1 Thursday, 7 December 2017 7 (10.45 am) 8 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes, Mr Lake. 9 MR LAKE: My Lord, the next witness is Julian Weatherley. 10 MR JULIAN WEATHERLEY (affirmed) 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You are going to be asked questions 12 initially at least by Mr Lake, Counsel to the Inquiry. 13 If you listen to the question and answer it as 14 directly as possible, if you speak into the microphone 15 so everyone can hear what you're saying, and don't speak 16 too quickly, so that the shorthand writers can keep up 17 with you. 18 A. Okay. 19 Examination by MR LAKE 20 MR LAKE: Thank you, my Lord. 21 Mr Weatherley, could you state your full name, 22 please? 23 A. Julian Michael Weatherley. 24 Q. Thank you. I would like you to look at a document, 25 please. You should have a hard copy in front of you. 40 1 It will also be shown on the screen. It's reference 2 TRI00000103. 3 I hope it's the same document you have both in hard 4 copy and in the electronic form? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Is that the document containing the questions and 7 answers that were put to you and then answered by you 8 for the purposes of this Inquiry? 9 A. It is, yes. 10 Q. Are you content that that be taken as your evidence for 11 the purposes of this Inquiry? 12 A. I am, yes. 13 Q. What I would like to do is just ask you questions about 14 certain passages within your answers for the purposes of 15 clarification. 16 Could we look, please, first at page 5. If we 17 enlarge the upper half of the page. 18 We can see question 5 there, which is asking about 19 your first impressions of the project, and the second 20 paragraph of your answer notes: 21 "My first impressions were that I did not see the 22 clarity in some of the client side Project Management 23 functions that I would expect to see on a project such 24 as this. For example, programme, risk and reporting 25 functions all required greater clarity." 41 1 I just want to look at this a little bit further and 2 ask you: what do you mean by a lack of clarity? 3 A. Well, I think at the time at which I mobilised on the 4 project, a number of these functions weren't operational 5 because the project had been in mediation. So at that 6 point they had presumably been stood down. 7 So the project was starting up again, and a number 8 of the functions, if I take risk management as an 9 example, wasn't operational as such at the time which 10 I mobilised. It had been pre mediation, so I understood 11 from undertaking the review, but it wasn't in operation 12 at the time that we mobilised. 13 Q. I see. So just to be clear, the comments that you make 14 here are very much related to the instant you took over, 15 after the mediation? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. So when you refer to the programme, that is 18 reflecting -- is it the case that that is reflecting the 19 position that there was no agreed programme for the 20 works as agreed in the Mar Hall Agreement? 21 A. Well, in the case of programme, a new programme had been 22 agreed as part of the Mar Hall Agreement. I suppose 23 what I'm really referring to is the way in which the 24 programme was managed holistically by the project rather 25 than the programme itself. 42 1 Q. I think this is something you come to later, that you 2 were given a programme which related solely to the 3 Infraco works, but didn't pull in all the other elements 4 of work that would be required to deliver the project as 5 a whole? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. Is that one of the things you observed on your start? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. I'll come back and ask you a few more questions about 10 that later, rather than now. 11 If we look at the following paragraph here, you say: 12 "The utilities risk was evident from my first 13 involvement but the extent of utilities related issues 14 did not become fully clear until spring 2012. It was my 15 view that addressing the utilities risk was one of the 16 key elements of a successful outcome, as this would 17 minimise change within the Infraco contract. 18 I considered that the team addressing the utilities risk 19 was under resourced at the point of Turner & Townsend's 20 mobilisation, and this was addressed as one of our 21 initial actions." 22 Now, firstly there, right at the end, when you refer 23 to being at the point of Turner & Townsend's 24 mobilisation, was your understanding that the team had 25 in effect been stood down pending the mediation? Or was 43 1 this a position that you understood had been in 2 existence all throughout the works? 3 A. There was a -- a utility. tie had a utilities team in 4 place at the time of our mobilisation. It was a small 5 team, no more than one or two individuals from memory. 6 And there were some works, I think, largely a desk study 7 being undertaken around the potential presence of 8 utilities within the on-street areas, and that was 9 a work stream which was in progress at the time via 10 mobilisation and Turner & Townsend effectively took over 11 at that point. 12 Q. So was that a function that had been going on throughout 13 the previous contract or was that something that had 14 been started up in the context of -- 15 A. I would imagine it had been done as part of the previous 16 contract, but I don't know for certain. 17 Q. You don't know for certain. 18 At the start of that paragraph that I just read, you 19 say: 20 "The utilities risk was evident from my first 21 involvement." 22 Can you clarify what you mean by the utilities risk? 23 A. Yes, simply that in order for the Infraco works to 24 progress as set out within the contract programme, they 25 required access to areas that didn't have utilities in, 44 1 or at least they required that the works would not be 2 held up by utilities. The programme didn't provide -- 3 the Infraco programme didn't provide for their works 4 being held up by utilities. 5 And therefore there was a risk that if their works 6 were held up by utilities, that they couldn't deliver to 7 their programme. 8 Q. Did you have a view as to how likely it was that 9 utilities would be discovered where they weren't 10 expected? 11 A. I thought it was very likely. We identified it as the 12 biggest risk to the project. 13 Q. Towards the end of that paragraph, you note that you 14 considered the team addressing utilities risk was 15 under-resourced. Was that simply a matter of manpower 16 and the number of people that were engaged in it? 17 A. Largely. Also -- I don't recall what plan tie had in 18 place for establishing the presence of utilities at the 19 time in which we mobilised. We took over this work 20 stream very quickly, so it's difficult for me to 21 remember exactly what was in place and what we put in 22 place, but there needed to be simply an increase in 23 resources. There needed to be some design work streams 24 in place. So there were a number of mitigations put in 25 place in order to deal with the utilities, one of which 45 1 was redesigning certain elements of the works to avoid 2 utility clashes. 3 So that design work stream needed to be put in 4 place, and that started with the production of some 5 class detection drawings, some CAD drawings that needed 6 to be produced. 7 Q. When you say design work streams, was that design work 8 to be carried out on the utilities or on the 9 infrastructure works so as to avoid conflict with 10 utilities? 11 A. It could have been either. Our preference for dealing 12 with utilities was that the solution was designed out 13 because that was the least expensive solution. But it 14 could have been either of those. 15 Q. Just to be clear, when you say designed out, does that 16 mean re-examining the infrastructure design to see if 17 the need for utilities works could be minimised or 18 avoided? 19 A. It could have included -- largely it was designing 20 changes to the utilities. So moving utilities. That 21 was the -- probably the most likely design conclusion. 22 But in some cases it did involve redesigning 23 infrastructure works so that they didn't clash with 24 utilities. 25 Q. Now, there has been evidence presented to the Inquiry 46 1 that the works were -- utilities works were 2 substantially complete. A figure of 97 per cent is 3 contained within the documents. 4 Is the sort of scope of work you're discussing, 5 including design work streams, going beyond the 6 3 per cent that was incomplete and revisiting the 7 97 per cent that were thought to be complete? 8 A. Sorry, could you ask the question again? 9 Q. Yes. I'm trying to think of a more focused way of 10 putting it. 11 When you had to do -- consider design work streams, 12 perhaps considering the Infraco, was that in sections 13 where utilities works had already been carried out under 14 the MUDFA contract? 15 A. I'm not certain the extent of the utilities works under 16 the MUDFA contract, but potentially, yes. 17 Q. But would you know, if you were turning to an area where 18 there was, for example, a conflict, whether utilities 19 works had already been carried out in that area? 20 A. In some cases that was certainly the case, yes. In 21 other cases perhaps not. 22 Q. In those situations, was that where it was necessary to 23 redesign or re-examine the Infraco works as well as 24 looking at the existing utilities works? 25 A. I can't be certain of that. The requirements to 47 1 redesign either utilities or Infraco works really 2 related to throughout the on-street areas. There were 3 limited examples where the Infraco works needed to be 4 redesigned. That wasn't the majority of the situation, 5 but potentially they could have occurred anywhere on the 6 on-street works section, from memory. 7 Q. When you say that could have occurred on the on-street, 8 is that the redesign of the infrastructure or -- 9 A. Both. 10 Q. Both. I'll come back to ask you a few more questions 11 about design in a little while. 12 At the moment I want to turn to the infrastructure 13 contract as it stood when you took over, as it had been 14 varied. 15 Perhaps if you could look at what became Schedule 45 16 of the Infraco contract. It's document reference 17 CEC02085627. 18 I don't know if you recognise this, looking at the 19 title with reference to Schedule 45 referred to in the 20 agreement between tie and Infraco? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Perhaps if we could look in particular at page 6 of 23 this. 24 Do you recognise this? 25 A. I will have seen it at the time I was on the project, 48 1 certainly. 2 Q. There's a reference within this Clause 6 to Pricing 3 Assumptions? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. It's noted that: 6 "The On Street Works Contract Price and the 7 On Street Works Programme has been fixed on the basis of 8 ... Pricing Assumptions." 9 Then look at Clause 6.2. It's noted that these have 10 been necessary. 11 I take it you were aware of the Pricing Assumptions 12 that underlay the contract? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. If we look at the following page, page 7, and 15 Clause 6.4, we can see here the Pricing Assumptions, 16 including the first one: 17 "The design will not be amended" 18 If you look down at number 5, we can see also 19 there's an assumption that Infraco will not discover any 20 utilities which require to be diverted, or in respect of 21 which protected works were required. 22 These assumptions were already in place by the time 23 you took over. That's correct, isn't it? 24 A. That's correct. 25 Q. Did these assumptions give you concern as to the ability 49 1 to perform the contract? 2 A. Well, it gave us concern that there were likely to be 3 variations as a result of the Pricing Assumption 4 variations, yes. 5 Q. Were there any of the assumptions which were particular 6 causes for concern? 7 A. Well, the discovery of utilities most significant. 8 Q. Did you give advice about that? 9 A. I think in our preliminary report that we wrote when we 10 mobilised, I believe we raised this as a significant 11 risk. 12 Q. Another thing that arose in the contract, I think you 13 refer to it in your statement, is that the basis of 14 payment under the on-street contract could change from 15 the fixed price to reimbursable -- cost reimbursable? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. That was to arise or could arise if there was occurrence 18 of what was known as the on-street works trigger date. 19 Do you recall that? 20 A. Yes. Sorry, I don't think it was a date. It was an 21 on-street works trigger, but I don't think it was 22 a date. 23 Q. If we look perhaps to page 5, Clause 5.1 in particular, 24 to identify the point at which this might happen, it's 25 noted that it shall occur on the first valuation date, 50 1 if any, on which: 2 "The Aggregate Claims Amount exceeds the Aggregate 3 Certified Amount by GBP750,000 or more; and/or 4 The Aggregate Extension of Time Claim exceeds 21 5 calendar days." 6 Now, I think you note in your statement this was 7 a concern to you? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Why? 10 A. Well, we thought that given the likely -- given the 11 amount of utilities we thought that we were likely to 12 encounter, we thought it was very likely that there 13 would be a significant number of variations, and that 14 there would potentially be either one of those criteria 15 met for the on-street works. 16 Q. Is this sort of provision whereby there's a switch from 17 a defined price to cost reimbursable on the basis of 18 claims or extension of time one you've encountered in 19 other contracts? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Did anyone explain to you what the reasoning for this 22 inclusion was? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Did you discuss it and your concerns in relation to it 25 with anyone at the Council? 51 1 A. I'm sure it came up in discussions during the 2 mobilisation. It was referred to in our preliminary 3 report and we presented our preliminary report to the 4 Council. So yes, there would have been discussions but 5 I don't recall the detail. 6 Q. Did it in fact change the cost reimbursable as you 7 expected it would? 8 A. Not to my knowledge, and not while I was on the project. 9 Q. You've referred there a number of times to the 10 Turner & Townsend report. I wonder if we could just 11 take a look at that, please. It's document WED00000103. 12 Now, I take it you recognise this document? 13 A. I do. 14 Q. This is the preliminary report that you've been 15 referring to; is that right? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. This is the version that the Inquiry has, and we see 18 towards the bottom right it's got the word "draft" on 19 it. Was there a later version prepared? 20 A. I don't believe there was. I don't believe it was ever 21 issued as a final document. 22 Q. I understand. Could we look at page 17 of this, please. 23 Enlarge the lower half of the screen, 4.2.7. 24 This is a comment we see from the heading in 25 relation to the on-street works pricing. The second 52 1 paragraph there notes: 2 "There are a number of areas of risk which will 3 require a well-resourced commercial team, working in 4 tandem with project managers and appropriate 5 record keeping to preserve as much of CEC's position as 6 is possible in the light of an unfavourable 7 arrangement." 8 Now, in your statement you make the point that you 9 didn't draft this section of the report. I think that's 10 right. 11 A. I didn't, no. 12 Q. Nevertheless, I think this was a report prepared by 13 Turner & Townsend intended to assist them in discharging 14 their function; is that correct? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. It was intended that Turner & Townsend would rely on it, 17 and you did in fact rely on it? 18 A. Certainly to inform how we would set up our team, the 19 capability of our team and what we would focus on, it 20 was used to inform that, yes. 21 Q. So on that basis, I take it you would expect it to be 22 well considered and reliable? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Did you form a view as to whether or not the 25 arrangements in the contract for on-street pricing were 53 1 unfavourable? 2 A. Not personally. I believe what we were referring to 3 here was the -- we were envisaging a situation where 4 Infraco were fully mobilised, with all the costs 5 associated with a fully mobilised team, but not being 6 able to progress with certain works because there were 7 utilities in the way. 8 Q. Is that back to what you meant about the -- dealing with 9 the utilities? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Was the -- a risk to the discharge of the contract? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Were you given any information, as you took over, about 14 the extent to which utilities and the discovery of 15 utilities had impeded the infrastructure works? 16 A. Prior to mediation? 17 Q. Prior to Turner & Townsend taking over. 18 A. I don't recall -- I would imagine that we did, but 19 I don't recall receiving any. 20 Q. If we could look at page 19 of this, please. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Is it page 19 of the document? 22 MR LAKE: I think it should be page 19 of the electronic. 23 I should say it's apparent from Mr Weatherley's 24 statement or questions and answers that sometimes the 25 page numbers don't match. The difficulty was at an 54 1 early stage, the page numbering wasn't fixed. It 2 renumbered itself each time a document was opened, but 3 I think Mr Weatherley has in fact throughout his 4 statement identified the correct passages, the ones to 5 which his attention has been drawn. 6 If you could look under the heading, "Planning 7 Perspectives", please. The second paragraph there, you 8 note that: 9 "Tie/CEC have found little satisfaction or 10 confidence in the schedules provided by BBS, nor will 11 they until common data structures and vocabulary are 12 established and schedules are combined into one master 13 programme to which all have coincident access. This 14 should lead to a consistent basis for the evaluation of 15 the project, or at least provide accurate information 16 for negotiation, resolution and the determination of 17 coherent action." 18 Again, I think once again you make the point this is 19 not something that you actually drafted? 20 A. Correct. 21 Q. But were you able to form a view on these matters about 22 the difficulties that arose from the lack of common data 23 structures and vocabulary? 24 A. One of the things that came out of our discussions with 25 tie during and just preceding the production of this 55 1 report, was that there wasn't or hadn't historically 2 been agreements on the position of some aspects of the 3 programme. 4 We thought that that was -- one of the reasons for 5 that was because particularly following the Mar Hall 6 Agreement, the programme as presented by Infraco didn't 7 represent the full scope of the works, and so there 8 wouldn't -- it would be difficult without finding some 9 common methodology for aligning the Infraco contract 10 with the remaining scope of the works. It would be 11 difficult to form that agreement. 12 Q. What would the effect be of being unable to form that 13 agreement? 14 A. Well, principally it would be very difficult to predict 15 when the sectional completion dates of the project would 16 be achieved. 17 Q. If you don't have a programme -- I will put it the other 18 way round. You described having a master programme that 19 draws all these things together as best practice within 20 your statement. 21 Is it ever the case that contracts of this sort of 22 scale are carried out without a master programme that 23 pulls all the elements together? 24 A. It doesn't always have to be in one programme. But 25 there needs to be either one programme or a suite of 56 1 programmes that contains the full scope of the works. 2 Otherwise, it's impossible to manage the interfaces 3 between the various contracts. 4 Q. Were you aware of to what extent there was an agreed 5 programme or an agreed suite of programmes prior to the 6 Mar Hall Agreement? 7 A. Only from the discussions that we had with tie at the 8 time we mobilised, and it was clear that there wasn't, 9 let's say, an agreed set of programmes between Infraco 10 and tie at that time. 11 Q. Was an explanation given to you as to whether or not 12 this had resulted in difficulties, and if so, what those 13 difficulties were? 14 A. Well, I got the impression that it had resulted in 15 difficulties in agreeing the status of the project. 16 Q. When you say you got the impression, was that your own 17 view, looking at the state of the project, or things 18 that were said to you? 19 A. It was things that were said to me. 20 Q. Who were you discussing this with? 21 A. I can't recall the name of the individuals, but I spoke 22 to a number of individuals within -- within tie, both 23 those responsible for programme and more widely, and it 24 was evident that there was or had historically been 25 a lack of alignment of client side and Infraco 57 1 programme. 2 Q. Just for a bit more clarity, when you say this gave rise 3 to difficulties in agreeing the status of the project, 4 in practical terms, what did that mean? What was 5 happening or not happening in contract administration? 6 A. Sorry, could you -- 7 Q. What was happening or not happening in terms of contract 8 administration when you didn't -- when tie didn't have 9 this suite of agreed programmes? 10 A. I didn't discuss that in -- I can't recall that level of 11 detailed discussion when I was talking about it with 12 tie. What I was saying previously was that in the 13 absence of having a holistic programme, it would not be 14 possible going forward to accurately predict the 15 sectional completion dates of the programme, or to 16 manage the interfaces. 17 Q. What effect does that have on project management and the 18 delivery of the works? 19 A. Well, it's impossible to plan the delivery of the 20 project and to focus on the right things. It's also 21 difficult to predict the outcome in terms of cost if 22 the -- we don't know when the programme is going to 23 complete, we don't know how much the project is going to 24 cost to deliver. 25 Q. You referred there to programme as being an element of 58 1 predicting the final date. Would I be right in 2 understanding that it's also necessary for predicting 3 all the different elements of works and the sequencing 4 of them to lead to completion? 5 A. The project was very heavily dependent on the successful 6 management of interfaces. So by that, for example, when 7 were the utility works, when were we going to get access 8 to do utility works, and when were the utility works 9 complete in a particular area that allowed Infraco to 10 mobilise. 11 Well, clearly you want that mobilisation to be 12 efficient and therefore if you don't know when it's 13 going to happen or there's ambiguity about when it's 14 going to happen, there's a risk that the project is not 15 delivered in the most efficient way. 16 Q. Was your understanding that had been one of the 17 difficulties? From what you were told, was that your 18 understanding, that had been one of the difficulties? 19 A. I'm not sure that I discussed that level of detail with 20 tie. I imagine it would have been a difficulty, but 21 I don't know that for sure. 22 Q. Then looking at your experience of other projects, if 23 there isn't an agreed programme where everything is 24 drawn together, is that a problem that is likely to 25 arise? 59 1 A. Yes. Sorry, is what a problem? 2 Q. The difficulty in managing interfaces between works and 3 ensuring the efficient delivery? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. If you could just go back to your statement, please, and 6 look at page 8, in paragraph -- the answer 6.8 at the 7 foot of the page, you refer here to schedule 3A or 8 perhaps revision 3A, sometimes it's referred to: 9 "... was BBS's contract programme at the time the 10 settlement agreement was signed, following mediation. 11 It therefore represented the contractual baseline for 12 the project against which the impact of all post 13 settlement agreement change would be measured. Any 14 client or third party initiated change to the activities 15 contained within the programme may have led to 16 a variation in the overall project cost and programme. 17 During our mobilisation stage we obtained further 18 information to create an integrated master schedule." 19 Now, I take it from what you say at the end there 20 that the programme revision 3A was not an integrated 21 one? 22 A. Well, I suppose it was integrated as far as the Infraco 23 responsibility that the Infraco contract was concerned, 24 but it wasn't for the full scope required to deliver the 25 project. 60 1 Q. Do you have any recollection of what particular elements 2 there were where further integration would be required? 3 A. Well, the -- the inclusion of utility-related activities 4 was the most significant omission, but there were -- 5 I believe there were others relating to the achievement 6 of third party consents and that sort of thing. 7 Q. To jump around a little bit, could I ask you to go back 8 and look at the Turner & Townsend preliminary report, 9 please. It's WED00000103. If we go to page 61 of the 10 electronic version. 11 We can see this is page 59 of the lower version. 12 If we could highlight the last entry on the table, 13 row 7, you note there in the first of the columns, 14 sorry, I should have taken you back to a previous page 15 to provide some context first of all. 16 We can see this is under the heading, "Key Strategic 17 Risks and Mitigation Measures", and a table is provided 18 which has got reference -- I think RAG, that's red amber 19 green, isn't it? It's how the risk is categorised? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Then we've got categories, route cause, risk definition 22 and the potential mitigation. 23 This is an examination of the various risks that lay 24 to implement the works post Mar Hall? 25 A. Yes. 61 1 Q. Then if I could ask you to go back to the following page 2 and look at row 7. We can see this is what -- the 3 category is given as being "Programme", and the route 4 cause is that the revision 3A programme only relates to 5 Infraco construction works: 6 "There is no visibility of activities relating to 7 design, approvals and consents, assurance and acceptance 8 testing. Also no visibility of construction works which 9 sit outside of the Infraco contract, including utility 10 works, diversions and basement works." 11 The risk that arises in relation to this is that: 12 "... the overall project requirements are not 13 understood and that the true project progress is not 14 correctly quantified." 15 Now, would I be correct in understanding that that's 16 the sort of risks that arises where you don't have an 17 integrated programme or a complete suite of programmes? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. And the mitigation measure you've noted in the 20 right-hand column there was: 21 "Establish a Baseline Master programme to cover all 22 project activities (Infraco and non Infraco)." 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. That was something you in fact did? 25 A. Yes. 62 1 Q. We have finished with that document for the moment. 2 I would like to go back and look at the question, 3 some of the issues surrounding design. If we could 4 look, please, at 22 within your statement, questions and 5 answers. 6 If we could highlight or enlarge question and answer 7 30. 8 The question you were asked was: 9 "To what extent was the design not yet complete when 10 Turner & Townsend commenced work on the job?" 11 You said: 12 "Design issues were resolved between 13 Turner & Townsend's design representatives and the BBS 14 design team. A number of design items remained 15 outstanding at the time Turner & Townsend commenced work 16 on the project, for example: the design of public realm 17 works, tram and carriageway alignment in York Place, 18 Cathedral Lane sub-station, On Street Works traffic 19 modelling, Edinburgh Gateway retaining wall; 20 Scottish Water legacy works and works north of 21 York Place." 22 Now, a number of those seem limited to quite defined 23 geographical situations such as north of York Place or 24 indeed the carriageway alignment in York Place itself? 25 A. Yes. 63 1 Q. There isn't a general reference, any general reference 2 here generally to the Infraco design works throughout 3 the whole of the route. Would you take it from that 4 that there was no design impediment to works starting in 5 the areas other than those referred to here? 6 A. Well, that is not necessarily a complete list. We had 7 ongoing design meetings throughout my time on the 8 contract. I was on it for 18 months and there were 9 design issues discussed at meetings throughout that 10 period. 11 So there was a list of discrete design issues that 12 needed to be dealt with. I'm not aware of many or 13 any -- I can't think of any examples where the lack of 14 design, with the exception of utility works, held up the 15 construction. 16 Q. When you say with exception of utility works, could you 17 explain what you mean there? 18 A. There were circumstances where utility works or works 19 relating -- works adjacent to utilities had to be 20 redesigned, and there were examples where that did hold 21 up the programme. 22 Q. Once again, to come back to a question I asked earlier, 23 were these utility works that had already been carried 24 out or were these ones that had not been yet addressed? 25 A. I think I would have to say a mixture of both. 64 1 Q. Just for clarity's sake once again, in terms of the -- 2 other than utility works, just looking at the design of 3 the infrastructure works themselves, have I understood 4 your answer to be that there were no design impediments 5 to actually getting the work started on the 6 infrastructure contracts? 7 A. I can't think of any examples, but -- there may have 8 been, but I can't think of any. 9 Q. You've referred there to -- the end of that answer to 10 works to the north of York Place, which you probably 11 think of as going down Leith Walk and beyond? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. In that the final agreement after Mar Hall was to take 14 the tram only as far as York Place, what were the issues 15 arising for works north of York Place? 16 A. My memory is that these were fairly minor in nature. 17 I think something of the order of GBP300,000 worth of 18 work in total, and it was to do with just wrapping up 19 works that hadn't been completed. So there were 20 temporary traffic management arrangements in place at 21 this location which needed to be -- needed to have 22 a permanent solution, and there were small amounts of 23 design work associated with that, but it was relatively 24 small in nature. 25 Q. In terms -- you mentioned there the tram and carriageway 65 1 alignment in York Place. What was the scope of design 2 work that was required there? 3 A. I think there were possibly two issues that I can think 4 of. One was the location of the tram stop, and the 5 turn back facility had not been concluded at the time we 6 mobilised. There was also, I think, the alignment, from 7 memory, both horizontal and vertical in York Place 8 hadn't been concluded because we were awaiting some 9 survey information relating to the precise location of 10 cellars which went under the carriageway, and therefore 11 could have impacted on the design. 12 Q. You said that there were minor issues arising in 13 relation to the design of the tram track generally over 14 the remainder of the route. Can you give me any 15 indication of the sort of issues that remained 16 outstanding? 17 A. In terms of design? 18 Q. Yes, please. 19 A. It was -- for example, there was some design issues 20 related to the form and location of the overhead line 21 electrification masts and supports; where they clashed 22 with the utilities, for example, they had to be in some 23 cases redesigned so that they were moved. There were 24 some locations where the presence of utilities meant 25 that we couldn't get adequate clearance at the top of 66 1 the utilities when the -- where the tracks went over it, 2 and there had to be special local designs to the track 3 slab to -- so effectively a reduction in thickness of 4 the track slab locally to allow the utilities to pass 5 underneath, that sort of thing. 6 Q. To come back to a question I have already asked in 7 a number of guises, were these areas where the utility 8 works had already been carried out? 9 A. I can't be certain. 10 Q. I'm just interested to know whether or not there was 11 a situation where utility works had been carried out, 12 and then you had to change infrastructure works such as 13 the location of masts, and whether there were any 14 questions asked as to why the utility works carried out 15 had this knock-on effect? 16 A. Yes. I think that is a likely scenario. I think that 17 probably did happen, but I can't be certain. 18 Q. If the concept had been that the infrastructure 19 contractor would be left with a clear path in which they 20 could simply put up the design that had been prepared, 21 was it not a cause for some concern if at this late 22 stage, they're having to reconsider the infrastructure 23 design to fit in with the utilities works already done? 24 A. It was of concern. I don't -- I don't recall instances 25 where the redesign of infrastructure works -- and 67 1 I think there were a handful of locations where that 2 occurred -- but I don't recall instances where that 3 impacted on the schedule. 4 Certainly not to a significant extent. 5 Q. Were there areas where simply the infrastructure works 6 could not -- when a late conflict was identified, the 7 infrastructure could not be changed and it was necessary 8 to redo utility works that had already been done? 9 A. Again, I think it's -- it's possible that that situation 10 occurred, but I can't think of specific examples. 11 Q. If we look further down the page, please, at question 12 and answer 31, you note here that this was a design and 13 build contract and it would be normal practice for 14 design works to be progressing at the same time as the 15 construction of other elements. 16 The Inquiry has heard evidence to the effect that 17 the original contract intention was that detailed design 18 would be complete by the time the contract was awarded. 19 Did you have views as to whether there were still items 20 of what might be termed detailed design that had to be 21 carried out while you were involved in the project? 22 A. Yes, and they are the items that are listed in the 23 question that we went through a moment ago. 24 Q. Yes. But in terms of the -- rather than the specific 25 locations such as York Place, looking at the remainder 68 1 of the line from Princes Street, obviously it might be, 2 say, from St Andrew Square west, were there questions of 3 detailed design still outstanding there? 4 A. There may well have been in relation to electrification 5 or items that were perhaps further downstream in the 6 construction programme, but we weren't redesigning large 7 sections of infrastructure works as we were building 8 them. The design was completed in time. Generally in 9 time for the works to be constructed. 10 Q. When you talk about electrification works being 11 designed, are you talking about the works that would be 12 undertaken by Siemens? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. As opposed to the civil engineering works? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. So was the detailed design outstanding in relation to 17 any of the civil engineering works from St Andrew Square 18 west? 19 A. Not wholesale along the full length of the on-street 20 works to my knowledge, but discrete locations, yes. 21 Q. Again, can you recall the sort of issues that arose, 22 where further design, civil engineering detailed design 23 was required? 24 A. It was the sort of thing like designing highway 25 junctions, traffic light operations, that sort of thing. 69 1 Locations of where overhead line gantries might be 2 attached to buildings. 3 So there was the alignment issue along York Place. 4 So there was a handful of maybe 20, 15 or 20 items that 5 were outstanding. 6 Q. When you took over, were you aware of any design issues 7 which had in fact been outstanding for some time and 8 required to be -- were only first resolved while you 9 were the Project Director? 10 A. I don't really know how long the design items that were 11 outstanding had been outstanding. 12 Q. But there were some design items outstanding when you 13 took over? 14 A. There were, yes. 15 Q. Were you given any indication, perhaps by the 16 representatives from BBS or the Council, as to why it 17 was possible to resolve these design issues after you 18 took over when they hadn't been resolved before? 19 A. Not really, no. I didn't have that discussion, no. 20 Q. No one indicated to you that different procedures were 21 assisting matters, or what blockages had been in the 22 past? 23 A. Not really. 24 Q. Were any changes made to obtaining -- the processes for 25 obtaining design approvals while you were involved in 70 1 the project? 2 A. During my time on the project? 3 Q. Yes. 4 A. I don't think so. The methodology for -- the governance 5 structure for discussing design issues was established 6 fairly early on, I would say within the first six to 7 eight weeks of our mobilisation in the form of design 8 control meeting. All the matters relating to design 9 were discussed at that meeting, and any issues where 10 things were unresolved or things that required action or 11 things that required escalation were identified at that 12 meeting. 13 Separate to that, there were detailed discussions on 14 specific points of design outside of that control 15 meeting, between largely the on-street works team and 16 the Infraco design representatives, and broadly that was 17 successful and continued throughout the 18 months that 18 I was on the project. 19 Q. What would be involved in an issue being escalated? 20 A. When this relates really to any items, whether they're 21 design or otherwise. 22 We discussed all aspects of the project delivery 23 through the control meetings that occurred, I think 24 every two weeks. So they related to design construction 25 programme risk, commercial issues. Anything that came 71 1 out of those meetings that couldn't be resolved at those 2 meetings or couldn't be resolved between the parties was 3 identified and was discussed at either the tram briefing 4 meeting in the case of Turner & Townsend involvement -- 5 or the programme delivery -- the project delivery group 6 meeting. 7 Q. Was that with a view to bringing in more senior 8 representatives of each of the interested parties, the 9 Council -- 10 A. Well, it was really -- there was -- there was no more 11 senior meeting between Turner & Townsend and Infraco 12 than the control meetings. There were a handful of 13 items that perhaps required more focus, largely client 14 side, that were identified in these meetings. So design 15 approval not being progressed or something like that. 16 But perhaps needed support from more senior 17 representatives of the client side team and therefore 18 they were escalated to the tram briefing meeting or to 19 the project delivery group meeting. 20 Q. That's really what I was getting at. When we're talking 21 about escalation, is it a different meeting within the 22 governance hierarchy for the tram project, or a more 23 senior person within respective organisations? 24 A. No. I mean, the -- the most senior representatives -- 25 as far as the day-to-day delivery of the project was 72 1 concerned, the most senior representatives of the client 2 team, of the project management team and of the Infraco 3 team, were all represented at the control meetings. 4 So the head of project for -- Martin Foerder for the 5 Infraco, Alfred Brandenburger for Siemens, and myself, 6 all attended the -- not necessarily all the meetings. 7 A large majority of the control meetings were attended 8 by us and generally speaking, we resolved most matters 9 in that forum. 10 Q. What sort of issues as a generality required escalation 11 that couldn't be resolved there? 12 A. It was largely around -- I'm trying to think of 13 a specific example. It would have been around items 14 that required -- that required scope definition or 15 approval that was a responsibility from the -- from the 16 client side team. 17 So I'm thinking -- for example, if it was an item 18 where we required Network Rail's approval to do 19 a particular piece of works, but hadn't achieved it 20 through the control meeting process, then that would be 21 escalated and we would come up with a strategy for 22 dealing with items such as that. 23 MR LAKE: My Lord, I think it was arranged to give the 24 suppliers a break around 11.30? 25 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We will adjourn now for the benefit 73 1 of the shorthand writers until about 11.45. 2 (11.30 am) 3 (A short break) 4 (1145 am) 5 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You are still under oath. 6 MR LAKE: Thank you very much, my Lord. 7 I would like to ask you some questions about the 8 utilities. In terms of the utilities that might be 9 found off-street, is it correct to say that the risk of 10 that was going to be taken by the contractor and was 11 included within the price agreed? 12 A. Yes, that's generally true, yes. 13 Q. When you say generally true, what was the qualification? 14 A. I think there was one exception to that, but in most 15 cases the price of the cost of diverting utilities were 16 included within the off-street works fixed price. 17 Q. If I could just go back to your statement for one 18 moment, and we look at page 34, and question and answer 19 58, it's more the last part of your answer there, when 20 you say: 21 "A lack of clarity on risk allocation in relation to 22 Off Street Works utilities frustrated resolution of 23 commercial issues between BBS and Turner & Townsend's 24 commercial teams." 25 What was the lack of clarity as to risk allocation? 74 1 A. I think this is related to one specific issue where -- 2 where there was a need to divert a gas main on the 3 off-street work section, and I think there was 4 a difference of opinion as to whether the cost of that 5 diversion should have been included within the 6 off-street works fixed price or not. 7 Q. You say there it frustrated resolution of commercial 8 issues. That gives the impression that it went beyond 9 that particular dispute, and had a wider effect. Is 10 that correct? 11 A. No, not to my knowledge. That particular issue was not 12 fully resolved between the respective commercial teams 13 and it was one of the items that, from memory, went to 14 the independent certifier to take a view on. 15 Q. I think you've indicated in your statement that the -- 16 having the independent certifier there was an effective 17 means of resolving matters where the parties couldn't? 18 A. I think so, yes. 19 Q. As far as the on-street works are concerned, the risk of 20 those was all to be taken by the client, the Council? 21 A. Yes, I think that's true, yes. 22 Q. Now, you said in your statement, the passage we have 23 looked at earlier, that utility-related issues became 24 clear in spring 2012. 25 A. Well, I think they were becoming clear. I don't think 75 1 they were clear at all by spring 2012, but the -- 2 I suppose the way I would describe it is the risk of 3 utilities was progressively becoming clear as we were 4 excavating more of the on-street work sections. 5 By spring 2012 a large majority of those utility 6 conflicts would have been identified, but certainly not 7 all of them. 8 Q. So what was becoming apparent was the scope of conflict? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. The idea that there would be conflict was really known 11 from the outset? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. You said within your statement that you carried out 14 further desk study and surveys. That would infer you 15 didn't feel that the investigation work that had been 16 carried out prior to your involvement was an adequate 17 basis on which to proceed; is that a fair comment? 18 A. Well, I think that is a fair comment, and that could 19 well have been because the desk study and survey works 20 that had been completed had not been completed for the 21 full section of the on-street works, and certainly that 22 was quite a large piece of work that we undertook, was 23 to undertake surveys and desk studies for all of the 24 on-street work sections to try and understand what the 25 scale of risk was that we were going to encounter. 76 1 Q. I just want to be clear, what was the work you carried 2 out? First of all, surveys, did you survey the whole of 3 the on-street works -- on-street area, sorry? 4 A. It varied. In -- as a minimum, we undertook a desk 5 study for the whole of the on-street works. By that, 6 I mean look at existing statutory utility provider 7 records and see what information they had in relation to 8 the likely location of utilities, and where that might 9 cause conflicts with the infrastructure works. 10 It would well have included in some locations 11 undertaking slit trenching, so digging trenches from one 12 side of the road to the other side of the road to 13 identify where there were -- to identify the physical 14 presence of utilities and the likely nature of the 15 remedial works that would need to be undertaken. 16 Certainly towards the latter end of my time on the 17 project, it became desirable to excavate from kerb to 18 kerb. In case of Shandwick Place, we excavated the full 19 road, we had to replace the full road carriageway 20 construction anyway. So we actually excavated the full 21 road and did a similar thing in York Place as well to 22 identify where all the utilities were, but I think in 23 most cases, we did as much -- as much identification 24 through survey works and desk study works as we could 25 before we excavated. 77 1 Q. Well, just dealing with that, when you say you did desk 2 surveys, had -- using the existing utility records, had 3 that not been carried out in some areas? 4 A. I'm sure it had, and I don't know to the extent to which 5 that had already been completed, and the extent to which 6 we needed to finish that off, but it was certainly 7 something that we were doing from the time we mobilised, 8 was undertaking desk studies. 9 Q. Did you then pick up work that had already been done, or 10 did you start afresh, saying we'll get utilities 11 records -- 12 A. We picked up work -- I said earlier that tie had a small 13 utilities team that were looking at desk studies at the 14 time we mobilised, and that's a piece of work that we 15 picked up as soon as we mobilised and continued with it. 16 I'm not sure of the scale of the need to do further 17 desk study works, but we would have certainly made sure 18 that a desk study was done for the whole on-street work 19 section. 20 Q. What about slit trenches? Had that sort of 21 investigation been carried out? 22 A. Previously? 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. I can't be certain. 25 Q. As I understand your evidence, that you decided there 78 1 should be further ones carried out? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. What led you to believe there should be further ones 4 carried out? 5 A. I can't -- I can't remember the timing, but I think the 6 first time we -- the first location we excavated in was 7 Haymarket. And we found in Haymarket the presence of 8 a number of utilities we weren't expecting to find, and 9 I think that influenced our decision to undertake quite 10 extensive surveys elsewhere in the on-street. We were 11 anticipating that we would similarly find utilities that 12 we weren't expecting to find. 13 And that proved to be the case. 14 Q. Now, do you have experience of -- had you -- at the time 15 you started work, did you have experience of this sort 16 of utility investigation in other projects? 17 A. Personally. 18 Q. Yes? 19 A. No. Well, I had experience in doing utility diversion 20 works, but not -- certainly not on this scale. 21 Q. Did you have experience of it within Turner & Townsend 22 that you could draw upon? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Were you able to form any view as to what extent the 25 level of investigation you required to carry out in 79 1 Edinburgh, including slit trenches, compared with other 2 locations where works were carried out? 3 A. Certainly within the team there was that capability and 4 we had a number of people within the team who had 5 undertaken similar works on other tram projects 6 elsewhere in the UK, and in Ireland, and certainly they 7 were -- they were very much able to take a view on the 8 appropriate action to take. 9 Q. At what stage in carrying out the works did you realise 10 it would be necessary to carry out further 11 investigations to verify the records of the utility 12 companies? 13 A. I think pretty much immediately. 14 Q. Did you say you carried out slit trenches on 15 Princes Street? 16 A. I am not -- I can't be certain that we did on 17 Princes Street because much of the -- the track was 18 already installed in Princes Street, and much of the -- 19 much of the infrastructure works had been completed at 20 the time we mobilised. So there may have been a need to 21 do local surveys. There was certainly utility works to 22 be undertaken in Princes Street, but I can't remember 23 whether they were identified through slit trenching, or 24 I think it was more local excavation. 25 Q. You said also you had full excavation in Shandwick Place 80 1 and York Place. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. What led you to take that approach? 4 A. Well, the design provided for the excavation -- in order 5 to build the foundation for the tram works, 6 a significant amount of the carriageway needed to be 7 excavated. The track slab was something of the order of 8 1.2 metres deep. So that's quite a sizeable piece of 9 excavation for a tram travelling in two directions down 10 Shandwick Place. 11 Once that excavation is taking place, there's very 12 little of the existing roadway left. And the need to -- 13 you can't excavate a vertical trench to build anything 14 in a road. It needs to be stepped. By the time you've 15 undertaken that, the time you have constructed that 16 detail, you've virtually dug the whole road out anyway, 17 in a narrow road like Shandwick Place; in York Place, 18 which is a bit wider, perhaps not the case. 19 But basically, there was so much excavation in 20 Shandwick Place anyway, and the design provided for the 21 need to reconstruct the carriageway. By the time that 22 was done, there was a very large excavation in 23 Shandwick Place, almost kerb to kerb. In fact it was 24 excavated kerb to kerb, and therefore that exposed the 25 majority of the utilities. 81 1 Q. The excavation would be part of the -- as you said, the 2 track slab under the infrastructure contract? 3 A. It would have been, yes. 4 Q. So were you essentially joining the utilities work to 5 the infrastructure work in Shandwick Place? 6 A. Sorry, could you -- 7 Q. Were you doing the utilities work together with the 8 infrastructure work in Shandwick Place? 9 A. In very close succession. I can't remember the precise 10 sequence of events, but I think what we did in 11 Shandwick Place is the utilities contractor McNicholas 12 and certainly in some locations, McNicholas undertook 13 the full excavation for the track slab in order to 14 identify the utilities and put those right, and so we 15 took the opportunity, since we were going to dig the 16 excavation anyway, to only dig it once. 17 Q. That would contrast, for example, with areas to the west 18 towards Haymarket, where you carried out investigations, 19 desktop and slit trenches, fixed the utilities, and then 20 did the track slab; is that correct? 21 A. I think a similar approach in both actually. In all 22 locations we would have done investigations before we 23 excavated to assess the scale of the utility diversions 24 required. 25 Q. For example, if we go towards the west, towards the end 82 1 of Palmerston Place, for example, where the trams would 2 run there, were the utility works done there ahead of 3 the infrastructure works, or were they done together? 4 A. I'm not sure where Palmerston Place is. 5 Q. It's to the west of Princes Street, between 6 Princes Street and Haymarket. 7 A. Right. 8 Q. Were the two different parts of work there, firstly the 9 utility works and then the infrastructure works? 10 A. I'm not sure. In an all cases there was a -- 11 a programme of utility diversion works in advance of -- 12 at least utility excavation works to identify the -- the 13 extent of the utility conflicts before there was the 14 need to undertake infrastructure works. I think that's 15 the case in all cases, that in some cases it was -- it 16 was prudent to do the two almost sequentially. 17 York Place is the classic example of that. 18 Q. We will come to York Place. I think essentially the 19 investigation, the actual carrying out of the utilities 20 works and then the infrastructure works were essentially 21 part of one process. 22 A. Yes, I suppose -- I suppose so, in the sense that we 23 didn't -- we didn't excavate for utilities, fill the 24 hole in and then re-excavate for infrastructure. But 25 they were done by different contractors sequentially. 83 1 Q. There was one excavation which covered investigation, 2 utilities and infrastructure? 3 A. I think generally speaking that's true, yes. 4 Q. That was true in York Place. Was that true throughout 5 the on-street works? 6 A. Generally I think that's the case, yes. 7 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: If the excavation was part of the 8 Infraco works to enable them to put in the concrete 9 slab, but was undertaken by the utility contractor, what 10 happened about payment for that? 11 A. Yes, I'm not entirely sure, my Lord, how that worked. 12 It might be that the Infraco did do the excavation, that 13 then the utility teams did their utility diversions, and 14 then Infraco completed their works. 15 York Place was slightly different to that. 16 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: What was different about York Place? 17 A. In the case of York Place, one of the Infraco 18 subcontractors, Crummock, had a separate contract which 19 was managed by Turner & Townsend to do the excavation 20 works under our direction at the same time that we 21 undertook utility works, which just meant that 22 effectively all of the preparation prior to Infraco was 23 undertaken or was overseen by Turner & Townsend, so we 24 knew that everything was complete before Infraco came 25 along. 84 1 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Would that then be reflected in the 2 price paid to Infraco? 3 A. It would have been, yes. 4 MR LAKE: In terms of carrying out utility works in other 5 locations, other projects, are they normally joined the 6 way they were at Princes Street, or were the utilities 7 works done first and then the infrastructure works 8 later? 9 A. I think it varies. It depends on the scale of the -- of 10 the utility works to be undertaken. In the case of 11 Edinburgh tram, there were so many utilities that needed 12 to be moved, it was likely that in order to address 13 them, there would need to be a large amount of 14 excavation. 15 York Place, again, being a good example of that, and 16 if you're going to undertake a large amount of 17 excavation, it makes sense to do the infrastructure 18 works at the same time. Otherwise there's a need to 19 excavate twice. If there was a project where the amount 20 of utility works was much smaller, then it could be done 21 as a separate contract in advance. 22 Q. If the excavation is the first time that there's also 23 an investigation carried out as to what's there, how did 24 you go about getting agreement amongst all the utilities 25 as to what was to be put in place, how they were to be 85 1 diverted? 2 A. I think in all cases we undertook both desk studies and 3 survey works in advance. So we -- by the time we got to 4 excavate, we had a pretty good idea of what we were 5 going to find. We had a co-located representative from 6 each of the statutory utility providers with our 7 on-street works team. And as that design and 8 preparation was being progressed, we worked with them to 9 identify what the likely best solution would be, and we 10 worked with Infraco to work out what the likely phasing 11 of arrangements would be, and the most efficient way of 12 delivering those works. 13 Q. Do I understand that in relation to the whole of the 14 on-street works, there was always some form of survey, 15 desktop or otherwise -- 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. -- initially? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. You always had an idea as to what utility diversion 20 works would be required? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. When you opened the surface of the road and you 23 discovered that utilities weren't where you thought they 24 were, or that there were other utilities there, what did 25 you do to get agreement to the utilities to further 86 1 solutions that would be required? 2 A. Well, there was a whole range of solutions. I suppose 3 the first thing was the establishment of a co-located 4 team. So we had representatives of the statutory 5 utility providers working with us on site so that we 6 could make decisions with them, quickly. Those 7 decisions varied and there was a sort of hierarchy of 8 preference as to how we would deal with each of the 9 utility conflicts. 10 Q. What do you mean, a hierarchy of preference? 11 A. So our preference was always to design out the solution, 12 which would be to either satisfy ourselves through 13 design that we didn't need to move the utility, or it 14 could be that we could put ducting around the utility so 15 that it could be passed through the infrastructure 16 works. Passed through the reinforced concrete base of 17 the track slab, for example. 18 So the simple rectification was always the 19 preference, and then the second layer of hierarchy would 20 be to perhaps undertake some modification work either to 21 the utility or to the infrastructure. 22 And then the third would be to actually slew, to 23 divert the utility, which is the most complex and 24 time-consuming solution, and we tried to minimise the 25 number of those occurrences. 87 1 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: If you passed the utility through the 2 concrete slab, how do you get access to the utility if 3 there's a fracture, say? 4 A. I think there was a very few number of occasions where 5 that occurred. Generally speaking, in the few occasions 6 that it did occur, there was a reduction in thickness of 7 the track slab depth. So a special track slab design to 8 pass over the utilities. But the utilities were passing 9 under cross ways. So the width at which you couldn't 10 get access was a few metres. It wasn't a significant 11 length, and that was done through agreement with the 12 statutory utility providers. 13 MR LAKE: In your view, did the co-location of the various 14 utilities with you, and taking decisions in the way you 15 have described, work? 16 A. Yes, very much so. 17 Q. Were you aware to what extent that differed from what 18 had gone before, before your involvement? 19 A. I can't answer that, I don't know. 20 Q. You say within your statement that the utilities 21 contract was on a cost-reimbursable basis and you 22 consider that that enables a quick response. Is there 23 any reason that that's preferable to having an agreed 24 schedule of rates with the utilities contractor? 25 A. Effectively, there was an agreed schedule of rates that 88 1 was used to build up the cost for the cost-reimbursable 2 contract. So we had a set of rates that we could call 3 upon for labour, plant, materials, which were used to 4 price the cost reimbursement contract. 5 Q. So when you say cost reimbursable, nonetheless, the 6 costs they could charge were defined by the contract? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Turning to a different issue, that of reporting, if you 9 could look, please, at page 11 of your statement. And 10 the answer to question 7. Could I highlight answer 7. 11 In the third paragraph you note that you haven't 12 seen the Tram Project Board papers and were not involved 13 in the project during the period which they cover, and 14 that you are not able to comment on these reports 15 specifically. 16 You go on to say: 17 "From my knowledge of the project review undertaken 18 by me and my Turner & Townsend colleagues as part of our 19 mobilisation, we concluded that the project reporting at 20 that time was unclear, was inconsistent between Tie and 21 Infraco, and did not place adequate emphasis on 22 addressing the main issues facing the project." 23 Now, just dealing with the elements of that 24 sentence, first, the project reporting was unclear. 25 What did you mean, it was unclear? 89 1 A. Well, I read some example progress reports at the time 2 which I mobilised on the project, and I have a personal 3 view about what makes an effective progress report, and 4 that's clarity on -- clarity on the progress achieved, 5 but also clarity on the items which are potentially 6 impacting on progress. But more specifically, clarity 7 on how they should be addressed. 8 My recollection of reading those reports was that 9 they identified issues, but they didn't necessarily 10 identify how they should be resolved. 11 Q. You say that the reports were inconsistent between tie 12 and Infraco. What inconsistency are you referring to 13 there? 14 A. Well, if I take schedule as an example, there wasn't an 15 agreed position on schedule between tie and Infraco 16 historically. 17 Q. On schedule? 18 A. On schedule. 19 Q. Which schedule? 20 A. On the construction programme. 21 Q. That's the issue we've discussed before the break? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Finally, that there wasn't adequate emphasis on 24 addressing the main issues facing the project. Can you 25 recall any of the main issues which you felt didn't get 90 1 the emphasis they merited? 2 A. Well, I don't know what the main issues were really at 3 the time in which tie were managing the project. 4 I don't recall that from reading the reports, but 5 I suppose what I'm picking up on is that there were 6 issues raised within the reports of things that either 7 weren't done or weren't agreed, but that it wasn't clear 8 to me, at least, reading the report, what the way 9 forward was in order to resolve those issues. 10 Q. Where there is this lack of clarity you're describing 11 there, what can that give rise to? Why do you seek to 12 avoid that lack of clarity? 13 A. Well, in order to deliver a project in the most 14 efficient way, it's important that in my mind, that all 15 the parties to the project and to the contract have an 16 agreed way forward, both from CEC and from the project 17 manager, and from the various contractors. 18 If we all understand what the issues are and we all 19 understand what the plan is to address them, then we'll 20 address them in the most cost-effective efficient way. 21 Without that clarity, then we won't. 22 Q. If we could look lower down the page, please, to 23 question and answer 8. The question 8 is referring to 24 the preliminary report we have looked at, and notes that 25 the existing procedure for contract administration is 91 1 described as "not adequate". You are asking if you can 2 explain the basis. 3 You have noted you weren't involved in drafting that 4 section of the report, but you also note that: 5 "Robust change control procedures were implemented 6 on the project following Turner & Townsend's 7 mobilisation ..." 8 Now, were you involved in the robust change control 9 procedures that were implemented when 10 Turner & Townsend -- 11 A. Yes, I was. 12 Q. In deciding what had to be introduced, did you not 13 require to take some view on what the problem was that 14 you had to deal with? 15 A. Well, in relation to change control and other items of 16 procedure, at the time of our mobilisation, some of 17 those procedures weren't in place because the project 18 had effectively been on hold. There was a new team had 19 been established involving Turner & Townsend and some 20 new representatives from CEC as well, and so there was 21 an opportunity to establish what we considered to be 22 best practice in terms of change control. 23 So we weren't necessarily establishing best practice 24 because we thought that there was something wrong with 25 the previous change control process. I don't have 92 1 knowledge of that personally. 2 The process for change control that we established, 3 we established because we thought it was the right thing 4 to do, and we agreed that between the parties. 5 Q. What in your view were the key elements that had to be 6 present in a change control process to make it robust? 7 A. Well, I think the main objective is to deal with them 8 swiftly and to have a process that flags up when changes 9 are agreed, to agree them, or otherwise swiftly, and 10 then to implement them swiftly, and that was done 11 through a combination of the control meetings which was 12 one source where the need for changes was identified. 13 We also had a -- we had a regular meeting -- I can't 14 remember whether it was weekly or two-weekly -- between 15 ourselves and the City of Edinburgh Council, where all 16 changes that were -- or potentially changes were raised, 17 papers were produced; I think from memory, we completed 18 them and there was -- a draft change order was produced 19 for that meeting, and then we went through them every 20 two weeks, possibly more frequently if necessary, and we 21 either agreed them or -- that they should be implemented 22 or otherwise. 23 Q. If there wasn't agreement, what would happen? 24 A. If there wasn't agreement, then we didn't undertake that 25 scope of the work. It was -- it was normally where 93 1 there was a discussion as to whether additional scope 2 items were required. If they were required for the 3 successful completion of the project, then they 4 generally were implemented. 5 Q. Could I ask you to look at the following page of this, 6 page 12 of your question and answer. 7 Look at question and answer 10. You refer there to 8 meetings within the governance structure in which 9 Turner & Townsend were involved, and that is the project 10 delivery group, the tram briefing meeting and the four 11 control meetings which you referred to. 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. The project delivery group and the tram briefing meeting 14 are both noted as being ones where Turner & Townsend 15 present information to others. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. In terms of where the decisions were actually taken as 18 to what happens or what is to happen in future, was that 19 taken by the other parties at these first two meetings 20 or was that a matter for the control meeting? 21 A. Sorry -- 22 Q. You describe Turner & Townsend making presentations to 23 the first two meetings? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. At which meeting were the decisions taken as to what was 94 1 to happen, how the project was to be implemented? 2 A. Well, at all meetings I would say. The control meetings 3 involved Infraco. And some of them involved CAF as 4 well, the tram provider. So those were the meetings 5 where, from a day-to-day project progression point of 6 view, decisions would be taken. 7 Really the tram briefing meeting and the project 8 delivery group was an opportunity to report progress 9 from Turner & Townsend to the client, and to give an 10 update on risks and programme and how we thought our 11 items arising should be taken forward. 12 And they were generally speaking, those -- the 13 presentation and our proposed approach for dealing with 14 things was agreed at that meeting. 15 Q. Dealing with the questions of programme, if we look 16 forward, please, to page 19 of your statement, and 17 answer 23 at the top of the page there, the third 18 paragraph on the screen at the moment refers to the 19 two-weekly planners forum, and you note that: 20 "This forum comprised representatives from 21 Turner & Townsend, BBS and CEC who were briefed to 22 reach cross party agreement on the status of the 23 contract schedule and the methodology for controlling 24 and reporting progress throughout the remainder of the 25 project. This forum proved effective in providing 95 1 a joined-up view of progress and identification of 2 critical and near critical paths." 3 Is that something, a form of meeting that you would 4 expect to see on most projects of this scale? 5 A. Yes, I think so. On all projects there needs to be some 6 common ground, some common agreement between the client 7 or the project manager's view of programme and the 8 contractor's view of programme. This was an effective 9 form of achieving that agreement. A very effective 10 form. 11 Q. In terms of requiring the parties to reach agreement at 12 fortnightly meetings, is having such regular meetings, 13 in your experience, does that lead to easier agreement 14 or more scope for disputes being identified? 15 A. No, I think the more frequent -- more frequently, people 16 can meet and agree the status of a project, the better. 17 I mean, in the case of Edinburgh tram, the project, 18 particularly at the phase which the planning forum -- 19 planners forum was introduced, was changing quite 20 rapidly. The impact of -- it was a situation where 21 there were various sites that were occupied by 22 McNicholas undertaking utility works and other sites on 23 the on-street section where Infraco were working and the 24 respective interaction between the two, and the handover 25 of one site to another -- from one party to another, was 96 1 changing quite rapidly, and there was -- because of the 2 nature of the utilities, and the scale of the utilities, 3 that position changed quite frequently. 4 So to have a regular planners forum that agreed what 5 had happened historically up to that point was very 6 useful because once you lose an assessment of current 7 status, it's very difficult to get it back again. 8 Q. I would like to refer to you a different document now, 9 please. Could we look at CEC01890994. 10 Now, this is the opening page in an agenda for 11 a joint project forum for Monday, 12 December. I think 12 you note in your statement that that is not a meeting 13 that Turner & Townsend -- that you would be represented 14 at. 15 A. Correct. 16 Q. Nonetheless, could we look forward to page 3 of this. 17 We can see that these are the minutes for the joint 18 project forum meeting that had taken place on 19 17 November 2011. 20 Within that, if we look forward to page 5, do you 21 see there a heading, "Governance - Project Team Structure, 22 Resourcing and Behaviours"? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Looking at the second paragraph there, we note that: 25 "Martin Foerder agreed that they were building 97 1 a good relationship with Turner & Townsend but there was 2 a concern over their interpretation of the contract and 3 the challenges that were being raised regarding the 4 contract. It was felt that they either did not 5 understand the contract or did not have a good working 6 knowledge of the terms of the contract. 7 Sue Bruce noted that this did not sound like the 8 current client instructions to Turner & Townsend, and it 9 was the Council's intention to constantly review and 10 hone the Project's arrangements to increase efficiency 11 and increase the good working relationships." 12 I accept you weren't at this meeting, but as the 13 Project Director from Turner & Townsend, were you aware 14 of the concerns that were being expressed as to your 15 interpretation or Turner & Townsend's interpretation of 16 the contract? 17 A. Certainly it was never mentioned in a -- it was never 18 mentioned formally in a meeting that I attended. As 19 with any contract, the process of value -- of valuing 20 the project on a period basis, there are disagreements 21 that occur, and there was a process for dealing with 22 those, and generally they were effective. 23 Q. If we look at the decision underneath this matter, if we 24 scroll up just slightly, we will see the first item 25 there is noted: 98 1 "To agree that CEC would review and discuss client 2 instructions with Turner & Townsend." 3 Which was something allocated to Dave Anderson. 4 Do you recall your instructions being modified or 5 reiterated in any respect? 6 A. No. 7 Q. What were your instructions? 8 A. Well, we had a scope of services which in very broad 9 terms required us to administer the contract in order to 10 achieve the Employer's Requirements. It was fairly 11 broad. 12 Q. Over and above that, were you given any perhaps more 13 informal guidance as to the manner in which you were to 14 approach the task? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Was it ever said to you that there should be a gentle 17 touch in a sense to the administration of the contract? 18 A. That was never discussed, no. 19 Q. Was it ever suggested that it was important to avoid 20 conflict? 21 A. It's always ideal to avoid conflict, but we were never 22 to my recollection coached on how we should administer 23 the contract. 24 Q. You see the second item here under the decision is that 25 there would be a briefing session on the terms of the 99 1 contract with Turner & Townsend. Was that something you 2 attended, you were given a briefing? 3 A. There was a session set up with -- between ourselves and 4 McGrigors. I can't remember the exact timing of that. 5 It was fairly early on, following our mobilisation. 6 I didn't attend it. 7 Q. Could we look at another document then. That one was 8 from November 2011. Look at a document from 9 January 2012. It's reference CEC01891213. Enlarge the 10 upper half of this. You can see that these are meeting 11 notes from the project delivery group that took place on 12 19 January 2012. 13 This time we can see that from the third last name 14 that you were represented and present at that meeting? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Can you go over to the second page of this, please. And 17 look at the lower half of the page. Under the heading, 18 "SOFT REPORT AND CLIENT DECISIONS REGISTER", it's noted 19 that you, Rob Leech, Shirley Mushet and 20 Alastair Richards highlighted successes, failures, 21 opportunities and threats, which had not been covered by 22 the tram briefing meeting: 23 "The following areas were highlighted: 24 The improvement in relations between 25 Turner & Townsend, BBS and CEC was continuing and meant 100 1 Project changes were being resolved as they occurred." 2 In what way had there been a need for an improvement 3 in relations between the parties? 4 A. I don't recall there ever being an issue with relations 5 between the parties. I suspect that was referring to 6 the fact they did continuously improve as we got into 7 a -- more of a business as usual approach with the 8 project administration. But I don't recall there ever 9 being a specific need for improvement. 10 Q. Would you agree with me that when one reads that the 11 first matter highlighted is an improvement in relations, 12 gives the impression at least that there had been 13 initially poor relations? 14 A. All I can say is that I don't recall there ever being 15 poor relations between the parties at the time that we 16 were administering the project. 17 Q. Was it the case perhaps that Turner & Townsend were told 18 that they had to change their approach to the 19 administration of the contract in dealing with the 20 consortium? 21 A. To my knowledge that didn't happen. 22 Q. Look at another document, please. This one is reference 23 CEC01942260. This is later still. It's note of 24 a meeting of the Joint Project Forum of 21 March 2012. 25 Once again, we are looking at a minute of a meeting that 101 1 you were not present at; is that correct? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. If we look at page 4 of this, and highlight item 3, 4 headed "Governance - Project Team Structures and 5 Behaviours": 6 "Sue Bruce highlighted the achievements of the last 7 year since mediation. The improved relationship was 8 a key factor in what had been achieved. There had been 9 occasions where Turner & Townsend's approach had caused 10 some tension and further discussions would be held with 11 Turner & Townsend to clarify that the Council expected 12 the Project to continue in the spirit of the settlement 13 agreement." 14 Now, firstly, were you made aware of occasions in 15 which Turner & Townsend's approach had caused tension? 16 A. No. 17 Q. Did Sue Bruce speak to you, or any of the other senior 18 Council representatives speak to you about this? 19 A. I don't recall them speaking to me about it, no. 20 Q. It's also said -- 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: What position did you hold in 22 Turner & Townsend? Were you a partner or -- 23 A. I'm a Director within the infrastructure part of our 24 business. 25 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Were you a Director at that stage? 102 1 A. I was. 2 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So it wouldn't be a case of someone 3 else more senior to you would raise the matter -- 4 A. There were no conversations with anyone more senior than 5 me where I wasn't present. 6 MR LAKE: It was said there that there would be discussions 7 held with Turner & Townsend to clarify what the Council 8 expected. Were you aware of discussions -- did those 9 discussions take place? 10 A. I don't recall them. 11 Q. If someone from the Council had come to you in about 12 March 2012 or thereafter, and said: this is our 13 expectation as to the spirit in which the contract would 14 be administered; is it likely you would recall that? 15 Would that be unusual? 16 A. I would think I would recall that. I also think the 17 spirit in which we executed the project was -- was in 18 a good spirit. We collaborated and played our full part 19 in collaborating. So I would have been very surprised 20 at any suggestion that we hadn't. 21 Q. I just wonder if you can shed any light on -- these 22 three documents are giving the impression, at least, 23 that there was tension or disagreement, that the Council 24 had to ask Turner & Townsend to change their approach? 25 A. The only tensions and disagreements that I'm aware of 103 1 were -- would have related to discussions around the 2 valuation of the application for payment each month. 3 There were -- each period, there were -- inevitably, as 4 with all projects, there were discussions around what 5 that payment should provide for, and there were 6 disagreements around that, but no one ever suggested 7 that we were not administering the contract correctly. 8 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: From the first document that we 9 looked at, it appeared that it was Mr Foerder who was 10 complaining that you didn't understand the contract. 11 Nobody ever raised that matter with you? 12 A. No. 13 MR LAKE: If we could look at page 17 of your statement, 14 please. Question and answer 20. You were asked the 15 question there about payments that were made to Infraco, 16 despite the fact that the information the independent 17 certifier said was required had not been made available. 18 Do you recall this question? 19 A. Can I just -- sorry, can I just -- 20 Q. I'll give you a chance to read it. (Pause) 21 A. Yes, I do remember that question, yes. 22 Q. If we scroll down so we can see the final part of your 23 answer, you say you were neither involved in the 24 detailed discussions relating to this change, nor in the 25 certification which was governed by the independent 104 1 certifier: 2 "I cannot comment on why CEC instructed 3 Turner & Townsend as they did in relation to this 4 payment." 5 An instruction from the Council to make a payment 6 despite the fact the information hadn't been provided, 7 would that be given to you or someone else within 8 Turner & Townsend? 9 A. It would have -- it would have been probably copied to 10 me, but it would have gone directly to the commercial 11 team, Turner & Townsend's commercial team. 12 Q. Is that something unusual, that the client directs you 13 to pay despite the fact information required by the 14 independent certifier is not available? 15 A. I don't recall it happening on other projects. 16 Q. So this is unusual then? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Did you form any view as to why the Council were doing 19 this? 20 A. I didn't, no. 21 Q. I mean, if it was suggested to you that this shows that 22 the Council were determined to avoid disputes even at 23 the cost of paying the sums that the certifier -- paying 24 sums in the absence of evidence required by the 25 certifier, would you agree with that? 105 1 A. Sorry, could you repeat the question? 2 Q. This is indicative that the desire to avoid disputes 3 goes so far as paying sums, despite the fact they're not 4 vouched? 5 A. I can't really comment on the reasons why CEC would ask 6 us to make a payment. From memory, we wrote an advice 7 note on this. 8 I don't recall the detail of that advice note, but 9 I do recall that we -- that there was discussions around 10 the amount of evidence that was provided in relation to 11 this item, and I think our commercial team was of the 12 view that not all of the information that they had 13 expected to receive had been received. 14 And that was -- that was included within the advice 15 note. 16 Q. Now, that particular issue related to the additional 17 sums payable to the consortium as a result of the late 18 start in works caused by the Council votes? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Looking now to a slightly different issue in relation to 21 sums payable for Scottish Water manhole connections, can 22 we look, please, at a different document. It's 23 CEC01942255. 24 We will see that this is your Progress Report 25 Number 6 for the period 25 February to 27 March 2012? 106 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Could we look in this, please, at page 24. We see 3 a heading, 6.2, is "Key Issues". This is under a more 4 general heading of "On Street - Main Works", but there's 5 a sub-heading, "Scottish Water Manhole Connections". If 6 you look at the third paragraph, you have noted: 7 "In parallel with the re-design Turner & Townsend 8 has prepared a briefing note setting out the history of 9 the issues and a commentary on the possible 10 apportionment of responsibility. The note concludes 11 that Infraco has at this time not demonstrated why 12 a Pricing Assumption Variation has occurred. It goes on 13 to state however that it is important to note that 14 even in the event that Infraco is liable for changes 15 relating to manhole connections it will still be 16 entitled to raise a PAV for those elements of the 17 drainage requiring redesign as a consequence of 18 utilities. Finally the note recognises that the tram 19 project is at a critical stage of construction and 20 considerable effort has been expended on all sides 21 developing close working relations between Infraco, CEC, 22 and its representatives and Turner & Townsend. Whatever 23 decision is reached with regards to the contractual 24 apportionment of time and cost, consideration will need 25 to be given to ensuring the relationships, crucial to 107 1 successful delivery of the project, are maintained." 2 If I just stop there, that seems to be suggesting 3 that whatever the contractual rights and wrongs, it 4 might be necessary to agree to give money to the 5 consortium in order to preserve working relations. Is 6 that a fair reading? 7 A. I don't think that was the intent of the paragraph. 8 I think what it's suggesting is that the entitlement in 9 this particular case was unclear. 10 There was a Pricing Assumption that variation was 11 likely to occur because whatever the arrangements 12 relating to that specific issue, and they're quite 13 complex in their own right, there would certainly be 14 a need in order to undertake -- in order to implement 15 the solution to this issue, there was a need to divert 16 utilities. And that would have held up Infraco. So the 17 issue over whether or not a Pricing Assumption had 18 occurred, I think it was clear Pricing Assumption 19 Variation had occurred. The extent to which that 20 Pricing Assumption Variation, that the costs associated 21 with that should be attributable to the Infraco 22 contract, I think, was a subject of some discussion. 23 Q. You start there by noting in the third line that the 24 advice note that had been prepared by Turner & Townsend 25 was that it has not been demonstrated why a Pricing 108 1 Assumption Variation has occurred? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. But towards the end of the paragraph, you're suggesting 4 that whatever decision is reached with regards to the 5 contractual apportionment, consideration will need to be 6 given to ensuring relationships are maintained. What 7 does that last sentence mean then: consideration must be 8 given to ensuring that relationships are maintained. 9 A. I'm assuming that it means that -- the important thing 10 is that the progression of the works continues. We'd 11 worked very closely with Infraco in order to -- in order 12 to make sure that their element of the works could 13 progress as quickly as possible, and in this particular 14 case that meant dealing with utility issues as well as 15 the potential -- the utility issues around the Pricing 16 Assumption Variation, as well as the issue with the 17 manhole. So there were two issues going on here. One 18 was clearly was a Pricing Assumption Variation. The 19 other one potentially was not, and hasn't been 20 demonstrated. 21 I think the purpose of this paragraph is to point 22 out that it's very important that whilst the discussion 23 around the Pricing Assumption Variation was going on, 24 that the issues relating to the utilities were resolved 25 quickly, to allow the Infraco to progress. 109 1 Q. If it was to be suggested that by this stage the works, 2 post Mar Hall, the rights and wrongs of the contract 3 were given much less importance than simply getting the 4 works done, would you agree with that? 5 A. No, I don't think I would agree with that. 6 Q. Is this paragraph not consistent with the desire not to 7 adhere to the strict terms of the contract? 8 A. I don't think that is what it's trying to suggest. 9 Q. To go back to the utility works just for one minute, we 10 see reference to legacy works in relation to 11 Scottish Water? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. What was meant by that? 14 A. Legacy works were works where some element of work had 15 been undertaken during the MUDFA contract that preceded 16 our involvement, but which hadn't been fully closed out 17 to Scottish Water's satisfaction. There was a need to 18 go back and undertake further works in relation to those 19 items. 20 Q. Just turning now to one question concerning the 21 programme, if I could ask you to look at another 22 document. It's CEC01932700. We can see this is the 23 Progress Report, your Progress Report number 14 for the 24 period 14 October to 10 November 2012. Do you see that? 25 A. Yes. 110 1 Q. If we could turn to page 12, and the upper half of the 2 page, you've got the heading, "Programme", and then 3 sub-heading, "Programme Structure". The first paragraph 4 says that: 5 "Increasingly it has become apparent that the 6 actual, on-site, sequencing and progress of the 7 project in each work area has continued to diverge from 8 the Revision 5 and Revision 5C Infraco programmes. In 9 order to address this disparity, Turner & Townsend have 10 implemented changes to the Master Schedule this period." 11 It's noted that the previous approach was that: 12 "The Master Programme has historically been based on 13 the Infraco Revision 5 and Revision 5C more pessimistic 14 programme phasing, with opportunities for earlier 15 completion identified within the QSRA process." 16 The revised approach is that: 17 "The Master Programme has been amended to include 18 the current working sequences and anticipated programme 19 to completion. With specific risks to the attainment of 20 these dates modelled within the QSRA (along with the 21 existing project risks)." 22 First of all, QSRA, is that a risk analysis relating 23 to the programming of the works? 24 A. Exactly that, yes. 25 Q. Had that been carried out before Turner & Townsend's 111 1 involvement in the project? 2 A. I believe so. There was certainly in the preliminary 3 report, there was -- it was noted that before the 4 Mar Hall Agreement, that tie were implementing QSRA 5 process here. 6 Q. What was the -- the essence of the problem that you're 7 identifying here in terms of the divergence? 8 A. The Infraco submitted a progressed version of their 9 contract programme each period. So each four weeks. 10 And that -- that was basically an updated version of the 11 contract programme, but with all the contract logic and 12 durations within it. So the activities that had been 13 undertaken up to that point were progressed accurately 14 to reflect what had actually happened. 15 The activities beyond the current time at which -- 16 the time of the report, still contained the original 17 logic and the original durations. There were some 18 modifications to that because Infraco issued some 19 subsequent versions to the programme to take account of 20 major changes in approach, but at this point in time, 21 the progressed version of the Infraco programme that was 22 submitted each month in our view didn't reflect the 23 correct logic and duration of the future works, and it 24 therefore became quite difficult for us to get an 25 accurate prediction of when the sectional completion 112 1 dates would occur. 2 Q. So is this an example of the problem of being unable 3 predict how to manage the works if you don't have an 4 accurate programme? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. In the paragraph up after the one I read, it begins "The 7 Master Programme", it says: 8 "The Master Programme now reflects the current view 9 of anticipated phasing of the working areas and presents 10 a more realistic view of the potential completion date. 11 The net result is a 3 month improvement on the 12 Section D completion date to 1 February 2014, when the 13 affect of the risk is scheduled." 14 Do you understand from that that the problem was 15 that the works were actually being done more quickly 16 than programmed and therefore when it was revised, it 17 had an earlier completion date? 18 A. Correct, yes. 19 MR LAKE: Thank you, Mr Weatherley. Those are my questions. 20 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I don't think there's anyone else 21 with any questions. 22 Thank you very much, Mr Weatherley. You're still 23 under citation, so you could be recalled if any issues 24 arose. Hopefully that won't be necessary, but thank you 25 for your attendance. You are free to go. If you just 113 1 leave your statement. 2 A. Thank you. 3 (The witness withdrew) 114 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR AXEL EICKHORN (continued) .........................1 4 5 Examination by MR MCCLELLAND (continued) ......1 6 7 MR JULIAN WEATHERLEY (affirmed) .....................40 8 9 Examination by MR LAKE .......................40 10 11 MR BRANDON NOLAN (sworn) ...........................114 12 13 Examination by MR LAKE ......................114 14 15 Examination by MR DUNLOP QC .................207 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 214