually go to tie's offices to work or did you 13 have a separate office? 14 A. It was CityPoint, tie's office. 15 Q. Thank you. 16 Going back to the statement, please, looking at 17 page 6, page 6 in Manchester. I'll try and summarise or 18 paraphrase what you set out in your statement. 19 In short, I think you say that Parsons' involvement 20 in Manchester was very different to the involvement in 21 Edinburgh; is that correct? 22 A. Yes, that's correct. 23 Q. I should perhaps just ask you to -- overview, to 24 summarise the differences between the involvement in the 25 two projects. 177 1 A. Well, whereas in Edinburgh we'd been appointed as the 2 System Designs Services Provider, so we were doing 3 detailed design in summary, in Manchester we were 4 appointed in a programme management capacity with the 5 overall programme management for Manchester Metrolink 6 being a joint obligation on GMPTE as it was, 7 subsequently TFGM and ourselves. 8 So we were in a management capacity in Manchester. 9 We were in a detailed design provision capacity in 10 Edinburgh. 11 Q. So just for the avoidance of doubt, Parsons did not 12 provide design services in the Manchester project? 13 A. Correct, we provided limited design management, but not 14 detailed design services. 15 Q. So there's no question of there being any overlap in 16 Parsons design staff between Manchester and Edinburgh 17 because you certainly weren't providing those services 18 in Manchester? 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. I think you have also explained in your statement that 21 Manchester was a design and build contract; is that 22 correct? 23 A. Yes. That's correct. 24 Q. So that's another difference with Edinburgh. 25 In short, in Manchester, were Parsons playing part 178 1 of the tie role as project managers? 2 A. It was -- I think yes, you could say that. It was an 3 integrated delivery team structure. So, as I say, we 4 were working with TFGM, with TFGM staff and 5 Parsons Brinckerhoff staff, in an integrated delivery 6 team which then carried out that programme management 7 function. 8 So it was a more collaborative approach, if you 9 like, than it was in Edinburgh with tie in their own 10 right being the programme manager. 11 Q. When you refer to Parsons in Manchester carrying out 12 a programme management role, are you making 13 a distinction there between programme management and 14 project management? 15 A. Yes, because the -- the Manchester programme, as it's 16 turned out over time, is a GBP2 billion programme of 17 several projects to create the new light rail 18 infrastructure. So we were there not just managing 19 individual project delivery, but managing the 20 programming, the co-ordination, the various different 21 aspects of pulling those different projects together 22 under that one umbrella. 23 Q. I see. Just sticking with Manchester, am I right in 24 thinking there was a phase 3a which was completed in 25 2013, a phase 3b which was an extension to the airport 179 1 completed in 2014, and also a phase 2cc which I think 2 was just under a mile city centre crossing completed 3 this year, I think; is that correct? 4 A. Last year, for second city crossing, yes, that's right. 5 Actually no, this year, you are right, my apologies. 6 Q. And were Parsons involved in the programme management of 7 all three of these phases? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. I understand. Thank you. 10 A separate point, please. Could we look at page 8 11 in your statement. In paragraph 26 you say, midway 12 through: 13 "There was not a pragmatic approach to delivering 14 planning consents for the scheme … The Edinburgh Tram 15 Project became bogged down with what you could argue was 16 an overly detailed approach to planning." 17 Is that another distinction you were seeking to make 18 with the Manchester project? 19 A. Yes, I think the key difference there is that Manchester 20 had been, as you rightly say, we started out with 21 phase 3a. Manchester had already been through phase 1 22 and phase 2, so there was experience from the 1990s of 23 actually having a tram system in Manchester, and there 24 was a desire for more. 25 Now, in Edinburgh it was different. It was green 180 1 field. There hadn't been that experience, and I think 2 not unsurprisingly, there was perhaps feeling the right 3 way to go about defining what that scheme should be. 4 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: In paragraph 26 you say there was 5 a lack of understanding, arguably, of the planning and 6 consents approach. Where do you think that lack of 7 understanding lay? 8 A. I think because the context was different. In 9 Manchester the context was adding to a tram system. So 10 the planning requirements, the consents requirements, if 11 you like, had already been proven on the earlier phases. 12 With Edinburgh, with what was a challenging, large 13 project, there was a need to develop those processes 14 from scratch almost. So it was -- it was far more 15 difficult in Edinburgh to address the major scheme and 16 create those specific processes for that scheme. 17 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: But was that a lack of understanding 18 by the planning authority or by Parsons Brinckerhoff or 19 by -- 20 A. By the planning authority, in my view. 21 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 22 Again, sticking on this page, could I also please 23 ask, in paragraph 27 on page 8, you explain: 24 "Manchester was different because it was an 25 integrated management team." 181 1 Then you say: 2 "The Edinburgh Tram Project was much more of 3 a supplier/client ring-fenced approach to delivery." 4 I wasn't quite sure of the differences you were 5 making there. Could you explain that, please? 6 A. Yes, I think -- partly this is with the benefit of 7 hindsight, but I think if you're looking back at lessons 8 learned and drawing the distinctions between the two 9 schemes, what we can look at now with the success in 10 Manchester was what we called the Metrolink family. We 11 took the initial delivery partner philosophy which was 12 a delivery partnership between ourselves and the 13 ultimate client, and we extended that into the supply 14 chain, which was Laing O'Rourke, Tallis. We extended it 15 into the operator, which was RATP, and everybody was 16 brought together in that integrated team approach. 17 Whereas the Edinburgh Procurement Strategy, and as 18 I say, part of this was with the benefit of hindsight, 19 was set up more as a set of individual organisations 20 with the interfaces between them where the management 21 focus was. 22 So it was a different approach. 23 Q. Thank you. Again, still on this page, bottom of 24 paragraph, paragraph 28, you say: 25 "During the early stages Parsons staff did not work 182 1 alongside TIE/CEC staff in an integrated delivery team. 2 It was only later in 2007 that we moved over to 3 CityPoint." 4 Do you remember approximately when in 2007 Parsons 5 staff moved into the tie office? 6 A. It would actually have been in 2006, and that was before 7 I got there. The point here, I think, is that we did 8 then get CEC planning staff alongside us in CityPoint, 9 and my recollection is that was very early in 2007. 10 Q. So just for clarity, Parsons were working in tie offices 11 in 2006? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. The change you're referring to here is that in early 14 2007 Council staff also went into tie offices? 15 A. Correct. 16 Q. You also then, at the very bottom, you say: 17 "That problem was due to there being a gulf between 18 Parsons and CEC." 19 Can you explain, please, what you meant by a gulf 20 between Parsons and the Council? 21 A. The two bodies were operating in isolation. So it 22 was -- we would have been producing designs which were 23 then being passed over for review and approval in 24 isolation. 25 So gulf is perhaps the wrong word, but there was -- 183 1 there was definitely a separation between the two 2 organisations, whereas bringing us together in CityPoint 3 allowed for much more rapid communication and picking up 4 on particular issues, you know, face-to-face. 5 Q. Did that help? 6 A. Yes, it did. 7 Q. So with the benefit of hindsight, is that something that 8 may have helped to have in place from the outset? 9 A. Yes, I believe it would. 10 Q. Thank you. Over to page 9 of your statement, please. 11 You explain in paragraph 29 -- we can read for 12 ourselves -- the number of Parsons staff involved in the 13 project. 14 Then in paragraph 31, please, you say: 15 "We were not really all that close to CEC ... CEC 16 were kept at an arm's length from us." 17 I just wondered, was that even after the 18 co-location, or does that refer to before the 19 co-location of staff? 20 A. That's even after the co-location. The co-location was 21 the -- at the detailed level with the detailed planning 22 people, but beyond that, there was more of an arm's 23 length relationship, which you could argue was justified 24 by tie's programme management role. 25 So again, this is a difference between the 184 1 integrated philosophy in Manchester and the more sort of 2 point to point structure that was here in Edinburgh. 3 Q. Then please jump to page 22. In paragraph 76 you 4 explain: 5 "The way to avoid issues, such as the problems we 6 faced with obtaining approvals and consents, is to 7 introduce a collaborative culture across all parties so 8 that everyone is then focused on the ultimate intent, 9 rather than getting side-lined with specifics." 10 You explain that's your own personal view. And 11 you've seen it work in Manchester. 12 I wondered, would it have been possible in Edinburgh 13 to have produced that sort of collaborative culture, 14 given the separate contracts that were in place for 15 design, utility diversion and infrastructure 16 construction? 17 A. I think that's a very good question indeed, and the 18 truth of the matter is back in 2007, you didn't hear 19 people talking about collaboration, whereas these days, 20 everybody in the construction industry is talking about 21 collaboration. 22 I think if you -- if you wind the clock forward, 23 the -- if you were doing this again, you would use 24 different contract terms that promoted collaboration as 25 a way of doing business, but you're absolutely right. 185 1 The contract structure as it was didn't facilitate that 2 effective collaboration. 3 Q. Thank you. I would like now to move on to the issue of 4 why you became involved in the Edinburgh Tram Project. 5 I'll go to three documents shortly. 6 Could you perhaps just give an overview of the 7 reasons why you became involved? 8 A. Yes. It was towards the end of 2006, and the project 9 was -- it was a problem as far as Parsons Brinckerhoff 10 were concerned, because the monthly reporting on the 11 financial performance was showing that the results were 12 going in the wrong direction. The margins that were 13 being delivered were reducing. We were looking at 14 a seriously loss-making project. 15 Certainly early 2007, it was number 2 on PB's global 16 list of problem projects. So it needed senior 17 involvement to address that problem and come in and work 18 with all concerned to recover the commercial position 19 from PB's point of view. 20 Q. Did you know at that stage why it was becoming 21 a loss-making project for Parsons? 22 A. No, but I very quickly learned. As I arrived in 2007, 23 then it became apparent, as I went through the project 24 history in detail, and it wasn't solely focused on 25 recovering the commercial position. It was also focused 186 1 very heavily on improving the client relations across 2 the board, but particularly between ourselves and tie. 3 Q. You were brought in as a very senior Parsons man. You, 4 I think, sat on the board; is that correct? 5 A. That's correct, and on this particular project 6 I reported direct to New York, which was 7 Parsons Brinckerhoff's Headquarters. 8 Q. When you did become involved as Project Director, what 9 initial impressions did you form both as to why it was 10 becoming a loss-making project for Parsons, but also any 11 impressions about the project more generally? 12 A. The headline impression was that change control hadn't 13 been managed effectively, that the team here was bending 14 over backwards trying to accommodate repeated change, 15 but in trying to deliver the Parsons Brinckerhoff 16 services had lost sight of the need to enforce rigorous 17 commercial control on that change control process. 18 So one of the things I did very quickly was put in 19 a proper change control regime which achieved two 20 things. It highlighted to all parties the volume of 21 change that we were experiencing, and it made sure there 22 was better commercial assessment of the consequences of 23 change. 24 Q. Thank you. I'll take you now to three documents, if 25 I may. They will come up on the screen. 187 1 The first one is PBH00020993. We will see from the 2 top of the page it's an email very early in your 3 involvement as Project Director. It might even have 4 been slightly before that. I don't know. It's dated 5 1 February 2007 to Greg Ayres. Now, who was Greg Ayres? 6 A. Greg Ayres was my Managing Director in the UK. He was 7 the Managing Director of Parsons Brinckerhoff UK, 8 Europe, Africa. 9 Q. The main paragraph starts by saying: 10 "The project management structure is confused; 11 commercial control is inadequate; and in simple terms 12 the overall management of the project under Mike's 13 direction has been poor." 14 Is that a reference to what you told us a little bit 15 earlier about essentially change control and Parsons 16 making a loss in the project? 17 A. Correct. 18 Q. Does it go any wider than that? 19 A. No. It was -- as I say, I think coming in as I did in 20 February 2007, you can immediately look back over the 21 preceding months, and you can view what had been 22 happening in the round, whereas I think the people who 23 were here working day in, day out, they were attempting 24 to address issues, and things were getting out on a limb 25 and they had to be brought back under more effective 188 1 control; and as I say, the way to do that was to ensure 2 that the change log was available to everybody and that 3 focused people on delivering that commercial rigour. 4 Q. Could we next please go to another document. 5 PBH00027328. 6 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: While we are waiting for that, the 7 last sentence on that email says: 8 "We must not proceed any longer with the wool being 9 pulled over our eyes." 10 Who did you think was pulling the wool over your 11 eyes? 12 A. I think what that's saying is with the monthly financial 13 reviews, because we did a monthly project status 14 assessment, and I think things were -- were diverging 15 from the forecast, but there was a temptation on the -- 16 perhaps on the project team's behalf not to fully bring 17 that to the fore from a senior management perspective. 18 Again, that's because it may be diverging slightly, 19 then a little bit more, a little bit more. It's when 20 you can look back at perhaps a six-month period, you can 21 see how far it's moved away from the original forecast 22 intent. So that was the thinking there. We've got to 23 draw a line. This is the position now. This is the 24 status. This is how far adrift it is. This is what we 25 have got to address. 189 1 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So it was really a failure on your 2 management team to recognise reality, as it were, and 3 to -- 4 A. Yes, you could say that. 5 Now, you know, it is a very complex project. So 6 it's not as if we were trying to do something that had 7 been done before and it was a readily available 8 solution, working with stakeholders who could appreciate 9 necessarily the bigger picture. So there were 10 mitigating factors, but that was what needed to be 11 confronted. 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 13 MR MACKENZIE: Just for clarification, why do you say it was 14 a very complex project? 15 A. Because the environment in the City of Edinburgh is 16 unique. It's a World Heritage site in part. There are 17 specific characteristics that are entirely different 18 from other cities in the UK with tram systems. It's 19 a different set of stakeholders. It's a different set 20 of aspirations. There are unique challenges with the 21 technical aspects. Every one of these tram schemes is 22 unique in that sense. 23 So from that point of view they are all complex. 24 Q. I think, just going back to Manchester briefly, I think 25 I'm right in saying that phase 3a used an existing rail 190 1 corridor; is that correct? 2 A. In part. The lines up to -- up to Oldham were existing 3 rail corridor. The lines out to the east weren't. They 4 were new build green field. So there was a mix. 5 Q. Thank you. 6 Now, this next document, PBH00027328, that's up on 7 the screen, we can see this was another email from 8 yourself, Mr Reynolds, dated 26 July 2007, again to 9 Greg Ayres. 10 The heading is "Tie Deliverables Analysis". I'm 11 interested in the paragraph in the bottom half of the 12 page which commences: 13 "Let's talk separately on the IDR strategy..." 14 What's the IDR strategy? 15 A. Interdisciplinary Design Review. 16 Q. You go on to say: 17 "... but I can't see that we have a strong case for 18 pressing IDR when we have still to respond to 19 yesterday's tie feedback. (some of which really came 20 as no surprise - at several points on this contract we 21 really didn't perform very well and whilst I hadn't been 22 made aware of the poor quality of the Requirements 23 Definition Report that statement has now been confirmed 24 to me." 25 I'm interested in what you say there of "several 191 1 points on this contract we really didn't perform very 2 well". What did you mean by that? 3 A. That does go back to that requirements definition phase 4 which was the very early months of the contract. And 5 the reality is that requirements definition duration was 6 concertinaed, because the contract was awarded later 7 than had been expected, so there was a very short period 8 of time to pull together quite a volume of work. 9 I think when you looked at it through the lens from 10 mid-2007, you would say that there had been some 11 shortcomings with that requirements definition 12 deliverables at December 2005. 13 Having said that, those problems were addressed in 14 the next phase, which was the preliminary design phase, 15 and I think if you go to the end of that phase, then the 16 problems have been -- well, have been addressed to the 17 point where that requirements definition shortcoming 18 wasn't a problem any more. 19 Q. Thank you. Then on to the third document in this 20 regard, is PBH00028567. If we go to the very bottom of 21 this email chain, please, we can see it's an email from 22 Chuck Kohler. Who is Mr Kohler? 23 A. Mr Kohler was the Chief Ops Officer for 24 Parsons Brinckerhoff in the UK. So he was alongside me 25 on the UK Board. 192 1 Q. Mr Kohler sends an email of 31 August 2007 to Greg Ayres 2 and copied to yourself in relation to Edinburgh Tram, 3 providing a draft lessons learned document, and asking 4 for a review and edits. 5 Then scroll up. We can see Mr Ayres on 1 September 6 has added his thoughts, and then, with the very top, we 7 see, I think, you, email of 4 September 2007, have added 8 some additional comments. 9 If we then go to the draft lessons learned document, 10 it's PBH00028568. If we can blow the whole page up 11 a little bit, please, if we can. 12 Now there are comments in all sorts of different 13 colours. I wonder, Mr Reynolds, if your comments might 14 be in red as the last set of comments. Take a minute 15 just to look at that, to see if that seems right. 16 A. That would seem to be right looking at the general 17 observations column. That would square with my thinking 18 at the time. 19 Q. I'll try not to take up time going through every point, 20 but if we look in the left-hand column, 21 Parsons Brinckerhoff factors, there's reference to 22 changed PM twice. Is that Project Manager? 23 A. Correct. 24 Q. Is that a reference to the very early days? 25 A. Yes, that's right. 193 1 Q. And PIC, is that Person-in-Charge? 2 A. That's right. 3 Q. Is that different to the Project Director? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. So who is the person in charge? 6 A. Having said it's different, the PIC is often the person 7 co-ordinating activity, whereas the Project Director is 8 more of an executive role. But for this project the PIC 9 would have been Mike Jenkins who was the Rail Business 10 Unit Director and this project sat within the rail 11 Business Unit. 12 Q. In the red text it states: 13 "I would say the PIC was unable to establish an 14 effective working relationship with the client. The PIC 15 failed to educate the client as to how the scheme would 16 be engineered and was unable to work with the client to 17 agree a workable delivery plan." 18 Is that again a reference to the early days of the 19 project? 20 A. Yes, and I think you could argue it's as a consequence 21 of not being resident, and the point I made a little 22 while ago about my twin goals were to establish 23 commercial rigour, but also, more importantly, arguably, 24 to generate a closer client relations -- client 25 relationship, and that then addressed that point that's 194 1 made there, if you like. 2 Q. Did you become Parsons' person in charge from around 3 February 2007? 4 A. Essentially, yes, because what happened was the -- the 5 project with me coming on board as Project Director, 6 that essentially meant the project didn't need to report 7 into the rail unit. As I say, I was reporting direct to 8 New York. So essentially I took on board the PIC 9 duties, because of the strength of the management team 10 underneath me. 11 That worked very much better in my view. 12 Q. And the bullet point beneath that, the original text had 13 been: 14 "First major multi office delivery." 15 Someone had added: 16 "First major multi-office design delivery." 17 Possibly then your text: 18 "I think the key issue here is that it was the first 19 LRT detailed design delivery project (for a rail 20 inexperienced client)." 21 A. Correct. 22 Q. Are there two parts to your comment there? Firstly, 23 that it was the first LRT detailed design delivery 24 project by Parsons, and then secondly, for a rail 25 inexperienced client? 195 1 A. Yes, by Parsons in the UK, that would be right, in terms 2 of the first LRT project, and then the fact, I keep 3 coming back to it, it's a rail inexperienced client. So 4 there needs to be that much closer interaction to ensure 5 that the opportunities are taken advantage of and the 6 issues are discussed and addressed jointly. 7 Q. The fact that this was a first major multi-office design 8 delivery, was that a factor in the problems that 9 occurred at least in 2006? 10 A. No, I don't think so, because the multi-office 11 requirement, given that we had such large numbers of 12 people on the job, and there were different areas of 13 specialty, so structures design, roads design, for 14 example, those competencies resided in different offices 15 across the UK, and I don't believe that was a problem 16 because the coming together of those different aspects 17 of the deliverables were controlled by design managers 18 who did meet regularly here in Edinburgh with the 19 management team in Edinburgh. 20 Q. Thank you. Then two bullet points beneath that: 21 "A major subconsultant not co-located with 22 Parsons Brinckerhoff." 23 Is that a reference to Halcrow? 24 A. It is indeed. 25 Q. Who I think were subcontracted by Parsons? 196 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Somebody, perhaps not you, had written in a purpley 3 colour -- somebody in blue had written: 4 "Is this key?" 5 To which somebody responded: 6 "It is if you don't effectively measure and control 7 his production." 8 I think in short, do you consider that Parsons did 9 effectively measure and control Halcrow's production? 10 A. Yes, we did. Inevitably there are shortcomings that 11 have to be addressed. That's part of a major project 12 like this, but by working closely with Halcrow, 13 ultimately we delivered a good product in my view. So 14 I believe we did control Halcrow effectively. 15 Q. I'm now going to ask you one further question about this 16 document. We can read about the tie factors in the 17 middle column, and then in the right-hand column, 18 general observations, the very last bullet point starts 19 with: 20 "The extended period of negotiation pre-contract 21 meant that contract award was delayed beyond the 22 client's business case aspirations. The client enforced 23 an unreasonably short period of time for the 24 requirements definition phase and this was signed up to 25 by Parsons. There was insufficient time for orderly 197 1 mobilisation and quality and timeliness of deliverables 2 suffered. As a consequence Parsons' reputation suffered 3 and the client's perception of Parsons' poor performance 4 carried through into preliminary and detailed design." 5 Is that point essentially again going back to the 6 very early stages of the contract? 7 A. It is, and bear in mind I wasn't there. So what I'm 8 reporting there is my interpretation of events as 9 reported to me. But certainly that was how I saw it, 10 and yes, it was those first three months from September 11 through December 2005. 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Mackenzie, is this -- 13 MR MACKENZIE: My Lord, I have finished with that document. 14 I just have three final tidy-up questions on this 15 chapter, if I may. 16 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes. 17 MR MACKENZIE: Mr Reynolds, do you consider that there were 18 things that Parsons could have done better in this 19 project? 20 A. I think there are always things that you can do better, 21 particularly when you're engaged in something that is 22 unique. You can always look back and say yes, we could 23 have done that differently. 24 But I think we had a very strong team here in 25 Edinburgh who were working diligently to deliver 198 1 a successful scheme. 2 Q. What were the things by way of overview that you 3 consider Parsons could have done better? 4 A. I suppose if you look at it from the overall project 5 delivery, we could have been more vocal in highlighting 6 the consequences of, for example, the charrettes process 7 that was embarked upon in July 2006, which had a severe 8 impact on programme. We should probably, rather than 9 going along with that as the design provider addressing 10 changing requirements, we should have been more vocal to 11 make sure people appreciated the consequences of going 12 down that side-track, as it were. 13 Q. Is there anything else? 14 A. There are details. We should have done the 15 electromagnetic interference part of the project rather 16 better. But that's a very small part of the whole. 17 As I say, you'll always find elements of technical 18 detail that you could have done better. But nothing 19 that was significant from a critical path point of view, 20 I would argue. The critical path was overwhelmingly 21 impacted by the repeated change problems. 22 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. That's perhaps a good 23 point to pause for today. 24 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you very much. We will adjourn 25 for the night, Mr Reynolds. We will resume again 199 1 tomorrow at 9.30. 2 Ms Fraser will speak to you about arrangements. 3 A. Thank you very much. 4 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We will adjourn until tomorrow at 5 9.30. 6 (4.35 pm) 7 (The hearing adjourned until Thursday, 12 October 2017 at 8 9.30 am) 9 10 200 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR ANDREW FITCHIE (continued) ........................1 4 5 Examination by MR LAKE ........................3 6 7 Examination by MR FAIRLEY ....................89 8 9 Examination by MR DUNLOP QC .................106 10 11 Examination by MR MARTIN ....................147 12 13 MR STEVE REYNOLDS (affirmed) .......................172 14 15 Examination by MR MACKENZIE .................172 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 201