1 Wednesday, 18 October 2017 17 (11.27 am) 18 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes, Mr Lake. 19 MR LAKE: My Lord, the next witness is John Casserly. 20 MR JOHN CASSERLY (sworn) 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I ask you to listen to the 22 question and answer it as directly as possible. If you 23 have qualifications or explanations, you can add these 24 after your primary answer. 25 If you speak loudly enough and clearly enough, so 60 1 that the shorthand writers can keep up with you. 2 Examination by MR LAKE 3 MR LAKE: Mr Casserly, can you state your full name, please. 4 A. It's John McNeill Casserly. 5 Q. And what is your occupation? 6 A. I'm a quantity surveyor. 7 Q. If you could look at a document on the screen. It's 8 TRI00000111_C. 9 You should also, Mr Casserly, have a paper copy of 10 that in front of you? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Is this a question and answer that you provided by way 13 of statement to this Inquiry? 14 A. Yes, it is. 15 Q. I think in the paper copy at least you have your 16 signature on the final page? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. Are you content that that be taken to be your evidence 19 to this Inquiry? 20 A. Yes, I am. 21 Q. Thank you very much for that. 22 I want to ask you a few additional questions about 23 various issues that have arisen. 24 Firstly, could I ask you about page 24 of your 25 statement, please. Question 31. This is in relation to 61 1 the carrying out of the utility works, and it notes 2 initially that at a Tram Project Board meeting on 3 5 September, Andrew Holmes raised the issue as to when 4 the more difficult sections of the utility diversion 5 works would be tackled. 6 Was it the question that less difficult sections 7 were tackled first? 8 A. I think that -- sorry to interrupt. 9 Q. No. 10 A. There were elements of the utility diversions 11 particularly round about Ocean Terminal, which were 12 easier or less difficult to then do utility diversions 13 on, because they were privately owned by Forth Ports and 14 there was less utilities in those areas. 15 So those areas were carried out while we were 16 awaiting the utility design or the diversions for the 17 utility designs from SDS. 18 Q. Now, presumably if those were the more straightforward 19 works, they could be carried out with fewer surprises 20 and fewer difficulties? 21 A. In theory. There's still a requirement because you're 22 trying to do a clean swept path for the tram that it 23 still restricts the amount of space either side of where 24 the tram is going for the utilities to be fitted in. 25 But yes, they should have been and there were less 62 1 difficulties associated with those things, because the 2 private owner of the utilities also had really good 3 records, and was also working with us on a day-to-day 4 basis actually on the site, dictating where things were 5 going. 6 Q. Was the effect of that that at the start of the works 7 being carried out, there was in a sense a false 8 impression that they could be carried out with 9 relatively little difficulty? 10 A. I think in the context they were easier to do because 11 you had the greater level of detail. I'm not sure that 12 there was a false impression that was given, because 13 everybody took a view and within the whole budget and 14 within the MUDFA and the tram project, there was always 15 a recognition that when you're moving utilities in 16 a city like Edinburgh, there will always be an element 17 of unexpected and additional things; and I think the 18 budget reflected that because I think the actual bundle 19 for doing the works, there was an allowance of risk and 20 contingency of about the same again. So the bundle for 21 the works was about GBP40 million. The risk and 22 contingency was about GBP35 million of -- so it was 23 GBP75 million, GBP79 million in total. 24 Q. Now, I think we know that the works took a lot longer 25 than was anticipated? 63 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Was that in part because although it was expected there 3 would be additional utilities to those known about, the 4 problems turned out to be worse than had even been 5 expected? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. When did that start to become apparent that that would 8 be the case? 9 A. I think very early in the process. It became apparent 10 that there was little ground investigation work had been 11 done, apart from a kind of ground penetrating radar. So 12 that when you actually started digging in the ground, 13 you discovered a lot more utilities than anybody had 14 anticipated, even having done a number of limited 15 surveys. 16 Q. I want to come back to ask you about surveys in a while. 17 When you say quite early, I think the MUDFA works 18 got under way in 2007. 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. As you have seen from this minute. Was the problem 21 apparent by the end of 2007? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. If we look at page 44 of your statement, if you look at 24 the lower half of this page, there are questions here 25 about the slippage in time. You were asked at the foot 64 1 of the page, what were the main reasons for the slow 2 progress, and you referred to a progress report there. 3 If I go over to the next page, the top of it, the 4 question is: 5 "To what extent could and should these difficulties 6 have been foreseen prior to Infraco contract close in 7 May 2008?" 8 You say: 9 "All foreseen and advised to tie Infraco team re 10 issues and potential impacts prior to May 2008 including 11 anticipated consequences to Infraco contractor." 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. I just want to look at the various components of that. 14 Can you recall really when that was first foreseen 15 and advised to the Infraco team? 16 A. Yes. We produced -- so the MUDFA team produced 17 a schedule of all utilities. There were a number of 18 issues associated with the design at that point. 19 So we put together a schedule which showed utilities 20 that had been left in place that the Infraco contractor 21 would have to deal with as they came along. 22 It showed areas where the tram design had changed, 23 because the slab thickness for the actual tram slab had 24 increased from the original design. So we'd moved 25 utilities, then the slab had increased in depth. There 65 1 was a decision taken that rather than readjusting 2 utilities, that the Infraco contractor would then deal 3 with those utilities that might be within that level. 4 So there was a whole raft of things which were then 5 produced in a schedule, which were then presented to the 6 Infraco contractor, prior to them signing the Agreement 7 and after they'd been made the preferred bidder. 8 I actually sat with them, and then there was a legal 9 note that was prepared by DLA Piper which detailed all 10 those things and then were sent to the Infraco team. 11 That was both the contractor and the Infraco team that 12 were negotiating the Infraco contract at the time. 13 Q. You said you passed information and had discussions with 14 the Infraco contractor, letting them know the additional 15 works they would have to do. I take it the people 16 within tie were made aware there would be additional 17 works? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Who was this information passed to within tie? 20 A. It was actually issued to the tie Board. So it went to 21 the tie Management Committee. So through Steven Bell 22 and Susan Clark. It was also issued to the programmers. 23 It was also issued to Geoff Gilbert and the team 24 that were negotiating the contracts with the Infraco 25 contractor, and there was a formal note -- I don't know 66 1 and I can't remember, so I apologise. The formal note 2 from DLA Piper, Sharon Fitzgerald produced it and 3 drafted it and I approved it. I can't remember exactly 4 who that went to within tie, but it covered all those 5 issues and it had the schedule attached. 6 Q. By the time you got to May 2008, all these people you 7 have referred to would be aware of two things. Number 8 one, that the MUDFA works as done by the MUDFA 9 contractor, Carillion, would not be complete, and that 10 Infraco would have to undertake these additional works? 11 A. Yes, and just to clarify as well, in that register of 12 those things that Infraco would have to deal with, it 13 wasn't just that they had to move a number of utilities 14 and diversions. By diverting utilities as you went 15 along, then you don't remove all the bits of pipe that 16 are underneath the tram. You have moved the utility. 17 So there's still old ducts and other things there. That 18 was also included in the list, so that the Infraco 19 contractor was able to take a view on that, from 20 a health and safety and CDM perspective. That means 21 when they're coming along, they know when they hit a 22 pipe, then the pipe's empty, there's nothing in it and 23 it's live, so that was included in the list as well. 24 Q. What I would like to do now is look at a number of 25 reports that were generated within tie which record 67 1 progress being made with the MUDFA works and just ask 2 you a few questions about that. 3 The first one I would like to look at is a document 4 reference CEC00114381. 5 I have transposed two of my numbers when I read them 6 out. Can we look at CEC00114831. 7 You can see this is a pack of papers prepared for 8 a meeting with the Tram Project Board that was to take 9 place on 9 April 2008. Not long before contract close. 10 Did you ever see these? 11 A. Not these papers, no. 12 Q. Could you look at page 12 within it. You can take it 13 from me that this is part of a report to the Tram 14 Project Board by the Project Director who was then 15 Steve Bell. We can see a summary of the MUDFA position. 16 What I'm interested in is the right-hand part of 17 this table, overall performance to date. We can see 18 that it was planned that there would have been a total 19 of 12,000 metres or so to be completed and in fact only 20 10,000 had been done. And that it was hoped that 104 21 chambers would have been corrected or moved and only 54 22 had been done. 23 Was that your understanding? Is that representative 24 of the position that existed at that time? 25 A. Yes. 68 1 Q. Now, that was something that existed after, as you say, 2 some of the more straightforward works had been done 3 down at Ocean Terminal. Was your feeling at that time 4 that matters were going to get worse as time went on, in 5 terms of the time lag? 6 A. I think it's difficult to say because it's to do with 7 what you actually discover in the ground as you're 8 digging and uncovering things in the road. Then -- and 9 in the pavements. 10 Then it's difficult to put a kind of view on it that 11 says it was going to get worse. I think it was 12 representative at the time of the issues. 13 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could you slow down. 14 A. Sorry. 15 MR LAKE: You said it was difficult: I think it was 16 representative at the time of issue. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Could we look and see how matters did move on. If we 19 could look at a document CEC00988024. 20 We can see this is -- the cover sheet indicates it's 21 the papers for the Tram Project Board meeting that was 22 to take place on 17 December 2008, the end of the same 23 year. Could we look at page 12, please. We can see 24 here, if we enlarge the table that's in the middle of 25 the page, we can see that in terms of the metres to be 69 1 replaced, the cumulative progress is that against the 2 planned replacement of 41,700 metres, actually only 3 30,445 have been done. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. So that is a slippage of approximately 25 per cent? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Can I ask you to give an audible answer. 8 A. Sorry, yes. 9 Q. In the earlier one, we saw it was from 12,000 to 10,000, 10 so it's clear by the time we are here that the slippage 11 is in fact increasing? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. If we look at the bullet points underneath this table, 14 we see: 15 "Reason for the lower than planned productivity 16 include:" 17 The second one: 18 "Re-sequencing at Haymarket due to traffic 19 management." 20 What was the issue there? 21 A. Because of the number of utility diversions required at 22 Haymarket in the very limited space and the restrictions 23 on the traffic management, we were uncovering additional 24 utilities as we were digging different sections of the 25 road. To allow us to try and accommodate that, the 70 1 traffic management had to be amended continually, to 2 then give you a wider area to then work within, and 3 there were restrictions on what we could do within the 4 traffic management, within the agreements that we had 5 with the Council and the Traffic Department within the 6 Council. 7 Q. If we look at the next bullet point: 8 "Close down of sites on Leith Walk due to a new 9 embargo." 10 I take it that speaks for itself. The Council had 11 decided or someone had decided there should be no 12 working, and that had made it necessary to shut down 13 certain sites for a while? 14 A. That's correct. 15 Q. This was in the December minutes. So was that something 16 that happened on the run-up to Christmas, to assist 17 Christmas shopping? 18 A. There were a number of different times at different 19 periods in the year when these things would happen, but 20 yes, I would assume that was for Christmas. 21 Q. The next point is lack of design for section 1a. What 22 were the difficulties with provision of design that were 23 happening? 24 A. The issue that we had was getting design information 25 from SDS, the designers, which was agreed and approved 71 1 by the utilities for the installation of the utilities. 2 Q. I wanted to look at two other documents, because I want 3 to contrast what happened between one month and the 4 next. 5 So could we look at CEC00983221. 6 We can see this is the Tram Project Board papers 7 this time for the meeting in July 2009; do you see that? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Then could we go to -- pardon me. If we start on 10 page 12, and we see the foot of the page here, the 11 progress on MUDFA during the period 3, and it's 12 represented in a table, but we really need to look to 13 the next page to see the end of the table. The 14 right-hand columns are the cumulative position. The 15 planned, the actual and then the various; is that 16 right -- 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Did you actually prepare this table and provide it to -- 19 A. I don't remember preparing that particular table. The 20 ones where -- the tables we saw previously where it had 21 that actual linear metreage of the utilities done, we 22 definitely prepared those tables. But I don't remember 23 preparing a table that then adjusted percentages based 24 upon output. It was -- we always produced tables that 25 showed actual linear metreage of utilities to be 72 1 diverted planned against actual. 2 Q. And then what we can see is the planned completion was 3 82.2 per cent. The actual was 78.6 per cent, with -- 4 that's 3.5 per cent roughly behind planned? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. If we then look at the next month, which is reference 7 CEC00739552. 8 We can see that these are the papers for a meeting 9 in August 2009, and then go to page 14 of those papers. 10 If we could just enlarge the MUDFA table from the centre 11 of the page. We can see that there's a dramatic 12 increase and that the cumulative plan is now up to 13 100 per cent, and the actual figure has jumped to 14 96.6 per cent. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Was there really such a big jump between the two months, 17 or is there some explanation for these jump in figures? 18 A. I think there was two kind of issues associated with 19 this. Some of the works were de-scoped from the MUDFA 20 contract and the MUDFA project and were tendered or let 21 to other contractors to deliver. So they were taken out 22 of the MUDFA reporting process, which would then reduce 23 the amount of planned against actual for the works that 24 were outstanding or remaining. 25 Q. So the difference is when we come to the second table, 73 1 the one we are now looking at, that's not all the MUDFA 2 works. That's only the MUDFA works still let under the 3 original contract? 4 A. That would be my understanding, yes. 5 Q. Do you know, was there any separate reporting channel 6 set up to indicate what percentage of MUDFA works 7 remained outstanding under the new contracts? 8 A. Not in this format. Again, on the utility diversion 9 works, we actually presented numbers on the actual 10 utility lengths to be done against planned, irrespective 11 of who was carrying out the works. So I couldn't say or 12 I can't remember if there was anything specifically done 13 outside the remit in the reports that we produced. 14 Q. Did you provide under those other contracts, did you 15 provide information to the management, to the Board, as 16 to how complete they were? 17 A. We did up to a point in time. The Infraco team that 18 were carrying out the Infraco works took over the 19 running and the closing out of those contracts at 20 a point in time near the end of 2009, but prior to that, 21 then yes, we actually were and the people within 22 MUDFA were supervising those additional -- the project 23 team within MUDFA and the project managers were 24 supervising those other contractors and co-ordinating 25 those works, but the actual management of them then 74 1 moved to the Infraco team, late 2009/early 2010. 2 Q. So thereafter, they would be the ones responsible for 3 gathering data as to how far through the works had gone 4 and how much was still left to do? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. I now want to look at other differences in the tiers of 7 reporting. If I could ask you to look at some other 8 documents with me. If we could look at CEC00080738. 9 Once again, we can see these are the papers for the 10 meeting that took place of the Tram Project Board on 11 4 June 2008. Could we go to page 10. 12 We could enlarge the heading "Progress - MUDFA" and 13 the bullet points underneath it. 14 We can see: 15 "Overall, cumulative progress is approximately six 16 weeks behind programme and, prior to mitigation, shows 17 a two week impact on the Infraco programme." 18 Were you involved at all in assessing the impact 19 that the MUDFA delays would have on Infraco or was that 20 different people within the -- 21 A. It was different people. We would produce a programme. 22 We would then issue that programme centrally, and then 23 that would be incorporated into a master programme 24 including the Infraco works by the -- Susan Clark and 25 her team. 75 1 Q. If we see that says six weeks and then we go -- contrast 2 that with what is in the month that follows, if we look 3 at file USB00000005. We can see these are the papers 4 for 2 July 2008, the following month. If we could look 5 at page 15, and enlarge the heading, "Progress - MUDFA", 6 and the three paragraphs or so. Yes. 7 Now, all that's said here is: 8 "Progress has started to show improved production 9 rates ... barriers to production have been addressed and 10 recovery works are under way." 11 Then the following paragraph it says where the MUDFA 12 works are, that's two to three weeks behind on Infraco 13 critical activities. So this is all that we know, that 14 it's got a little bit better on the six weeks behind 15 that we were told previously? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Now, if I could ask you to look at a different document 18 now, it's got reference CEC01302139. We see this is the 19 MUDFA Sub Committee Report, papers for their meeting 20 that took place on 4 June 2008, which is round about the 21 same time as the last two documents we've been looking 22 at? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Could we look at page 8 of this. We can see this is 25 a paper to that Sub Committee entitled "Construction 76 1 Director's Report" for 4 June 2008. 2 And an executive summary, we see a table recording 3 the performance that was taking place on the project. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Were you involved in preparing that table or the data 6 for it? 7 A. Yes. For the actual numbers of the utility diversions 8 planned and actuals, yes. 9 Q. If we look at what's said there in the overall 10 performance to date on the right-hand side, out of 11 a planned 24,000 metres, an actual 15,000 metres had 12 been done. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Now, that's on very crude arithmetic, roughly 15 40 per cent less than should have been done? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Is that just the representation -- a different way of 18 saying it was six weeks behind? 19 A. Yes. When you take the programme, I think the previous 20 report said it was the critical items on the Infraco 21 project. On the programme and the programme path, there 22 would be critical items and a critical path. Some of 23 those utility diversions that might not have been 24 completed in the actuals might not be on the critical -- 25 sorry, I apologise for talking too fast. 77 1 Some of the items that may not have been completed 2 as actual utility diversions might not have any impact 3 on the critical path of the Infraco Contract. And 4 therefore the six weeks' delay that we previously saw on 5 the previous report might not be associated with every 6 single utility not being completed. There might only be 7 four or five, ten, 15 key utilities that then impact the 8 critical path of the Infraco contract. 9 Q. I can understand why advice would want to be given to 10 the Board about particularly what is going to affect the 11 other contracts. 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. But was there any discussion with you about why these 14 figures, the 40 per cent behind schedule, were not being 15 reported to the Tram Project Board? 16 A. No. As I say, we produced the numbers and we also sat 17 in a monthly meeting, presented these numbers and showed 18 all the figures. We weren't involved in the production 19 of the reports that then went to the sub-committees of 20 the boards. 21 Q. I think ultimately the agreement with Alfred MacAlpine 22 that became Carillion was terminated by agreement? 23 A. Yes, after I had left tie, yes. 24 Q. You say it was after you left. That is my next 25 question. Were you involved at all in the discussions 78 1 and negotiations for what went into the Termination 2 Agreement? 3 A. No. 4 Q. I want to put to you some more general questions about 5 utility works and how they are managed and some of the 6 problems. 7 A common theme that emerges throughout your 8 questions and answers is the difficulties arising from 9 inaccuracies of the records held by utilities? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. I think I understand it correctly that this is something 12 that's common throughout all historic cities? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. What were the solutions to that? How did you get round 15 that? 16 A. Well, in fairness to the utilities, the Scottish Water 17 and SGN, the gas company, have quite good records. The 18 differential being that the utility might not be exactly 19 where they said it is. It could be slightly off-line, 20 but they have actually quite good records of where their 21 utilities are. It's the balance of the utilities that 22 don't have very good records. 23 The only way of then dealing with that, or the only 24 practical solution, I believe, is doing a greater level 25 of site investigation, digging trial holes, exposing 79 1 what's in the ground, and having the utilities and 2 designers with you when you do that, to then come up 3 with a solution, depending on what you find. 4 Q. That raises two things that I want to ask you about. 5 Number 1, what sort of investigations take place, and 6 how you go about finding the solution, getting the 7 involvement of the utilities. 8 Firstly, the investigations. You're talking about 9 trial holes there. Previously you've mentioned radar? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Is radar an effective way of finding out what's under 12 the roads? 13 A. I think it has a place, but it wouldn't tell you all the 14 information. It is limited on what it can actually 15 produce and do. 16 Q. What can it tell you and what can't it tell you? 17 A. Depending upon the type of radar survey, and I'm not an 18 expert in this, so I apologise, but depending upon the 19 type of radar survey and utilities that were in the 20 ground, if there's something that that has an electrical 21 pulse or can have a current through it, then it's got 22 a chance of detecting it. If it doesn't have an 23 electrical pulse or a current through it, it will not 24 find it. 25 Q. So things like the modern gas pipes, polyethylene gas 80 1 pipes, would they be found? 2 A. No, not in my experience. 3 Q. Okay. So you get at best a partial picture of what's 4 under the ground using radar? 5 A. At best, yes. 6 Q. If you are using radar on a route that's going to be 7 done, how much of the route would be generally surveyed 8 with radar? 9 A. Personally, and I wasn't involved in the -- in the 10 actual surveys that were undertaken, I would have 11 surveyed the whole route, and I would have carried out 12 trial holes along that whole route as well, as the radar 13 surveys. 14 Q. Now, trial holes obviously have the difficulty that they 15 cause traffic disruption in a city like Edinburgh? 16 A. Potentially. 17 Q. Why only potentially? 18 A. Because it depends on what you're trying to find. Part 19 of the trial holes is to identify the utilities that are 20 there and give you an indication. You don't have to dig 21 across the whole road. By the nature of the beast, it's 22 called a trial hole. So you select where you put your 23 trial hole, and it also then gives you a view on what 24 spice might be available to actually accommodate 25 utilities you're going to divert out of the tram 81 1 pathway. 2 Q. That is what I was going to ask you. You need to know 3 not just what's under the route where the tram is going 4 to go. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. You need to know what's next to it to know if there's 7 going to be any space to move the utilities under the 8 tram? 9 A. Correct. 10 Q. But that sounds like trying to get all that information 11 for the whole of the tram route would be almost 12 tantamount to digging up the entire tram route before 13 you start? 14 A. Which is impossible to do, yes. That's the only way you 15 would get a complete picture of the whole site and then 16 exactly what you're faced with. 17 Q. Once you discover what's there, you've got to try and 18 design the movement -- how to move the utilities and 19 where to accommodate them? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. How swift is that process? 22 A. Unfortunately it depends upon the amount of space that's 23 available to then put the utilities into, and then the 24 number of the utilities. Each of the utility providers 25 has a standard design that they would like you to 82 1 follow, which gives them a standard space inbetween 2 utilities, so they get access and go through that 3 process, which is marvellous when you've got an open 4 road and nothing else that's there. 5 When you're moving everything, a large number of 6 things into a very congested space and therefore they 7 don't get the design parameters and the things they 8 would normally expect to get, it's then a more difficult 9 discussion, because you need the utilities to then 10 almost give you or remove their design standards, and 11 change them to accommodate whatever they can actually 12 achieve in the ground, rather than their preferential or 13 their standard design parameters. So it makes it more 14 difficult to then get agreement on where all the 15 utilities would go. 16 Q. So presumably, if you wanted to get that variation 17 standards, you've got to put a design proposal to 18 electricity company, gas company, water company and 19 say: is this acceptable to you? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. And is it easy to get a reply out of them for that? 22 A. It depends -- to start off with, at the MUDFA project, 23 it was very difficult. The SDS provider, that was part 24 of their role, and part of their remit, as was the trial 25 holes, and actually doing a site investigation over the 83 1 whole site. 2 The relationship from an SDS perspective, the 3 designers, took a very kind of standoffish approach, 4 where they expected the utilities to actually come up 5 with the answers and provide them with all the 6 information, and then a design. Halfway through, or not 7 halfway, but very early in the process, it was 8 recognised by MUDFA that we had to have a more proactive 9 approach with the utilities. So we actually engaged 10 with the utilities, brought them to the site, and had 11 a representative of each of the utility companies on 12 site every day, with a representative of the designer, 13 so instead of them sitting in Newcastle, somebody 14 actually on site with us, to then help get through that 15 process, and agree where utilities would go and come up 16 with designs. 17 Q. Was that being done, getting people on site, when the 18 actual MUDFA works were being undertaken, the road was 19 being broken, or was that earlier at the design stage? 20 A. We tried to do it earlier at the design stage and then 21 also during the actual MUDFA works that were being 22 undertaken, because you could still discover additional 23 things that needed to then be dealt with, and at that 24 time you then don't have the time to go through a formal 25 three, four, five, six weeks' process. You need to try 84 1 and get a decision as quickly as possible. 2 Q. Because what I was thinking is if you discover that you 3 want to move an electricity cable in a way that doesn't 4 comply with their requirements, they might say no. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. So you have to move it somewhere different and that's 7 then going to cause a problem for gas or water, and 8 you've got to go to them? 9 A. That's it exactly. 10 Q. So is there any established means of forcing everyone to 11 come together, all the utilities and the project 12 designers, to try and get decisions made on these 13 matters quickly? 14 A. There's nothing to force them, and there isn't any 15 avenue, other than through New Roads and Street Works 16 Act, which would then mean taking a dispute to the new 17 roads and street works and following a kind of formal 18 legal process. 19 Q. How long would that take? 20 A. It would take an awful long time. Six months to a year 21 potentially, and obviously that is not conducive to then 22 delivering a tram project. 23 So the only way to deal with it was to actually get 24 representatives who had the authority or were 25 significantly senior enough within the utilities to come 85 1 and spend time with us, get them in a room, and MUDFA 2 nine times out of ten then co-ordinated those meetings. 3 The MUDFA project managers in charge of each section of 4 the works would then have liaison meetings with the 5 utilities and have them all in the room at the same 6 time, to then come up with a negotiated or a reasoned 7 solution. 8 The only caveat to that is that some utilities just 9 by the nature of what they are, take precedence over 10 others. So for instance, a gas main, because of the 11 health and safety implications, always -- almost always 12 gets priority because it's different from having 13 a telecoms cable. 14 Q. I could see that anything that's going to fail to danger 15 has to be given priority? 16 A. Correct, yes. 17 Q. When you say that these sessions were run by MUDFA, was 18 that people within tie or the MUDFA contractors? 19 A. No, it was people within tie. We also had the MUDFA 20 contractor in the meetings as well, to make sure that we 21 had everybody -- everybody's input to get the best 22 solution and the most economical and advantageous to try 23 and get it delivered. So rather than having three or 24 four different meetings, you get everybody all in the 25 room at the same time, agree the solution, and then go 86 1 and try and deliver that solution. 2 Q. From what you are saying, that sounds like that was 3 voluntary, it depended on the co-operation of everybody 4 concerned? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Did you get the co-operation of everybody? 7 A. I think initially there was a bit of push back, but yes, 8 we did get the co-operation of the utilities, and they 9 did try to help us wherever they possibly could. There 10 were a number of locations limited, and I think one of 11 them was Constitution Street, where we couldn't get 12 a design that would meet everybody's requirements and 13 was left in abeyance. 14 So it just kept getting put back and put back and 15 the reason being the distance between the walls or the 16 buildings in Constitution Street is almost exactly the 17 width of the tram just about. So there isn't anywhere 18 to put utilities. So it becomes a much harder 19 discussion and debate. 20 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Was that ultimately resolved or is it 21 still in that position? 22 A. It wasn't resolved at the time that I left tie, my Lord. 23 MR LAKE: Is there any way in which, in the absence of an 24 agreed solution, it's possible to impose a solution on 25 the utilities? 87 1 A. It's -- again, there's the health and safety issues with 2 those like a gas main, where they, under their design, 3 could then take you to a Health and Safety Executive. 4 So you couldn't impose upon the gas utility a solution 5 which they then could then say breached our health and 6 safety, and therefore they didn't believe there was 7 a safety issue with it, in which case you would have to 8 go to a regulator and again that would take you 9 a considerable period of time to get a resolution on. 10 So we didn't impose upon the utilities. We tried to 11 get to an answer with them that was acceptable. 12 Q. Were you satisfied as a generality that where the 13 utilities raised concerns or problems, they were genuine 14 concerns or problems or they were just seeking to adhere 15 to their guidelines for their own convenience, their own 16 corporate convenience? 17 A. I think that in general the utilities did change their 18 guidelines. I think the one that was hardest to get 19 a change from was the gas network. But again, it's 20 a safety issue. So you can understand the issues that 21 they had, but they did use a safety card quite a lot of 22 the time if they didn't like the design. 23 Q. If gas is a utility which takes priority, possibly for 24 understandable reasons, is there merit in essentially 25 starting with gas and you think that they have perhaps 88 1 some adequate record, starting with them, and getting 2 that done first, and then bringing the others together 3 to essentially force a solution from them? 4 A. I think in reality that's the way the actual discussions 5 took place. So rather than having a separate discussion 6 with the gas provider, getting a design and then coming 7 up with a solution for everybody else, that was again 8 a critical thing through the discussions: where does the 9 gas main go and how do we accommodate that, and then how 10 do we then get everything else round about to fit. 11 Most of the other utilities recognise that the 12 things that have a public health or a health and safety 13 issue would get priority. 14 Q. Sticking with the issue of the utility companies and the 15 co-operation you got from them, did they co-operate in 16 terms of provision of information such as they had about 17 the whereabouts of their plant? 18 A. I think they did provide all the information that they 19 had, actually drawings and details. I think they also 20 provided, after we initiated the kind of MUDFA approach 21 of getting the people in the room and then discussing 22 things, it's also apparent that quite a lot of the 23 utilities have personnel who have a really good 24 understanding of where their assets are in the ground, 25 which might not necessarily be shown on a set of 89 1 drawings. Because of work done over a period of years. 2 Those people were invaluable in then helping to come up 3 with a design and come up with a solution. 4 Q. What about once the works had been done, presumably 5 particularly with things like water and gas, perhaps 6 others also, they need to accept the works or approve 7 the works before they connect back into their network? 8 A. That's correct. 9 Q. Was there co-operation given in relation to that, or 10 were there difficulties? 11 A. No, there was good co-operation given in the -- the 12 contractor that was selected for the MUDFA works was 13 actually an approved contractor for all of the 14 utilities. So they're actually an approved gas 15 supplier, electrical supplier, Scottish Water, and the 16 telecoms providers. That was one of the reasons they 17 were selected. 18 So they would have used the same contractor. We 19 also had programmed in reconnection dates. So 20 disconnecting the existing services, and then connecting 21 to the new service once it was diverted. There was 22 a very thorough process for going through that. And the 23 utilities then attend, so they send an inspector, who 24 then inspects the diversions and doing any testing, 25 checks the testing. So, for instance, Scottish Water, 90 1 the diversion would be done. A Scottish Water inspector 2 would be present who would witness the flushing of the 3 mains, who would witness the tie into the new mains and 4 would approve all that before you could then put the 5 mains into service for the customers. 6 Q. Was that a smooth process in practice? 7 A. It was smooth inasmuch as sometimes the dates -- so you 8 have to give the utilities advance notice when these 9 things are going to take place, so that they have the 10 people that are able to sign those things off present at 11 the time, which are different from the people that are 12 going to be approving the designs and the other 13 elements. 14 The only issue that we had is sometimes the utility 15 diversions or the readiness of Carillion might have 16 slipped from the day that they said it was going to be. 17 So they might have said: I'll be ready on Monday; and 18 actually it was ready on Wednesday. Sometimes it's 19 quite difficult to then get the utilities staff back, 20 that says: on Monday we are not ready, can you come back 21 on Wednesday. Sometimes that wasn't always available, 22 but in fairness to the utilities, they did try to 23 accommodate everything and they did put things in place 24 to try and reduce those outputs. 25 Q. Dealing with money dealings with the utilities -- 91 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. -- under the New Roads and Street Works Act, there would 3 be a payment due in some instances from the utility 4 company to tie in respect of the works, because the 5 utility company are getting a newer asset? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Now, were there difficulties in trying to get those sums 8 agreed? 9 A. There were -- there were difficulties in trying to 10 understand -- the New Roads and Street Works Act and the 11 payments that are associated with that betterment, 12 I think is what it's known as under the New Roads and 13 Street Works Act, also depends upon the age of the 14 utility and how long it's actually been in service. 15 So if it's a brand new asset that's only been in 16 service for a year, there isn't a lot of benefit for the 17 utility in getting a new asset. So you don't get any 18 money in effect. Whereas some of the older utilities, 19 like a water main or a gas main, some of those had been 20 in the ground for over 100 years, and therefore you're 21 getting a 80, 90, 95 per cent contribution to the cost, 22 but only of the diversion. 23 So the issue that we had was more about the age of 24 the asset and when they were installed, and part of that 25 was because the utilities themselves didn't actually 92 1 know how old some of the assets were. 2 Q. Presumably that didn't hold up any work actually getting 3 things moved? 4 A. No. 5 Q. It just held up agreeing the money? 6 A. It's just a commercial agreement. In fairness to the 7 utilities, we got to a position where if we knew the age 8 or they had drawings showing the age of assets at one 9 end of a street and another end of a street, let's say, 10 the section in the middle, we took a reasonable view 11 that said: it's reasonable to assume that the asset that 12 we don't have a date on is placed in the same kind of 13 time frame. So we used that as a basis, which I thought 14 was a reasonable view from the utilities and 15 a reasonable way to go forward. 16 Q. If I could ask you to slow down. 17 A. I apologise. 18 Q. Were there situations where you simply couldn't reach 19 agreement or it took an inordinate amount of time to 20 reach agreement on what the betterment sum would be, 21 because you couldn't agree the age? 22 A. I think -- well, not so much the age. The area that we 23 had the most issue with was the telecoms and 24 particularly BT and trying to get the telecoms element 25 sorted. 93 1 Q. Why? What was the problem there? 2 A. The problem there is that we had a continuing debate 3 about what was actually in the ground to start off with, 4 and how many cables there might be. So for instance, 5 along Leith Walk there's a number of cables in the 6 ground. You then come along and we were putting in what 7 would appear to be a significantly increased number of 8 cables and ducts for British Telecom. 9 And the cables that we put in today carry a lot more 10 information than previous cables. So the query that we 11 had constantly, which was very difficult to try and draw 12 out from BT, is there is a great deal of benefit that 13 they're getting because they're getting additional. So 14 an increased number in the actual number of cables that 15 are there to start off with. And an increased 16 capability within those cables which meant that in 17 theory, we should have been able to put in less cables 18 because the modern day cable can carry a greater amount 19 of data. We ended up putting in more cables, and so the 20 BT element wasn't resolved at the time that I left tie, 21 and MUDFA -- sorry, tie appointed through the Infraco 22 contract, and somebody that worked with the Infraco 23 team, a liaison with BT to try and resolve all those 24 issues. 25 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: When you're speaking about 94 1 betterment, you said that you got a percentage of the 2 betterment, depending upon the age of the original pipe 3 or what have you. 4 I think you said something like only a percentage of 5 the diversion. So that if you had an old pipe, 6 100 years old, and you were replacing it at the point of 7 diversion, you would get 90 per cent of whatever -- of 8 the diversion. But could you then connect the new pipe 9 to the 100-year-old rusty pipe at the other end? 10 A. Yes, my Lord, you could. The issue -- the only issue 11 with that and the reason I say for the diversion, there 12 were a number of utilities, particularly the gas main, 13 where, because of the restrictions and what you could 14 do, then rather than having the utility on Leith Walk, 15 so there's an existing pipe which runs down Leith Walk. 16 Because of the constraints and design constraints, there 17 was a view taken that you would do a diversion that 18 actually went down one of the side streets, connected to 19 an old or another gas main, and then you brought it back 20 in through another side street. So it took away the 21 issue where there was a really congested area. 22 Quite rightly, the gas authority said: I only wanted 23 to replace 20 metres of pipe, but you have had to go 200 24 metres to do the 20 metres; I'm only contributing to the 25 20 metres that we are getting that -- that you should 95 1 have actually only diverted, I'm not paying for you 2 because you have had to take it all round Edinburgh to 3 get back to the same place. So we would only get the 20 4 metres or the contribution to the 20 metres, rather than 5 the 200 metres. 6 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 7 MR LAKE: One other matter you mentioned in your answers is 8 the difficulty when you uncovered something in the 9 ground and you didn't know what it was or whose it was. 10 Yes. 11 Q. I think you said if you couldn't get an answer, you 12 simply had to cut it under controlled conditions? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Is that simply an inevitable consequence of the poor 15 records? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Is there any other solution to that that you can think 18 of, other than just cutting it under controlled 19 conditions? 20 A. There are other ways where you could spend a lot of time 21 having all the ground and everything all ready, 22 everything all opened up, where you spent a lot of time 23 with the utilities where people go and trace it, track 24 it and then try and find where it was. 25 From our perspective, and from a cost and time 96 1 perspective, that could have taken six or eight weeks in 2 some instances. 3 By having the utilities and having them all involved 4 in the process, getting them all there, letting them 5 look at their records, and also the people that 6 understood their assets, that knew what the assets were 7 in the area, if they were unable to then ascertain who 8 owned the two or three that were left, or however many, 9 then there was an agreement with the utilities that we 10 would actually cut it; and then if there was a complaint 11 or somebody then phoned up the utility, then we would 12 reconnect or we would do something with it. If nobody 13 then contacted us or nobody contacted the utility, then 14 it wasn't diverted because it was assumed to be an 15 abandoned utility. 16 As I say, when you divert or put in new utilities, 17 it isn't common practice to then remove all the old 18 things. So you're finding old abandoned utilities as 19 well as existing and operational utilities in the 20 ground. 21 MR LAKE: Thank you very much, Mr Casserly. Those are the 22 only questions I have. 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I don't think there are any issues 24 raised by anyone that hasn't been covered. Thank you 25 very much, Mr Casserly. And particularly for coming at 97 1 short notice. 2 You're still under your citation. Technically it 3 would be possible to recall you. I don't envisage that 4 happening. Thank you. 5 A. Thank you. 6 MR LAKE: My Lord, the next witness will be Jim McEwan. He 7 will be giving his evidence by videolink, and the 8 arrangements are in place for that to commence at 9 2 o'clock this afternoon. So I'm afraid I don't have 10 another witness to provide just now. 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I was going to say to -- I realise 12 that sometimes people stay in over lunchtime, but 13 could I ask that people leave over lunchtime because 14 various tests and things have to be undertaken of the 15 equipment to make sure that it's in order for the 16 2 o'clock video session. 17 We will adjourn until 2 o'clock. 18 (12.20 pm) 98 1 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR MARK BOURKE (sworn) ...............................1 4 5 Examination by MR LAKE ........................1 6 7 MR JOHN CASSERLY (sworn) ............................60 8 9 Examination by MR LAKE .......................61 10 11 MR JAMES MCEWAN (sworn) .............................99 12 13 Examination by MR LAKE .......................99 14 15 Examination by MR DUNLOP QC .................174 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 193