1 Thursday, 12 October 2017 21 (3.20 pm) 22 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Mackenzie. 23 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. The next witness is 24 Alan Dolan. 25 163 1 MR ALAN DOLAN (sworn) 2 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Have a seat, Mr Dolan. 3 Could I ask to you listen to the question and to 4 answer it as directly as possible before adding any 5 qualifications. In other words, if it's capable of yes 6 or no, then that should be the answer. But then you can 7 qualify it if you need to do so. 8 Would you speak clearly into the microphone and at 9 a reasonable speed so the shorthand writers can keep up 10 with you. 11 A. I shall. 12 Examination by MR MACKENZIE 13 MR MACKENZIE: Good afternoon. 14 A. Good afternoon. 15 Q. Can you state your full name, please? 16 A. Alan Hugh Dolan. 17 Q. And your current occupation? 18 A. I'm a design engineer. I am in position at Manchester 19 metro. 20 Q. Thank you. Now, you have provided a written statement 21 to the Inquiry, Mr Dolan. I would like to take to you 22 that. You should have a hard copy, I think, in front of 23 you as well. 24 Our reference number is TRI00000101. It's also up 25 on the screen. 164 1 Could you please go to page 45, the very last page. 2 We see a signature there dated 17 July 2017. Can you 3 confirm, please, that that is your signature and that 4 this is the written statement you have provided to the 5 Inquiry? 6 A. It is my signature. 7 Q. Is this -- 8 A. And if this comes with that, this is the statement 9 I made. 10 Q. I can confirm it does, thank you. 11 Your written statement, together with the evidence 12 you give today, will form your evidence to the Inquiry? 13 A. Thank you. 14 Q. Now, can we go back to page 1 of your statement, please, 15 by way of introduction. 16 In the heading, "Introduction", at the top of the 17 page, can we look at that, please. It says that you 18 took position as Interim Project Manager: 19 "... for the Edinburgh Tram Project from late 2006 20 when P McCauley, Project Manager, returned to his home 21 posting in the USA." 22 I wonder whether the reference to late 2006 should 23 be a reference to late 2005? 24 A. My apologies. You are correct. Actually Paul went back 25 in 2006. Jason turned up in 2006, and there was 165 1 a period that I took interim. My apologies for that, 2 but you are correct, sir. My apologies. 3 Q. No need to apologise, thank you. 4 Then further down, in the introduction, the box 5 section, we asked in question 1(1) about your 6 professional qualifications, et cetera. And I think 7 essentially we can see you are a qualified engineer, 8 member of a professional body, and you have then in 9 part 2 of the question experience in various light and 10 heavy rail schemes in both Asia and also, I think, 11 Melbourne, Australia; is that correct? 12 A. That is correct. 13 Q. And of course also the heavy rail experience closer to 14 home as well in the Channel Tunnel Project? 15 A. That is correct. 16 Q. Thank you. What I would now like to do is largely put 17 your statement to one side for just now, and look at the 18 question of your involvement in the utility diversion 19 works, and in particular the question of producing 20 design for the utility diversion works. 21 Just briefly, Mr Dolan, what responsibilities did 22 you have for the production of utility designs? 23 A. Ensuring that the utility SUCs provided to us 24 information to a C4 standard so that we could vertically 25 and horizontally confirm a swept path such that the tram 166 1 system design would have a clear run through. 2 SUCs did have agreements with tie based on 3 information that we would provide. They would do 4 certain design works. We would put forward combined 5 services drawings, take those combined services 6 drawings, and then use them in future, hand them over to 7 tie such that tie could procure a MUDFA installation 8 contract, and move services to create that swept path 9 vertically and horizontally. 10 Q. Thank you. On the question of investigations for the 11 MUDFA works, did Parsons Brinckerhoff have 12 responsibilities for carrying out the investigations for 13 these works? 14 A. Investigations in so much as surveys in the -- in 15 critical junction areas, and also to provide combined 16 services drawings either side or below the swept path, 17 such that we could allow the systemwide contract of the 18 Infraco to come through at a later date and install his 19 works. 20 Q. Thank you. 21 So what investigations were undertaken by or on 22 behalf of Parsons Brinckerhoff in that regard? 23 A. Various investigations. Slit trenching, soil testing, 24 the majority of the work done at junctions known at the 25 time where the swept path horizontally and vertically 167 1 were going to meet at critical junctions. 2 Q. Had there originally been an intention to undertake 3 survey works of the whole tram route, but that was then 4 restricted to critical junctions? Are you aware of 5 that? 6 A. No. Only to inform the design. You would do on tram 7 systems and alignment systems like this, you would take 8 the areas where you know there is either congestion. 9 You would get that information from the SUCs by their C4 10 drawings. You would see where your swept path is. 11 There would be no necessity for the whole route to be 12 surveyed to give that a swept path. Areas going out 13 from the Haymarket to the airport where you go rural, 14 there would be no need for that. Inside the city you 15 would put more work in that area, and that is normal on 16 transit systems like this. My apologies. I'm trying to 17 give you as much information as you need. 18 Q. Thank you. I can quite understand not undertaking 19 a survey of the whole route for the off-street section 20 from the airport to Haymarket. I just wondered about 21 the on-street section from Haymarket down to Newhaven. 22 Would it be good practice to survey the whole of the 23 on-street route? 24 A. Not in my experience. You would rely on C4 drawings 25 being given to you which would come from the SUCs. You 168 1 would identify the swept path you intend to use to that 2 SUC. He would then provide you C4 design information 3 showing you where those utilities were. 4 Where they were in a congested area, you would look 5 further. That's in my experience. 6 Q. Thank you. Can you just explain the reference to C4 7 drawings? 8 A. C4 is a level of design from the SUCs which give line 9 and level and within the realms of the statutory 10 obligations of measurement, where their assets would be 11 or should be to their latest or their last contractor's 12 as built drawing. 13 Q. Thank you. Now, again, sticking with the on-street 14 section from Haymarket down to Newhaven, you referred to 15 surveys being carried out at critical areas or critical 16 junctions. Are you able to just talk us through, 17 starting from either end of the route, I don't mind 18 which, identify those critical areas where surveys were 19 carried out? 20 A. I can't give you the names of them, no, but they would 21 all probably be the slit trenching works and the survey 22 works at each junction and roundabout, going down within 23 what was designated the swept path originally against 24 the original design drawings. 25 Q. So there would be a focus on road junctions and 169 1 roundabouts? 2 A. Yes. May I answer a little bit more than yes? Yes, on 3 the basis that normally, if there are distribution 4 systems coming down a main artery, like Leith Walk, the 5 utility companies do take the arteries and then move off 6 the junction. So that's where the slit trench work 7 would be, I think. 8 Q. Now, this may be a different type of survey, but we have 9 heard evidence about underground voids and cellars under 10 Princes Street and no doubt elsewhere on the road 11 network. Is the type of surveying we have been talking 12 about in respect of utilities, would that sort of survey 13 also be set up to detect things like underground voids 14 and cellars in Princes Street or is that a different 15 type of survey? 16 A. You would use different methods. You would use GRP or 17 different methods of survey. Again, the information 18 that we were provided, we would review that, and I think 19 at the requirement definition stage, we reviewed all the 20 information that we had in the data room. There were 21 identified areas of underground voids and we did set 22 a sub-consultancy survey GRP in those areas, and we did 23 detect in line with the information we were given, 24 underground works that we had to do design work, either 25 strengthen, take away to allow that swept path to be 170 1 determined. 2 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You referred to GRP; is that ground 3 penetrating radar? 4 A. Yes, my Lord. 5 MR MACKENZIE: Excuse me if it's my ignorance, but you 6 mentioned firstly, we discussed the surveys I asked you 7 about from the utility diversion works, and then I asked 8 you separately about the sort of survey that may detect 9 voids or cellars under Princes Street, and you made 10 reference to GRP. I have divided the two types of 11 surveys in that way. In fact were they carried out at 12 the same time? 13 A. Two different sets of work would not -- unless we had to 14 take a temporary TRO to close an area or a junction, 15 would those two pieces of work have been done together? 16 Possibly. Am I aware that they were all done together? 17 No, I think they were done in two separate -- two 18 separate pieces of work. 19 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Can I just clarify what you're saying 20 about the radar. Are you saying that the decision 21 whether or not to subcontract investigations of that 22 nature was dependent upon the information that you had 23 from the utility companies? 24 A. Both, my Lord. Utility companies and the drawings and 25 the information we were given in the data room to 171 1 provide our tender drawing. There was information there 2 that was possibly from history. Underground bunkers 3 from the war, there were tunnels, as we went under Leith 4 Walk, and what we wished to do was try and identify line 5 and level of these to see and make sure they did or they 6 did not interfere with the horizontal and vertical 7 alignment that we needed to keep clear for the tram 8 system coming through. 9 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: In a city such as Edinburgh, with its 10 historical connections and the awareness that there will 11 be all sorts of things under the ground, was any 12 consideration given to a full survey of the route, of 13 the on-street route, ignoring the off-street? A full 14 survey of that on-street route by ground penetrating 15 radar. 16 A. Not a full one, no. 17 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Can you say why not? It's not 18 a criticism. 19 A. No, no, to do that you would literally have to go from 20 one end of the route on-street all the way through, and 21 cost-effectiveness of that against what you would find 22 would probably not be viable. 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 24 MR MACKENZIE: Again, sticking with this point, Mr Dolan, in 25 respect of the surveys for the purpose of trying to 172 1 detect utilities, I think I can almost see the logic 2 about restricting that to critical junctions and 3 roundabouts, but if one is seeking to detect underground 4 cellars or voids or whatever, they wouldn't be 5 restricted to particular junctions or roundabouts. So 6 in order to try and detect them, one would have thought 7 logically one would need to GRP the whole route, the 8 whole on-street route any way. 9 A. In my experience that's not done. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Some suggestion generally that 11 records of utility companies aren't always the best. 12 Are you happy with the records that you had? 13 A. In my experience there are good records, there are bad 14 records. You have to take the C4 information you are 15 given from the SUCs and work with it. If it's found not 16 to be correct, you would go back and discuss that with 17 the utility company, my Lord. 18 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. 19 Two documents I would like to look at, please, on 20 the same point. The first document will come up on the 21 screen. It's CEC01638353. 22 You didn't see this document at the time, but 23 I think it was sent to you by the Inquiry for the 24 purposes of your statement. 25 We will see the second email down is from Ray Dent, 173 1 who I think was in tie, and it's sent to Graeme Barclay, 2 who I think was the tie MUDFA manager or construction 3 director, and the date is 28 March 2007, and Mr Dent 4 starts off by saying: 5 "This is not intended to be an SDS bashing note, but 6 I am beginning to despair." 7 I'm interested then in the paragraph under "Site 8 Attendance and Design During Construction". Mr Dent 9 sets out: 10 "There appears to be an SDS tactic of avoiding doing 11 work now and accepting that it will have to be done 12 later where they expect to be paid, rather than use 13 current contract priced resources to do the job properly 14 now. Example, SDS want to do trial pits to 15 discover/confirm service positions/depth (despite the 16 fact that the contract and their own strategy document 17 requires that they 'investigate' where data is thought 18 not to be good)." 19 In bold text: 20 "SDS were going to do hundreds of trial pits, then 21 proposed tens of trial pits, then 3 and now zero. 22 All a strategy to minimise spend now and to use later 23 opportunity of doing the work with new money." 24 The bit in bold, "SDS were going to do hundreds of 25 trial pits", and down to zero, do you have any comment 174 1 on that suggestion? 2 A. I haven't from a point of view that I'm not aware of 3 other discussion with Ray regarding the hundreds of 4 trial pits, then proposed ten, then zero. I do remember 5 a discussion. 6 It wasn't regarding trial pits though. It was 7 regarding information on manholes positions and that 8 information should have been provided as by the utility 9 companies. If we would have had to have done trial 10 pits. What I don't understand is the -- they will be 11 paid later. We wouldn't have been paid later unless we 12 were asked to do something outside our contract. 13 I don't understand that, no, sorry. 14 Q. So in short, did SDS instruct trial pits as part of the 15 utility investigations? 16 A. Utility investigations, yes, for -- to identify 17 a clearance vertically and horizontally for a swept 18 path. 19 Q. And approximately when were these investigations carried 20 out? 21 A. They would have been done during or shortly after the 22 requirement definition stage, which would be late 2005 23 and during early 2006 when we were moving into the PD 24 stage. 25 Q. These trial pits were carried out at the critical 175 1 junctions roundabouts, as you explained earlier? 2 A. Yes, and if there was information, we were to seek to 3 ensure something that we would see in the preliminary 4 design. That information would have been requested 5 also. 6 Yes. 7 Q. Did you have any concerns at that time whether 8 a sufficient number of trial pits had been carried out 9 in the correct locations? 10 A. At that time, no, we were putting the contracts out to 11 do the survey work as the designing increased into the 12 preliminary design stage. 13 Q. Thank you. Just while we have this document, a separate 14 matter is a question of the designs for phase 1a. Can 15 we see the very bottom of this email. Mr Dent says: 16 "Despite the clear understanding that tie want SDS 17 to de-prioritise Section 3 designs ..." 18 That's the phase 1a -- 19 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Phase 1b, isn't it? 20 MR MACKENZIE: Sorry, phase 1b, my Lord, thank you: 21 "... they continue to work on it as a priority on 22 the basis that tie have not instructed them otherwise. 23 Immediately it was known to tie that we should not..." 24 At the top of the page: 25 "... proceed at present with Phase 1b (Section 3) 176 1 ... Susan told SDS so, and later Ailsa wrote in similar 2 terms to SDS. Alan Dolan is now saying the SDS 3 recognise Ailsa's communication as informing but not 4 instructing them to prioritise other sections. Indeed 5 Alan proudly announced today that they are working hard 6 on Section 3 and would imminently deliver this design 7 (and PB are pushing Halcrow to that end) despite the 8 fact that tie don't need it." 9 Do you have any comments on what is set out there? 10 A. I haven't any comments regarding Ailsa's comments, but 11 what I can do is try and explain. The minute it was 12 indicated to us that tie wished us to close down certain 13 works in a certain area, it was cognisant and my design 14 teams would have asked for an instruction to do so such 15 that if there was to be any movement of personnel from 16 a design task, (a) it could be audited that they were 17 doing so. We did understand phase b was to take less 18 priority than 1a, and all I asked at that time was, 19 fine, would somebody, Ailsa, would somebody, Susan -- 20 I believe that Susan is Susan Clark because I remember 21 discussing this with Susan. And she said: Alan, you 22 know we don't want that work over there, but that's easy 23 to talk over a table. It's very difficult as a design 24 manager to take a verbal from somebody: please don't do 25 this, please do that. 177 1 All I asked for at that time was some form of audit 2 trail, variation instruction, to down tools in 3 a particular area. That wasn't given to me. 4 I think the word "proudly" is -- should not have 5 been used in that letter. I don't think I would have 6 proudly announced. 7 What I would have said is: we have a design team 8 working in Section 3. They are working in that at this 9 moment in time. I haven't got anything to move a design 10 team from A to B, because in the event that this verbal 11 instruction is rescinded and tomorrow you make 12 a different discussion with me and say: Alan, I'm sorry, 13 I told you to stop work. I move a design team, it is 14 not done overnight. There are design teams -- in 15 Section 3, if I can explain, the design team was in 16 Newcastle. We were the design team managers here. We 17 were looking after the interface with the client and 18 with outside parties. 19 We were passing information to our design teams in 20 Manchester and in Newcastle. We had Halcrow's design 21 team here doing work on-street in Section 1. For me to 22 move design teams, I objected to the word "proudly" 23 because that's not me. I would have discussed the 24 matter and asked for an instruction. The instruction 25 didn't come, and I obviously had been to a meeting to 178 1 say: I'm sorry, we still have a design team working in 2 that area. 3 I wouldn't have been proud for it because I'm 4 a design manager. If I've got guys who are doing wasted 5 work, I'm not happy about that because I'm spending my 6 own money. 7 That was a fixed price piece of work and I wouldn't 8 have been proud that we were doing work that should not 9 and was not required. It was required inside our 10 contract. It was required as a deliverable and we did 11 deliver it. 12 Q. I understand. So in short, your position is that you 13 required a formal instruction from tie to change what 14 was happening? Thank you. 15 Now, a separate document, please, CEC01540976. This 16 is back to the question of investigations. 17 Again, you won't have seen this particular document, 18 but it's the content I'm interested in. 19 What it is is an email from Sandra Cassels. If you 20 scroll to the very bottom of the page, we will see she's 21 a partner in DLA Piper Scotland LLP. 22 Back to the top of the page, please, we can see it's 23 dated 3 December 2011 to Andrew Fitchie, and copied into 24 Keith Kilburn. 25 Then in the second paragraph they are talking about: 179 1 "... strategy initially agreed with Tie was that DLA 2 were to review the legal basis of three potential claims 3 by Tie against SDS (dilapidation surveys, sewer surveys 4 and trial holes)." 5 Ms Cassels goes on to say: 6 "Each of these potential claims concerns an 7 interpretation of the scope of services contained in the 8 SDS Agreement and what services SDS were obliged to 9 perform. Tie are of the opinion that SDS were obliged 10 to carry out certain types of survey far greater in 11 scope than SDS actually carried out, whereas SDS are of 12 the opinion that they have fulfilled their obligations 13 under the SDS Agreement." 14 To pause there, Mr Dolan, were you ever aware of 15 there having been a dispute or disagreement between SDS 16 and tie as to the scope of the surveys that were to be 17 carried out? 18 A. Not in this detail, and I think Steve Reynolds took this 19 on board and -- can I just have a look at the date 20 again, please, on the letter? 21 Q. Yes. At the top of the page we see it's 22 3 December 2007. It's the context of claims. 23 A. Yes. I think Steve would have taken that on board, and 24 I think what he did, he took -- he took all of the SUC 25 Agreements. I remember Steve -- I don't remember this 180 1 particular piece of correspondence, but around that time 2 and around the claims discussions, Steve took all the 3 SUC Agreements that were originally in the data room. 4 They were unsigned, but we used them to understand where 5 the intended work was to be given to us prior to tender, 6 I think. And what our SDS interpretation of surveys was 7 to inform the design. 8 I believe Steve discussed this with Steven Bell. 9 I don't think after that discussion, this issue was 10 furthered. So whatever discussion was put in place 11 between the parties, I don't think that was ever pushed 12 through as a claim against us, because I think there was 13 an understanding once Steve checked the utility 14 documentation. I think he sat down with people from tie 15 and I don't think this issue went any further. 16 I don't recall it going any further. So I assume 17 that was closed out between Steve and, I would say at 18 that time -- that's why I was looking at the date. 19 Q. Thank you. 20 A. It would be -- it probably would have been Steven Bell 21 or -- it probably would have been the discussion with 22 Steven Bell at that time, after we reviewed all of the 23 utilities information and what they had to provide to 24 us, such that it informed our design such that we would 25 design in critical areas. 181 1 Q. I understand. 2 Just reading on in this email, it states: 3 "It was also noted by John that the invitation to 4 tender and SDS's offer was prescriptive in terms of the 5 types of surveys to be carried out, but that the scope 6 of services annexed to the SDS Agreement does not 7 include that level of information." 8 So, in short, if there was a dispute about this 9 matter, that may be a possible explanation for it? 10 A. It certainly may be, but I can't help you there because 11 I didn't help with the tender and I don't know which -- 12 if that was there or not. 13 Q. I understand. 14 A. But your reasoning there, it would be reasonable to 15 assume, yes. 16 Q. Presumably the answer to avoid such a dispute is to 17 specify clearly in the contract what's to be done? 18 A. I concur with that, yes. Yes. 19 Q. Thank you. 20 Now, that's that matter. The question of the 21 investigations. 22 I would like to move on, please. Can you give 23 a brief overview of the main problems that Parsons 24 experienced when trying to produce utilities design? 25 A. Manifold. Primarily, in my experience previous to 182 1 coming to Edinburgh, we take on board a fixed alignment 2 as best we can. We would prepare a strategy document 3 identifying the route, identifying the utilities in that 4 area, and as best we could, we would -- I think I used 5 information in my statement, KISS. Keep it simple and 6 keep it still, because the minute you start on a design, 7 be it the preliminary design stage or the detailed 8 design stage, the minute you start to move or wish to 9 move a tramstop or wish to add a tramstop in, move 10 a piece of asset which has a base inside or very close 11 to the external extremities, the information you will 12 have given to the SUCs, this is my swept path that 13 I require, it changes, and that kicks in a consolidated 14 piece of design work. 15 It's called configuration management. The minute 16 you move an asset, once you've determined what your keep 17 it still footprint is, you have to go through that 18 process. Check every one of the utilities. So that was 19 the basis of it. 20 I don't think the utility companies were brought on 21 board earlier, and as a strategy, I said I wasn't 22 involved in the tender. The strategy of giving the 23 designer the role that you give the designer here for 24 utilities is not one in the industry that I'm familiar 25 with that we have done elsewhere. It is new. It is -- 183 1 it's giving the designer a co-ordination role that 2 perhaps he can help with, but he can't command. 3 The only people who can command that are the people 4 who were the statutory authorities that can actually do 5 two things. Move the design themselves because the 6 assets belong to them, give information to a contractor 7 that they may move assets, but they need to be aware of 8 every movement that the infrastructure design team on an 9 ongoing basis is rolling with. 10 If they are outside this configuration management 11 regime, it's helpless until they receive the next set of 12 drawings showing the revision. 13 I think we took great -- we took great criticism 14 that SDS were giving drawings out time and time and time 15 again. It's because of this. 16 What the industry is used to, and what I'm used to 17 as a design team integrator, is preparing the swept 18 path, keep it still as best you can. There will always 19 be changes and you have to manage them. So you have to 20 understand. You go through configuration management. 21 But you give to the expert, the SUC authority, it's his 22 asset. He knows where it is. And if he doesn't, you've 23 given the asset manager, the owner, the responsibility 24 to -- it's your drawing, you're moving it. You take 25 responsibility if that drawing is wrong or not. And 184 1 move it out of that swept path. 2 That's the -- that's the template we use on other 3 projects. After I moved from this project straight down 4 to Manchester -- 5 Q. Mr Dolan? 6 A. It was automatic -- I'm trying to give you -- you can't 7 give a short answer to this, and I'm trying. 8 Q. Mr Dolan, I'm sorry to interrupt. I'm conscious that 9 I think we can finish your evidence by 4.30, but you 10 will have to give focused concise answers. So when 11 I ask what were the main difficulties experienced in 12 producing design, if you could just perhaps keep in 13 front of your mind focused, concise short answers? 14 A. My apologies. 15 Q. I apologise for interrupting. 16 A. I'm trying to give you as much information to explain 17 the difficulty factor in the contract being set up as it 18 was. It gave risk away from perhaps a management house 19 to a design house, when in fact the simple and cheapest 20 and easiest way was not to do it in that way. That's 21 the point I was trying to -- other models of transit 22 work don't do it like that. Why? Because it's 23 convoluted and you're giving the risk area into three 24 parties instead of you giving the risk area into one 25 party. Much cheaper. He owns the asset. He knows 185 1 where he's left it. You've told him where your swept 2 path is. He was the correct person to give that piece 3 of work to. 4 This contract didn't. Unfortunately it didn't, and 5 this is the evidence to say the difficulty factor grew 6 as the infrastructure kept continuously moving as the 7 design changes moved. We had to keep going back in 8 configuration management to reconsider the utility 9 drawings. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Can I just -- I realise what you said 11 about timing. But as far as the norm is concerned, 12 would the sequence be that you, as the designer, would 13 identify design swept path of the tram and give that 14 information to the utilities owner, as it were? And ask 15 them to move their utility -- 16 A. That's the model we -- sorry, my Lord, I didn't allow 17 you to finish. That's the model we're using in 18 Manchester and it works perfect. 19 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: How do you manage the situation where 20 obviously there are going to be a lot of different 21 utilities? So you have your swept path. Do you give 22 the plan to each of the utility companies and how do 23 they organise it so that the water board go in first and 24 the gas board go in second? Who arranges that? 25 A. The delivery partner that I'm working for in Manchester 186 1 have a team to assist each utility and that is 2 discussed. 3 It wasn't allowed here because it was in a different 4 form. The design model that we are using in Manchester 5 is different. We give each utility company: this is 6 where our swept path is, and then we go in combination 7 into each utility company, talk -- that wasn't allowed 8 inside this framework. It works in Manchester because 9 each utility company know how economically, 10 collectively, they can get in and out with a contractor 11 by doing certain works first, what works second, what 12 works third. 13 I know I'm taking time, but it's important that this 14 is understood. 15 One of the problems with the utilities section of 16 work was even after the design, unfortunately what tie 17 missed in their understanding of what they were trying 18 to do, there are certain utility companies, the large 19 boys, Mr Water, but in particular Mr Telecom, he was 20 probably the only SUC that stuck exactly to his 21 agreement, gave us exactly the C4 drawings that we were 22 requiring. 23 Not only that, I believe tie missed the fact that we 24 can draw it on a drawing, we can show it out of the 25 swept path. It went into the tie programme. What tie 187 1 missed, unfortunately, was when tie went back to that 2 utility company, said: yes, you can move a piece of duct 3 for me, or you can move a piece of concrete for me; but 4 it took a year after the designs were complete for tie 5 to integrate with telecom and get those utilities moved, 6 because they were the only people physically, by law, 7 that could actually make the connections. 8 We had that same situation with Scottish Power, and 9 to some degree, not so much with Scottish Water or gas, 10 because they have contractors that do that work. 11 But it was -- it wasn't a well thought out plan. 12 I didn't want to give personal -- personal opinion, but 13 from a lessons learned, moving forward, I know you're 14 going into the second phase soon of a tram system. It 15 would not be right for a lessons learned to be 16 understood. That section of thought process for 17 utilities didn't work. We were inside it. I had to 18 make it work for my company because we had a contract to 19 complete. 20 But the model was wrong. Your swept path is given 21 to the utility companies. Give them the opportunity to 22 move their assets, because if it's wrong, if it's in the 23 wrong position, if it's the wrong size, if it's falling 24 apart, the minute you open the trench, it's their 25 responsibility. They are the only people who can 188 1 actually make that call. A designer cannot make that 2 call. All I can do is show a line on a drawing, on 3 a CSD drawing -- sorry, combined services drawing is 4 showing water supply, electricity supply, telecoms 5 supply. I can give that on a drawing, but I cannot tell 6 you if the piece of asset that's being moved is in good 7 condition, bad condition. 8 The only person who can do that is the utility 9 company himself. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 11 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. I understand. 12 A. I'm sorry I'm taking a long time. This is the crux 13 of -- 14 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Please don't -- 15 A. And the thought process behind this needs to be 16 understood. 17 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Dolan, please don't apologise. 18 I'm interested to know what the way forward might be. 19 A. I think the model used on the second part of the tram 20 system will be more akin to what I have just described. 21 I don't know, but I hope so. 22 MR MACKENZIE: That's a very helpful explanation, thank you. 23 I would like to turn now, please, to two documents 24 which I think may illustrate the sort of problems that 25 were encountered. 189 1 The first document will come up on screen. It's 2 CEC01800436. If we go to the last page, please, the 3 copy is not great. If we go to the last page, we can, 4 I think, see your signature and name there, Mr Dolan. 5 Do you see that? Back to the first page, please. 6 We see the date is 28 February 2007. 7 There's a lot of information in the letter. I don't 8 propose to read it all out, but in short, 9 could I perhaps ask you just to take a minute to read 10 that first page and confirm if this is a good 11 illustration of the sorts of problems that arose. 12 A. It is. It is. 13 Q. Do you recognise the letter in fact? 14 A. Yes. It brings in what I was describing where -- keep 15 it still. If you're moving it, understand why you're 16 moving it, and then understand the implications. 17 Q. For example, in the middle paragraph: 18 "SDS also express concern that the utilities team at 19 tie appear to be attempting to develop an early 20 programme of utility diversion works for MUDFA, for 21 early implementation (in road), in complete denial of 22 the consequence of utility apparatus diversion designs 23 that both our parties are developing and delivering 24 being out of sequence with the development of the 25 finalised roads and OLE design on which it should be 190 1 based." 2 Just pausing here, what of course happened was that 3 the procurement strategy was for an early MUDFA contract 4 to divert the utility works in advance. 5 Given all design is interrelated, it seems to an 6 outsider quite a hard thing to do, to on the one hand 7 have an early utility diversions based on utility 8 designs, but on the other hand, still be designing the 9 rest of the scheme, including the roads and positionings 10 of various things. It seems quite hard to do utilities 11 in advance while still designing everything else at the 12 same time; is that a fair point? 13 A. It is fair, and I'll answer from a point of view of 14 experience. 15 You can do that well. A bit later in my statement 16 I said only if you use the KISS principle of design. 17 Keep it simple. Keep it still. Don't do this unless 18 you've got an alignment that you already know has got 19 royal assent, has got the buy-in of all the stakeholders 20 that you will not be going through many, many redesigns 21 and thought processes. 22 If you're out in the sticks, and it doesn't matter 23 whether your alignment changes one metre to the left or 24 two metres to the right, it's not important. If you're in 25 the middle of a street process that we have here, it 191 1 wasn't a good strategy in my opinion. Would I have put 2 it forward? No. If that's the answer you're looking 3 for. 4 Q. Thank you. So in short, the more changes one has, the 5 more problems that will arise, and the more changes to 6 the other design, the more changes that will cause to 7 the utilities design; is that -- 8 A. And that configuration loop it brings in. Way, way, way 9 much pressure on the design teams that you've got, 10 because you've sent them three weeks ago an alignment. 11 You then go through a redesign for a reason. It may be 12 a charrette. It may be a change, a tramstop move, 13 because somebody wishes it for a particular reason. 14 Use this strategy where your design is already 15 cemented, not when you're starting off. And if you're 16 going to use that, make sure you programme correctly 17 a time when that MUDFA contract is going to come in. 18 Don't put it up front of works unless you have cemented. 19 Keep it simple. The major one I use is keep it still. 20 Q. Thank you. Over the page to page 2, please. You set 21 out in the five points, you say: 22 "This approach adopted by tie will inevitably have 23 the following consequences:" 24 (i) Delay to the SUCs' approval of the SDS’ Detailed 25 Design submissions; (ii) A very negative response from 192 1 the SUCs when they discover that they have been 2 requested to formally approve or they have already 3 approved submissions only for them to change later and 4 require re-approval. 5 (iii) The potential for costly re-work by MUDFA, 6 et cetera; and (iv) The potential for MUDFA to claim 7 standing time from tie, et cetera; and (v) A programme 8 mismatch between tie's programme for execution of MUDFA 9 works and SDS' ability to deliver updated IFC drawings 10 to MUDFA. 11 I think in short your position would be that these 12 matters could be avoided by following your adage of keep 13 it still, keep it simple? 14 A. Exactly. 15 Q. I understand. 16 A. Exactly. 17 Q. Then -- 18 A. I wasn't trying to teach anybody to suck eggs. I said 19 later in my statement also, lessons learned. It's 20 a lesson to learn. You can use this in its right 21 environment. To do it in the wrong environment, don't 22 do it. That's a designer's perspective. 23 Q. Thank you. Over the page at page 3, please. Again, 24 I think the initial five bullet points address the 25 problem of changes. Then underneath that, you say: 193 1 "Our prime concern is that tie are aware of the 2 consequences due to the separation that exists between 3 their project management of SDS' utilities design 4 their project management of the rest of SDS' 5 infrastructure design. More importantly, SDS holds the 6 view that we cannot be held liable for consequential 7 affects resulting from:" 8 The three matters we can read for ourselves there. 9 Thank you. 10 A. That's the configuration management loop that I was 11 describing earlier. Once you've moved something, you've 12 got to go back over, and we were going back to the 13 utility companies and, to be honest, they were getting 14 a little bit fed up with a designer walking in saying: 15 I know what I asked you three weeks ago, but can we just 16 move it to the left a little or can we move it to the 17 right a little; and you break down the relationship with 18 the utility companies that you actually know what you're 19 doing. 20 Q. It could be a never-ending cycle? 21 A. It is -- on that project it was. 22 Q. The second document, please, is PBH00003588. We can see 23 this is a letter. If we blow up the bottom left-hand 24 corner, please, dated 17 April 2007. It's from 25 Glazebrook at tie. Look at the last page, please, 194 1 page 5. I think we can see again your name and 2 signature there, Mr Dolan; is that correct? 3 A. That's my signature. 4 Q. Back to page 1, please. Again, I don't have time to 5 read it all. 6 A. It's okay. 7 Q. We can see it's headed "Utilities/MUDFA Programme", and 8 at the bottom of the page, states: 9 "We would advise tie that the late submission of 10 Sections 1A and 3B were due primarily to the late issue 11 (by tie) of C4 Notices to each SUC and the failure of 12 tie to complete Agreements and commercial negotiations 13 with each SUC. SDS has been unable to procure 14 sufficient and timely information from the SUCs in order 15 to further the detail design in accordance with the 16 agreed design programme between tie and SDS." 17 Is that an indication of the sort of problems you 18 experienced at that time? 19 A. Exactly so. 20 Q. Thank you. 21 A. And you have to as a designer, from a audit trail point 22 of view, it may not be a nice letter for my client to 23 have received. But again, it's lessons learned. You're 24 telling your client, if this is going to continue to 25 happen, the programme is only going to move to the 195 1 right. You've got to get it right. Keep it simple. 2 Keep it still. Once you've got an alignment, stay with 3 it as best you can. There will always be reasons, 4 technical reasons, why we have got to move a pole, but 5 not to go back and try to redesign something to look 6 better into the environment. 7 If you're going to do that, take a year before you 8 start to get it right. And then give it to a designer. 9 I think that's the lesson to be learned here. 10 Q. Yes. We have also, I think, heard evidence from other 11 witnesses that in general when designing something, it's 12 good practice to go through various stages, and at the 13 end of each stage or phase to stop and agree a baseline. 14 So, for example, agree a requirements definition stage, 15 agree the deliverables, and before then moving on to the 16 next stage and so on. Presumably if that sort of 17 approach is followed, that may then help the utilities 18 design if there is a fixed baseline to work from? 19 A. It is, and if that was put into the programme, it would 20 have helped, but that was not the case here. 21 Q. I understand. One last point in this letter, if we 22 scroll down a little bit more on this page we're looking 23 at, please, can we see at the second last sentence in 24 the main paragraph at the bottom we're looking at: 25 "At the end of the day the SUC approval period will 196 1 be whatever they decide and we have no option but to go 2 along with it. As this has become apparent, updates to 3 the SDS design programme have reflected this situation 4 and will continue to do so." 5 So is that really then the heart of the problem in 6 relation to the SUCs, that the approval period would be 7 a matter for them? 8 A. It is, as a rule of thumb, unless you put it into your 9 contract that -- the contract between tie and the SUC, 10 if they make an agreement and that there is a cost 11 associated with that agreement, and it is 20 business 12 days, my experience, if you put the designs to them in 13 the right way, in the right form, in the right programme 14 terms, such that they can review it, they know it's 15 coming, they know it's not going to change in three 16 weeks' time, they see it once. 17 The utility companies, they're conglomerates, but 18 the engineers that they've got are specialists and they 19 can do this. You keep going back, second month, third 20 month, fourth month, with the same set of drawings moved 21 from a position, and when they ask you why this has 22 moved, you give them an answer that somebody wished to 23 move a tramstop 300 ml or whatever, they don't take 24 kindly to it, then they say: I have looked at this 25 drawing once, it will go to the back of the queue. 197 1 You lose credibility with two engineers. The 2 designer can go, get a good relationship going, and 3 because of this, it falls down. 4 Certainly with Scottish Water, definitely with 5 Telecom, we didn't get a chance. They just stuck to it 6 and said: this is what you are getting. It's 40 weeks. 7 If you want me to look at that again, and they stuck to 8 that, and they absolutely annihilated the tie programme, 9 because of this event. 10 So yes. 11 Q. Now, I think the two companies you mentioned there were 12 Scottish Water and -- was it the Telecoms? 13 A. Telecom, Scottish Telecom. 14 Q. Were they the two SUC groups who you had the most 15 difficulty with in terms of delay? 16 A. To be honest, Scottish Water were very, very helpful in 17 relationship to seeing things time and time again, they 18 didn't enjoy that part of it. 19 I think the agreement with Scottish Water was later 20 agreed with tie, which didn't help us at the beginning 21 of the project, because there was a designer walking in, 22 trying to get drawings approved without an agreement in 23 place between two parties that we were working for one 24 party. 25 Telecom, completely different. We gave them an 198 1 alignment. They set off. They gave what I would say is 2 a reasonable C4, and they stuck to it. If there was an 3 amendment, it was difficult to get them to re-look at 4 it. They are a massive organisation, and if they do 5 a design, it isn't just a design dropping underneath 6 a swept path. You may find with telecom, they would 7 have to go back, three or four or even five major 8 manholes back, to make the design work to do whatever we 9 were doing, to change it. It had great consequences on 10 programme, yes. 11 Q. Thank you. There are two final matters in relation to 12 MUDFA I would like to ask you about, please. The first 13 one is to go back to your statement at page 23, if 14 I may. At page 23 of your statement, in question 27, at 15 the bottom half of the page, this refers to a letter of 16 April 2007 from Graeme Barclay, et cetera. Then your 17 reply in May 2007 stating it was unfortunate that the 18 MUDFA construction implementation programme started in 19 the one area where tie had placed the SDS infrastructure 20 design on stop. 21 Do you remember what this issue was? 22 A. Yes. Yes, I do. 23 Q. Can you briefly explain it? 24 A. I think earlier on you asked me about why the contract 25 didn't work. There were silos within tie. They had 199 1 some -- Graeme Barclay was a good solid engineer and he 2 tried his best to move a contract, but Graeme was 3 looking after the utilities and the MUDFA contract. 4 Susan had told me to stop work in a certain area, only 5 to find that Graeme was moving forward within tie, with 6 the risk and trade-off programme. 7 The risk and trade-off programme, if everything had 8 been still, it would have meant a contractor and tie 9 making a decision to do works before perhaps the 10 designer was happy. The utility company would be -- 11 have to be happy to have that utility and asset moved. 12 What Graeme didn't understand, and I tried to 13 explain verbally and when he wouldn't accept the verbal 14 discussion, I asked him for evidence of a stop notice 15 being recognised by Susan, and Graeme, you are now 16 making a utility diversion under a risk and trade-off 17 set of drawings without taking cognisance of the Infraco 18 changes in design. 19 I was aware because all of the three sections of 20 design came through me. I was aware that in that 21 particular area where he had chosen to start his risk 22 and trade-off and take a chance at getting the MUDFA 23 programme going, getting them to install works, I was 24 aware that the alignment had potential of not being 25 corrected at risk and trade-off drawing, and I said no 200 1 to him. I said (a) I haven't got time to review this, 2 I'm doing other work, but what I can tell you is you are 3 starting in the wrong area because I have just been told 4 down tools in that area. We are going to change the 5 alignment. 6 I believe this letter refers to the bottom of 7 Constitution Street going on to Ocean Drive. 8 Q. I see. So in short, what's required is a joined-up 9 approach by project manager? 10 A. Definitely. Susan wasn't understanding what Graeme was 11 doing. Graeme was trying to do something to move the 12 job forward. I applaud him, but you can only do that if 13 you've got cognisance of the whole design. The only 14 person that has that or had that at the time was the 15 SDS, because we were watching and moving the design. We 16 were doing the configuration management. If this moves, 17 it means that moves. And Graeme was trying to get 18 something going, and he was going to change a utility 19 when in fact the alignment was going to change. 20 So he could have been putting it in the right place, 21 but it would have been luck. It wouldn't have been good 22 design configuration management. He would have been at 23 large risk of making mistakes. 24 He was asking me to take time out of a precious 25 design schedule I was trying to keep, which I didn't 201 1 keep, and he was putting more work on my designers to 2 check things and we knew that that wasn't going to -- 3 that wasn't going to work. 4 Q. Now -- 5 A. I remember -- this is Constitution Street, I know it is. 6 Bottom of Constitution Street going into Ocean Drive. 7 Q. Thank you. The last matter in relation to MUDFA I would 8 like to ask you about, I have seen a reference in the 9 documents to trial holes having been dug in the 10 on-street sections in late 2007 and early 2008, very 11 shortly before the commencement of the on-street utility 12 diversion construction works. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Is that something you recollect? 15 A. Yes. To use the words "trial holes", I don't know 16 whether Duncan has given evidence yet, but in discussion 17 with CEC, Duncan was highlighting, in the past, there 18 have been fall-ins of the road, and as a strategy, 19 a good designer would take on board, it would be normal 20 to do this. As the road was taken up, we had an 21 infrastructure design which provided a tram system that 22 could have void spanning capability. 23 That void spanning capability had a dimension facet 24 to it. In the event that poor soil condition by old 25 broken drains or previous water leaks from 202 1 Scottish Water had taken the underneath away, we put 2 forward to tie and the informed contractors that were 3 pricing the job, we would have a rolling contract, and 4 we would have what Duncan called a suite of designs for 5 road make-up to protect this void spanning of our design 6 of tram, of tramway, and it was a metre in either 7 direction. 8 So if we found failed pieces of road underneath when 9 the Infraco came and took their soil away, they did soil 10 sampling, these trial pits that you refer to, we would 11 use the suite of road make-up in agreement that we 12 discussed with Duncan, because he was aware prior to our 13 time we didn't know Edinburgh. Duncan knew Edinburgh 14 very well. He knew where road weaknesses were, he knew 15 where roads were repaired years ago, and our interface 16 with him was particularly for that, because we need to 17 know history if there have been any weaknesses. 18 And those trial trenching that you're talking about 19 is as we roll the Infraco soil away, check what's 20 underneath, soil sample it, not only for failure of soil 21 condition; we were also asked to take on board 22 environmental issues. So the soil was tested for 23 contamination as well. Very little contamination was 24 found as we rolled away. We didn't find any brown 25 condition. 203 1 That's the slit trenching that's referred to, 2 I believe. 3 Q. So these trial holes, is it Duncan Fraser? 4 A. Duncan Fraser. He took us round. He took me round one 5 evening and we went to every area that he knew has been 6 in the past some form of -- 7 Q. In short, was the purpose of these trial holes to inform 8 the utility works or did they have a different purpose? 9 A. At that time it was to inform soil condition underneath 10 to support the Infraco design, and confirm that the 11 strategy of the one metre coverage could hold, and we came 12 up with a suite of drawings. If the soil trenching and 13 if the soil testing gave us a bad condition, we knew 14 immediately how the Infraco should deal with it. We 15 didn't have to take it away, do a design, and come back 16 to him. We already had the suite of drawings. We 17 discussed this with Duncan, and it was a strategy that 18 CEC were happy that we were taking on board, and the 19 soil trenching was for that information. 20 Q. So were these trial holes a way of testing whether the 21 proposed trackform design by SDS would work? 22 A. Not would work, no. Our design would work within 23 a design criteria. If we found that design criteria, if 24 that chasm underneath the road was larger, that piece of 25 road area was taken away and prepared better such that 204 1 the trackform that was designed with the one metre 2 criteria, we could span one metre on trackform if you had 3 a void underneath it. Anything larger than that, we 4 strengthened the area, and one area of good work with 5 Duncan and his team was coming up and discussing where 6 the weak areas were known to be from history, and 7 obviously we took cognisance of that, and did work in 8 that area. 9 But as a strategy, as the whole of the work that was 10 taken away, the soil was tested, ensured that it met the 11 criteria, and if it didn't, it was taken away, treated, 12 strengthened, such that the one metre span could work. 13 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. My Lord, I'm content to take much 14 of Mr Dolan's written statement as read. There are two 15 final questions I would like to ask, which I think may 16 take about five minutes. 17 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes. 18 MR MACKENZIE: If I may. Thank you. 19 A. I'm sorry for taking my time. I want the point to get 20 over. My apologies. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We were late in taking you, Mr Dolan, 22 because of activities earlier. 23 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 24 One matter I should ask you about, Mr Dolan. 25 Trudi Craggs. Do you remember her? She gave evidence 205 1 that changes had been made to the design for the tram 2 project in late 2005 during the parliamentary process. 3 That these changes had not been reflected in the SDS 4 contract signed in September 2005, and in fact had not 5 been taken into account in the design until she had had 6 what she referred to as a brain dump session with 7 Parsons designers around March/April 2006 and explained 8 these parliamentary changes which seemed to come as news 9 to Parsons. 10 Do you have any recollection of that? 11 A. Yes, I do. If you looked at the original contract that 12 was signed, I think it was signed round about 13 September 2005. It had a design programme in it. 14 The PD design was supposed to kick off January and 15 finish -- sorry, the PD design was supposed to be 16 started in 2005, I think, and carry through to 2006. We 17 didn't get royal assent until March or April 2006. By 18 then we were two third of the way through our PD design, 19 PD -- we called it PD1 eventually, but it was the 20 preliminary design. 21 Trudi came back. She'd satisfied royal assent and 22 she'd got rid of all the objections. Trudi was an 23 absolute fantastic servant of CEC. She did brilliant. 24 She came back. She gave us a brain dump of 25 everything that they'd discussed between going in and 206 1 coming out, but she gave us that information in round 2 about 1 April 2006. 3 We were two thirds of the way through our PD. There 4 were changes. Haymarket, airport, Gogar shopping 5 centre. I can't remember them all offhand, but if you 6 were to show me the documents, I could tell you where 7 they were. 8 She gave us the brain dump. We took it on board for 9 the last two months of our preliminary design stage as 10 best we could. 11 There was something called PD2 that you would find 12 in certain correspondence. PD2 was the wash-up of the 13 information that Trudi gave and any changes between us 14 starting PD, which was round about January 2006, and us 15 completing in June 2006. Any comments that were taken 16 on board during that period, we fastened into a PD2. 17 But our PD was delivered 2006. 18 We waited 21 days, and we took as much cognisance 19 that we could from Trudi on the brain dump between her 20 coming in and giving us the brain dump between April and 21 June. The rest was carried out during the year, and we 22 said we would take all changes into the detailed design 23 that we hadn't on PD1. But we actually called it PD2, 24 and we carried that on during June 2006 to the end. 25 Unfortunately the charrettes flew in round about 207 1 July and took all of the design time. 2 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I think the charrettes are 3 a different issue. 4 A. I'm just giving you history of that time frame. But 5 Trudi did a brilliant job in conveying to us that 6 information. Should it have been given to use in 7 a better form from tie? Perhaps. But Trudi understood 8 and delivered it to us, and we were thankful for it 9 because we were designing on old drawings. We did get 10 updated drawings from tie, but not the true closure on 11 royal assent drawings. 12 MR MACKENZIE: I understand, thank you. 13 The final point I should put to you. If we bring 14 the document up, it's CEC02083973. We are now jumping 15 forward to 2011. You will remember that the Mar Hall 16 mediation took place in March 2011. And this document 17 we're about to see is reporting on progress shortly 18 after Mar Hall. 19 I don't think you've seen this before. We'll see 20 it's headed "REPORT ON PROGRESS SINCE COMPLETION OF 21 HEADS OF TERMS TO 8 APRIL 2011". It's been prepared by 22 Colin Smith of HG Consulting and reviewed by 23 Martin Foerder. 24 If we could jump, please, to page 118, we can see 25 this is an email from Andy Conway of the Council, dated 208 1 5 April 2011, headed "Tram - CEC Approvals". If we 2 look at the table and scroll down a little, please, we 3 can see that the open technical approval comments as at 4 24 March 2011 were 2,782, and within about two weeks, by 5 5 April 2011, they had been reduced to 85. Do you know 6 why that was the case? 7 A. Yes. I was party to the workload of what was done here, 8 and it was, as far as I'm concerned, it was a brilliant 9 effort between four parties: CEC's technical guys, SDS, 10 Bilfinger Berger, their input, and one guy that I have 11 not seen any letters from, Damian Sharp. Damian was 12 giving tie assistance in trying to close this out, and 13 what we did, we got the design team from SDS, the 14 technical team from Andy Conway. We stuck ourselves in 15 Bilfinger Berger's site office, and we just worked 16 through it and ground it. 17 We worked very, very, very collaboratively 18 eventually with CEC to reduce this, and it looks a lot 19 to start with, open technical approval comments, but if 20 I can help you by saying a lot of good work was done, 21 but the numbers may be a little bit misleading. 22 If you have a technical comment on a tramstop, and 23 it says this has the wrong dimension from here, it has 24 it the number of times that you have the number of 25 tramstops. 209 1 So there might be 2,782, but the minute you sit down 2 with CEC and understand that this 500 dimension should 3 be 520, the number of tramstops you've got, you change 4 one drawing. You configuration manage this 20-odd 5 times, you take away not one comment. You take 27 at 6 a time. 7 But Damian, Andy Conway's boys, my design team, and 8 to some degree Bilfinger Berger where they had input to 9 help, we just crashed it at the site and through a very 10 short period -- I don't know what period of time that 11 is, but a lot of good work was done, and that was 12 probably the best work that CEC and the SDS did 13 together. 14 Q. Why wasn't this done before? If it could have been done 15 this quickly, why wasn't it done earlier? 16 A. My answer I have to give, I think, is tie kept us at 17 a distance early on. And the minute we struck up the 18 relationship with CEC and their technical team -- and at 19 that time it was critical to the project and everybody 20 knew it. Even CEC knew that something special had to 21 happen. Damian put together: this is what we're going 22 to do. He was working on behalf of tie. I think Duncan 23 gave his chaps: guys, we've got to get this done, and my 24 design team and Andy Conway's technical team, we just 25 rammed through it. To be honest, they did a brilliant 210 1 job. 2 Q. Mr Sharp had told us in his evidence that he thought it 3 was a tactical decision by the consortium not to close 4 these matters out while the parties were in dispute, 5 despite the fact that these matters were capable of 6 being closed out reasonably quickly and easily once 7 agreement had been reached on the underlying dispute. 8 Do you have any comments on that suggestion? 9 A. I don't, but certainly from the SDS side we wanted rid 10 of those comments. We would have done anything, you 11 know, in our gift to try and get them down to less than 12 100 at that date because all our drawings were out there 13 and we were at risk at having fault. But they were tiny 14 comments that just had to be put together. They just 15 needed effort. 16 But certainly on SDS's side, I don't believe -- 17 I can't speak for BBS, but I don't believe so. There 18 was no evidence to me that that was the case. Certainly 19 from an SDS point of view, we wanted rid of those 20 comments and we wanted the job finished. 21 I didn't want to be there any longer. I wanted to 22 close that job out. 23 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, Mr Dolan. As I say, you have 24 provided a helpful statement. I'm happy to take the 25 other matters in your statement as read. So I have no 211 1 further questions. 2 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: There are no questions from any 3 parties. 4 Thank you, Mr Dolan. Technically you're still under 5 citation and you could be recalled if any issues arise. 6 Hopefully that won't happen. Thank you very much. 7 A. Thank you very much. Thank you. 8 (The witness withdrew) 9 (4.40 pm) 10 (The hearing adjourned until Friday, 13 October 2017 at 11 9.30 am) 12 212 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR STEVE REYNOLDS (continued) ........................1 4 5 Examination by MR MACKENZIE (continued) .......1 6 7 MR ALAN DOLAN (sworn) ..............................164 8 9 Examination by MR MACKENZIE .................164 10 11 12 213