1 Wednesday, 4 October 2017 2 (9.30 am) 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Good morning. I apologise for the 4 cancellation of the hearing yesterday, which was due to 5 circumstances beyond my control. 6 I'm able to advise the core participants and the 7 public that we've managed to rearrange the witnesses 8 from yesterday, for Friday of this week. So that they 9 will be heard on Friday, which means that we will not 10 have lost any time. 11 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. The next witness is 12 David Crawley. 13 MR DAVID CRAWLEY (affirmed) 14 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You will be asked some questions. If 15 you can lean into the microphone so that you can be 16 heard by everyone in the room, and also speak slowly so 17 that the shorthand writers can keep up with you. 18 If you are asked a question, if you would answer it 19 directly, if it's capable of yes or no, that's the 20 answer, and then if you want to give an explanation to 21 follow it. 22 A. Thank you. 23 Examination by MR MACKENZIE 24 MR MACKENZIE: Good morning, Mr Crawley. 25 A. Good morning. 1 1 Q. Can you state your full name, please? 2 A. David Crawley. 3 Q. And your current occupation? 4 A. I'm a director of an engineering management consultancy 5 company. 6 Q. What is the name of that company? 7 A. Xanta. 8 Q. Thank you. You have kindly provided a statement to the 9 Inquiry. Look at that first, please. The number will 10 come up on the screen. You have also got a hard copy. 11 It is TRI00000030_C, and if you go to page 71 of the 12 statement, please? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Wait for it to come up on the screen in a second. 15 Can you confirm, please, that's your signature and 16 this is the written statement you have provided to the 17 Inquiry? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Thank you. Mr Crawley, your evidence to the Inquiry 20 will comprise both this written statement and the 21 evidence you give today. I should also say in passing 22 that you've also helpfully given an explanatory note 23 with appendices and we'll come back to look at that 24 later, but I'll just give the document reference for 25 that in passing. The document ID is WED00000027. 2 1 If we could go to page 72, please, of your statement 2 and start with your CV. 3 Go on to page 73, I'll just take things 4 chronologically. 5 At the bottom of page 73, we can see you have at the 6 bottom of the page, a degree in mechanical engineering, 7 and your membership of various professional bodies, and 8 then we see just work up the page, we see, for example, 9 1983 to 2003, you had various roles in London 10 Underground; is that correct? 11 A. That's correct. 12 Q. Then if we carry on scrolling up, we see again various 13 roles in Metronet Rail, and then over the page to 14 page 72, again, bottom of the page, again we see 15 Metronet Rail, 2003 to 2006, and at the top of the page, 16 we see as you mentioned from 2006 to present, Managing 17 Director of Xanta Limited, Commercial Management and 18 Engineering consultancy for the rail industry, and we 19 see you have provided services to various projects, 20 including you have advised on the Docklands Light 21 Railway, the London Tramlink and the London Underground? 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. We also, I think, will see the bullet point Edinburgh 24 Tram Project, which of course is what interests us, and 25 we can see it states: 3 1 "Board Safety Advisor." 2 Just pause there. Are you still safety adviser? 3 A. No. 4 Q. This is historic? 5 A. This is historic, yes. 6 Q. I understand. 7 Did that essentially tie in with the same period you 8 were the Director of Engineering Assurance and 9 Approvals? 10 A. No, it followed it. So I was the Director of 11 Engineering Assurance and Approvals from about 12 February 2007 to February 2008. There was then a hiatus 13 of some months and I took up the role at the back end of 14 2008 as the Board Safety Advisor for a period of about 15 another 12 months into 2009. 16 Q. Thank you. I understand. 17 Now, just sticking with the CV, it says while you 18 were Director of Engineering, Assurance and Approvals, 19 it says: 20 "Supply and Support of Director of Engineering 21 Services." 22 Who was that? 23 A. That was the combination of me and Tony Glazebrook. 24 Q. I see. So that's not somebody else. That's really the 25 same as the Director of Engineering, Assurance and 4 1 Approvals? 2 A. It is. And throughout my tenure there, the title seemed 3 to change. I didn't take much notice of the title. 4 I just took notice of the job content. 5 Q. I understand. Now, we can put that to one side, thank 6 you, and go back to page 2 of your statement. I would 7 simply like to go through that so we have an overview of 8 your involvement with the tram project. 9 Starting at page 2, I won't read it all, but if we 10 see the top paragraph, you explain you received 11 a telephone call from Andie Harper in early January 12 2007. A few lines down, it said: 13 "He wanted someone to undertake a quick review of 14 the project as there were concerns at that time about 15 the rate of progress." 16 You were told the project was in trouble and it was 17 felt that a quick review might help identify the issues 18 that were causing the difficulties and possible 19 solutions. Is that correct? 20 A. That's correct. 21 Q. Now, I'll come back shortly to look at the slides you 22 prepared in January 2007. I'm just sticking just now on 23 your role at tie. 24 So you do go on to say you undertook the review, and 25 if we can scroll down a bit further, please, and in the 5 1 paragraph in blue, we see there: 2 "Following that presentation I had a discussion with 3 Mr Bell ..." 4 Et cetera. You say: 5 "It appeared to me that I could either work in steps 6 to resolve the management problems ... or could take on 7 a functional role within TIE." 8 Mr Bell advised you he had plans to resolve the 9 management problems, but thought you could assist by 10 taking on a functional role within tie. I think that's 11 what happened? 12 A. That is what happened. 13 Q. Yes. In the last paragraph there you were interviewed 14 by Mr Bell and Mr Crosse, who was the new Tram Project 15 Director, for the role. Following interview, you were 16 offered the role of Engineering Director. And that was 17 undertaken, I think, on a job share basis with 18 Mr Glazebrook; is that right? 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. Yes. On average, Mr Crawley, during 2007 how many days 21 a week did you spend in that role? 22 A. Three days a week physically in Edinburgh. And at least 23 another day, maybe even a bit more, dealing with the 24 emails and phone calls remotely. 25 Q. Thank you. During this time, I think, you were not an 6 1 employee of tie. You were a consultant? 2 A. I was a consultant. 3 Q. Thank you. If we could go to page 3, please, towards 4 the top half of the page, we can see the paragraph: 5 "My involvement in the Edinburgh Tram Project 6 reduced from late 2008 or early 2009." 7 I think you earlier told us that you had stopped 8 working as -- I'll call it Engineering Director for 9 shorthand. You stopped working in that role. Did you 10 say in early 2008? 11 A. Early 2008, although I did take up the new role of Board 12 Safety Advisor later in 2008 right through to part of 13 2009. In that hiatus between early 2008 and later in 14 2008, however, because Tony Glazebrook was still in 15 post, issues were still being fed to me remotely because 16 he was also contracted through my company. 17 Q. I see. So did you have any awareness of the issues that 18 were arising in the tram project between early 2008 when 19 you stopped being Engineering Director and later in 2008 20 when you became Board Safety Advisor? 21 A. Only if they happened to be referred to me. 22 Occasionally issues arose where they wanted an 23 independent view or a quick view, another pair of eyes, 24 and that was fed to me on a case-by-case basis, but 25 there was no systematic involvement. 7 1 Q. So effectively your involvement as Engineering Director 2 ended in early 2008? 3 A. Correct. 4 Q. I understand. You go on just to explain that your role 5 had been to help understand what could be done to rescue 6 the project that was obviously failing, as we will come 7 back to, January 2007 review, and you explain you helped 8 unhook the blockage in delivery of design, et cetera. 9 Mr Glazebrook continued to have greater involvement and 10 we will be speaking to him later. 11 Okay. 12 Could we pause there and look at another document, 13 please, which will come up on the screen. If we start, 14 please, with CEC01785248. This is to do with your 15 duties as Engineering Director, Mr Crawley. 16 If we can see the main email, it's from 17 Matthew Crosse, dated 5 March 2007, subject, "team 18 descriptions", and I think Mr Crosse had come in earlier 19 that year as the new Tram Project Director. Mr Crosse 20 states: 21 "As part of the new organisational arrangements, 22 I believe we need to have clarity about what we all 23 do ..." 24 Then the paragraph after that: 25 "As a team leader, please can you consider what you 8 1 do ... try and complete a one pager ..." 2 If we then look at the top of the page, we see you 3 quickly came back on the same day to Mr Crosse saying: 4 "My offering is attached." 5 And the subject is "team descriptions". This is 6 engineering team job description, and the attachment is 7 CEC01785249. We can see this is headed, "Engineering, 8 Assurance and Approvals", "Team role summary", towards 9 the top, and four bullet points we can perhaps blow up. 10 We see the team role summary, firstly: 11 "To provide leadership and resolution for the 12 engineering issues emerging from the Tram Project; to 13 report on and manage the SDS contract deliverables 14 against programme; to deliver the required project 15 approvals to programme; to deliver value engineering 16 savings." 17 Now, that was a summary of the team role. Which of 18 these matters were you involved in on a day-to-day 19 basis, Mr Crawley? 20 A. The first bullet point under "Team role summary", to 21 provide leadership and resolution for the engineering 22 issues emerging from the tram project, was what most of 23 my time was spent on. I did produce some reports, which 24 is the second bullet point. And only peripherally 25 involved in the others. 9 1 Q. So who else within tie was primarily responsible for the 2 other matters? 3 A. Tony Glazebrook and the other members of the engineering 4 team. 5 Q. Did you have overall responsibility for each of these 6 four bullets? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. If we could put that to one side and go back to your 9 statement, please, at page 3. In sub-question 2, in the 10 text in bold, we had asked: 11 "... if you could explain who was your predecessor 12 as TIE's Engineering Director for the tram project..." 13 You replied: 14 "I do not know who my predecessor in the role ... 15 was." 16 I think in short this was perhaps a new role that 17 was created; is that correct? 18 A. I have no idea. 19 Q. Did anyone explain to you if this was a new role? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Did that seem odd, that it hadn't been explained to you? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Why not? 24 A. I cannot think of a reason why you would think it odd. 25 It doesn't occur to me that it's odd. 10 1 Q. Is it quite usual for you providing consultancy services 2 to perhaps -- parachute into a project is the wrong 3 word, but to -- 4 A. I understand the point. And yes, that is quite usual. 5 Q. Are you perhaps asked to provide a fresh pair of eyes so 6 you wouldn't necessarily want to look into the question 7 of continuity from a previous role, or what? 8 A. I have never been in the position of having to look to 9 continuity to a previous role. 10 Q. I see. 11 A. I will point out that this role of -- we will summarise 12 it as Engineering Director -- was put to me in an email 13 from Steven Bell, I believe it was -- it was certainly 14 end of January 2007. Having delivered the three-day 15 review and having said in the covering note I would be 16 interested in discussing further involvement, I received 17 a phone call saying: I'm going to send you an email with 18 some details of a role we think you could undertake; and 19 the email duly arrived with the term "Engineering 20 Director" in it. 21 That email made no reference to any of the issues of 22 a predecessor being in place, or even something similar 23 to the role being in place. 24 So I took it from the email that internal discussion 25 had been had, and indeed that email referenced 11 1 a discussion between Steven Bell, Susan Clark, and 2 Matthew Crosse, who had concluded, I think, if 3 I remember their words, that they were keen to know if 4 I would undertake the role. 5 Q. I understand. 6 We also see over the page at page 4 of your 7 statement, towards the top in the second paragraph in 8 blue, you say: 9 "My role was not to supervise delivery of the design 10 services by SDS. It was to find a way to resolve the 11 disputes that had arisen between TIE and SDS that were 12 preventing delivery of the design services required from 13 SDS." 14 A. That's correct. 15 Q. Yes. The first sentence, your role was not to supervise 16 delivery of the design services by SDS, was that the 17 role of tie's SDS Contract Manager? 18 A. That was, and that -- there is a project manager role 19 defined in the SDS contract, and at the time that was 20 held by Ailsa McGregor. 21 Q. Thank you. I think then when she left that role, in 22 I think April 2007, Mr Glazebrook procured that role? 23 A. Correct. 24 Q. Until I think October 2007, and Damian Sharp may then 25 have filled that role? 12 1 A. That's also correct. I recall it. 2 Q. Thank you. I should ask, did each of these individuals, 3 Ailsa McGregor, Mr Glazebrook in that role, and Mr Sharp 4 report to you or someone else? 5 A. Tony Glazebrook continued to report to me. There was -- 6 I will call it a dotted line to Geoff Gilbert and I do 7 recall some email traffic between me and Geoff Gilbert 8 at the point it was announced, I think by Geoff, that 9 they wanted Tony to pick up Ailsa McGregor's role. 10 Q. Thank you. Go back to your statement, please. 11 Sub-question 5, we asked: 12 "What were the duties and responsibilities of 13 Steven Bell, TIE's Engineering and Procurement 14 Director?" 15 You replied: 16 "I have no knowledge of any of these items." 17 Is that the case, Mr Crawley, that throughout 2007 18 you had no knowledge of the duties and responsibilities 19 of Mr Bell? 20 A. I would be hard pressed to give a detailed statement of 21 what they were. He was part of the tie organisation at 22 first, but not part of the project organisation. So he 23 sat outside of the project. The project reported into 24 him. 25 Later, he became the Project Director. 13 1 Q. It just seems a little, perhaps, odd coming to it 2 afresh, to see Mr Bell's title as tie's Engineering and 3 Procurement Director, and to see your title as 4 Engineering Director, and to try to work out the 5 interplay or overlap? 6 A. My reporting line was into Matthew Crosse and 7 Matthew Crosse reported, I think, into Steven Bell. 8 Q. An item in passing, Mr Crawley. Do you recall 9 a sub-committee called the Design, Procurement and 10 Delivery sub-Committee? 11 A. I don't. 12 Q. That's not a sub-committee you sat on, I don't think? 13 A. If I did, I have forgotten it. 14 Q. Again, just before we come to your January 2007 review, 15 one final question in terms of your role in tie. 16 Did you have any involvement in the engineering 17 aspects of the procurement of the Infraco contract, 18 including the employer's requirements and reviewing the 19 civils proposals by the bidders? 20 A. I certainly had no involvement in any commercial 21 elements. If I had any involvement in engineering 22 elements of that, it was minor. I remember a discussion 23 on the tram vehicle specification, and I remember 24 meeting CAF for that purpose. 25 Q. Would it be fair to say that the procurement of the 14 1 Infraco contract was carried out without much 2 involvement of the engineering team of which -- which 3 you headed? 4 A. That is correct. 5 Q. Now, finally, before we come to your January review, 6 just to set the scene, I think before your involvement 7 with the project, preliminary design had been delivered 8 in June 2006, but for a number of reasons, it had not 9 been possible to progress the detailed design; is that 10 correct? 11 A. That's correct. 12 Q. I think in short you were asked in January 2007 to -- as 13 a fresh pair of eyes to come and have a look what the 14 problems were and to suggest solutions? 15 A. That's correct. 16 Q. Thank you. If we could now please go to your January 17 review, the document is CEC01811257. We can see this is 18 headed "tie Tram Project, A Review", by yourself, in 19 January 2007. Move on to page 2, please. We can see 20 the scope, and the first bullet point, it's a review of 21 the design review process based on interviews with key 22 personnel. 23 So just to pause there, it's not a wider review of 24 the tram project. It's the design review process? 25 A. That is true, although once I began, it was clear that 15 1 it was impossible to ignore all the other issues 2 emerging which didn't specifically relate to design 3 review. 4 Q. Are these other issues in these slides we are going to 5 look at or should I ask you about them separately? 6 A. They are in these slides. I tried to limit things to 7 the design review process because that was the scope. 8 But some of the issues kept on emerging. 9 Q. Yes. It might be helpful, Mr Crawley, just before we go 10 into the detail of the slide, if you could by way of 11 overview, explain some of these issues? 12 A. The issues, they are documented but they are primarily 13 to do with tie -- I'm going to call it the tram project. 14 It's wrong to call it tie, because it consisted of tie, 15 the TSS contract, Transdev as advisers on operations, 16 and also SDS as the contractor delivering the design. 17 The phrases which kept on emerging were poor 18 leadership, not feeling like one team, and everybody 19 knowing that in their opinion the project was too late 20 to be delivered in anything like the original programme 21 and to budget. 22 These were common themes. Those are not necessarily 23 to do with the design review process. Nevertheless, 24 that is what interviewees kept offering. 25 Q. Thank you. If we can go, please, to page 3 of this 16 1 document, we can see the list of interviewees. I think 2 you explained in your statement that you focused on 3 people actually carrying out the tasks rather than at 4 a more senior management level? 5 A. Correct. 6 Q. I think that's where one is likely to get the truth 7 from; is that correct? 8 A. That was my view and is my view. 9 Q. Thank you. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Can I just ask, you said that one of 11 the issues that was identified, or a theme that was 12 being repeated, was that the progress was too late to 13 enable the project to be delivered on time and within 14 budget. That was in January of 2007. 15 A. Correct. 16 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So even before the contract was 17 signed, as it were, everyone -- not everyone, but there 18 was an appreciation that it was too late to be delivered 19 on time and within budget? 20 A. I think that's a very fair summary. 21 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 22 Go to page 18, please. 23 We can see you list a number of specific design 24 review issues. Firstly, the effective engagement of CEC 25 remains an issue. Then secondly: 17 1 "The Charrettes process may lead to significant 2 programme and cost risk ..." 3 The fourth bullet point: 4 "The alignment of the design review process and the 5 procurement process needs further understanding." 6 Then lastly: 7 "SDS interaction and management is not effective." 8 The first bullet point, Mr Crawley, what was the 9 issue with CEC? 10 A. I was told at the time that CEC seemed to be entirely 11 separate from the project, despite their forming an 12 integral part of the design process. It was a feeling 13 expressed by everybody. 14 Q. Yes. I think at this stage in the document you're 15 simply reflecting what you've been told? 16 A. Exactly. This was probably day 2 of 3, having come to 17 it cold. 18 Q. Yes. The last bullet point about SDS, what was your 19 understanding of that feedback? 20 A. Simply that it was proving difficult to engage with them 21 and to make progress against what seemed like impossible 22 obstacles. 23 Q. What were the impossible obstacles? 24 A. It wasn't clear at that point. I was simply reflecting 25 what I was told. 18 1 Q. Did it become clear? 2 A. It certainly did become clear because within an hour of 3 starting the role as Engineering Director in 4 February 2007, I had understood that the entire detailed 5 design team had been sent back to Birmingham by SDS and 6 no work was being done. 7 Q. And why was that? 8 A. Because they had reached an impasse on, I believe, my 9 memory says, 79 major issues, which meant that SDS were 10 essentially burning cash by keeping a design team idle 11 in Edinburgh. So they left. 12 Q. Did SDS require decisions to be made by others on these 13 issues before they could progress the design? 14 A. That is what they said. They said their preference was 15 to be instructed to proceed, so that they didn't have 16 the risk associated with proceeding, and basically my 17 role was to unpick that, which I did between about 18 February and July; the number of issues reduced to 19 single digits some time in July. 20 I did that mostly by a process of doing exactly 21 what they said they wanted. I instructed them to 22 proceed, having first assured myself that the risk 23 occasioned by doing it to tie was minimal. 24 Q. Thank you. I will come back to that issue of resolution 25 of the critical issues. 19 1 Over the page of this document, page 19, the next 2 slide is headed "Themes from the interviews". We can 3 read that for ourselves, but some fairly serious issues 4 listed under: 5 "The Tram Project is reactive and feels unplanned. 6 Few believe the programme can be met. Not enough of the 7 right experience in the right place ... CEC seen as 8 (necessarily) having many factional and incompatible 9 views which need joining up. The Tram Project is not 10 one team. Design should be seen as an iterative 11 process, but is not accommodated as such." 12 Pausing there, can you explain that point, 13 Mr Crawley, you do in your statement also make this 14 point yourself? 15 A. The design -- there's a clue in the word tram system. 16 The system is by definition a collection of parts 17 configured to perform a particular purpose. So there 18 are many elements which have to be designed often in 19 parallel. 20 That does mean that, as one element of a design 21 comes to completion, it may prove not to be entirely 22 compatible with the other elements of design coming to 23 completion shortly thereafter and some iteration to 24 a final solution is always necessary. 25 The only way to avoid the need for iteration is to 20 1 do something that's even slower and to do everything 2 serially. 3 Q. As part of design being a system, we've also, I think, 4 seen a term, an interdisciplinary review? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Is that something that takes place towards the end of 7 the design process or all the way through it or what? 8 A. It's part the way through it. It's detailed in the 9 design management plan. And the intention is to bring 10 together, for example, let's take the example of 11 a section of the tram system which may consist of some 12 track on a ballast, some track embedded in street, 13 a bridge, maybe some junction work. All of those things 14 are termed disciplines and they need to be integrated, 15 and at the design stage, whilst the design is under way, 16 that integration should naturally have been taken care 17 of by the designers in the detail. 18 But at the appropriate point, when enough of the 19 detail has been collected, process stops. There is 20 a pause. And there is a review to ensure that all of 21 those disciplines have indeed been properly integrated, 22 and only then is the design allowed to proceed for final 23 completion. 24 Q. So not only is design iterative, it's also 25 interdependent. So changes to one item of design may 21 1 affect other items of design? 2 A. Correct. Correct. 3 Q. What you were describing is a process that to outsiders 4 seemed as though it's going to take a bit of time? 5 A. It takes as long as it takes. It's a fairly common and 6 well-established process. 7 Q. The key presumably is to set up a clear and simple 8 system at the outset, and everyone understands their 9 roles and responsibilities, and there are forums for 10 clearing decisions? 11 A. It's essential. 12 Q. Thank you. 13 Now, again, sticking with this document, and over to 14 page 20, please, "Analysis". Is this your analysis? 15 A. This is my analysis after two days. 16 Q. After two days, yes. 17 Did your views change in any way on these matters? 18 A. No. 19 Q. The second bullet point states: 20 "There is no disagreement on programme risk - the 21 programme will most likely not be met with current 22 arrangements." 23 We can read then for ourselves in the interests of 24 time. 25 I was interested in the last bullet point, though: 22 1 "To move from reaction to planned action while still 2 delivering the work will prove difficult but must be 3 attempted." 4 What did you mean by that? 5 A. Right. Once a protocol -- we could call it a culture -- 6 has been established, it's very difficult to break it, 7 and the project was resourced for delivery, not for 8 culture change. 9 So it would require some energy to be put in to 10 break the culture that was there and to create a new 11 one, but at the same time, because the project was late, 12 delivery must continue. It's quite a difficult thing to 13 pull off. 14 Q. Did you pull it off? 15 A. I don't think so. 16 Q. I was getting ahead of myself. I think there were some 17 improvements particularly in resolving critical issues 18 and some improvement in delivery of design, but things 19 perhaps then tended to slip later on; is that -- 20 A. Well, you're absolutely right, although I was clear, 21 I offered tie two choices for my involvement. The first 22 was to deal precisely with the issue you have just been 23 citing, and the second was to take a functional role, 24 and others, that being Matthew Crosse, would handle the 25 issue of culture. 23 1 Q. Thank you. Then over the page then to page 21. You set 2 out certain specific strategic problems. I think we can 3 just read that for ourselves. 4 You do, however, say in the last bullet point: 5 "The creation of one team from tie staff and 6 contracted parties ..." 7 Why was that important, creating one team? 8 A. Having appointed a supplier, a consultant, in this case 9 the SDS contract, Parsons Brinckerhoff, to perform the 10 design, it makes no obvious sense to me to do anything 11 other than form one team around them and to clear 12 obstacles from their path. 13 I'm going to summarise for effect. What I saw on 14 arrival was effectively tie and SDS in conflict. In 15 other words, having appointed this contractor to do the 16 design, upon which there was total dependence and almost 17 no chance of changing, it makes no sense to do anything 18 other than to remove obstacles from their path. 19 I didn't see any of that happening. 20 Q. Did you form any view as to why tie and SDS appear to be 21 in conflict? 22 A. No. I could only note on arrival there was no design 23 team. They've all been sent back to Birmingham. 24 Q. Over the page, please, at page 22, you set out a number 25 of solution sets. We can see in the first bullet point 24 1 reference to strong leadership fostering common goals 2 and direction, et cetera. We get a reference to the one 3 team ethos. 4 Under the third last bullet point you say: 5 "Management of the TSS and SDS contracts as 6 originally designed." 7 What did you mean by that? 8 A. Okay. Well, TSS was contracted to provide tie with 9 technical detailed engineering support to enable tie to 10 fulfil its function. tie was a very small organisation. 11 Its original statement of intent was to operate at 12 a strategic level, in other words contracting 13 everything. So TSS would need to be intrinsically 14 joined to tie and part of their management arrangement. 15 That didn't appear to be the case from these 16 interviews, which you can see documented here, and it 17 didn't appear to be the case to me subsequently after 18 I arrived. I was also led to understand on arrival that 19 the TSS involvement was to be reduced from that point, 20 because most of the budget had already been spent; on 21 what, I'm not sure, and whether wisely, I'm not sure, 22 but it had been spent, so their involvement was reduced. 23 So the idea was that the detailed design would be 24 done by SDS, Parsons Brinckerhoff, that tie and TSS 25 would do the very thing I have just said, clear 25 1 obstacles from their path, while demanding what was 2 theirs by right and by contract, which is delivery of 3 a completely designed tram system fit for construction. 4 Q. Thank you. Finally, the last slide over the page, 5 please, page 23, we can see suggested action, deliver a 6 solution. We can see the third bullet point again: 7 "Leadership from the top is the most important 8 feature to mould and encourage these solutions and, in 9 the first instance, overcome barriers (perceived or 10 real) between tie, TSS and SDS. The creation of 11 a vision for the end-game is vital as part of this." 12 In terms of that last sentence, Mr Crawley, you 13 simply mean there must be a vision for where everybody 14 is going, the endgame? 15 A. It's two things. What does the end result look like? 16 It clearly wasn't intended to look like it now does. It 17 would have been twice the length of system, and how are 18 we going to get there? A route map in strategic terms 19 that everybody could relate to, no matter what their job 20 was. 21 Q. Thank you. Finally, the last bullet point: 22 "The project is resourced and structured to deliver 23 a project, not to re-invent itself." 24 What did you mean by that? 25 A. In order -- it refers to my earlier point. If the 26 1 project wished to change its own ethos, change its own 2 culture, you would have to inject more energy into it 3 because it was only resourced to run steady state 4 delivering the project. It wasn't resourced to change 5 itself as well. Additional help would be required. 6 Q. Thank you. 7 Now, we can put that document to one side. Now 8 I would like to look at a document in February 2007, to 9 look at some of the changes that were, I think, made. 10 It will come up on the screen. It's PBH00021285. 11 Now, this is a series of slides headed, "Improving 12 design and engineering". It was a paper to the Design 13 Procurement and Delivery Sub-Committee on 14 13 February 2007. 15 Now, Mr Crawley, this presentation was by 16 Steve Reynolds and Matthew Crosse. I don't think it was 17 by you? 18 A. No, it wasn't by me. 19 Q. Did you have any involvement in this? 20 A. It doesn't look at all familiar to me. 21 Q. No. I would like just to look at four slides. They may 22 illustrate, I think, some of the themes and issues that 23 you had picked up on. 24 If we can go to page 3, please, to begin with. We 25 can see "Summary of paper", "Underlying Issues arise 27 1 from", for example, 1: 2 "Project structure means tie doesn't always face up 3 to asset ownership responsibilities." 4 Then secondly: 5 "Project prone to gridlocks through indecision and 6 poor co-operation of stakeholders." 7 I take it that's a point you would have agreed with 8 at the time? 9 A. Yes. It does occur to me, given that you have told me 10 one of the authors was Matthew Crosse, that this fits 11 exactly with the email I received from Steven Bell at 12 the end of January, which was copied to Matthew Crosse, 13 and which cites Matthew Crosse, Steven and Susan Clark 14 as being behind fixing the issues I had identified in 15 the January 2007 review. 16 Q. Yes. We can see, for example, the next bullet point: 17 "Some tie resource weaknesses and with a lack of 18 engineering leadership." 19 I think you were to plug that gap with 20 Mr Glazebrook; is that correct? 21 A. I believe so. 22 Q. Yes. Also, for example, the next bullet point: 23 "Overly ambitious programme with a disconnect to 24 outputs." 25 I take it you would have agreed with that, based on 28 1 the feedback you'd received? 2 A. Correct. 3 Q. Then: 4 "Variable quality and processes + inconsistent 5 follow through." 6 If we go then to page 31, and this mentions the 7 issue of critical issues resolution. The third bullet 8 point: 9 "Systematic process to close down issues." 10 Including, if need be, the last bullet point: 11 "Use of facilitator to ..." 12 You mention two of the senior staff, Mr Gallagher at 13 tie, and Andrew Holmes, the Director of City Development 14 at the Council. 15 I take it in short this is what you introduced as 16 systematic process to close down these critical issues? 17 A. I believe so, yes. 18 Q. Then it would be helpful also to look at slide 29, 19 page 29, because as well as the critical issues, I think 20 the second change you tried to introduce was in relation 21 to the design review process and we will come back to 22 that later. But this slide, I think, seeks to show the 23 current design review process, and we can see the 24 left-hand box, preliminary design phase complete, and 25 then go to the SDS develop design box. It's then issued 29 1 to tie. tie undertakes full review, and it's either 2 accepted or it goes back via the red line to the box, 3 SDS developing design. 4 Just looking at this, is it's perhaps not obvious 5 where the input of the City of Edinburgh Council and 6 other interested parties takes place; is that fair? 7 A. From that, it's impossible to tell. But they should -- 8 it should be in the box that reads "tie undertakes full 9 review", because for tie you must read "support from 10 TSS", because they had the technical competence to do 11 the review, but also CEC in respect of public realm 12 works, because they were the only people empowered to 13 approve. 14 Q. Yes. Also we see in that box that the current process 15 was tie undertakes a full review of the design, but 16 I think that was one of the changes you suggested later 17 as well? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. We will come back to that. 20 The other helpful slide, I think, is page 30, 21 showing proposed changes to process. 22 We can see under the SDS Develop Design box, below 23 that there's reference to Intermediate Design Reviews, 24 et cetera, and below that reference to involvement of 25 tie, TSS, Transdev and CEC. So it seems to be envisaged 30 1 as well as, I think you mentioned, these bodies, 2 certainly the Council, have obviously a role in design 3 review, at an even earlier stage they should all be 4 involved in the developing design stage; is that 5 correct? 6 A. That's correct. In the case of -- CEC were in a very 7 special position. They were the ultimate client. But 8 in a sense -- in essence, they were also in the chain of 9 delivery. Delivery couldn't happen without CEC 10 involvement. But ultimately the design had to satisfy 11 CEC in every respect because they were the ultimate 12 client. 13 Q. Yes. Just to -- from a lay perspective, I think one can 14 see the good sense in having all interested bodies 15 involved at a -- during the design development stage to 16 say what they want. So that when the design gets to the 17 design review stage, it's more likely to be accepted? 18 A. Agreed. 19 Q. Thank you. 20 You can put that to one side, thank you. Coming 21 back to the question of the critical issues, and in the 22 helpful explanatory note you provided with your 23 statement, the reference is WED00000027. If we can go 24 to page 7, please, and halfway down the page, it's 25 immediately apparent -- in short, what I'm trying to do, 31 1 Mr Crawley, is trying to avoid reinventing the wheel. 2 You have set out what happened in terms of setting out 3 the critical issues. I would like to use what you have 4 said in this explanatory note. You have said: 5 "It was immediately apparent, as indicated by the 6 January 2007 review, that there was a significant 7 problem with design progress (at that time the project 8 was at the Preliminary Design stage prior to moving to 9 Detailed Design)." 10 You say: 11 "In February 2007 there were about 80 items which 12 were the subject of lack of agreement between SDS and 13 tie and which had the effect of halting design progress. 14 It was the SDS view that tie should instruct them to 15 proceed on these items because they required decisions 16 which were outside the scope of supply for which they 17 took design risk." 18 Can you explain that sentence? 19 A. I can explain what was explained to me by SDS, but 20 I can't explain the sentence. 21 What SDS said was that if they were required to 22 design outwith the limits of deviation, may I assume 23 that's a defined term understood by everybody? It's the 24 limits which are set by parliamentary approval inside 25 which design must take place. 32 1 SDS took the view that any design, for any reason, 2 however reasonable, which had to fall outside of the 3 limits of deviation was something that they were not 4 empowered to undertake and refused to move. 5 I dealt with that by issuing them a written 6 instruction, I can't remember when, but it was certainly 7 early to mid-2007, pointing out that they had been 8 contracted to design a tram system in Edinburgh. The 9 instruction didn't mention limits of deviation. 10 And that therefore, if circumstances meant that the 11 design had to take place outside the limits of 12 deviation, that we would deal with it as and when it 13 arose, and would they please proceed with designing 14 a tram system in Edinburgh. 15 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I just understand that. The 16 limits, there are horizontal and vertical limits of 17 deviation within which one has to work. 18 How could it come about that you would be designing 19 outside the limits of deviation? 20 A. Because having begun the design, it's apparent that 21 that's the only practical way of achieving it. There is 22 one example which does spring to mind. 23 They needed to place a substation for power supply 24 adjacent to the track, but the only location that they 25 could find that was practicable to access was outside 33 1 the limits of deviation. 2 It was actually on the CEC-owned land and CEC had no 3 objection to its use, and yet the SDS view was that they 4 would prefer to be instructed rather than simply to 5 design it on CEC land. So I instructed them. 6 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 7 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. Then over the page, please, 8 Mr Crawley, at page 8, so that's to do with the limits 9 of deviation -- 10 A. There it is. 11 Q. That's the substation example, I think, in bold text at 12 the top. 13 Just below that, the paragraph below that, you say: 14 "Other reasons for lack of progress relate to the 15 SDS views of failure by tie to respond in a timely way 16 in the design review process and failure by CEC to give 17 planning permission in time for the review process. tie 18 have said of these issues that there was some truth in 19 the first issue, but in respect of the second that SDS 20 did not provide sufficient information for CEC to 21 approve." 22 We will come back to that issue. 23 Then after you set out some examples, you go on to 24 say: 25 "These issues were referred to as 'Critical Issues' 34 1 and in February 2007, I established a process designed 2 to clear them, based upon the principle that the party 3 best suited to taking the risk should do so. This 4 process was made much easier by the cooperation of 5 Steve Reynolds, who was the most senior 6 Parsons Brinckerhoff manager on site. He had been 7 assigned to the project by Parsons Brinckerhoff 8 specifically to deal with the growing problems ... 9 It was inevitable that as tie was the 'party of 10 substance' that tie would be taking (back) most of the 11 risk as it was best suited to carry it, but in practical 12 terms that risk would not materialise, eg if building 13 outside the limits of deviation was required, CEC as the 14 owner of tie, could provide the necessary authority. 15 This is a mechanism which would not be available to SDS. 16 The chart below [we will come on to] indicates the 17 position and history in June 2007. This indicates that 18 significant progress was made in removing these issues. 19 It also shows how new issues were being added in April 20 and May following a restart of design work in April but 21 that the issues were being quickly cleared as they 22 arose." 23 A reference to Project Dashboards. 24 Over the page, please, we can see the graph you 25 referred to or chart at the top half of the page. We 35 1 don't have to take too long on it, but I think in short, 2 each of the columns represents critical issues and we 3 can see there's a downward trend between February 2007 4 and June 2007 as these issues are resolved; is that 5 correct? 6 A. That's correct, yes. 7 Q. Thank you. 8 Now, we can put that to one side for just now, and 9 go to another document, please, in March 2007. It's 10 CEC01628233. You will see about halfway down the page, 11 Mr Crawley, we will see this is an email from yourself 12 dated 23 March 2007 to various individuals within tie. 13 The subject matter is "Outstanding Issues - Clearing 14 House". I'll just read the first paragraph. You state: 15 "Some of us, having met recently on the subject of 16 programme review, are concerned to ensure that any such 17 review properly recognises that there are a number of 18 outstanding issues which, if not dealt with promptly, 19 will threaten achievement of the programme. Some of 20 these issues are long-standing and require decisions to 21 be made now. The consensus of view is that a decision, 22 even if sub-optimal in the first instance, will allow 23 faster progress to be made through subsequent change 24 control than delay for a 'better' decision. It is clear 25 that a definitive and final decision on some issues will 36 1 not always be in tie's gift. However, it will be 2 possible for tie to make an interim 'decision' to give 3 direction. To this end, a 'clearing house' is being 4 organised as follows." 5 Is this part of the critical issues resolution -- 6 A. It was an adjunct to it, and it was created to support 7 it and make it possible to respond more effectively as 8 new issues arrived, which as you would have seen from 9 the previous graph, it's a live process, and as some 10 issues were being closed, new ones are arriving. 11 Q. Can you just explain, please, the sentence that the 12 consensus of view is that a decision, even if suboptimal 13 in the first instance, will allow faster progress to be 14 made through subsequent change control than delay for 15 a better decision? 16 A. I think it's self-evident. Any progress in 17 approximately the right direction must be better than no 18 progress whatsoever, because having made a small amount 19 of progress in the right direction, it's often the case 20 that it frees up other associated issues. 21 It's also enormously important for -- to put it 22 basically, morale. 23 Q. Was that same approach taken to resolution of the 24 critical issues? 25 A. That was the underlying thought, yes, just make some 37 1 progress. 2 Q. Could we also in a similar vein, please, look at another 3 document, PBH00003595. It's not a great copy, but the 4 top left-hand corner, it's a letter from 5 Parsons Brinckerhoff, indeed, from Mr Reynolds. We can 6 see it's dated 11 July 2007. 7 The first paragraph we can perhaps blow up. We can 8 see it states: 9 "We can confirm that SDS has now remobilised those 10 areas of design activity which have been held awaiting 11 resolution of the Critical Issues. We are also very 12 pleased to be able to acknowledge the collaborative 13 approach taken by tie, TEL and CEC to the resolution of 14 the Critical Issues." 15 Is this reference what you told us earlier, 16 Mr Crawley, about Parsons having sent their design team 17 back to Birmingham? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. Because they couldn't make progress, but now they can? 20 A. Correct. 21 Q. A few paragraphs down: 22 "It is now 12 months since the SDS Preliminary 23 Design was delivered and with the extended consultation 24 on design options through the period since then, it is 25 our view that what has been developed is so close to 38 1 optimum that there is nothing to be gained by delaying 2 the completion of the detailed design while further 3 possible refinements are investigated. In our view the 4 major risk is not that the design may be 99% 5 optimum rather than 100 per cent; it is that further 6 optioneering may delay completion of the programme to 7 the point where cancellation of the scheme results." 8 I'll stop there. Do you agree with what's said 9 there? 10 A. I do. 11 Q. Now, I know it was before your time, but are you aware 12 whether between the preliminary design being delivered 13 in 2006 and up until at least January/February when you 14 started, is it correct to say that during that period 15 there was essentially an extended consultation on design 16 options? 17 A. That is my understanding, but I have little detail of 18 it. 19 Q. Thank you. Just standing back, the preliminary design 20 was delivered in June 2006. We're now into June and 21 July 2007, when there is resolution of the critical 22 issues and remobilisation of the Parsons team. 23 Does that mean there was approximately a year during 24 which, for whatever reason, it had not been possible to 25 meaningfully progress the detailed design? 39 1 A. That's how I read it. 2 Q. Thank you. Just sticking with this issue, another 3 document, please. It's TIE00064787. 4 This is headed: a Draft Paper to the DPD, Design 5 Procurement Delivery Sub-Committee, 10 May 2007. 6 Go over the page to page 3, please. We see proposed 7 by yourself, recommended Matthew Crosse, approved, 8 David Mackay on behalf of the Tram Project Board. I'm 9 not sure, do you have any recollection of this paper, 10 Mr Crawley? 11 A. Vaguely, yes. 12 Q. Go back to page 1, please. 13 We see at the top, section 1 dealing with 'Critical 14 Issues'. Then we carry on to the graph at the bottom, we 15 see again a similarish graph where here, for example, 16 critical issue, just under 80 in February 2007, but by 17 April are down to about 25; is that correct? 18 A. Yes, that's correct. 19 Q. Thank you. Then go over the page, please. 20 In paragraph 2, Requests for Information, I think 21 again this is something else which had been holding up 22 the progress of design; is that correct? 23 A. That's correct. 24 Q. So I think in short, SDS had formally requested 25 information from tie. A number of these were 40 1 outstanding. We see that it states here in the report: 2 "Good progress is being made on closing requests for 3 information as follows." 4 We can see from 30 March 2007 there were 40 such 5 requests open that had dropped to 17 just a month later, 6 by 27 April 2007. 7 So that's the resolution of critical issues. But we 8 go on to in paragraph 3 the question of 'Design 9 Assurance', where I think this was another important 10 change you recommended in the design and review 11 procedure; is that correct? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. It's probably best just to take it at present from the 14 report. We can see the report states: 15 "Agreement has now been reached with SDS on the 16 provision of designs accompanied by design assurance 17 documentation. This will result in packages of designs 18 being supplied, section by section, in a form which is 19 self-consistent, complete (or if not, with defined 20 status), with interdependencies already reviewed and 21 with associated approvals. The package will also 22 contain associated TRO [Traffic Regulation Order] 23 information although until the full modelling exercise 24 has been concluded this cannot be finally confirmed. 25 In the event that changes are required in respect of 41 1 TROs it is not thought that the design impact will be 2 great. 3 The first design assured delivery will take place 4 in respect of section 5C in the week beginning 5 7 May 2007. This will be subjected to significant 6 scrutiny as the first exemplar available in the new 7 format and decisions will be made on the details of 8 subsequent reviews, once the results of this experience 9 are available. 10 Overall there are likely to be about 40 such 11 packages." 12 Just to pause there, that was the intention at this 13 stage? 14 A. That was the intention at that stage, yes. 15 Q. We will come back to look at what happened. 16 Sticking then with paragraph 4, 'Design Deliverables 17 progress reporting, it's stated: 18 "The new dashboard for deliverables measurement has 19 been accepted by SDS and is being implemented as 20 planned. The first issue of the Dashboard is shown 21 below and indicates the total number of physical design 22 deliverables due against the Version 14 programme. 23 There are 5,373 items of contracted milestone 24 deliverables. These are related to the 40 design 25 assured packages referenced above." 42 1 It then goes on to say: 2 "As this is the first issue, the Dashboard contains 3 only one line - the Baseline programme. This is 4 arbitrarily taken as being the same as the Version 14 5 programme. This will not change from this point but 6 subsequent issues will contain two additional lines 7 starting at the point 'Now'. The first of these will be 8 the contracted position, which will change from period 9 to period depending on change orders issued to SDS, and 10 the second will be the cumulative actual number of 11 deliverables achieved against the variety of programmes 12 issued so far." 13 Can we go back, please, Mr Crawley, to the sentence: 14 "The first of these will be the contracted 15 position." 16 What was contracted position a reference to? 17 A. The current accepted programme. 18 Q. Over the page, please. You can see -- perhaps blow up 19 the paragraph at the top, please. It states: 20 "There is an important conclusion from this 21 Dashboard - the rate of delivery from 'Now' must 22 effectively double if the programme is to be met. This 23 does not necessarily imply that actual work rates must 24 increase as to meet this Deliverables rate requires that 25 a large proportion of the Deliverables affected must be 43 1 at an advanced stage of completion already. The 2 Dashboard will provide reliable data from this point 3 which demonstrates physical progress on design and 4 approvals." 5 If we then look at the graph, is the doubling, can 6 we see that by the line in the graph? 7 A. It's the gradient. It's the gradient of the line to the 8 right is approximately twice the gradient of the line to 9 the left. 10 Q. Thank you. I think this graph shows all the 11 deliverables being delivered by -- is it perhaps 12 February, March, April 2008? 13 A. Yes, correct. 14 Q. I would like to go back to your statement, please, where 15 you answer some questions in relation to this paper. 16 It's at page 23, please, of your statement. 17 Question 38 simply refers to the document we've just 18 looked at. Scrolling down to the answers, please, 19 sub-question 3, we asked: 20 "What were your views at that time in respect of how 21 realistic it was that the rate of design delivery would 22 double?" 23 You replied: 24 "It was clear that it could not, but we had to do 25 everything we could to increase it as much as we could." 44 1 Was that a view you held at the time, Mr Crawley? 2 A. Yes. Simply because, to say of a project in a developed 3 arrangement, an extant arrangement, which was running 4 steady state, please do everything twice as quickly, 5 didn't seem likely to succeed. 6 Q. Was it perhaps a bit worse than that, in that given the 7 difficulties and problems that had been experienced with 8 design, when you say the project had developed an 9 arrangement, an extant arrangement, which was running in 10 a steady state, the use of the phrase "steady state" 11 perhaps suggests that things were running an acceptable 12 fashion, when I don't think that was the case? 13 A. No, I don't mean to imply it was acceptable. I simply 14 mean to imply it was what it was, and it had to change 15 by a factor of 2 from what it was. 16 Q. I understand. So the graph we looked at just a few 17 seconds ago showing all of the deliverables being 18 delivered in February, March, April 2008, is that 19 essentially an aspirational timescale, rather than 20 something you consider was likely to happen? 21 A. Yes, although it was more -- it was meant more as 22 a statement of what would have to happen if the then 23 Version 14 programme were to be delivered. Otherwise it 24 was clear that the Version 14 programme could not be 25 delivered. 45 1 Q. Were others in tie aware that the doubling of 2 deliverables in order to meet the programme showing 3 delivery by February, March, April 2008, were others in 4 tie aware this was unlikely to happen? 5 A. I can't say. The reports are clear. My reference point 6 for all this actually goes back to 22 February 2007, 7 because one of the first things I did on arrival was to 8 organise a meeting of all parties over a day to try and 9 understand where the major blockers were, and over the 10 course of that day, we discovered a five-month delay. 11 Now, the consequence of the five-month delay was 12 that I had a discussion with Matthew Crosse, who was the 13 Project Director, and we discussed that the project 14 would need to be rebased, recognising the five-month 15 delay. 16 He then took the matter up elsewhere within tie. 17 I did not. The only result of that acknowledgment of 18 the five-month delay was simply to say there would still 19 be trams for Christmas. That was the phrase. Trams for 20 Christmas, which I understood to mean Christmas 2010. 21 I think that commitment was met in that there was 22 a single tram in Princes Street, Christmas 2010. 23 Q. Just for the record, the meeting you referred to in 24 February 2007, I think that's dealt with at page 16 of 25 your statement? 46 1 A. Okay. 2 Q. Thank you. 3 Now, put that document to one side, please. 4 Again, a similar theme. Document PBH00011528. At 5 the bottom of the page, we can see this is an email from 6 Tom Hickman within tie. I think he had responsibilities 7 for programming; is that correct? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. This email is dated 30 May 2007. It's sent to yourself, 10 Mr Glazebrook, but copied in to other tie staff, 11 including Mr Crosse, the Tram Project Director. This is 12 an overview of SDS Design Programme Version 15 received 13 23 May, and then over the page, please, I won't dwell on 14 the details, but over the page, we can blow up the top 15 half, please. Mr Hickman provides a commentary on the 16 reasons for movement in dates. But if we can just scan 17 over the bullet points, in short, I think, Mr Crawley, 18 this email is suggesting continued design slippage; is 19 that correct? 20 A. That's correct. 21 Q. It may be helpful to go to the attachment of the email. 22 It is PBH00011530. If we turn it round and blow it up, 23 in short we can see this document will show -- turn it 24 round again. We can blow it up now. 25 We can see, along the top, the different sections of 47 1 the tram system. For example, Gogar depot, Gogar to 2 airport. Haymarket to Gogar. Haymarket corridor, 3 Haymarket to Newhaven Road, Haymarket to Granton Square. 4 Then a section of numbers given. Then we can see under 5 "Preliminary Design", that's all said to be 100 per cent 6 complete for each of the sections. Under "Detailed 7 Design", we can see the planned number and the actual 8 numbers. So, for example, under "Gogar Depot", it had 9 planned to be 96 per cent detailed design complete and 10 it's at, I think, just over 30 per cent. And similarly, 11 Gogar to Airport, planned 98.4 per cent, actual 59.8. 12 Haymarket to Gogar, planned 96 per cent, actual 43. 13 Haymarket Corridor, planned 95.6 per cent, actual 71.5. 14 Haymarket to Newhaven Road, the on-street section, 15 planned just over 80 per cent, actual 39.8 per cent, and 16 lastly, Haymarket to Granton Square, planned 17 95.2 per cent, actual 52.2 per cent. 18 There's a further breakdown of the particular 19 components of each of these sections below that, which 20 I don't think we have to go to. 21 But in short, that is showing a picture of the delay 22 in detailed design at this stage; is that correct? 23 A. That's correct. 24 Q. We can leave that document. Back to your statement, 25 please. Page 24. Question 39, we asked you various 48 1 questions. Firstly, we asked: 2 "Did these slippages cause you concern?" 3 You replied yes. Sub-question 2 at the top of the 4 page, we asked: 5 "What were your views around that time on whether 6 the design slippages could be arrested and whether the 7 design programme and procurement programme were 8 realistic and achievable?" 9 I think the next wording is yours, although it's not 10 in blue. So I think you then replied: 11 "The design slippages were reduced over time, but 12 not eliminated against an overall programme which was 13 too ambitious, given all that was known by then. It was 14 not considered acceptable to do what was really required 15 and issue a much extended programme which was re-scoped. 16 Eventually, of course, that is what happened anyway 17 because that is what the applied forces dictated. It 18 would have solved a lot of problems if the programme had 19 been delayed to let the design catch up." 20 We will pause there because I'm going to ask you, 21 towards the end of the examination, I'll come back to 22 the question of Infraco and what risk they took on 23 through design. 24 Just in terms there, was that a view you held at the 25 time, that it was not considered acceptable to do what 49 1 was really required and issue a much extended programme 2 which was rescoped? 3 A. That was my view at the time. 4 Q. Did you discuss that with anybody at the time? 5 A. Matthew Crosse. 6 Q. Again, similarly, you say: 7 "It would have solved a lot of problems if the 8 programme had been delayed to let the design catch up." 9 Is that a view you held at the time? 10 A. Yes, it is. 11 Q. And did you discuss that with anybody? 12 A. Matthew Crosse. 13 Q. What was his response to that? 14 A. It wasn't acceptable. That there were -- it appears, 15 political imperatives. In other words, the original 16 programme had to be achieved by some means, and my 17 understanding, which is why I wrote what I wrote about 18 the Infraco, is that it was considered that were the SDS 19 design contract being novated to the Infraco, then that 20 in some way would make up time, by allowing essentially 21 some design to proceed in parallel with construction, at 22 least those bits of design which could be dealt with in 23 that way. 24 Q. Does that give rise to any concerns in approach which 25 allows some design to proceed in parallel with 50 1 construction? 2 A. I would always be concerned. The original intent, which 3 is, I think, well-documented in the SDS contract, is 4 that they would deliver a design which could then be 5 constructed. It's a serial process. 6 Q. Thank you. Again, sticking with this point, the next 7 part of your statement, if you zoom back out, question 8 40, in terms of your answer to the question 1, again, we 9 see: did you have any concerns around that time, if so, 10 what were they. You replied: 11 "It was clear by then that despite the five-month 12 delay announced previously, the rate of progress would 13 always be much slower than the programme indicated and 14 required; an accumulation of utilities issues, consents 15 and sheer volume of detailed design issues required 16 a different approach." 17 Again, is that a view you held at the time? 18 A. Correct, it is. 19 Q. Then we asked: 20 "Were any such concerns ever satisfactorily 21 resolved?" 22 You say no. 23 I think I had also asked you, Mr Crawley, 24 question 40 quotes something from a document Mr Reynolds 25 had produced internally for Parsons, and in that 51 1 document, Mr Reynolds had noted that you and 2 Mr Glazebrook were developing misgivings about tie's 3 organisational capabilities, and that you were both 4 concerned about tie's failure effectively to manage the 5 complexities of the tram project. Were those quotes 6 true? 7 A. I don't -- I don't recognise them as quotes from either 8 me or Tony Glazebrook, but that could well be what 9 Steve Reynolds had inferred. 10 Q. Is what is set out there -- 11 A. I think it's fundamentally true because -- and it's 12 reflected in my answer in the blue in paragraph 1. 13 I couldn't see anything that had changed to address the 14 reasons behind the five-month delay which was identified 15 in February 2007. At the point of identification 16 I had -- I'd only been there for two weeks at that 17 point, but at the point of identification, it became 18 clear that the rate of delivery required by the 19 programme could never be achieved in practice unless 20 something else had changed. 21 By the time of this report, which was June 2007, 22 I couldn't detect anything that had changed 23 significantly. 24 Q. Would it be fair to say that at the time, you had 25 misgivings about tie's organisational capabilities? 52 1 A. Yes, fair. 2 Q. Would it be also be fair to have said that at the time, 3 you had concerns about tie's failure effectively to 4 manage the complexities of the tram project? 5 A. I think it's self-evident. 6 Q. Just by way of explanation, why -- what were the 7 problems? 8 A. Fundamentally, and to be fair to everybody, I was 9 advised even before doing the quick three-day review in 10 early 2007, that many of the delays initially were 11 caused by the utilities diversion project. And that was 12 a function of having poor records and being constantly 13 surprised when the ground was opened up as to what was 14 or was not there. 15 There were further problems associated with 16 utilities in terms of installing the new utilities, 17 which were the ones that were placed to one side of the 18 track form. That then meant that the entire design 19 programme was held up, because it's not possible to 20 complete the design if the utilities work hasn't been 21 done. 22 That in turn had the knock-on effect of causing the 23 novation of the SDS design contract to the Infraco. So 24 there was a sequence of dependent problems, each leading 25 to the other. 53 1 Q. But in terms of misgivings about tie's organisational 2 capabilities and tie's failure to effectively manage the 3 complexities, what do these concerns relate to? 4 A. Simply the sheer volume of issues and the fact that tie 5 was also dependent on the TSS contract. The TSS 6 contract had been reduced in its -- I can't say scope, 7 but certainly in its volume, because we were told that 8 the budget had been spent, or much of it had been spent. 9 So it was the ability to respond both to a large 10 number of issues -- that's come out elsewhere in terms 11 of requests for information -- and the interdependencies 12 between those items. 13 Q. Would it be fair to say that at the time, these various 14 issues weren't being effectively managed? 15 A. Yes, you could say that. 16 Q. Thank you. 17 Now, another document I would like to go to, please, 18 is CEC01670035. This relates to Audit Scotland were 19 asked in June 2007 by the Scottish Ministers to 20 undertake a review or performance audit of the tram 21 project. 22 If we start at page 2, please, and go through the 23 email chain. So at the bottom of this page we see an 24 email from Matthew Crosse dated 8 June to yourself, 25 subject "briefing note": 54 1 "As discussed a template with headings. Aim is to 2 summarise what happens in your area and convey 3 confidence that we have a plan and achieving the plan, 4 albeit with some challenges." 5 Just pause here. I should ask you, Mr Crawley, do 6 you have any recollection of providing information to 7 Mr Crosse to enable him to brief Audit Scotland as part 8 of their review? 9 A. I have no memory of it at all. This email chain 10 indicates that I did. 11 Q. So just scroll up through the emails. There's then one, 12 8 June, where you come back to Mr Crosse and say: 13 "Try this." 14 Further up the page, Mr Crosse states: 15 "David, just the job - thanks. Have made a few 16 changes and taken out the last slide merging some of 17 the challenges with the previous slide ..." 18 Up the page, there's then an email from 19 Stewart McGarrity, the tie finance manager, saying: 20 "The really direct questions that you need to 21 prepare for are: has the design gone according to the 22 programme so far - if not why not? What has changed 23 which gives you confidence the design process will 24 deliver to the procurement programme now on the table?" 25 Over to page 1, please, in the middle email, again 55 1 from you, Mr Crawley, dated 10 June, and you say: 2 "I have updated the presentation with two additional 3 slides at the end which attempt to answer Stewart's 4 questions." 5 We should go to these slides which -- separate 6 document, CEC01674236. We can see this is titled, 7 "Edinburgh Tram Project Engineering, Assurance and 8 Approvals. Briefing Note for Audit Scotland". 9 Just go through each of the pages slowly. So just, 10 Mr Crawley, to give you a chance to read them to 11 yourself. I'm not going to ask you any questions until 12 we get to the last two slides. Just slowly go to 13 page 2, please. Perhaps, Mr Crawley, you can indicate 14 when we can move to the next one. 15 A. Okay. 16 Okay. 17 Okay. 18 Okay. 19 Okay. 20 Okay. 21 Q. There we can blow up this slide, please. I think this 22 graph looks familiar to us from having seen it a little 23 earlier this morning. 24 We can see it's headed "Current progress and 25 challenges". You have seen a similar version earlier 56 1 this morning. It's then headed "Some design slippage to 2 date. Typical period view shown below". 3 Are you able to explain, Mr Crawley, what the 4 different lines in the graph represent? 5 A. Okay. Well, let's go through what the words say. Heavy 6 blue line, Version 15 starts. These are design elements 7 which have begun and then you jump to the red line which 8 is the number that had been finished. There isn't 9 a one-to-one correspondence between things on the blue 10 and the red line. They are things in the programme, 11 whichever programme they are, whichever elements they 12 are, which have either been started or finished. 13 And so what this effectively shows, the baseline V14 14 is the thin line. And the V15 line, which is below, 15 essentially is showing a slower progress on 15 than on 16 14. 17 All the values are lower. 18 Q. So what does that mean in terms of whether there's any 19 ongoing design delay or slippage? 20 A. It shows that there could be some design slippage to 21 date as the title says. 22 Q. In short, does this steepening of the lines to the right 23 of the vertical V15, the vertical line, does the 24 steepening of the graph, does that similarly indicate 25 there has to be something akin to doubling of 57 1 deliverables? 2 A. Yes, it's essentially the same graph as the other one. 3 Yes. Yes. It does. 4 Q. If all deliverables are to be met by -- delivered by 5 February, March, April? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. Yes. Then lastly, over the page, please, at page 9, 8 again, I'll just let you read that to yourself. 9 A. Okay. 10 Okay. 11 Q. I take it you agree with what's set out in that last 12 slide? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Thank you. Then last item, go back to the email chain, 15 please, at CEC01670035, top of the page, an email from 16 Matthew Crosse, dated 11 June 2007, to yourself, copied 17 into others. Mr Crosse states: 18 "I think we should stick with current pack. The 19 last 2 new slides, beg a lot of questions. If they 20 want to understand more about current and past progress, 21 we can respond when asked. 2nd slide shows what we 22 have done. The critical issues, stakeholder approvals, 23 tie together solution is the script." 24 The email chain ends there. Do you recall, 25 Mr Crawley, did you have any further discussion with 58 1 Mr Crawley (sic) in relation to his decision to stick 2 with the current pack and not include the last two new 3 slides? 4 A. No, I had no further discussion. In the email chain 5 below, I saw it a few moments ago, I did say: Matthew, 6 you are going to have to take a view on the last two 7 slides. And the reason I said it, it is self-evident, 8 they beg a lot of questions and he's instantly picked 9 that up and said: I won't use them. 10 Q. Were you involved in any way in any presentation or 11 briefing to Audit Scotland? 12 A. Not to my memory, no. 13 Q. Do you know whether Audit Scotland were told about the 14 design difficulties and slippage? 15 A. No, I don't. 16 Q. If Audit Scotland had asked you about the progress of 17 the design works, what are you likely to have replied? 18 A. I would have shown them those two last slides and 19 I would have referred to the five-month delay discovered 20 on 22 February. 21 Q. So you're likely to have mentioned the difficulties and 22 delays that have been experienced? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. In a similar way as you have explained in your evidence 25 this morning? 59 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Finally on this point, if Audit Scotland had asked you 3 whether the design is likely to be delivered to 4 programme, what are you likely to have replied? 5 A. No. 6 Q. For the reasons you mentioned -- 7 A. For all the aforementioned reasons, starting with the 8 study I did in 2007. 9 Q. Thank you. 10 My Lord, that may be an appropriate time to pause. 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes. We are going to have a break 12 for the benefit of the shorthand writers, Mr Crawley. 13 We'll resume again at about 11.25. 14 (11.05 am) 15 (A short break) 16 (11.25 am) 17 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You're still under oath, Mr Crawley. 18 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. 19 Mr Crawley, just one matter I should have clarified 20 with you at the time that it arose this morning. Do you 21 remember saying there was a single tram in 22 Princes Street for Christmas 2010? What did you mean by 23 that? 24 A. I remember I may have got my dates wrong, but there was 25 certainly a tram parked at the end of Princes Street 60 1 closest to this building, and I recall it was on the 2 newly laid track, and I also recall it having to be 3 moved, the wheels rotated two rotations in each 4 direction, once a month, in order to avoid damage due to 5 inactivity. That tram was, at least at sometimes, open 6 to the public. 7 Q. Thank you. 8 Now, I would like to -- we mentioned resolution of 9 the critical issues, and we touched upon, I think, 10 a proposed new system for design review involving 11 self-assured packages. 12 Could we go then to an email, PBH00010843. We can 13 see at page 2, please -- this is an email from yourself, 14 Mr Crawley, dated 26 April 2007 to Steve Reynolds at 15 Parsons Brinckerhoff. Subject matter is design 16 assurance implementation. You say: 17 "Steve, to confirm our conversation today I have 18 produced the notes below." 19 Then a few paragraphs down, the paragraph states: 20 "The overall concept is that you will deliver design 21 'packages' containing logically grouped designs (in order 22 to address interdependencies) and will add a covering 23 statement which provides competent assurance that the 24 design is fit for purpose. This will cover the issues 25 identified in the checklist in the attachment and is 61 1 intended to add value by ensuring that reviewers have 2 a summary of important issues with the supporting 3 evidence to inform their review." 4 Then in the third numbered paragraph, we see 5 reference to: 6 "To cover the assurance checklist issues requires 7 a simple pro-forma to accompany design packages in which 8 you should indicate for each item whether or not 9 assurance is being claimed. Where it is, a reference to 10 the location of the supporting evidence should be 11 provided. Where it is not, statements of the issues 12 giving rise to this should be provided." 13 We will go in a second, Mr Crawley, to the assurance 14 checklist. But in short, by way of overview, what's the 15 purpose of these changes you are seeking to make? 16 A. When being presented with a package of designs for 17 review, it's very useful to know what was in the mind of 18 the designer. That can be handled a number of ways. 19 But in essence, the design assurance statement is 20 intended to provide a quick route to understand how much 21 of the design is -- I'm going to say to standard and how 22 much of the design may be problematic, and to show that 23 the designer has evidence that the job they have done is 24 the correct job. 25 That may sound almost like a statement of the 62 1 obvious, because a good design will naturally be 2 accompanied by all of that information. It will 3 naturally be available. 4 That wasn't the way in which design review had been 5 done. If you're presented with volumes of data and 6 designs to review, you are faced with the issue of where 7 to start and in what level of detail. This was designed 8 to avoid that need. 9 It also recognised the fact that SDS were the design 10 authority. They had the competence to design. Those 11 reviewing the design did not have the competence to 12 design. 13 They had the competence to review, but not to do the 14 design. 15 Q. Yes. So the design assurance statement we will come on 16 to in a second; presumably that fulfils two purposes. 17 Firstly, it ensures that the designer has taken into 18 account the necessary requirements, but also the 19 production of the assurance statement helps the 20 reviewers show that the designer has taken into account 21 the requirements? 22 A. That is absolutely right, yes. 23 Q. Please go to the suggested assurance statement. It's 24 CEC01511908. 25 We can see this is headed, "Design Assurance 63 1 Statement". We can see Parsons Brinckerhoff on it, and 2 over the page, we don't have to spend too long. It's 3 simply to give an overview of what the statement 4 contains. 5 Over the page, please, we can see various matters 6 set out, including section, subsection details, and 7 various questions are asked of the designer, including 8 at the bottom, reference to applicable system-wide 9 drawings and documents. 10 Over the page, we see in the first box, principal 11 standards, detail applicable standards. Have they all 12 been adhered to, et cetera. 13 The next box, g) Requirements Test Specification. 14 We can scroll down through the various pages to see 15 the things that had to be taken into account. 16 The next page, page 6, we see the box, n) 17 Approvals and Consents, and then the question: 18 "Have all Approvals and Consents been granted for 19 this submission?" 20 Now, that was an issue that we'll come on to shortly 21 caused problems. I think that box maybe was 22 problematic. Let's go over the page again, please. We 23 can see all the requirements that had to be taken into 24 account, and on to page 8, please. There's then a set 25 of guidance notes as well. 64 1 So this was the intention that the designer would 2 complete this design assurance statement for each design 3 package; is that correct? 4 A. Correct. 5 Q. Thank you. 6 But I think there were early indications of 7 difficulties with this new approach. If we go, for 8 example, please, to document CEC01675827, this is an 9 email chain involving Andy Conway of the Council. 10 If we go to page 2, please, and start at the 11 beginning. In the middle email from Andy Conway dated 12 19 July 2007 to various individuals, but not, I think, 13 at this stage, Mr Crawley, to yourself. Instead to 14 Mr Glazebrook. It arises from the minutes of a meeting, 15 but then the text of the email, Mr Conway says: 16 "We were promised that the new design submission 17 packages would include all relevant info ... in fact the 18 words used by SDS were that we would receive 19 'everything', plus a design assurance statement. This 20 is not now the case and I really don't see how CEC will 21 be able to approve an incomplete design, particularly 22 when you consider the impact of the stage 2 Road Safety 23 Audit. 24 I'm also unclear how SDS can assure the design, 25 knowing that it is incomplete." 65 1 On to page 1, please. In the email in the second 2 part of the page, this is from Jason Chandler of 3 Parsons Brinckerhoff, and Mr Chandler says in the first 4 paragraph, we can see the sentence: 5 "The main problem here is that SDS are being pushed 6 to complete a detailed design to meet procurement 7 programme dates whilst also leaving the door open for 8 changes to be made post completion of the modelling 9 works. In an ideal world we would wait for all 10 modelling to be complete before completing the design 11 but this would add unacceptable delays to the programme 12 and delivery, unfortunately, this would mean that the 13 design would be completed later and the design for the 14 whole route would land for review and approval in one 15 package which would be a very tall order for yourselves 16 and tie as the reviewers." 17 To pause there, Mr Crawley, the reference to the 18 modelling works, is that, do you think, a reference to 19 the traffic modelling works? 20 A. I took it to be that. As soon as I read that, I took it 21 to be exactly as you have said. Because there was an 22 earlier reference to this traffic modelling works 23 holding up design. 24 Q. Thank you. So that would be in relation to the 25 on-street design? 66 1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. Thank you. Just finally, the top of this page, the 3 email at the top, Mr Conway responds to Mr Chandler, and 4 in the second paragraph says: 5 "I appreciate that we’re all doing our best, given 6 some very difficult circumstances. I still believe that 7 the design assurance proposal won't resolve as many 8 issues as people first thought, particularly with regard 9 to obtaining the technical approvals from CEC. That 10 doesn't mean we don't progress it that way, it just 11 means we should do it with our eyes open with the risks 12 identified and robustly costed with the project's 13 business case." 14 I'm going to come back to parts in your statement, 15 Mr Crawley, where you explain the problems with the new 16 proposed design assurance process, but are you able to 17 just give an overview of what those problems were? 18 A. Most of the problems revolved around the inability of 19 SDS to complete a design, and therefore a reluctance to 20 use the design assurance statement which was run in 21 parallel with the design verification statement. 22 The design verification statement runs at the back 23 end of the design management process and it's shown in 24 the design management plan. This process of design 25 assurance runs in parallel, and it provides a useful 67 1 summary of the information from the designer and also 2 a statement of confidence by implication from the 3 designer. 4 Because approvals from CEC often were not 5 forthcoming in a timely way, at least according to SDS, 6 actually according to me too, it meant that the whole 7 process was delayed, and the design assurance statement, 8 if used, was used much later than even I was there. 9 I think I had already gone by the time it was used in 10 anger. 11 Q. Then you do deal with the matter in your statement. If 12 we could go to your statement, please, to page 30. 13 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: While we are doing that, you say you 14 agreed with SDS that the CEC approvals were not done in 15 a timely way. Could you just explain a little bit more 16 about that? 17 A. CEC often asked for additional information than was 18 provided to support the approvals process. SDS often 19 indicated that they thought they had provided what was 20 adequate and CEC did not believe it so, and asked for 21 more. 22 There was then the problem of how to resolve things 23 which may be the subject of subjective approval. It may 24 be the appearance of something in the public realm. And 25 it's very difficult, without clear guidance and 68 1 certainly without written standards, to get it right 2 first time. So there was a heavy level of iteration in 3 the back end of the approvals process. 4 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Was this at the stage of getting to 5 CEC Planning Department or was it -- 6 A. Yes. Although by that time CEC had moved into the same 7 offices as tie, in order to speed up the whole process 8 of communication, and the people based there had 9 delegated powers from the Council within limits, and 10 that was to avoid a Full Council meeting on every item. 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 12 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 13 So at page 30 of your statement, Mr Crawley, in 14 question 53 in the answer 1, you explain that: 15 "SDS never fully engaged in the design assurance 16 process as redefined ..." 17 Just pausing there, "as redefined", did that mean 18 the new design assurance process that was intended to be 19 brought in, or does redefined mean a re-definement of 20 that new process? 21 A. No, it just means the new process that we just looked 22 at. It's my clumsy wording. 23 Q. Not at all. Thank you. 24 Go back to your statement: 25 "... and stuck more closely to the original section 69 1 by section programme of seeking approvals when all was 2 complete. My impression is that because SDS felt under 3 attack they stuck closely to the terms of the contract 4 and were reluctant to adopt this design assurance 5 process." 6 Pausing there, you say that SDS stuck more closely 7 to the original section by section programme of seeking 8 approvals when all was complete. 9 Is that not in short what the Council wanted? 10 A. Yes. But it was also not compatible with speeding up 11 the design process. 12 Q. Yes. So standing back, as I understand it, the Council 13 said: we can't issue any approvals or consents, nor can 14 we perhaps even indicate if what is produced will 15 satisfy us, unless we have a completed package? 16 A. That's correct. 17 Q. Which was inevitably going to delay the process? 18 A. That's correct. 19 Q. Then over the page, please, page 31 of your statement. 20 In the top you say: 21 "Often that process could not work as the last 22 few per cent of design for any section took 23 a disproportionately long time to complete. To stick 24 with that approach guaranteed slow progress. 25 Although CEC were promoters of the Tram scheme, 70 1 they did not contribute in a supportive role to TIE's 2 efforts to secure the designs. To my recollection, they 3 were only involved in the prior approval process." 4 Do you know why it was the case, Mr Crawley, that 5 the last few per cent of design for any section took 6 a disproportionately long time to complete? 7 A. Because it was the prior approvals, in other words the 8 consent of CEC, that that refers to. 9 Q. Again, just to an outsider, one is not clear why the 10 parties couldn't have agreed. It was simply the last 11 few percentage to be completed; why couldn't the parties 12 get together and agree what was required to be done? 13 A. I agree with your surprise. 14 Q. Are we back perhaps to issues of clear leadership and 15 direction? 16 A. We could be. 17 Q. Presumably an obvious way to resolve these matters would 18 have been to have a bit like the critical issues forum. 19 That sort of forum, but involving the more senior people 20 in each organisation? 21 A. That's quite right. One phrase I heard, personally 22 heard used much by CEC representatives was the powers of 23 the Council must remain unfettered. That wasn't 24 helpful. 25 Q. Yes. So by that, were the Council perhaps saying that 71 1 we can't tell you in advance what we require because 2 that might fetter our -- 3 A. That is exactly right. 4 Q. But what was required presumably was very clear guidance 5 from the Council as to what they were looking for? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. I see. 8 Are you aware whether any such clear guidance was 9 given while you were Engineering Director? 10 A. No. 11 Q. We move to a separate point, please. Another document, 12 CEC01627050. 13 This is an email from yourself, Mr Crawley, dated 14 19 July 2007 to Steve Reynolds at Parsons Brinckerhoff, 15 subject "A faster programme". 16 You say: 17 "I know that you and Jason are working on the design 18 deliverables programme but given the importance of the 19 matter I would like your views on the beneficial impact 20 each of the following, alone or in combination, will 21 have on the programme end date (with and without 22 Section 3 - phase 1b), and on the delivery date of the 23 design assured packages by tram section ... 24 1. Move all Section 3 work to the back of the 25 programme. 72 1 2. Remove some or all of the structures from each 2 Section's design deliverables package and consider them 3 separately (and subsequent to the design assurance 4 packages). 5 3. Double the number of design staff available." 6 Then you say: 7 "What I really need to know is how many section 8 packages can be delivered by mid-September using this 9 approach." 10 Can you remember what prompted this email? 11 A. The need to deliver far more design more quickly. I was 12 exploring options which seemed to me would deliver 13 benefit to see what their response would be, 14 and I really didn't ever receive what I thought was 15 a meaningful response. 16 Q. Was this prompted in any way by the Infraco procurement 17 programme? 18 A. That was going on at the same time, but I wasn't 19 directly involved in it. This was prompted more by the 20 constant pressure to deliver more design more quickly, 21 and also by the fact that the procurement people 22 involved with the Infraco work were clear that the more 23 that remained unresolved, the more adverse the risk 24 would be perceived by the Infraco and thereby there may 25 be an adverse impact on price. 73 1 Q. Thank you. 2 Now, Section 3 was the phase 1b section from, 3 I think, Haymarket down to Granton? 4 A. I think so, yes, that's correct. 5 Q. I think we had asked in your statement why was work 6 still ongoing in that section, and I think you 7 replied: it would have required someone in tie to have 8 given the instruction to stop producing design for that 9 section. 10 I think part of that section was included within the 11 SDS contract. Is that correct? 12 A. That's my understanding, yes. 13 Q. Now, who within tie would have required to give 14 instruction to stop producing the phase 1a design and 15 concentrate all resources on production of phase -- 16 A. That would have had to have been the Project Director, 17 and I can't remember the exact timing, but tie ltd 18 itself, sitting outside of the project, would have had 19 to have been involved in that, because there would have 20 been a large number of stakeholders who would have had 21 to agree with it. 22 Q. It may have been the case that in 2007, funding was only 23 available for phase 1a. To an outsider it may seem 24 surprising that design was still ongoing for phase 1b. 25 Do you have any comments on that? 74 1 A. I don't. 2 Q. Let me ask you this on this point. If all of the 3 resources in every organisation -- so that's including 4 SDS, tie, TSS, the Council and the utility companies -- 5 had been concentrated on phase 1a design only, is 6 detailed design for phase 1a likely to have been 7 finished earlier? 8 A. I really don't know. It's likely to be finished 9 earlier. Would it be soon enough? I don't know. 10 Q. Why do you say you don't know? 11 A. Because there are too many unknowns. Too many 12 interdependencies of different things. It also sounds 13 like a very unlikely thing to happen, as you have 14 described it. 15 Q. Also in terms of the unknowns and interdependencies on 16 the different things, are we back then to all issues and 17 difficulties you have mentioned this morning? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. On the question of removing some or all of the 20 structures from each design deliverables package and 21 consider them separately, do you know why you asked 22 about that? 23 A. The structures used to give rise to a large number of 24 issues, they were quite complex in terms of their impact 25 on the surrounding infrastructure. And it seemed that 75 1 if it were possible to deal with what would have been 2 maybe 99 per cent of the route by excluding the 3 structures, then at least 99 per cent of the route as 4 a design could have been secured, leaving, I admit they 5 are large things, leaving only the structures to deal 6 with at a later date. But it would also have allowed at 7 least the appearance and actuality, for that matter, of 8 significant progress. 9 The plan was always that each subsection had to be 10 done completely within itself, which means that it had 11 to include the structures. 12 Q. I understand. 13 I would like to move on, please, and go back to your 14 statement, page 32. You see from the very top of the 15 page, there's reference to minutes of the DPD committee 16 on 2 August 2007, noting you had explained the concept 17 of just in time delivery and the fact there was no 18 margin for error. 19 Is the reference to just in time delivery and no 20 margin for error, is that to ensure that the overall 21 programme is met? 22 A. It is, but it's also a reference to the interdependency 23 within design packages and across design packages. So 24 there's no point in having something to review if it 25 depends upon something which isn't there just in time. 76 1 The concept of receiving it early was simply not going 2 to happen. 3 Q. Then it's also in the question, we see: 4 "Version 17 of the design programme was available 5 and was "the first one that it has been possible 6 to construct since the successful resolution of 7 virtually all of the long outstanding critical issues 8 and RFIs [requests for information]." 9 So was this essentially the first design programme 10 that any reliance could be placed on? 11 A. I think that's a fair comment, yes. It certainly had no 12 obvious overt flaws, although still lurking there was 13 the unanswered question of how to increase the rate of 14 production. So the obvious problems of issues had been 15 removed, but the underlying issue of rate of production 16 had not. 17 Q. Presumably for this Version 17 of the design programme 18 to be met, it's perhaps self-evident there would require 19 to be no further delays in producing design? 20 A. That would be reasonable, but it also depended upon -- 21 I can see it's written here -- this means that when the 22 18 final design assurance packs are submitted for 23 review, the workload would be manageable. The idea 24 behind that was that the confidence generated by the 25 design assurance packs would mean that the need for 77 1 detailed inquiry and review of the specifics of the 2 design would be much reduced. 3 Q. Do you know, Mr Crawley, Version 17 of the design 4 programme, for it to be met, would that require the rate 5 of production to double in the way we discussed earlier? 6 A. That would still be there at that time. 7 Q. Just for the avoidance of doubt, what were your views 8 around this time as to whether that programme was likely 9 to be met? 10 A. I think unlikely. 11 Q. For all the reasons we discussed? 12 A. For all the reasons aforementioned, and indeed that's 13 what happened anyway. 14 Q. Now, at the bottom of page 32, if I may, please, in 15 question 6 we asked: 16 "What was your view at the time as to whether it was 17 sensible and realistic to base the design (and 18 procurement) programme on design being produced "just in 19 time" with "no margin for error"?" 20 You replied: 21 "It was the only approach left to recover some of 22 the lost time." 23 Presumably the other alternative approach was to 24 pause the Infraco procurement programme to allow design 25 to catch up? 78 1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. But we discussed this morning that -- you mentioned 3 a political imperative that wasn't going to happen. 4 A. That's -- that was the clear view I was given by all 5 those in the most senior positions in the project. 6 Q. Just for the avoidance of doubt, we should list them. 7 That would be Mr Crosse you mentioned. Anybody else? 8 A. Steven Bell. 9 Q. Anyone else? 10 A. I certainly heard Willie Gallagher speak on a few 11 occasions. 12 Q. Thank you. 13 Now, then, if we may go back to your statement at 14 page 33, please, just to move on a little forward -- 15 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Before doing that, you referred to 16 the need to address the underlying issue of rate of 17 production of designs. Go back to something 18 Mr Mackenzie asked you about. 19 Would that be improved if you diverted designers 20 from designing route 1b to route 1a? Or is that 21 over-simplistic? 22 A. No, I think it's a perfectly reasonable question, but in 23 the earlier document we looked at, where I asked for 24 SDS's view on three different things one might do to 25 speed it up, one was doubling the number of designers. 79 1 One could take them from 1b to 1a or one could get them 2 from elsewhere. I never received what I would call 3 sensible engagement with the issue. 4 So yes, it would have been possible to speed it up, 5 but that wasn't done, and further resource wasn't 6 supplied. 7 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 8 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 9 Top of page 33 mentions another matter which arises 10 from the minutes of the DPD committee on 2 August 2007. 11 It noted that Version 17 of the design programme would 12 be slightly revised to give structural design elements 13 a lower priority than other design elements, which was 14 noted to facilitate their earlier completion, with 15 consequent improvements in the overall review process. 16 In question 1 we asked: why was it decided to do 17 that? 18 You replied: 19 "I have no certain information on that but it was 20 probably in consequence of the value engineering 21 exercise which was focused on high value structures." 22 Now, the other thing we can see in question 2 is 23 reference to a "TSS Structures, Value Engineering, Weekly 24 Progress Report" by Scott Wilson, dated 28 July 2007, and 25 it noted that: 80 1 "Preliminary design work on some of the structures 2 has only recently recommenced as they were on hold for 3 a number of reasons. The outcome of this may be the 4 provision of more expensive structures than envisaged at 5 present." 6 Do you know, Mr Crawley, why the preliminary design 7 work on some of the structures had been on hold? 8 A. I don't. 9 Q. Thank you. 10 But it does appear from that that the design of at 11 least some structures was not well advanced at this 12 time? 13 A. That's correct. 14 Q. Yet a decision had been made around this time to give 15 structures a lower priority in the design programme? 16 A. As indicated, yes. 17 Q. I just wonder, was there a risk that that may store up 18 problems for later, either firstly that it may be 19 difficult for Infraco bidders to produce a price for 20 structures if they don't know what is to be built? 21 A. I agree with your observation. 22 Q. Secondly, there may be a risk that any delay in 23 completing the design structures and obtaining all 24 necessary consents may impact upon the construction 25 works programme? 81 1 A. It certainly would. 2 Q. But these would be matters for tie's procurement team 3 which you weren't involved in? 4 A. Correct. 5 Q. I'm not going to go to your statement, but on the 6 question of value engineering, I think in short you have 7 said in your statement that that is something that 8 should be done preferably at an earlier stage in the 9 design; is that correct? 10 A. Yes, because once the design has reached any given phase 11 of completion, if then one wishes to modify any one 12 element of it, it will have consequent effects on all 13 the other elements, or could have. 14 Q. I think in short you have said it should be done at the 15 preliminary design stage? 16 A. Preferably, because there is every opportunity then to 17 fix the design at the detailed design stage, but if 18 you're applying it to an item which has already been the 19 subject of detailed design and subsequent integration 20 with other elements of design, then you risk changing 21 many things for the benefit on one element. 22 Q. You also say -- we don't have to go to it, but at 23 pages 7 and 8 of your statement, you say: 24 "Here Value Engineering was applied late in the 25 process to reduce costs to try and stay within budget." 82 1 Is that correct? 2 A. That is certainly the message I received, yes. 3 Q. From whom? 4 A. Jim McEwan. 5 Q. Was Mr McEwan primarily responsible for the value 6 engineering exercise? 7 A. My memory says he was appointed by Willie Gallagher 8 specifically for that purpose. 9 Q. You have also stated your statement at pages 35 and 36 10 that the Value Engineering exercise was not driven by 11 what was truly possible instructions. Can you explain 12 that a little? 13 A. The driving force was to reduce budget requirement. It 14 wasn't necessarily to ensure that every structure was 15 designed as efficiently as it could be. In fact, if the 16 structures had been designed properly in the first 17 place, they would already be designed as efficiently as 18 they could be, and my observation is that the target 19 figures for cost reduction on the structures were never 20 met. Possibly because they were already as efficient as 21 they could be. 22 Q. Now, go on to another document, please. We're back to 23 the new design process. It's TIE00041688. It's another 24 note of concern. It's an email from Gavin Murray, who 25 I think was on the tie design team? 83 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Dated 13 September 2007 to yourself and Mr Glazebrook, 3 headed "Design Review and Technical Approval". 4 Mr Murray states: 5 "I fear we are not just back where we were last 6 December but back from where we started. 7 This message is predominantly to advise 8 a conversation between Andy Conway and I following the 9 session this am. Andy is of the view that the sort of 10 submission we reviewed this am will not provide the 11 Council what they require to review and agree with 12 respect to the issue of Technical Approval. He feels 13 that different parties within Council will require 14 considerably more information (albeit that information 15 may be available within another package which SDS are 16 due to provide)." 17 So in short, is that another example of the issue we 18 discussed before about the Council wanting a complete 19 design package before they would consider whether it was 20 appropriate to grant an approval or consent? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. But in terms of whether the design programme was likely 23 to be met, this sort of message coming back from the 24 Council ought to have rung alarm bells? 25 A. Yes, it did. Well, it didn't ring alarm bells. The 84 1 alarm bells were already ringing. This simply confirmed 2 the position. 3 Q. Just go back to your statement at page 37. At the 4 bottom of the page in question 68, and in your answer 1, 5 this is a reference to the email we just looked at, you 6 say: 7 "SDS were contracted to design, but received little 8 help from those providing consents. It was not 9 a collaborative process and should have been. CEC did 10 not work effectively with SDS in order to identify what 11 design might be acceptable to it if it was not satisfied 12 with the original design." 13 We are simply back to what we discussed earlier? 14 A. We are. 15 Q. I understand. 16 Then let's go to page 44 of your statement. In 17 question 87, the purpose of taking you to this is simply 18 for a snapshot in time. At the top of the question the 19 reference, an email of 21 November 2007 from Carla Jones 20 of Parsons Brinckerhoff, attaching a weekly deliverables 21 tracker, and noted that there were a total of 344 design 22 deliverables. 283 had been planned for delivery by that 23 date, of which 227 had been delivered. 24 So to pause there it, we are seeing some progress in 25 the production of design, some progress, but still 85 1 slippage; is that fair? 2 A. That's a fair deduction. 3 Q. But also in terms of a percentage, we can see, I think, 4 that of the 227 delivered designs, out of the total of 5 344, I think that's about two thirds? 6 A. Yes, it is. 7 Q. I don't say that is necessarily the only figure to look 8 at, because some packages may be bigger or smaller? 9 A. I think it's a representative snapshot. 10 Q. Thank you. We will come on to see that in the Infraco 11 contract, there was a base date for design information 12 fixed as at, I think, 25 November 2007. I want to come 13 on to ask you a few questions about that later. 14 I appreciate you weren't involved by that stage. 15 Could we please go to another document to do with 16 the design programme. It's PBH00031752. This is an 17 email, Mr Crawley, we can see from the top of the page, 18 by yourself, dated 26 November 2007 to Mr Reynolds with 19 programme insights. 20 Then you set out the various issues you deal with. 21 I think in short you were raising the issue of 22 transparency of the SDS produced programme. If, for 23 example, we go over the page to page 2, for example, 24 "Programme of Consents" at the top, you set out various 25 consents required and then say: 86 1 "It is not clear to tie (from the master programme) 2 what the programme for gaining such consents is. 3 Please provide a programme of consents consistent 4 with other activities in the Master Programme." 5 Then under "Design Deliverables Tracker and progress 6 reporting", there's the mention at the top, for two 7 periods running of programme slippage. 8 You then go on and say that there are two issues: 9 "1. It is worth noting that prior to the 10 publication of each tracker, we appear to have no 11 insight that significant slippage is about to occur ..." 12 Then secondly: 13 "When each Master Programme version is issued, we 14 appear to be presented with a fait accompli - a programme 15 which has emerged from some analysis and action which is 16 not visible to tie which purports to represent the 17 impact of issues arising." 18 Then: 19 "It is clear that if we are to feel comfortable with 20 the assertion that the current emerging delays are not 21 'mission-critical' we need more transparent insights 22 than we have, and we need to accompany them with 23 meaningful forecasts." 24 Then at the bottom of the page: 25 "How can we gain more meaningful insights into 87 1 programme revisions, their underlying causes and the 2 creation of meaningful forecasts?" 3 Over the page, please, to page 3, under "Management 4 Reporting", it says: 5 "A theme through all the above points is the 6 impression created that programme revisions are treated 7 mechanistically and that what we receive by way of 8 programme revision is what emerges from changing certain 9 specified programme elements but keeping all other 10 programme dependencies and elements unchanged. What is 11 not obvious to tie is where management thinking may have 12 been applied to each programme revision to mitigate any 13 adverse impact of events. Programme revisions do not 14 feel like 'management forecasts'. 15 "How can we achieve genuine management forecasts?" 16 To pause there, what did you mean by that last 17 sentence: 18 "Programme revisions do not feel like 'management 19 forecasts'." 20 A. Right. Best way to describe this, if you could imagine 21 a programme of works with all the many interdependencies 22 of items that there are, for some reason, some external 23 factor, one of those elements becomes late. 24 There is a consequent knock-on effect on all the 25 other elements. 88 1 What I was asking for here was, rather than simply 2 accept that everything else moves to the right: what 3 have you done to try and claw back some time? Have you 4 applied any thinking to it, or have you just run your 5 programme machine? The answer felt to me like they had 6 run their programme machine and applied no thinking 7 whatsoever. So management forecasts means forecast by 8 management as people thinking. 9 Q. Does that also mean the separate point that it's one 10 thing just to put the numbers in and run your programme 11 and say this is what could be done, but is a management 12 forecast really something you're saying: we think this 13 is likely to be done. 14 A. It must be. It has to be realistic. So what I was 15 looking for was the mitigation of the original cause of 16 delay, which may have been some small detail, and the 17 rationale for why that mitigation was likely to be 18 effective. 19 We always used to say of these programmes, and I'm 20 going to just use it colloquially as we said it, that 21 they had special levers in them. One item may slip 22 three weeks and the whole programme slipped six months 23 in consequence, and we never understood why. 24 Q. Do you consider that you ever had a good insight into 25 and understanding of SDS programmes, including the 89 1 underlying causes of revisions to the programme, and 2 whether the revised programme is a meaningful forecast? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Do you consider that anyone else in tie had a good 5 understanding of these matters? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Without a good understanding of these matters, was tie 8 in a position to know whether the revised programme was 9 likely to be met? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Could we go in passing, please, to another document. 12 CEC01682900. 13 Now, you have, Mr Crawley, mentioned the Design 14 Management Plan, I think, earlier in your evidence. So 15 we should just look at this to see what it refers to. 16 At page 2 of the document, please, we can see this 17 version is issued date 13 September 2007. We can see 18 that halfway down the page? 19 A. Mm-hm. 20 Q. I think the main authors are yourself and Mr Glazebrook. 21 If we can go, for example, to page 5, and under 22 paragraph 2.2, Design Review Process, my purpose in 23 doing this is just so we have an understanding of what 24 the process was around this time. 25 So, firstly, submission of designs to a programme 90 1 backed up by a variety of consultation forums for 2 stakeholders as the design proceeds. 3 We will come on to look at these consultation forums 4 shortly. 2: 5 "Technical Approvals" 6 Et cetera. 3, Prior Approvals. 4, a Design Review, 7 and just to pause, for the avoidance of doubt, 8 Mr Crawley, by this stage is it clear that technical 9 approvals and any prior approvals require to have been 10 obtained before the design review stage? 11 A. I'm not sure I understand the question. 12 Q. Yes. I'm simply trying to understand what the design 13 process was at this time. And whether there were 14 a series of stages? 15 A. I'm waiting to see what's on the following page because 16 Version 5 of this plan has the diagram that I would need 17 to refer to. This is Version 3.1. 18 Q. Yes. There is a -- let's just quickly go over the page. 19 There's a diagram. It may not be the one you wish to 20 refer to? 21 A. It is the one I want to see. 22 Q. I see. Is it easier if you describe the stage of -- 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. So blow up perhaps the top diagram, please? 25 A. Okay. So everything in the purple coloured oval, 91 1 entitled "Prior Approvals Process", is CEC. The red 2 bars entitled "Technical Approval" are also CEC. Later 3 versions of this plan split the red bar into two parts, 4 one of which deals with all technical approvals that are 5 not roads elements, and technical approvals which are 6 roads elements. 7 You can see towards the bottom of the diagram, the 8 point at which the interdisciplinary design check takes 9 place, and you can see following that the design 10 verification statement. 11 In parallel with the Design Verification Statement 12 would be the Design Assurance Statement which we have 13 discussed earlier today. 14 The green box at the bottom, "Design Review", is the 15 20-day process operated by tie. So when a design is 16 received from SDS, it would go into a 20-day process and 17 be turned around and it's all inside that small element 18 there. 19 The rest of this process down to, but not including, 20 the interdisciplinary design check, design verification 21 statement, is CEC led. 22 Q. Sticking with the purple area, then there are three 23 light blue coloured boxes that refer to Informal 24 Consultation Element 1 and Informal Consultation 25 Elements 2 and 3; is this the stage at which there is 92 1 input by the various stakeholders? 2 A. Correct. 3 Q. For each item of design or for each design package, do 4 they have to go through each of the elements, 1, 2 and 5 3? 6 A. No, the elements 1, 2 and 3 are simply to say you may 7 have many elements being handled in parallel because 8 those elements themselves form part of a package. 9 Q. I see. So -- 10 A. And it's a convenient -- any convenient packaging that 11 makes logical sense. 12 Q. But a package is likely to contain many more than three 13 elements? 14 A. Absolutely. 15 Q. It may be several hundreds? 16 A. Could be. 17 Q. I understand. 18 Again, just to the outsider it looks like quite 19 a complicated and time-consuming process? 20 A. I agree with you. It took me about two weeks to gather 21 the information necessary to draw that. I remember 22 Duncan Fraser from CEC telling me he found -- I'm very 23 pleased he said this -- an excellent diagram showing 24 what the CEC process was. So I'm pretty sure I got it 25 right. 93 1 Q. Okay. If we then please go on -- I'm sorry. Is there 2 anything else you would like to draw our attention to 3 from this diagram before he leave it? 4 A. No. 5 Q. On the next page, please, page 7, we see 6 paragraph 2.2.1, "Submission of Designs". I think in 7 short this is describing how input from the various 8 stakeholders would be obtained during the design 9 development stage? 10 A. Yes, that's correct. 11 Q. That may be something which had been missing in the 12 previous process? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. On the question, if we can go back to this page, under 15 2.2.2, "Technical Approvals", and similarly in 2.2.3, 16 "Prior Approvals, were there any time limits in the 17 procedure at this stage for obtaining these approvals? 18 A. Other than the ones noted there, I'm not aware of. 19 Q. So it would just take as long as it would take? 20 A. Yes. This comes back to the comment of the powers of 21 the Council must remain unfettered. 22 Q. Thank you. 23 I think we can leave that document, unless there's 24 anything else you would like to draw attention to? 25 A. Fine, thank you. 94 1 Q. Thank you. 2 If we could then go, please, to February 2008, which 3 I think about the time when your involvement as Director 4 of Engineering came to a close? 5 A. Correct. 6 Q. So if we go by way of example to CEC01424691, there we 7 can see this is headed, email from Mr Crawley, by 8 yourself, at the top. Sent 19 February 2008. Just below 9 up the top half of this page, if we may. Thank you. 10 I think in short there are ongoing issues with 11 design and you set out the original concept, et cetera, 12 and a few lines down you say: 13 "Then the programme slipped massively and made this 14 pointless as there would be nothing to review until 15 about now." 16 So I think by this stage some design packages are 17 starting to come through for review; is that correct? 18 A. That's correct, but is essentially incomplete. 19 Q. For the reasons you've -- 20 A. For all the reasons we have discussed. 21 Q. The last few percentage of design preventing complete -- 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. Completion of the package and signing off of the design 24 assurance statements? 25 A. That's correct. 95 1 Q. Thank you. Really the point in taking you to it was 2 this. In the last paragraph, you state: 3 "I hope this helps your discussion - as I'm still 4 connected to email, etc I could not help but 5 notice this ..." 6 I wonder if this was an illustration of your 7 involvement really coming to a close at this stage? 8 A. It was. I was clear that I was moving on, but the 9 agreement was I would still be available to consult on 10 specific issues as they arose, and in due course that 11 led to an offer from Steven Bell to return as the Board 12 HSQE adviser. 13 Q. Thank you. I would like then to go to another document, 14 please. That's DLA00006338. 15 Now, this is a document from Bilfinger Berger, 16 entitled "Edinburgh Tram Network - Infraco Contract 17 Design Due Diligence Summary Report". We can see 18 towards the bottom, the date, 18 February 2008: 19 "Minor error corrected - issue for onwards submission 20 to tie". 21 Did you see this document at the time? 22 A. I don't recall it at all. 23 Q. But I think you have seen it as part of the Inquiry? 24 A. Correct. Correct, but at the time I don't recall having 25 seen it. 96 1 Q. What I would like to do is put some parts to you simply 2 to ask whether what is contained in this document 3 accords with your recollection of matters at the time or 4 whether you would strongly disagree with certain things 5 that are said here. 6 So on to page 3, please. We can see this is an 7 Executive Summary of Bilfinger Berger's report. 8 In the first paragraph we can see, by way of 9 explanation, it states: 10 "In order to determine the design status prior to 11 contract award a technical due diligence has been 12 carried out for the design ... The due diligence process 13 has been based on the relevant design information 14 received by BBS by 14 December 2007." 15 It then goes on: 16 "Contrary to the tie's original intention for this 17 project stage, the design is incomplete and will require 18 significant further development. Several sections are 19 currently under redesign and the final concepts for 20 these are unknown to us. According to the SDS document 21 tracker more than 40% of the detailed design 22 information has not been issued to BBS at all by the 23 above-mentioned cut-off date." 24 Would you have been in general agreement with these 25 statements if you had seen this document at the time? 97 1 A. I would. I can't comment on the specific numbers, but 2 it feels about right. It seems perfectly reasonable. 3 Q. Thank you. 4 The report goes on, if I may: 5 "Where the detailed design is available, it is 6 mostly of acceptable standard. However, this does not 7 apply throughout. Particular areas of concern are the 8 geotechnical and earthworks design, the pavement design 9 as well as the design of tram stops and certain 10 structures." 11 If you had seen this passage at the time, would you 12 have generally agreed with that? 13 A. Generally. I could relate more to the comment on the 14 geotechnical item. Perhaps less so on the others, but 15 I can't say that that's untrue. Some due diligence 16 detailed work has been done and I think it can be taken 17 at face value. 18 Q. The next paragraph does go on to deal with the 19 geotechnical item. It states: 20 "No geotechnical interpretive reports and earthworks 21 design has been made available. The factual ground 22 investigation report has only been issued in 23 November 2007. There is a risk that the design of 24 bridges, retaining walls and embankments, which was 25 completed prior to this factual GI information being 98 1 available, will change." 2 Would you have been in general agreement with that? 3 A. Yes. I mean, it starts out with a statement of fact in 4 any event, that the factual ground investigation report 5 has only just been issued in November. So the stage 6 this was looking at, which was December, there would 7 have been little opportunity for use to have been made 8 of the information in that report. 9 So yes. 10 Q. Thank you. 11 Now, I'll skip the next paragraph which refers, for 12 example, to pavement surveys. But then if I can start 13 up again: 14 "For many areas the 3rd approval status is 15 not clear. Formal tie/CEC design approvals are 16 generally outstanding. Not a single design element has 17 received final approval and has been issued for 18 construction." 19 To pause there, again, would you have been in 20 general agreement at the time of that? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Then the next paragraph: 23 "The latest available SDS programme is Version 23. 24 This shows a slippage of more than a year compared to 25 the programme in the SDS agreement. It schedules the 99 1 release of issue for construction information from 2 April 2008 to the end of 2008. This is based on 3 optimistic approval periods for which no contractual 4 reference could be found." 5 To pause again, would you have been in general 6 agreement at the time with that? 7 A. I agree. 8 Q. The last paragraph here states: 9 "In accordance with tie's original procurement 10 concept, a complete and issued for construction design 11 would have been novated to the Infraco. The current 12 design is far from meeting these requirements and, as 13 a consequence, a novation is considered to present 14 significant and unforeseeable risks to the project." 15 Would you have had any comments on that, or would 16 that be a matter for Bilfinger essentially? 17 A. I think these are reasonable statements. They're being 18 asked to take on risk for something which at least at 19 one level at that point in time was unknowable. 20 Q. If we then please go on to page 7 of the report, and in 21 the second paragraph from the top, it states: 22 "During due diligence it became also apparent that 23 the design priorities do not correspond to the 24 construction priorities. This means for example that 25 the design of Phase 1b (Sections 3A to 3C) is quite far 100 1 advanced, whereas for some sections of Phase 1a which 2 will be constructed first, only preliminary and concept 3 design information is available." 4 To pause there, again, the same question. Would you 5 have generally agreed with that at the time? 6 A. I do, yes. 7 Q. Then three paragraphs down from that, the question of 8 value engineering states: 9 "It is also worth noting that tie and BBS have 10 a mutual interest in carrying out significant value 11 engineering. So far there is no allowance in the SDS 12 programme for value engineering. Any re-design due to 13 value engineering would lead to further delays, which 14 would have to be considered when making the decisions 15 whether or not to proceed with certain VE alternatives." 16 Again, would you have generally agreed with that at 17 the time? 18 A. I agree with it completely. 19 Q. At the bottom of the page we see, under paragraph 5.1, 20 design availability/approval status, just towards the 21 very bottom it says: 22 "The following items are key risks identified in 23 relation with Design Availability and Approval Status." 24 Bullet point 1: 25 "Sections 1A, 6 (depot) and 7A are under redesign. 101 1 Final concepts for these areas are unknown." 2 Just in passing, I think 1A was Newhaven Road to 3 foot of Leith Walk. I think 7A is the airport. Is that 4 correct? 5 A. I believe so, and I think the issue -- I'm trying to 6 remember, but I think the issue with the depot was the 7 need to move or otherwise redesign water utilities which 8 were essentially underneath the depot. 9 Q. I understand. Then over the page, please, we'll see 10 a number of bullet points. I'm not going to read them 11 out, but we can just see for ourselves the various items 12 which the report says are key risks identified in 13 relation with design availability and approval status. 14 Again, once you have had a chance to look at it, 15 Mr Crawley, are these bullet points generally matters 16 you would have been in agreement with at the time? 17 A. Yes, I'm in agreement, or I would have been in agreement 18 had I seen this at the time, and I'm in agreement now. 19 Q. Yes. If you had seen the document and if you'd been 20 asked about it at the time? 21 A. Correct. 22 Q. Now, do you consider you ought to have been shown the 23 document and asked about it, given that you were either 24 Engineering Director or had only recently stopped that? 25 A. I had no interest in taking part in the commercial 102 1 process at all. And had I been invited to, I would have 2 done my best to decline the opportunity. 3 Q. Why? 4 A. It's more trouble than it's worth. Also, I had 5 a potential conflict of interest, or at least the 6 perception of one. So in May 2007 I advised Steven Bell 7 in writing and verbally that I was also under contract 8 to Siemens, who of course were part of this contract. 9 The work I was doing was absolutely no relation to 10 this, but nevertheless they were in common ownership, 11 and that issue would have had to have been put to one 12 side, had I taken any part in the commercial elements. 13 Q. Was your work for Siemens anything to do with Edinburgh 14 Tram Project? 15 A. No. It was to do with -- I can tell you exactly what it 16 was for. It was to do with a bid to replace the 17 traction package on 92 tube stop running on the London 18 Underground Central Line and for their bid to replace 19 the Piccadilly Line trains on London Underground. 20 Q. Going back to this report, presumably, the people 21 dealing with the commercial elements, as you put it, 22 would be tie's commercial and procurement team, is that 23 correct? 24 A. That's my understanding. 25 Q. If the people on that team didn't put this report to 103 1 either yourself or Mr Glazebrook, would they be in 2 a position to know whether what was set out in the 3 report was correct or not? 4 A. As we've been going through these various points, I have 5 to say, most of them seem self-evident. In other words, 6 they don't really require further corroboration. Most 7 of them are not assertions of a view. They're just 8 statements of fact. And those facts could be easily 9 corroborated. 10 Q. So we perhaps have to ask the commercial and procurement 11 team? 12 A. You must. I really wasn't involved. I simply don't 13 know. 14 Q. Thank you. 15 Could we then move on to page 9, the last page in 16 this document I would like to look at. 17 In the second paragraph from the top, that provides: 18 "Without knowing the final details we understand 19 that some CEC requirements are likely to change, eg 20 Picardy Place layout, or finishes for tram stops and 21 urban spaces. The current design does not reflect these 22 new requirements." 23 So that's a reference to still ongoing change? 24 A. It is. 25 Q. Then: 104 1 "Insufficient design for pricing does not only 2 affect the Infraco contract with tie but would also 3 prevent BBS from letting comprehensive subcontract 4 packages. From experience, any design variations that 5 occur after a subcontract is placed are likely to lead 6 to excessive claims from subcontractors." 7 Is that a valid point? 8 A. Absolutely valid. 9 Q. Under "Conclusion", it states: 10 "Whilst parts of the design are far advanced ... the 11 design of other elements and sections is still at 12 preliminary/concept stage or even completely missing. 13 The available design for certain sections is subject to 14 change, as we understand that these areas are currently 15 under re-design." 16 Then a reference to consultation with key third 17 parties not being concluded. There is a risk that the 18 design as envisaged by SDS may not gain the required 19 third party approvals. 20 Then: 21 "Contrary to the original design delivery programme, 22 not a single design element has received final tie/CEC 23 approval and has been issued for construction. Issue 24 for construction information for the final elements is 25 now not scheduled to become available before the end of 105 1 2008." 2 Lastly, if I may: 3 "The evolution of the design programme and the fact 4 that the target design completion date has slipped by 13 5 months over 2 years suggests that the design 6 development process is not running smoothly and that 7 there are significant risks that further slippages will 8 occur." 9 If you'd been asked for your views on the last 10 passage I have read out at the time, what would you have 11 said? 12 A. That's perfectly reasonable, and in there you can see 13 that 2 to 1 ratio, 13 months in two years. 14 Q. So would you have agreed with the statement that the 15 design development process is not running smoothly, and 16 there are significant risks that further slippages will 17 occur? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. If this isn't a matter to ask you, please just say, but 20 did you have any views at the time, whether discussed 21 with others or kept to yourself, as to whether it was 22 appropriate to proceed to award the Infraco contract 23 while these various matters were outstanding? 24 A. I have said already in my statement and the accompanying 25 documents that I didn't think this was a sensible thing 106 1 to do. If you just say the words out loud, I'm going to 2 start building it before I have finished designing it, 3 you can detect there is a problem there. 4 Q. Did you express that view to anyone within tie? 5 A. I had an informal conversation with Matthew Crosse, but 6 I didn't press it as a formal matter at all. It seemed 7 to me without point to press the matter because the 8 decision had already been made, and most of the 9 commercial process wasn't visible to me in any event. 10 So the moment had already passed. 11 Q. We could put that document to one side, thank you. 12 Could we look at another document, please. It's 13 Schedule Part 4 of Infraco contract. It's USB00000032. 14 Did you see this document at the time, Mr Crawley? 15 A. I don't recall seeing that, no. 16 Q. So the first time you saw this was when you were sent it 17 by the Inquiry? 18 A. Correct. Correct. 19 Q. Thank you. Just one or two parts of it I would like to 20 put to you, if I may. 21 Page 5, please. When you scroll back a couple of 22 pages, under paragraph 2.3 we see the base date design 23 information is defined as the design information 24 drawings issued to Infraco up to and including 25 25 November 2007. 107 1 If you had been asked at the time whether there were 2 any risks in basing base date design information on the 3 drawings as at that date, what would you have said? 4 A. Yes. Based on everything else we've already discussed 5 this morning. 6 At that time the biggest issue was that the rate of 7 delivery was too slow. That was the biggest issue, and 8 therefore the designs were incomplete. 9 Q. Also I think we have seen from the Bilfinger due 10 diligence report that in any event some design was 11 changing? 12 A. It was. 13 Q. If we could then please go to one of the pricing 14 assumptions in this document, and go to page 5, please, 15 under paragraph 3.4 it makes reference to certain 16 pricing assumptions. We see number 1 is that -- I won't 17 read it out loud, but if you could just take a couple of 18 minutes, Mr Crawley, to read this price assumption 1, 19 please. 20 A. Okay, I have read it. 21 Q. Over the page, please. 22 A. Okay. 23 Q. Would it help to see the both pages side by side? 24 A. I think I can remember it. 25 Q. Thank you. My question is in short, Mr Crawley, is: do 108 1 you understand what that pricing assumption means? 2 A. It appears to say that everything is based on a design 3 which will not change. That doesn't really make any 4 sense. 5 Q. Did you have clear understanding of what these 6 provisions mean? 7 A. From that, no. I mean, there's reference -- there are 8 inferences here of things that I can't see directly. 9 Q. If you had been asked at the time for your views on the 10 reading of this as Engineering Director, would you have 11 been able to say you had a clear understanding of what 12 was meant? 13 A. Not on the words without some form of supplement. 14 I would have asked questions to ensure I'd understood. 15 But what the words appear to say, the first two items, 16 1.1 and 1.2, is that no significant change from the base 17 date design will happen. But we already know from other 18 sources that it was happening. 19 Q. Now, as a separate question, some other witnesses may 20 suggest that it had been agreed that Bilfinger had 21 agreed to take on the risk of normal design development. 22 Is that something you have any awareness of, or is that 23 a matter for others? 24 A. I really have no awareness of it at all. 25 Q. Thank you. If it had been suggested to you at the time 109 1 that Bilfinger had agreed to take on the risk of normal 2 design development, would you have had any reaction to 3 that suggestion? 4 A. I would ask for a definition. Normal design development 5 could include all of the changes that are implied here 6 or not. It just needs a definition, and an agreement on 7 the definition. 8 Q. Thank you. 9 Mr Crawley, if we now go back to your statement to 10 just ask you some questions which do relate to the 11 Infraco issue. 12 It's probably best done by going through your 13 statement. You have already explained you weren't 14 involved in the Infraco procurement. I understand that. 15 Do you consider that you or Mr Glazebrook ought to 16 have been involved in that process, in particular in 17 relation to the employer's requirements and the civils 18 proposals? 19 A. We would probably have added some value. 20 Q. Why is that? 21 A. Because we are competent people with experience relevant 22 to those issues. 23 Q. Do you consider that anyone in tie's commercial or 24 procurement team had sufficient engineering 25 qualifications and experience to deal with the issues 110 1 relating to the employer's requirements and civils 2 proposals without the assistance of yourself or 3 Mr Glazebrook? 4 A. I simply don't know, although I'm aware they did have 5 access to TSS and to Transdev, and Transdev certainly 6 were competent, and so were TSS competent. 7 Q. Yes. 8 Now, there is an issue as to the misalignment 9 between the SDS design, the employer's requirements, and 10 the Bilfinger civils proposals. I think you had some 11 awareness of that matter; is that correct? 12 A. I did. What I was hearing was that -- I was aware that 13 the employer's requirements were in a process of change 14 after they had been connected to the commercial process. 15 So all I was aware of was a constant change to the 16 employer's requirements. This is a 700 plus page 17 document, full of very detailed requirements in which 18 it's also, I have to say, inevitable that there will be 19 some internal conflict which will need resolving, and 20 that's probably why this constant revision was going on. 21 Q. But is it your position you were not really involved in 22 curing any misalignment between SDS design, employer's 23 requirements and Infraco proposals? 24 A. No. 25 Q. Can we go, please, to page 10 of your statement. This 111 1 concerns the issue of the Infraco taking design risk at 2 novation. I just ask these questions by way of 3 clarification. 4 In question 12, halfway through your answer at the 5 bottom, you say: 6 "In practice, because the design was incomplete when 7 the Infraco was appointed, it was the Infraco which took 8 design risk via the novated SDS contract to complete 9 designs to IFC." 10 What did you mean by that? 11 A. Exactly what I wrote, which is where designs had to be 12 modified or created from scratch, because the SDS 13 contract was through the Infraco, it is to the Infraco 14 that tie would look in the first instance if there was 15 some deficiency or absence. 16 Q. Yes. So that statement is really based on a high level 17 understanding of the concept of SDS novation that you 18 didn't look at, for example, the details of 19 Schedule 4 -- 20 A. I hadn't seen it. 21 Q. Nor do I think would you have seen the SDS novation 22 contract, because it was May 2008 and you were away in 23 roughly February? 24 A. No, I hadn't seen it at all. As you say, it's just what 25 the words mean in English. Someone is going to novate 112 1 a contract, okay, the responsibilities move with it. 2 Q. Just the last sentence on the page: 3 "This led to a significant amount of design re-work 4 at the Infraco's behest; there was no incentive for the 5 Infraco not to revisit design of which it had little 6 knowledge and for which it was now responsible." 7 Is that statement again just based as 8 a generality -- 9 A. It's based on a generality. If somebody said to me: I'm 10 making you responsible for this design of which you know 11 nothing; I would be looking in detail at what it meant. 12 Q. Because you weren't involved as Engineering Director 13 after the award of the contract, I shouldn't ask you 14 questions about what happened in that period? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Thank you. 17 On page 36, please, in question 62, these are again 18 clarification questions. Your answer to question 1, you 19 said: 20 "From the outset of the Infraco award much of the 21 SDS design was questioned and in many cases reworked to 22 reflect Infraco's view of risk exposure as a result of 23 Infraco taking on the risk associated with incomplete 24 design. Infraco were reluctant to accept responsibility 25 for incomplete design without adding to the price." 113 1 Mr Crawley, given you weren't involved at this 2 stage, how are you able to say these things? 3 A. That was because, as I have discussed earlier, between 4 leaving in early 2008 and then reappearing in the HSQE 5 adviser role, I was still being fed issues. 6 Q. I see. Who by? 7 A. Tony Glazebrook. 8 Q. So I should be asking Mr Glazebrook these matters? 9 A. Correct. 10 Q. As a separate point, Mr Crawley, I think the MUDFA works 11 and design was not something you were involved in; is 12 that correct? 13 A. No, I wasn't involved. That's correct. 14 Q. I won't ask you about that. You do mention it at parts 15 in your statement, you mentioned it this morning, but 16 I will not go into any more detail than that. Finally, 17 please, if you can go to page 70 of your statement. We 18 asked for any final observations you had, including the 19 project management and governance, and at question 159 20 you list a number of matters, I think, many of which we 21 have discussed this morning. So I'm just going to take 22 this section as read. 23 Then over the page, please, in question 160, you 24 were asked why the Edinburgh tram system appears to have 25 cost so much more than other tram systems, and you refer 114 1 to poor governance and over specification. I think the 2 governance point you have mentioned in the previous 3 question and answer. What does the over specification 4 point relate to? 5 A. It refers specifically to the 700 pages plus of the 6 employer's requirements. Many guided system projects, 7 which includes trams, are dealt with through 8 output-based specifications and governing standards. So 9 the governing standards cover virtually all of the 10 relevant issues, and the output-based specifications 11 deal with the specifics of performance required. And 12 that gives a large amount of latitude to the designer. 13 700 pages of detailed requirements, which inevitably 14 will contain conflicts internally, seem to me to be an 15 over specification. I have written specifications, 16 personally written specifications, for entire new 17 rolling stock for London Underground, using far fewer 18 pages than 700. 19 Q. Thank you. Mr Crawley, I should also say that in your 20 explanatory note we looked at earlier, WED00000027, 21 pages 4 to 6, you do helpfully set out your views on how 22 that design could have been completed to a much earlier 23 programme. We are going to take that as read. We 24 touched upon many of these points this morning. 25 So I have no further questions, thank you. 115 1 Questions by CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY 2 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Crawley, can I ask you to look at 3 the penultimate page of your statement. Sorry, I meant 4 the actual -- not the annex. If we go back to the body 5 of the statement, second last page. I think it's 6 about -- 7 MR MACKENZIE: Page 70, I think, my Lord. 8 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Yes. It's question 159 and the 9 answers to that. 10 Mr Mackenzie said he wasn't going to ask you about 11 MUDFA programme, but in point 5, you speak about the 12 delay in the MUDFA programme because of a lack of 13 knowledge of utilities and other ground conditions. 14 As I understood from your statement, you made 15 reference to the fact that what was found underground 16 was significantly greater or worse, however you want to 17 put it, than the records disclosed. I think there were 18 significantly greater number of underground chambers, 19 for instance? 20 A. It was a 2 to 1 disparity. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: 2 to 1, and also I think a greater 22 number of conflicts. 23 Really what I'm wondering is: to what extent could 24 that be addressed? I think the records are notoriously 25 bad. 116 1 A. I think that's the point. Records are notoriously bad, 2 and it is only in recent times, probably only the last 3 20 years, that utilities companies will keep what 4 I would call meaningful records. 5 So for a long established city such as Edinburgh, 6 one ought to expect surprises, and none of them will be 7 any good. 8 So the fact one has records from utility companies 9 is a very good starting point. One shouldn't predicate 10 an entire programme on it without significant research, 11 physically, ground penetrating radar, slit trenches and 12 suchlike, to test the degree to which compliance is 13 likely. 14 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: That's one of the points I was going 15 to ask about. 16 Could the deficiencies in the records be cured to 17 some extent at least by using the techniques that you 18 have mentioned, the ground penetrating radar, slit 19 trenches, trial pits? 20 A. All of this was done, but too late. It just needed to 21 be done much earlier. 22 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: When do you understand that it was 23 done? 24 A. Whilst -- to the original programme, which assumed, is 25 my understanding, that the programme would be predicated 117 1 upon the utilities companies' records as being largely 2 correct. 3 If it was then discovered that the utility company 4 records were not largely correct, there was no slack in 5 the programme to take up the resultant delay. And the 6 only solution therefore would be to start much earlier, 7 to establish how well the utility company records 8 represented reality. And I don't know if that was done. 9 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So would that really involve 10 a detailed survey of the entire line? 11 A. Yes. And it would have to be the entire line, because 12 it's not really acceptable to assume that in one 13 location whatever is found is typical of all other 14 locations, because Edinburgh is such a long-established 15 city. 16 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Even if that were done, would you 17 still make some allowance for the risk of having -- 18 coming across something that you didn't -- still didn't 19 anticipate. 20 A. That would be very wise. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 22 Do you want to ask anything? 23 I don't think anyone else has asked -- indicated any 24 questions. So, Mr Crawley, thank you very much. That's 25 the extent of your evidence. You're free to go. 118 1 Technically you're still subject to your citation 2 and you may be recalled if necessary. Hopefully that 3 won't be necessary. 4 A. Thank you very much. 5 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We will adjourn until 2 o'clock. 6 (12.55 pm) 7 (The short adjournment) 8 (2.00 pm) 9 MR MACKENZIE: My Lord, the next witness is Tony Glazebrook. 10 MR TONY GLAZEBROOK (sworn) 11 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You will be asked questions. If 12 I could ask you to speak clearly into the microphone so 13 everyone can hear what you're saying, and also speak 14 relatively slowly so the shorthand writers can keep up 15 with you. 16 Examination by MR MACKENZIE 17 MR MACKENZIE: Good afternoon, Mr Glazebrook. Could you 18 state your full name, please. 19 A. It's Anthony Glazebrook. 20 Q. And your current occupation? 21 A. Is consultant engineer. 22 Q. Thank you. I would like to start with your CV, please, 23 Mr Glazebrook. It will come up on the screen. It's 24 CVS00000059. Go to the last page, please, page 6. We 25 can see halfway down you set out your qualifications. 119 1 In short you have a degree in electronic engineering and 2 then we see your membership of various professional 3 bodies. 4 Just working backwards, please, if we can go to 5 page 5, we can see just by way of overview that from 6 about 1970, you were employed in various roles by 7 British Rail, in the area of signal engineering; is that 8 correct? 9 A. Yes, that's correct. 10 Q. Again, similarly, at page 4, I think we can see that as 11 well. Similar type roles with British Rail. Obviously 12 getting increasingly senior. 13 Then please at page 3, we can see that you worked 14 for other companies, again in signalling and controls; 15 is that correct? 16 A. Yes, that's correct. 17 Q. Thank you. Page 2, we can see a reference to Head of 18 Engineering Compliance with Thameslink 2000 project for 19 Railtrack. We can see various other roles there as 20 well. And we can see that from February 2007 you formed 21 your own engineering company, and I think above that we 22 see your involvement with the Edinburgh Tram Project as 23 Engineering Services Director between 16 February 2007 24 to 31 March 2011. Is that correct? 25 A. Yes, that's correct. 120 1 Q. Thank you. So that's all just by way of overview. 2 Then please go to your statement you provided. 3 I think you have a hard copy before you, and a copy also 4 on the screen. The reference is TRI00000039_C. 5 I should please go to page 46 of the statement. 6 We see a signature dated 19 June 2017. Could I ask 7 you to confirm, please, that that is your signature and 8 that this is the written statement you have provided to 9 the Inquiry? 10 A. Yes, it is. 11 Q. Thank you, Mr Glazebrook. I should say that your 12 evidence to the Inquiry will comprise both written 13 statement and the evidence you give at these hearings. 14 Thank you. 15 What I would like to do is simply go through your 16 statement and look at your various responses and ask 17 various questions in clarification or expansion, from 18 time to time breaking off to look at other documents. 19 Starting at page 1 of your statement, please, we can 20 see in question 2, about halfway down, actually if we go 21 back to the main question 2, halfway down the page, we 22 asked in sub-question 1 the circumstances of you joining 23 tie. You explained you had been approached, I think, by 24 David Crawley; is that correct? 25 A. Yes, that's correct. 121 1 Q. You explain that your job title was Engineering Services 2 Director from beginning of February 2007 to end of 3 March 2011. Just pausing there, Mr Glazebrook, I assume 4 you were a consultant rather than an employee of tie? 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q. I think you job shared with Mr Crawley, at least during 7 2007; is that correct? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. How many days a week did you work on the project on 10 average? 11 A. Initially it was three days a week, and then it became 12 four days as the years progressed. 13 Q. I understand. Did you have an overlap day with 14 Mr Crawley? 15 A. Pardon? 16 Q. Did you have one-day overlap with Mr Crawley? 17 A. Usually, yes. 18 Q. Did you work these days in the tie office in Edinburgh 19 or at home? 20 A. During 2007 it was always in the tie offices. 21 Q. Thank you. I think we have heard from Mr Crawley that 22 he ceased acting in the role of Engineering Director in 23 about February 2008. Does that tie in with your 24 recollection? 25 A. Yes. Yes. 122 1 Q. So from about February 2008 you would have been the only 2 Engineering Services Director? 3 A. Correct. 4 Q. We also see in sub-question 3 we asked your main duties 5 and responsibilities, and you explained they were: 6 "Throughout the project to ensure that the overall 7 system design met all engineering acceptance and 8 approvals criteria." 9 We can see below that that you reported to the Tram 10 Project Director; is that correct? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Was that Matthew Crosse? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. At least during 2007? 15 A. Yes, that's right. 16 Q. Could we please look at a separate document, 17 CEC01785249. If we could blow up the top half of the 18 page, what this is, Mr Glazebrook, in, I think, 19 March 2007, Mr Crawley had been asked to set out the 20 duties of the Engineering, Assurance and Approvals Team, 21 and he had produced this document in response. So we 22 can see the first four bullet points at the top of the 23 page. Do you agree those set out the role of the team 24 at that stage? 25 A. Yes, that's correct. 123 1 Q. Of those four bullet points, are there any points that 2 you had particular responsibilities for? 3 A. The first three. 4 Q. The last one, about Value Engineering, was that 5 a different part of tie dealing with that? 6 A. Not really. That just came later. 7 Q. I see. By later, when do you mean? 8 A. Probably 2008 or 2009, thereabouts. Around the time of 9 Infraco contract let. 10 Q. So that time in 2008 or 2009, about the time the Infraco 11 contract was let, did you have responsibilities for 12 value engineering savings? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. I should just say, May 2008 was when the Infraco 15 contract was let. Fix that date in time. Thank you. 16 Could I also please ask what were the roles and 17 duties of Steven Bell during 2007? 18 A. He was my boss. I reported to him. I gave him monthly 19 reports and we had occasional meetings. 20 Q. Now, I think in 2007 Mr Bell's job title was Director of 21 Engineering and Procurement. We know that in early 2008 22 Mr Bell became the Tram Project Director. So I'm 23 wondering, during 2007, when Matthew Crosse was Tram 24 Project Director, and Mr Bell was Director of 25 Engineering and Procurement, did you say you reported to 124 1 Mr Bell as your boss? 2 A. No, I'm sorry, I was incorrect there. I reported to 3 Matthew, but I talked to Steven from time to time on 4 particular issues. 5 Q. Yes. Do you know what Mr Bell's duties were during 2007 6 and responsibilities? 7 A. Well, I assume he was Matthew's boss, and involved with 8 the Infraco procurement. 9 Q. So it was your understanding in 2007 that in terms of 10 seniority, Mr Bell was above Mr Crosse? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Does that seem odd that the Director of Engineering and 13 Procurement is above the Tram Project Director? 14 A. That's how I understood it to be, yes. 15 Q. Could I separately please ask you about the Design and 16 Procurement and Delivery Sub-Committee. Is that 17 a committee you were familiar with? 18 A. Not really, no. I don't recall it particularly. I know 19 it was there. There were many committees there, but 20 I don't recall specifically what it was or what it did. 21 Q. That's certainly not a committee you sat on? 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. Do you consider you ought to have sat on that, given you 24 were Engineering Director for the tram project? 25 A. It would probably have been useful, yes. 125 1 Q. Do you know why you didn't sit on that committee in 2 2007? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Presumably you weren't asked to? 5 A. Pardon. 6 Q. Presumably no one asked you to sit on it? 7 A. That's correct, yes. 8 Q. Thank you. 9 Moving on in your statement, please, go back to 10 page 2, if we may. We had asked for the overview of the 11 design problems, and in particular if we could go at the 12 bottom third of the page, in the sub-question 1 towards 13 the bottom, we had asked: 14 "By way of overview: What was your understanding of 15 the main difficulties and delays encountered in carrying 16 out the design work?" 17 You replied: 18 "The poor relationship that SDS had with tie, 19 utility companies and CEC, largely through inadequate 20 specification compounded by constant meddling, delayed 21 problem clearance, unclear/missing/duplicative roles and 22 responsibilities." 23 Now, there are a number of items or things in that 24 answer. Could you explain each of these factors, 25 please, Mr Glazebrook? 126 1 A. Yes. The specification was very, very complex, 2 comprised thousands of pages. It was evident to me, and 3 indeed it was evident to many of us, that the 4 specification of the different elements had not 5 necessarily been correlated, shall we say. So there 6 were either duplications or gaps which had to be 7 resolved. 8 In terms of constant meddling, it seemed to me that 9 the way the organisation was arranged and the way people 10 seemed to take their responsibilities meant that, 11 certainly to my recollection, there was a belief that 12 anyone could input, criticise, comment, continually, 13 which rather than solving problems, actually compounded 14 the problems. 15 On the subject of delayed problem clearance, very 16 quickly we became aware that there were quite a lot of 17 critical issues. I think there was 80 something, which 18 had been around for some time, some years in some cases. 19 So one of our first priorities, that is David and I and 20 our team, was to resolve those as far as we could. 21 In terms of the last line, I think that reinforces 22 what I said just now. The roles and responsibilities 23 within tie not only were, but increased, in their 24 duplication. Now, whether that duplication was by 25 design or by assumption, I don't know. But certainly 127 1 many people felt they had the right to comment on 2 everything under the sun rather than use their energies 3 and their brains to resolve problems. 4 Q. Thank you. 5 The question of the duplication within tie you just 6 mentioned, can you identify between the different 7 individuals or teams? 8 A. Yes. This became worse once the Infraco contracts had 9 been let, and we all moved to Edinburgh Park. 10 As well as my team, there was a team -- I forget the 11 name of it, but it was under Bob Bell. And there were 12 project managers assigned to each engineering 13 discipline, and the unfortunate consequence of that, 14 compounded by the cost management people, was that we 15 now, instead of having one or maybe three lots of 16 people, the three being CEC, other parts of tie and 17 ourselves, commenting on design, there were two new 18 groups of people commenting on design, and further 19 compounding the problem, none of whom to my recollection 20 or impression seemed to want to solve problems, merely 21 to raise problems. 22 So those particular new duplicative roles were the 23 project manager roles under Bob Bell and the finance -- 24 I can't remember what they were called. Sort of cost 25 management people, that were floating around also 128 1 commenting on everything under the sun. 2 Q. Thank you. You also earlier in your answer mentioned 3 gaps in specification. Can you indicate which areas 4 there were gaps? 5 A. Probably the key areas. If we take, for instance, 6 planning, planning is one of these things, which, being 7 subjective, is not particularly well specified. So that 8 caused problems, an example being the long wall at 9 Murrayfield practice pitches, where agreement on what 10 pattern or patterns should be in the stone work was 11 first amusingly and then irritatingly delayed because of 12 the subjective nature of it. 13 There were a lot of cases, I can't give you chapter 14 and verse, where there seemed to be conflictions. 15 What I mean by that is it's the nature of a city 16 that's trying to fit a trail way, meaning track poles, 17 signs, alignment of roads to avoid bicycles going down 18 the rails, instead crossing at 90 degrees, as well as 19 the general public realm issues, there were so many 20 factors, some of which conflicted, that it was very hard 21 to resolve all of those in a way that didn't pop up some 22 other problem like the proverbial balloon being poked. 23 That's really a key area where I would have thought 24 and would have expected and wished that CEC, instead of 25 being in a clipboard role, would have been in 129 1 a problem-solving role, but they seemed reluctant to do 2 that. 3 Q. What do you mean by CEC in a clipboard role? 4 A. Criticising rather than solving. 5 Q. Finally, I think you had also mentioned the question of 6 constant meddling. Was that meddling from people within 7 tie? Was that the various interested parties or both or 8 what? 9 A. My recollection is it was principally within tie 10 actually. 11 Q. Does that come back to your explanation about in 12 particular after Infraco let, there being other people 13 involved and commenting on design? 14 A. Yes, that made it worse. It was there before. 15 Q. Thank you. 16 We go back to your statement then. We had asked in 17 sub-question 2 what were the main reasons for these 18 difficulties and delays. And you had answered: 19 "Poor Utility performance due to their inadequate 20 records and processes." 21 I think that's perhaps self-evident. Then: 22 "CEC "we won't tell you exactly what we want but 23 when you make us a proposal we'll tell you what's wrong 24 with it" approach. 25 Tie organisational confusion - it was as though 130 1 everyone was encouraged to meddle with every conceivable 2 aspect of design, regardless of their role, knowledge 3 and experience. 4 Sometimes inadequate SDS resource." 5 Then lastly: 6 "Poor tie/SDS liaison leading to mutual distrust." 7 Were these various factors in your view present 8 throughout your involvement with the tram project? 9 A. Yes. I would like to just explain a wee thing. Where 10 I have put "sometimes inadequate SDS resource", 11 I wouldn't regard that as a blaming statement. I think 12 that was because, if I had been in charge of SDS, and 13 I had seen the amount of meddling, delay and lack of 14 problem solving, I would have probably wanted to assign 15 expert resource on to other things until the problems 16 had been resolved. So that's what I mean by that. 17 Q. Thank you. Of these various factors you have listed, 18 are there any that you wish to expand upon or do you 19 consider them largely as self-evident? 20 A. I think the utility one, as you say, is self-standing. 21 CEC, we have commented on that just now. 22 tie organisational confusion, again, I have made 23 some words a little while ago. 24 I think the last thing I would say is poor tie/SDS 25 liaison. It seemed incredible to me at the point 131 1 I joined, after a lot of years running and being 2 involved with projects before, it was incredible to me 3 that nobody seemed to have taken the lead to sit down 4 with SDS and find out what was wrong. 5 Instead, the imperative seemed to be to call in 6 people from London, from the United States, rather than 7 sit down with the actual people on the job to find out 8 simply what was causing the delay. 9 Q. What became your understanding for what was causing the 10 delay? 11 A. Really, it was a combination of the reasons above, that 12 problems with specification, the lack of people wishing 13 to help, but rather wishing to criticise. Those were 14 the two principal causes. 15 Q. Thank you. Going back to your statement, in 16 sub-question 3, we asked what steps were taken and when 17 to address these matters. You explain: 18 "When Matthew Crosse was the Project Director he 19 supported our process improvements." 20 Just in summary, Mr Glazebrook, what were the 21 process improvements? 22 A. Yes, the main one was -- the two main ones, rather, were 23 the introduction of the critical issues resolution 24 process and the second one was to draft, discuss, agree 25 and work to a design management programme. 132 1 Q. What were the main features of that design management 2 programme? 3 A. To say who did what, to provide some timescales, to 4 provide some quite detailed content information, in 5 particular on a thing we called either a design 6 assurance statement or a design verification statement, 7 and the purpose of that was to elicit from SDS a package 8 of information that really described why the design was 9 fit for purpose and approvable. 10 Q. Had there been a design management programme in place 11 before your arrival? 12 A. Sorry, had there been? 13 Q. Had a design management programme been in place before 14 your arrival? 15 A. Not to my recollection, no. That's why we made it 16 a number 1 priority. 17 Q. Is that something that tie required to put in place or 18 is that something the designer required to put in place? 19 A. It's something we saw as absolutely necessary to attempt 20 to improve the relationship between tie and SDS and to 21 reduce the risk of design rejection. 22 Q. Thank you. Back to the statement. 23 In subparagraph 4, question 4, we asked: 24 "Were these steps successful (and, if not, why 25 not)?" 133 1 You replied: 2 "Initially, yes. Had assigned management roles been 3 followed they would have remained so. But the tie 4 organisation grew and became confused, thereby negating 5 and reversing many previous improvements to overall 6 performance." 7 During what time period approximately was there an 8 improvement? 9 A. From my recollection, it was from the point where we did 10 the critical issues process and introduced the design 11 management plan until the Infraco came along, not that 12 it was their fault per se, but because the other 13 organisational changes and enlargements at the time 14 brought along many more people, all of whom started 15 meddling. 16 Q. You had mentioned earlier the question of the CEC 17 approach, of we will not tell you exactly what we want, 18 but when you make a proposal, we will tell you what is 19 wrong with it. Had that approach improved during 2007? 20 A. Not really. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I just go back a few minutes 22 and ask about the design management programme. Is that 23 something that you would always expect to be in place in 24 a contract of this -- 25 A. Yes, without something like that, nobody knows exactly 134 1 what to do, to what standard and when it should be 2 produced. 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Whose primary responsibility would it 4 be to have such a system in place? 5 A. The informed client, I think would be my answer. In 6 this case it was tie. 7 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 8 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 9 Then back to your statement, please, Mr Glazebrook. 10 Over the page at page 4, please, in question 6 we had 11 asked questions in relation to the SDS provider. In 12 question 6(1), we had asked for your views in general 13 upon the performance of Parsons Brinckerhoff and their 14 sub-contractor, Halcrow, and you replied: 15 "Aside from intermittent resource issues they were 16 adequate. Because of the constant delays and rework, it 17 was difficult for SDS and Halcrow to maintain unchanging 18 resource." 19 In terms of time period, again, does this apply 20 throughout your involvement in the tram project? 21 A. My remark there relates to earlier stages, in other 22 words of my involvement from 2007, probably through to 23 when Infraco were installed, because what happened, at 24 the point where Infraco came along and we all moved to 25 Edinburgh Park, SDS became implanted in the buildings 135 1 there, and I think the general relationship was better 2 because the lines of communication were slightly less 3 confused. 4 Q. I think it might be the case that in fact there was 5 co-location with SDS staff later on in 2007. Might that 6 be correct? Or is your recollection it was after the 7 Infraco contract was let? 8 A. I can't recall the exact dates. My rough recollection 9 is that they were with us in CityPoint for about a year 10 before they moved out to Edinburgh Park, which would 11 have taken it into 2008, but maybe that's a flawed 12 recollection. 13 Q. Then in sub-question 2, we asked: 14 "What were your views on the extent to which the 15 delay in producing ... design was due to the SDS 16 provider?" 17 You replied: 18 "SDS had to contend with unclear/inadequate 19 specifications, inadequate utility performance and 20 constant interference in the acceptance and approvals 21 process." 22 Can you just explain each of these factors, please. 23 A. Each of them? 24 Q. Yes. 25 A. I've already referred to those things in general. 136 1 I mean, if one were to assemble on a table the pile 2 of pages, detailed pages of specification, that would be 3 quite a substantial pile. What we found was it's 4 impossible for individuals to assimilate all that stuff. 5 It's inevitable, in any engineering design, that 6 sometimes people will design things to some extent based 7 on good practice, or their experience, which may 8 slightly conflict with some subparagraphs somewhere 9 lurking in a specification. The owner of the 10 specification, that's usually the point at which they 11 pop up and say, no, that's not what I wanted at all. 12 But it's also the nature of specifications that it's 13 very hard to make them specific. They're almost always 14 full of equivocation or with some equivocation in them. 15 The utility performance, that really, in my view, in 16 my recollection, delayed everything. It was hard to get 17 information from utilities. Invariably, when the street 18 was dug up, it was different to how it was portrayed on 19 drawings. 20 There were also issues with betterment and 21 restoration of utilities which delayed things. 22 Yes, the constant interference. I mean, that 23 just -- that seemed to progress to a, in my view, level 24 hitherto unknown to me. I have never seen so much 25 interference and it fatally flawed the process of 137 1 getting some sort of fixed design by the point at which 2 Infraco came along. 3 Q. Again, is the reference to the interference after award 4 of the Infraco contract you mentioned, I think, Mr Bell 5 and his team and project managers. 6 A. They were just some of them, yes. I mean, CEC were 7 possibly -- I don't know if I should accuse CEC of 8 interfering. One of the parts of the design management 9 plan, the design management process was that we had 10 round table discussions on things, and that was an 11 attempt to try and focus the resolution of problems in 12 a controlled manner such that the people round the table 13 were the people who could make decisions. 14 But it was hard to get decisions out of CEC, even 15 then there would be perhaps a reversion to the role of 16 criticising or saying, you know: go away and do it again 17 and then we will look at it again; which wasn't helpful. 18 Design does not progress with that sort of way forward. 19 Q. Thank you. Then in question 7 of your statement -- it's 20 on the screen just now -- we simply note in a number of 21 documents, note your concerns in relation to the 22 performance of tie. Then if we can go, please, to the 23 next page, we ask a question and see your reply. Top of 24 the page, sub-question 1, we asked if you raised your 25 concerns. We asked: 138 1 "Did you have any concerns ..." 2 You explain you raised them with Matthew Crosse who 3 was sympathetic: 4 "Subsequent Project Direction and Executive action 5 confused or even countered any improvement and caused 6 further organisational confusion and project delay." 7 Now, I think Matthew Crosse was Project Director 8 until early 2008. So is it that period you're referring 9 to when Mr Crosse was sympathetic? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. When you refer to subsequent Project Direction and 12 Executive action, are you referring to after Mr Crosse 13 had left in early 2008? 14 A. Exactly so. 15 Q. I understand. 16 Then if we could please look at question 8. We go 17 on to the question of CEC and third parties, and in 18 sub-question 1 we had asked for your views in general on 19 input of the Council in design process, and you 20 explained: 21 "CEC had much valuable and transferable experience. 22 However, instead of using that to lead the design 23 through clear and practical specification (ie leaving 24 scope for sensible SDS interpretation), it directed its 25 energies into constant interference and rejection of 139 1 offered design." 2 Are you able to give any examples, either broadly, 3 or particular examples? 4 A. It varied from things like the wall, as I mentioned, at 5 Murrayfield through to the position of litter bins and 6 the clearance for pavements. 7 Edinburgh is an exceptionally difficult city to fit 8 things into because of its historical nature. The 9 geometry of junctions has arisen through history and 10 landownership and so on, so nothing was in our favour. 11 But it was apparent to me that the people in CEC really 12 do know what they were doing, and if only they could 13 have been part of the team which helped us to resolve 14 things, it would have been so much more productive. 15 You know, in defence of CEC, this was their first 16 project ever with the tram. They had no experience of 17 that sort of thing at all. So with the benefit of 18 hindsight, it would have been good if they had either 19 decided themselves or been told to be part of the 20 problem solving process, rather than just the reviewing 21 process. 22 But for reasons which frustrated me constantly, they 23 saw their role to be purely part of the acceptance 24 process. Very few things were accepted. Almost 25 everything was rejected. So it was a very inefficient 140 1 and thoroughly impractical process. 2 Q. We know in other planning areas there is a plethora of 3 guidance available to particular developments, and the 4 designer can then have a look at that guidance and 5 develop a design that complies with it. So presumably, 6 in short, what was required at the outset here was 7 guidance from CEC on the sort of design that was 8 required? 9 A. Yes, exactly. I mean, in any piece of road design, if 10 they had sat down with the designers or even had points 11 during the design development process where they 12 imparted their knowledge and their views, it would have 13 made the whole process so much more effective and 14 streamlined, rather than waiting until much further on 15 and then saying, no, this is all wrong. 16 Q. Now, I think in terms of guidance, the Council did issue 17 a tram design manual around December 2005 or 18 January 2006. I'll give the reference without going to 19 it. CEC00069887. I think when one looks at it, it's 20 a very high level document. Do you remember looking at 21 that at all? 22 A. I recall it. I mean, it's in the nature of high level 23 documents that if they're going to be useful, people 24 have to recognise there has to be flexibility in the 25 result of their application. 141 1 But it seemed to me there was inflexibility in that 2 result. A high level thing by its very nature has to be 3 equivocal. It can't be otherwise. So to then bring in 4 unequivocation is not reasonable. 5 Q. I think in one area more detailed guidance was given 6 later. If we can go, please, to another document, 7 PBH00018590. We can see this is a letter from the Head 8 of Planning and Strategy at City of Edinburgh Council. 9 Top right-hand corner we can see the date, 10 10 April 2008. 11 Just to pause here, we know that the preliminary 12 design was delivered in June 2006 by the designer, and 13 this document is coming almost two years after that. 14 We can see it's directed to Mr Bell at tie, and the 15 heading is "TRAM PUBLIC REALM DESIGN WORKBOOK". We can 16 see the opening paragraph: 17 "I am writing to suggest a way of ensuring that the 18 designs for the tram project fit with the Council's 19 wider aspirations for public realm." 20 Then please scroll down to the bottom paragraph on 21 this page. It provides that: 22 "The public realm consultants have since engaged 23 with the Tram Design Working Group and assisted the 24 Council in its formal responses to the designs being 25 presented by SDS. In tandem with this, specific design 142 1 discussions and consultations have taken place directly 2 with SDS as part of the formal consultation process with 3 the Council on various tram issues. An important aspect 4 of the public realm work has been to define more clearly 5 the Council's guidance on design approaches to 6 surfacing, materials and construction details, thereby 7 developing a clear design philosophy." 8 Just to pause here, presumably this is the sort of 9 thing that would have been helpful at a much earlier 10 stage? 11 A. Yes, and it's also interesting. It's the first time 12 I have seen this document. Its implication is it's 13 a very helpful thing. 14 I think in the very last paragraph on that page, 15 where it says about approaches to surfacing, materials 16 and construction details, what we found was that that 17 would have been insufficient to complete an unequivocal 18 guidance to designers as to how to get things to be 19 approvable at the first go. 20 In other words, there's more to planning acceptance 21 than just those things there. But it's a very good 22 practical letter. It's a shame that it wasn't brought 23 to my attention. It's a shame I knew nothing of it, we 24 knew nothing of it. It's a shame it didn't come to more 25 because it would have been a very helpful imperative, 143 1 and as you say, it should have been really right at the 2 outset, not in 2008, which is way too late. 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: What other issues would you expect 4 guidance to cover? 5 A. Okay. I mean, two examples I can give you. One is the 6 tram electrification poles. When they were first 7 presented, they were just in effect rods sticking out of 8 the earth, and then not accepted by the planners, and it 9 ended up with the spike on the top that we see now. 10 That's one classic sort of thing I'm fairly sure would 11 not have appeared in there. The sort of thing that was 12 specified might be that they would be painted or 13 galvanised, that they would be subject to maximum and 14 minimum-sized dimensions and height, but things like the 15 spike on the top were not specified and were part of the 16 subjective nature of the planning approval, as was 17 the -- whether to have saltires on the wall at 18 Murrayfield, issues like that. 19 It's very hard to specify things which are made 20 subjective, which perhaps begs the question as to why so 21 many things are subjective and why can't they be 22 accepted as presented if they are fair and reasonable. 23 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. 24 Just to complete this document, if we could go over 25 the page, please. In the third last paragraph, about 144 1 halfway down, we see the letter states: 2 "I therefore enclose the Tram Public Realm Design 3 Workbook ..." 4 I think it's explained elsewhere in the letter it is 5 a working draft: 6 "The Design Workbook is divided into sections along 7 the tram routes from Haymarket to Constitution Street 8 and Leith Docks." 9 In short, there's a separate chapter in each part of 10 this document dealing with Haymarket, West Maitland 11 Street, Coates to Atholl Crescent et cetera. So each 12 part of the on-street works are dealt with separately. 13 Then the paragraph carries on: 14 "The Council require that the information provided 15 in the document should be considered as supporting 16 detail to the supplementary guidance already in place, 17 ie the Tram Design Manual and the Edinburgh Standards 18 for Streets." 19 You have also mentioned, Mr Glazebrook, that even 20 a document such as this can't perhaps provide the amount 21 of detail that is required, but presumably if one sets 22 out principles to some degree of detail, any missing 23 detail can be covered by discussions between the Council 24 and the designer? Does that seem correct? 25 A. It's a very good initiative. It's an extremely good 145 1 one, as I said, looking at the date, it seems to be 2 several years too late. As to why I know nothing of it, 3 I can only assume there was so much other flak going 4 around that this perhaps was buried in the flak. 5 Q. So is it your position you don't remember actually 6 seeing this Tram Public Realm Design Workbook? 7 A. I don't recall it. 8 Q. I think just to add something else to that picture, 9 there was some resistance at fairly senior levels in tie 10 to receiving this document so close to the integral 11 award of the contract. That may not be something that 12 you were aware of. 13 A. Even if it had been close to the Infraco award, that 14 would have been a shame to have withheld it because it 15 appears to me to be a very practical way forward. Okay, 16 too late, but even if things are a bit late, they can 17 still be useful. Because the design was so far from 18 completion at the point of Infraco let, that this would 19 have been very beneficial in my view. 20 Q. Do you know whether the designs produced by 21 Parsons Brinckerhoff from this time on did have regard 22 to the -- this design workbook? 23 A. I'm afraid I don't know the answer to that. 24 Q. Going back to your statement, please, page 5. At 25 question 8, sub-question 2, we had asked for your views 146 1 on the extent to which the delay in producing, 2 et cetera, design was due to the Council, and in your 3 view it was a very significant factor. 4 Just to pause here and try and put what I think the 5 Council's position is, I think Council witnesses either 6 have said or may say that the Council devoted 7 a considerable amount of time and resources to 8 discussing with SDS what was required, but that was not 9 reflected in design submissions. Do you have any views 10 on that suggestion? 11 A. I don't believe it. 12 Q. So you wouldn't agree with that? 13 A. No. 14 Q. It may also be said on behalf of the Council that the 15 Council had a duty to ensure that design was of 16 a sufficiently high standard and quality, and that their 17 efforts have been reflected by the design quality of the 18 tram system that has been built. Do you have any 19 comments on that suggestion? 20 A. I guess it's self-evident that the thing as built, the 21 system as built, is excellent and complies as far as is 22 reasonably practicable with every possible specification 23 element, safety element, risk element and so on. 24 Because I left in 2011, when only some construction had 25 been done, possibly the performance of CEC afterwards 147 1 became more direct and more proactive and improved that. 2 But I can't really comment on what happened after 3 I left. 4 But up to the point I left, it was certainly still 5 in my recollection exceptionally difficult to get input 6 from CEC at the right point to avoid rework and wastage 7 of time and resource. 8 Q. It may also be said on behalf of the Council that if 9 they were to specify in detail in advance exactly what 10 they required, they would then be fettering their 11 discretion when they came to formally consider an 12 application for an approval or consent? 13 A. I think that's unlikely. I think it would have been on 14 the balance of probabilities way more helpful to have 15 helped rather than to remain unfettered. 16 Q. We've discussed how in an ideal world, the Council could 17 have provided guidance and relatively detailed guidance 18 for the designers. During 2007 do you think the Council 19 knew what they wanted? 20 A. Hard question to answer. Possibly on the basis that 21 this was the first tram installation in Scotland in 22 modern times, it's the case that sometimes you don't 23 actually realise what you want until you see some of the 24 steps leading towards it. 25 I think it's for that principal reason that had 148 1 I been CEC, I would have said to myself: words are 2 insufficient. What we want is people round tables, so 3 we can together find out what the issues are, what the 4 conflicts are, and resolve those into an acceptable 5 design. 6 Q. In terms of this being the first tram, presumably it 7 should be easier for CEC, if the extension is to be 8 built, because they have a tram they can go and look at 9 and they have a design showing how the tram system 10 integrates with the city landscape; is that correct? 11 A. It would be wise for any subsequent extension in 12 Edinburgh if the parties involved recognised the 13 difficulties, the extreme difficulties in programme and 14 cost in getting the present part built, and adopted 15 a different, more collaborative approach to delivering 16 the extension. I think in my view it would be extremely 17 unwise not to do so. 18 Q. Thank you. 19 Then back to your statement, please, to page 8. 20 I should say, to put this in context, previous pages had 21 dealt with various documents relating to resolving the 22 critical issues which had arisen, and on page 8, in the 23 sub-question 2, we had asked: 24 "What was your understanding when you joined tie of 25 the main reasons for the delay in progressing Detailed 149 1 Design?" 2 You referred to: 3 "Distrust and confusion between SDS, tie and CEC." 4 What was the distrust and how had it arisen? 5 A. Well, the distrust was palpable. There were words said 6 about each parties, both ways, that were not the sort of 7 things you would expect to hear, and they really were 8 symptoms of the disease, the disease being the failure 9 to engage effectively with each other, and instead to 10 point fingers and in the case of -- this is my personal 11 view -- in the case of senior management, to, rather 12 than perhaps dive down to the coalface, to try and 13 project themselves even higher in the sky, even further 14 from reality and truth, to say: you need to change 15 something; without the slightest understanding of what 16 the causes were, which is a flawed process. 17 Q. Who do you mean by "senior management"? 18 A. I would say everyone above me. 19 Q. Sorry? 20 A. Everyone above me. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: That was the position from the point 22 of view of tie, but I got the impression that you were 23 speaking about this being a reciprocal issue between 24 tie, CEC and SDS. 25 A. Yes. SDS were deeply frustrated. I think that's the 150 1 one word I would choose to use. Deeply frustrated. 2 They found it hard to understand why everything was so 3 difficult and why everyone wanted to put obstacles in 4 their way, rather than guide them into a successful 5 resolution of anything at all. 6 In the case of CEC, I felt that their main 7 contribution was really purely in finger pointing. Why 8 is it so late? Why is everything so difficult? Rather 9 than, as I suggested, sitting down, as we did, my team 10 did, that was our role, to sit down with the designers 11 and probe what the issues were and progressively to 12 solve those. 13 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: tie was a wholly owned company of 14 CEC. Do you say that this attitude from CEC applied to 15 them as well? 16 A. It was everywhere, yes, it was ridiculous. 17 MR MACKENZIE: Back to page 8, please, Mr Glazebrook. We're 18 still dealing with the question of resolving the 19 critical issues, and we see in the sub-question 4, we 20 see what you say there. 21 Come back, please, to sub-question 5 and then 6. So 22 resolution of the critical issues was successful, and 23 you go on in sub-question 6 to say: 24 "The majority of issues were resolved fairly quickly 25 and ways forward determined once the improved process 151 1 was introduced. However, the nature of the 2 tie/TSS/CEC/TEL organisational and role confusion meant 3 that people felt able to reopen otherwise closed issues 4 repeatedly for their own reasons." 5 In terms of the reopening of issues and the time 6 period, is this in relation to later in 2007, 2008 or 7 what? 8 A. It was -- it seemed to come to the fore after Infraco 9 had been appointed. 10 Q. Thank you. 11 I would like to move on in your statement, please, 12 to page 9. In sub questions 1 and 2 you say: 13 "CEC believed that tie should be doing all review, 14 yet they repeatedly stepped in with rejections of 15 usually incomplete design detail. As if it wasn't 16 complex enough with tie's own apparent practice of 17 "anyone can comment", the various organisational 18 elements within CEC were uncoordinated and produced 19 a rising tide of rejective comments." 20 Is there anything you want to add to that or is that 21 fairly self-explanatory? 22 A. Nothing to add. 23 Q. Then sub-question 2. We'd asked to what extent the 24 Council had been involved in the changes made to the 25 process for the production and review of design, and you 152 1 replied: 2 "Fully involved, but there seemed to be an agenda 3 against 'we'll tell them clearly what we want' possibly 4 because they believed that their powers had to remain 5 unfettered, hence they could not be seen to 'lead' any 6 design work. They seemed to believe that tie had been 7 set up specifically to stop all problems arising." 8 Again, if we can scroll further down this page in 9 your statement, please, on to question 11 at the bottom 10 of the page, sub-question 2. This is events in roughly 11 April 2007, and in answer to sub-question 2 you say: 12 "Repeated discussions with SDS revealed the 13 ineffectiveness of the tie/CEC/TEL/TSS approach, but by 14 the time David Crawley and I were engaged, the die was 15 firmly cast of behaviours, expectations and results. 16 These were very hard to challenge because everyone 17 seemed to believe that they had a right - duty even - 18 to comment on everything, thereby contributing to the 19 environment of confusion." 20 Now, when you say everyone seemed to believe that 21 they had a right or a duty to comment on everything, do 22 you mean within tie or do you mean all of the interested 23 parties? 24 A. Everywhere. I think some people misunderstand the 25 meaning of the phrase or words "constructive challenge". 153 1 If an organisation gives to another organisation the 2 responsibility to do something, then you would think 3 that that person that had been given the responsibility 4 would equally be given the freedom to lead, direct and 5 approve that process, but that was not the case. 6 Q. What you've been describing so far, Mr Glazebrook, 7 sounds like a very dysfunctional process? 8 A. Exactly so. 9 Q. Is that a fair way to describe it? 10 A. Yes, exasperatingly so. 11 Q. Did that ever improve while you were with tie? 12 A. No, it got worse. 13 Q. For the reasons you have mentioned earlier? 14 A. Mm-hm. 15 Q. Could you then please go back to your statement at 16 page 10. Question 13, I think in April 2007 you took 17 over the role of SDS Project Manager from 18 Ailsa McGregor; is that correct? 19 A. Mm-hm, yes. 20 Q. It might be helpful just to pause now to look at an 21 aspect of the SDS contract. If we could bring up, 22 please, CEC00839054. 23 So this is the 2005 contract between tie and 24 Parsons Brinckerhoff. We can go to, please, page 39. 25 At the very bottom of the page, under clause 10, 154 1 management of the services, states: 2 "The Client's Representative shall ..." 3 Over the page at the top: 4 " be responsible for the day-to-day supervision 5 of the Services to be performed by the SDS Provider." 6 To pause there, was it the case, Mr Glazebrook, that 7 tie's SDS Project Manager was also tie's client 8 representative under this contract? 9 A. Probably. I don't recall that particular detail. At 10 the point where I took over, there was no briefing or 11 anything like that as to what I was to do. I don't 12 actually recall seeing this document. I may well have 13 done but it's a detail thing. I don't recall that. 14 I think the reason possibly why I do not recall it, 15 and it wasn't briefed, and I might not have followed it 16 to the letter, was that in my long experience, when you 17 have a situation which is almost completely chaotic, 18 when the objective is to resolve design, that is where 19 you direct your energies. 20 If that meant that I was deficient in following the 21 strict duties of the SDS Project Manager, then I would 22 still assert that my approach was the correct one to 23 take in the circumstances at the time, because all these 24 sort of documents are drawn up on the basis that you 25 have a free flowing, steady flowing orderly project 155 1 which was not the case. 2 Q. So do you know who was the tie's client representative 3 in terms of this contract in June 2007, for example? 4 A. No, because you would imagine that a client's 5 representative would know exactly what their powers 6 were, and I don't recall that being the case. It may be 7 that somebody emailed me this document. I don't recall 8 it specifically, but, as I say, my experience indicated 9 to me that what I should be directing my energies into 10 was the resolution of the principal problem, which was 11 the progression of design. 12 Q. Regardless of the terminology being used, whether it's 13 client's representative or SDS Contract Manager, as 14 a matter of fact was anyone in tie in 2007 supervising 15 on a day-to-day basis the services performed by SDS? 16 A. My role as the Director was to try and resolve the 17 problems and to maintain progress. Indeed, to improve 18 progress. 19 So in that context I was in daily contact, frequent 20 contact each day, with SDS to see what the blockages 21 were and find ways of resolving them. 22 Q. I understand. 23 If we can go back to your statement, please, to 24 page 13, and question 19, halfway down the page, we see 25 reference to an email from Trudi Craggs in June 2007. 156 1 Then we asked for your views on these matters, and you 2 explained that: 3 "From the time of my involvement in this major 4 project, it was self-evident that the processes employed 5 were ill thought out and were failing. In addition, the 6 determination and allocation of organisational roles and 7 responsibilities either was flawed or was not applied 8 and followed. The mutual distrust led to mutual blame 9 and little evidence of a concerted approach to working 10 together as a team to resolve the problems. As the 11 problems mounted and became more numerous, time and the 12 will to do anything other than firefighting disappeared. 13 The overall imperative was proceed to timescales, 14 sometimes seemingly regardless of common sense. No one 15 had the courage to stop, examine, discuss, resolve, 16 agree a better way forward!" 17 Now, is this a view you held at the time, round 18 about June 2007? 19 A. It probably took me about six weeks to realise the 20 appalling situation the project was in, and to start 21 asking myself the question that any reasonable person 22 would ask that has been involved with real projects at 23 the front line, which is: why don't we stop and move 24 forward better? Why do we proceed and make things 25 worse? To this day I don't understand the answer to 157 1 that question. 2 Q. Did you discuss that option of stopping or pausing with 3 anyone else in tie at the time? 4 A. Matthew. 5 Q. Mr Crosse? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. When was that, approximately? 8 A. Probably from the point where I realised the enormity of 9 the problem, which would have been probably six to eight 10 weeks from my starting. I was located physically close 11 to him in the office, just by chance. So it was easy to 12 get his attention and to say: Matthew, this is the sort 13 of thing that suggests we should be doing something 14 different; and he was always very receptive to useful 15 discussions backed up by evidence and fact. 16 Q. What was Mr Crosse's response to the suggestion that 17 things should stop or pause? 18 A. Well, I don't exactly recall, but I know that his sort 19 of body language and general demeanour suggested that he 20 thought the same, but that perhaps organisationally or 21 through his responsibilities was prevented or felt 22 prevented from doing so. Because clearly had he been 23 able to do so, he would have done. 24 Q. In short, do you know why there wasn't a pause to allow 25 design to catch up? 158 1 A. I think when so many -- this is my personal view, based 2 on many years' project experience. When a sufficiently 3 large number of senior people are determined on a course 4 of action and ill-informed through lack of contact with 5 people that actually know, they will inevitably make the 6 wrong decision. 7 Q. You also say in this answer that: 8 "The overall imperative was to proceed to 9 timescales sometimes seemingly regardless of common 10 sense." 11 Where did that imperative come from? 12 A. Well, not from me. From other parts of the tie 13 organisation, I guess, and maybe CEC. It's hard for me 14 to answer that question because there were so many 15 people wanting the thing to be done to a particular 16 timescale. The press, the politicians. It seemed that 17 everyone wanted progress regardless of what that 18 progress meant in practical terms. I think it's very 19 hard when people don't take the trouble to find out what 20 feet are doing under the surface to assume from the 21 sereneness above the surface that nothing is happening, 22 whereas in fact a lot is happening. 23 Q. In that regard, when you say that people don't take the 24 trouble to find out what is under the surface, is that 25 again a reference to, you would say, anyone above you in 159 1 tie? 2 A. Yes, more or less. I mean, whenever I was -- if ever 3 I was invited to a meeting at a higher level, which was 4 extremely rare, which taking a much earlier point you 5 made, I found quite surprising, that as the person 6 charged with making the process work, and indeed project 7 managing SDS, I would have thought that I would have 8 been involved in many significant decisions, the like of 9 which might have been: is it wise to take this course of 10 action or that? But I never was. 11 Q. Finally, this point. You say no one had the courage to 12 stop, et cetera. 13 A. Mm-hm. 14 Q. Why would that have required courage? 15 A. Well, I guess the results speak for themselves. If you 16 end up with a project which has only delivered 17 approximately half the infrastructure for 50 per cent 18 more cost, the nature of hindsight, I concede, is to say 19 we should have done this rather than that. 20 But these are all experienced people. These are all 21 senior people, and the role of senior people sometimes 22 is to take the courageous decisions that others are not 23 empowered to take. 24 Q. Thank you. Moving on to another matter. I would like 25 to ask, in June 2007, Audit Scotland conducted an audit 160 1 or review of the tram project? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Did you have any input into briefing Audit Scotland? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Do you know what, if anything, Audit Scotland were told 6 about the design difficulties and delay? 7 A. I have no idea. 8 Q. If you had been asked by Audit Scotland in June 2007 9 about any design difficulties and delay, what would you 10 have told them? 11 A. I would have told them the situation as I understood it 12 to be at the time. Unembellished. 13 Q. Along the lines that you have explained to us today? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. If in June 2007 Audit Scotland had asked you whether the 16 design was likely to be produced in accordance with the 17 design programme, what would you have said? 18 A. It would be impossible. 19 Q. Again, for the sorts of reasons you discussed with us? 20 A. Mm-hm. 21 Q. Thank you. Going back to your statement, please, to 22 page 14 -- 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You said you had no input into 24 briefing Audit Scotland. I have inferred from the 25 subsequent answers that you were never interviewed by -- 161 1 A. I don't recall any involvement with them at all. We all 2 knew they were around and I think we were all concerned 3 that it might produce a further turbulence in the 4 progress of the project, but I have no recollection 5 whatsoever of anyone coming to me and saying: right, 6 Tony, what's going on? 7 MR MACKENZIE: Then in your statement at page 14, can we 8 please look at answer 1. We had asked about why it 9 hadn't been possible to produce 18 batches of 10 self-assured design and it was decided instead to 11 produce 63 batches. You explained: 12 "The sheer volume of detail in a tram project! To 13 produce a completely self-standing package of assured 14 design based on 1/18th of the entire project, let alone 15 the activity needed to review and accept it, proved to 16 be unrealistic. In addition, it was unrealistic to 17 expect a project to deliver even a single element of 18 unequivocal design in an environment of organisational 19 and specification unclarity, together with inadequate 20 processes." 21 Then in sub-question 3, please, at the bottom, we -- 22 an email we looked at this morning, by Mr Conway of the 23 Council. But more importantly, over the page, please, 24 page 15 at the top, this perhaps reflects the answer you 25 have just given me in relation to Audit Scotland. We'd 162 1 asked here: 2 "In general, how confident were you around that 3 time..." 4 This is July 2007: 5 "... that design would be produced in accordance 6 with the design programme, and would be of the required 7 quality?" 8 You explained: 9 "The working and organisational environment at the 10 time rendered it impossible." 11 Just for completeness, is that a view you held at 12 the time? 13 A. Absolutely. 14 Q. Did there ever come a time throughout your involvement 15 in the tram project when you considered that design 16 would be delivered to programme? 17 A. No. 18 Q. For the various reasons you've discussed? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Thank you. 21 A separate point, please. Page 15 of your 22 statement, question phase 1b designs. Page 15, and in 23 question 23, in sub-question 1 we asked: 24 "Was design work [this is July 2007] still being 25 carried out on Section 3 (ie phase 1a) and, if so why?" 163 1 You said: 2 "No one had given a clear directive otherwise." 3 Who within tie would that directive have required to 4 have come from? 5 A. Probably the Project Director, but the reason why work 6 was still being carried on was that there was -- in some 7 respects that part of the route, namely along an old 8 British railways route, was less affected by the myriad 9 of complexities around streets, street design and so on. 10 So not surprisingly, the designers drew the conclusion, 11 with my agreement, that if you have a situation where 12 you want to employ people gainfully, and the project 13 says you can do so, it's better to do the things which 14 are easy than to waste time on the things which are 15 unresolvable. 16 Q. Thank you. 17 Now, if all of the resources and every 18 organisation -- so that's including SDS, tie, TSS, the 19 Council and the utility companies -- if all of these 20 resources had been concentrated on the design of 21 phase 1a only, is the design for phase 1a likely to have 22 been completed earlier? 23 A. Possibly, but it would have needed a change in attitude 24 and organisational roles and responsibilities for that 25 to have happened. 164 1 Q. Again, we're back to the problems and difficulties you 2 have referred to earlier in your evidence. Thank you. 3 Again, going back to your statement, page 15, 4 please. Question 24. We had referred in the question 5 to minutes of the DPD Sub-Committee on 2 August 2007, 6 where Mr Crawley had explained the concept of "just in 7 time" delivery and the fact "there is no margin for 8 error". 9 Can we go then to page 16. In sub-question 2, the 10 question was: 11 "What was your view at that time as to whether 12 version 17 of the design programme was realistic and 13 achievable?" 14 You say: 15 "It was highly risky." 16 The next answer, please, to sub-question 3. We 17 asked: 18 "What was your view at the time as to whether it was 19 reasonable to base the design (and procurement) 20 programme on design being produced "just in time" with 21 "no margin for error"?" 22 You answered: 23 "It was exceptionally risky. At that point - indeed 24 at others before - the ship should have been hove to in 25 order to get resources and processes in order and for 165 1 a practical course to be charted. But senior management 2 seemed intent on maintaining course regardless, probably 3 because they absented themselves from the real action 4 and appeared to manage by meeting and email." 5 Why do you say, Mr Glazebrook, that this approach 6 was exceptionally risky? 7 A. Well, it was like the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster 8 at Felixstowe. If a ship sets off with its bow doors 9 open but the captain has no idea, it will fill with 10 water and capsize, which is exactly what happened. It's 11 the same sort of thing. 12 If you keep ploughing on, regardless of the reality 13 staring you in the face, you will manage yourself into 14 a foolish result. 15 Q. Now, you say if the captain has no idea, I suppose 16 a question to be asked here is whether the senior 17 management at tie and others at a senior level involved 18 in the project were aware of the difficulties that 19 you've discussed with us? 20 A. In the four years I worked for tie, I had 20 minutes' 21 discussion with Richard Jeffrey and that was the 22 totality of my involvement with the top people. That 23 was the only time I was asked and it was cut short 24 because of other greater priorities which, as I recall, 25 were dealing with the press, rather than finding out the 166 1 facts. 2 Q. Mr Jeffrey, I think, was appointed the Chief Executive 3 of tie, was it 2009? 2009, I think. I can't entirely 4 remember. But certainly 2007 he wasn't there? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And he wasn't there in 2008. 7 So did you have any discussions in 2007 or 2008 with 8 any senior tie individuals other than Matthew Crosse? 9 A. No. I was never asked. 10 Q. Presumably the route for you to get your concerns known 11 to those higher up was through Mr Crosse? 12 A. That's how it appeared to me. 13 Q. And was Mr Crosse aware of your concerns? 14 A. Yes, I think he shared the same concerns. It's hard to 15 recall in detail, but I found Matthew to be a practical, 16 reasonable person. But I did get the impression that 17 his hands were tied and that the imperative to meet 18 dates superseded or supplanted or certainly was a higher 19 priority for various reasons than finding a way to plot 20 a course that might have taken longer, but in the event 21 less long than it actually took in the reality of the 22 situation. 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Mackenzie, will you find 24 a convenient -- 25 MR MACKENZIE: Yes, my Lord. 167 1 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Is this convenient? 2 MR MACKENZIE: Yes. 3 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We are going to break for just over 4 15 minutes to give the shorthand writers a break. We 5 will resume again at 3.35. 6 (3.16 pm) 7 (A short break) 8 (3.35 pm) 9 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: You're still under oath, 10 Mr Glazebrook. 11 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you, my Lord. 12 Mr Glazebrook, could I clarify one matter you spoke 13 of before the break. 14 I'd asked you about who Mr Crosse reported to during 15 2007. I think you said your understanding was he had 16 reported to Steven Bell, and I had queried that because 17 I said, well, Mr Crosse was the Tram Project Director, 18 was it really the case that he reported to Mr Bell, who 19 was the Director of Engineering and Procurement? 20 I think you said that was your understanding in 2007; is 21 that correct? 22 A. I reported to Matthew. I assume that Matthew reported 23 to Steven. That seemed to be how the way things worked, 24 but maybe I was wrong. I don't recall an organisational 25 structure that clarified that. 168 1 Q. If the Inquiry were to hear evidence from Mr Crosse that 2 he in fact reported to Mr Gallagher, I take it you would 3 accept that? 4 A. Sure, yes. 5 Q. Now, returning, please, to your statement, if I may, to 6 page 17, in question 27 concerns an email in August 2007 7 in relation to value engineering. We had asked for your 8 views on these matters, and in sub-question 1 you 9 replied: 10 "To have decided to do value engineering in an 11 already chaotic project was ill advised. It diverted 12 attention from matters of real importance and should 13 have been priority 10, not priority 1. It demonstrates 14 a detachment from reality." 15 Now, those are quite strong words, Mr Glazebrook. 16 A detachment from reality on the part of who? 17 A. Well, as I have said before, many people that -- I don't 18 know how to express it best -- maybe absented themselves 19 from front line realities. Whoever it was decided to 20 proceed with VE, it was, as I have said here, the words 21 are exactly as I feel they are now. It was an 22 ill-advised decision. We should have directed our 23 attention to solving problems, not creating new ones. 24 Q. Thank you. Again, a point of clarification. Please, at 25 page 20 of your statement, on a different matter. 169 1 Page 20. In paragraph 32, where you refer to tie's 2 Design Management Plan. Now, we asked various questions 3 about it, and you replied: 4 "It was an all too rare example of a properly 5 thought-through process, which other parts of tie could 6 have used as an exemplar, but didn't." 7 For the avoidance of doubt, which other parts of tie 8 are you referring to? 9 A. All the other parts of tie. I mean, the beauty of not 10 having a process is that nobody can tell you're not 11 following it. 12 Q. Again, please, at page 21 of your statement, in 13 paragraph 35, we see a reference to Damian Sharp joining 14 tie in October 2007. I think Mr Sharp became the SDS 15 Project Manager, so he relieved you of that role. But 16 you say: 17 "I don't know why he was engaged." 18 Were you or Mr Crawley ever consulted about the 19 appointment of Mr Sharp? 20 A. Well, I wasn't. I don't know if David was. 21 Q. Did you consider there was a need for such a post? 22 A. It actually helped me in some ways because I'd become 23 aware by then there were elements of the project 24 management role which really were -- perhaps I could 25 say -- misuse of my skill and experience. Damian had 170 1 a more commercial approach or more commercial experience 2 which was one thing that was needed, and it enabled me 3 to concentrate on the engineering elements of the 4 project. 5 Q. Now, we may hear from Mr Sharp that he reported to 6 Steven Bell. Is that correct? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. Did he report to you or Mr Crawley? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Because on the face of it, it may seem odd, if Mr Sharp 11 is being employed as SDS Project Manager, and he's not 12 reporting to the Heads of the Engineering, Assurance and 13 Design team. Do you have any comment on that? 14 A. It's perhaps another example of organisational 15 confusion. 16 Q. Did that cause any difficulties as far as you were 17 aware? 18 A. As I have said here, it created another interface, but 19 my recollection was that Damian did that part of the 20 project thoroughly. 21 Q. And what do you mean by "another interface" to be 22 managed? 23 A. Because just occasionally -- it's hard to recall the 24 detail, but SDS might have said something like: Tony, 25 you're telling me to do this, but Damian is telling me 171 1 we've got to do that. That was not through malice or 2 anything like that; it was perhaps just a lack of 3 co-ordination. 4 Q. Thank you. Back to your statement, please, to page 23. 5 In question 40 it refers to an email on 21 November 2007 6 from Carla Jones of Parsons Brinckerhoff, attaching 7 a weekly deliverables tracker which noted that (out of 8 a total of 344 design deliverables), 283 had been planned 9 for delivery by that date and 227 had been delivered. 10 So I think it would be fair to say that shows that 11 there was some progress being made with design, but 12 still some slippage? 13 A. Yes, that's a fair remark. 14 Q. And simply a snapshot in time, I think, 227 deliverables 15 that had been delivered out of a total of 344 is about 16 two-thirds of the detailed design. Does that generally 17 accord with your recollection from that time? 18 A. I don't recall that detail. I mean, a lot of the design 19 deliverables that had been delivered were around utility 20 design. But there were many others, for instance, the 21 easier parts of the track design, the easier parts of 22 the structures design, which enabled work to progress by 23 Infraco quite early on. Specifically areas like the 24 busway, the guided busway, the track out in the 25 countryside towards the airport, Ingliston Park and 172 1 Ride, and major structures like the bridge at 2 Edinburgh Park, the big bridge over the Network Rail 3 route. 4 Q. Okay. Then over the page we asked certain questions. 5 Page 24, please. 6 In sub-question 1 we asked if you had any general 7 comments on the documents, and you stated: 8 "In a welter of detail the essential underlying 9 causes of problems often lie buried out of sight. The 10 majority of the tie/CEC organisations seemed always to 11 be pre-occupied with monitoring numbers rather than what 12 actually was happening and proactively and 13 collaboratively tackling the causes of why some of it 14 wasn't happening." 15 So is that really, Mr Glazebrook, a note of caution 16 to say that: despite the numbers of design deliverables 17 I have referred to, there may be underlying causes 18 buried out of sight? 19 A. Yes. Throughout the project there seemed to be this 20 preoccupation with numbers and dates and things. 21 I mean, one could equally argue in project management 22 that if you progressively and proactively solve issues, 23 the programme will inherently be correct. If you merely 24 follow numbers, without finding what the underlying 25 issues are and resolving them, it will almost inevitably 173 1 drift, which is exactly what happened. 2 Q. Then in sub-question 2, we asked what your views were in 3 late 2007 on whether the design programme would be met. 4 And you replied: 5 "It was unlikely to happen without significant 6 project cultural change and organisational clarity. The 7 Titanic 'deckchair' metaphor springs to mind." 8 Just for the avoidance of doubt, could you explain 9 that metaphor, please, in terms of how it applied to 10 this project at this point in time? 11 A. The ship sinking. Rather than investigate the causes or 12 get everyone into lifebelts, we fiddle around with the 13 deck chairs on deck. 14 Q. Then, please, on a separate question of the procurement 15 of the Infraco contract, I think at pages 11 and 12 of 16 your statement, you said you were not involved in the 17 Infraco evaluation or procurement. Is that correct? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Why weren't you involved in that? 20 A. I don't know. 21 Q. Did you consider you ought to have been involved in 22 that? 23 A. Part of me thought yes, because just as in any major 24 project, if you like, early contractor involvement 25 between client and contractor is a good thing. That 174 1 would have been a good thing. But the other part of me 2 said that on the basis of all the problems that we have, 3 it seemed to me that what was going to happen would be 4 a huge commercial battle, a battle to assign pounds to 5 perceived risks, and it would further divert my energies 6 and expertise away from engineering problem solving. 7 So on balance, I'm glad I wasn't involved. 8 Q. Putting the tram project to one side, and looking at 9 what might be usual practice in industry, would it have 10 been usual practice for someone in your role as Director 11 of Engineering to have had some involvement in the 12 infrastructure procurement process? 13 A. It would be very unwise not to do so. 14 Q. Why? 15 A. Because if it's an engineering infrastructure project, 16 then to exclude the person who knows about engineering 17 infrastructure is folly. 18 Q. Yet that seems to have happened in the case of this 19 project; is that correct? 20 A. Mm-hm. Yes. 21 Q. Are you able to explain why that happened in this 22 project? 23 A. I don't know. It's possible that people above me 24 believed that they had sufficient knowledge of the 25 issues that they needed no support. But again, I think 175 1 the results speak for themselves. 2 Q. Did you ever say to Mr Crosse: it was folly not to 3 involve you and Mr Crawley in the Infraco procurement. 4 A. No, I don't recall saying such a thing, because it was 5 presented as a fait accompli. 6 Q. Presented by whom? 7 A. Well, I just found out that that's what the result would 8 be, that we wouldn't be involved. 9 Q. How did you find out? 10 A. It's hard to recall. Probably just by observing that 11 Infraco were coming in and out of the building and we 12 weren't involved at all, and when asked the question: 13 isn't that strange; the answer was: we don't need you. 14 Q. In terms of the employer's requirements and the Infraco 15 civil proposals, are these the sorts of documents or 16 issues that engineering input is needed on? 17 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? 18 Q. Sorry, it was a bad question. 19 Is engineering input required on the employer's 20 requirements and in considering the civils proposals? 21 A. I'm sorry, I still don't quite understand what you're 22 getting at. 23 Q. Part of the Infraco procurement process must involve 24 considering the employer's requirements; is that 25 correct? 176 1 A. Yes, certainly. 2 Q. And also considering the civils proposals by the 3 bidders; is that correct? 4 A. Absolutely, yes. 5 Q. Does one require engineering expertise and experience to 6 consider the employer's requirements and the civil 7 proposals? 8 A. Any one tendering for such a contract would need to have 9 that knowledge and experience to do it robustly, yes. 10 Q. But you've explained that yourself and Mr Crawley were 11 not involved in these matters? 12 A. Yes. I don't know why that was, and it was a foolish 13 thing to do perhaps. 14 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I think the question was maybe viewed 15 from the other side. You say anyone tendering for the 16 contract would have to have engineering experience, but 17 I think the question was really directed to the people 18 evaluating the tender. 19 A. Well, exactly. A project such as this, which is 20 nine-tenths engineering, I would have thought there 21 would have been an element of evaluation from the 22 engineering team, but there was none whatsoever. 23 Absolutely zero. 24 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 25 MR MACKENZIE: I just wonder, Mr Glazebrook, to what extent 177 1 were you not asked to be involved and to what extent did 2 you try on purpose not to be involved? 3 A. Oh, crumbs. I certainly didn't try on purpose not to be 4 involved, no way. But why we weren't, I have no idea. 5 Q. Thank you. Then page 24 of your statement, please. In 6 question 41, I'll give you a minute just to read what's 7 set out there, but in short it's to do with 8 a misalignment. 9 In question 1 at the bottom of the page, we say: 10 "We understand that concerns in relation to the 11 Employer's Requirements were expressed on a number of 12 occasions in 2007 ..." 13 Then we ask on the next page, 25: 14 "When did you first appreciate that there was 15 a misalignment between the SDS Design, the Employer's 16 Requirements and BBS's offer?" 17 You replied: 18 "This had been the case from the outset, but was 19 ignored for reasons unknown to me." 20 Are you able to explain how that misalignment came 21 about? 22 A. No, it's possible that from the outset, SDS were told 23 that the employer's requirements would be any or all of 24 simplified rationalised conflicts removed, and I do 25 recall that at various points, SDS suggested that they 178 1 would be prepared to help in that process. 2 That may sound a bit unusual, but because the 3 employer's requirements had been written for a project 4 of which -- it had not happened in Edinburgh, it was 5 almost inevitable that some of the employer's 6 requirements either would be unnecessary or conflicting. 7 So it was always apparent they needed to be brought 8 into a set of coherent requirements. 9 But that never happened. I recall they were very 10 large. It was a huge document, and there's probably 11 some sort of mathematical relationship between the 12 number of pages of document and the likelihood of it 13 being equivocal, rather than unequivocal. 14 But unfortunately never were they -- was that 15 exercise done to improve and finalise the employer's 16 requirements. I don't know why that was. 17 Q. What sort of problems can arise if there's 18 a misalignment between the SDS design, the employer's 19 requirements and the civils proposals in an offer? 20 A. Gaps and conflicts. 21 Q. And what are gaps and conflicts -- 22 A. Gaps where something has assumed to be specified but 23 isn't, and that only becomes apparent when the design is 24 rejected for reasons which are not specified. 25 Conflicts, because, again, in a huge welter of 179 1 specification detail, it will naturally arise that some 2 things are in conflict with others. 3 An example might be clearances in the street. It 4 might be impossible to achieve certain clearances and 5 some leeway is necessary. One specification might say 6 this. Another one might say that. 7 So one might say that wires at a voltage higher than 8 earth shouldn't be closer than X from a building. 9 Another one might actually countermand that by saying 10 they had to be further from some other obstacle or 11 thing, which means you just cannot place the wire, for 12 instance. 13 Q. What problems might any such gaps and conflicts give 14 rise to? 15 A. Well, that's a classic case where in a collaborative 16 project, such solutions can be, if you like, negotiated. 17 Q. If it was simply a collaborative project, what problems 18 might arise from gaps and conflicts of the type you've 19 mentioned? 20 A. The designer can't win. 21 Q. What do you mean by that? 22 A. Whatever is proposed, somebody will say is unacceptable. 23 Q. So in short, any such gaps and conflicts should be 24 addressed to the extent possible? 25 A. Exactly so. Led by the client in such a case. 180 1 Q. Presumably before an infrastructure contract is let? 2 A. Definitely. 3 Q. Why do you say definitely? 4 A. If you don't resolve such conflicts before, it will 5 either produce a change or it will have been priced in 6 as a risk, which may or may not arise, and if it doesn't 7 arise, then I have never known a project where you get 8 a refund. If it does arise it's just absorbed in the 9 risk budget. So the client loses. 10 Q. Thank you. 11 We should go to another document. CEC01601660. 12 Now, if we look at page 2, please, we can blow up, 13 please, a third of the way down the page. 14 This is an email from yourself, Mr Glazebrook, dated 15 25 April 2007 to Mr Crawley, Jim Harries of Transdev and 16 Gavin Murray of tie, on the question of employer's 17 requirements. You say: 18 "Just to advise you that since "Engineering" is the 19 designated owner of this document, Martin and I have 20 today agreed a process whereby this document gets put 21 right, for subsequent interaction with the Infraco 22 bidders to ensure that what actually gets built is 23 rather closer to what everyone actually needs." 24 So on the face of it, this point in time, 25 April 2007, it looks as though you did have 181 1 a responsibility for the employer's requirements; is 2 that correct? 3 A. Well, presumably so. I don't recall that particular 4 thing. In hindsight it's a little hard to see how 5 engineering could be the owner of the entirety of 6 employer's requirements, which covered commercial things 7 as well as engineering things, unless I remember it 8 incorrectly. 9 I do recall this sort of discussion. Martin Donohoe 10 is a very practical person with a great deal of 11 experience. I don't know what happened after that, but 12 I do know there was activity. There were lots of people 13 saying, yes, we'll revise the employer's requirements, 14 SDS were very helpful in wanting us to do that, but 15 I don't recall the reasons why that came to grief. 16 I have no recollection why that was the case at all. 17 Q. But is it your evidence that as a matter of fact, you 18 were not involved with the employer's requirements 19 document throughout 2007 and early 2008? 20 A. There are things that existed when we came along. 21 I don't know who would have decided or assigned the 22 responsibility of them to us, but without looking 23 through them again and reminding myself of the content, 24 I'm a little surprised that engineering alone would have 25 been the designated owner for such an all-embracing 182 1 document. Looking at the date, April 2007, I had not 2 been there very long. So that would be four, five, six, 3 seven, eight, nine, ten weeks or so. Possibly 4 I misunderstood the way in which things should be done. 5 It was early in my time and I guess I came with a hope, 6 a feeling, an expectation that issues around 7 specification would be relatively easy to resolve. 8 Unfortunately that didn't prove to be the case. 9 Q. Certainly looking at the project from the outside, 10 I think one can see the logic as to why the engineering 11 department of tie would be the designated owner of the 12 employer's requirements document, but it may be that 13 that didn't reflect the reality of what happened later 14 on in 2007 and into early 2008? 15 A. Maybe. I can't recall the detailed content of those 16 requirements. So I can't really comment. 17 Q. Okay. Back to your statement, please, at page 25. 18 We'd got to sub-question 2, towards the top of the 19 page. We are still on the question of the misalignment 20 between these three elements. We had asked how it had 21 arisen, et cetera. You replied: 22 "It is inevitable that in any complex major project 23 there will be a multiplicity of requirements. The fatal 24 flaws were to proceed before these were established and 25 to fail to have in place a culture and process which 183 1 accepts that requirement/specification change are 2 inevitable, but has practical and effective processes to 3 deal with such changes." 4 Why do you use the words "fatal flaws"? 5 A. I think from observation of the result. 6 Q. So that's an example of -- with the benefit of 7 hindsight? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Albeit if you had been asked for your views at the time 10 on whether any problems might arise because of -- if 11 there was a misalignment between the SDS design, 12 employer's requirements and the civils proposals, 13 I assume you would have given an answer in similar terms 14 you've given us a few minutes before? 15 A. Indeed, and everybody was saying that. It's a mystery 16 to me why it wasn't proceeded with to clarify, close 17 gaps, and to remove conflictions. 18 Q. Which individual or individuals in tie had 19 responsibility for resolving that issue? 20 A. It's a general project issue because it involved not 21 just engineering, but everything. I mean, it's one of 22 those situations where a large engineering project can 23 have everything dumped on to engineering. But as I say, 24 without relooking at the engineering -- the employer's 25 requirements, I can't recall in detail the content of 184 1 every provision in it. But my recollection is that it 2 was more than just engineering. 3 Q. Thank you. 4 Back to the statement, please. Again, sticking at 5 page 25 and question 42. I won't read it out, but this 6 refers to an email on 30 November 2007 you sent to 7 Steven Bell. You refer to there being widespread 8 unclarity as to who does what in tie, et cetera. 9 A paragraph down, you refer to it having come to 10 light that tie's procurement team had been receiving 11 documents direct from SDS which were not lodged within 12 tie's document control system. You say: 13 "The result is that I and my team, and doubtless 14 others, are working on duff gen and making duff 15 decisions. This is incredible." 16 Then in your answer to sub-question 1 you say you 17 cannot add to those words which express clearly not only 18 your frustrations, but also some positive suggestions 19 for improvement elsewhere. They were unheeded. They 20 arose because of the organisational problems within tie 21 that were never effectively addressed. 22 So is that essentially a reference to the 23 procurement team working without proper reference to the 24 engineering team, and doing things which may impact upon 25 the engineering team's work? 185 1 A. Yes, it was not just the procurement team. It was 2 general. All the people involved with the project, 3 really. 4 As I said in that -- in the second part of the 5 email, well, the one numbered 2, there was widespread 6 unclarity and I do recall that when we produced our list 7 as to who does what, everyone said: this is a great 8 idea, we should all do this; but they didn't. 9 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Mr Murray's email just above your 10 first answer, is that an example of meddling? 11 A. An example of what, sorry? 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: People meddling. 13 A. Exactly so. 14 MR MACKENZIE: I think I had suggested to you before, 15 Mr Glazebrook, that the design process seemed 16 dysfunctional, but from what you are saying, would it be 17 fair to say that tie as an organisation seemed 18 dysfunctional? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Now, you sent this email to Mr Bell rather than to 21 Mr Crosse, who was the Tram Project Director. Do you 22 recall why that was? 23 A. No, I don't recall. I don't know whether this was an 24 answer to a question. I have no idea why I wrote it. 25 Q. Thank you. 186 1 Another matter, please, at page 26 of your 2 statement. Towards the bottom of the page, question 45, 3 we set out an email you weren't involved in, and I'm 4 just interested in your views. 5 We see an email of 14 December 2007 from 6 Duncan Fraser in the Council. He asked certain 7 questions about the quantified risk allowance, including 8 querying the provision made for the likely change in 9 scope, given the incomplete/outstanding design, 10 approvals and consents. 11 Mr Fraser had stated: 12 "The scope of the works is not clear to CEC ... 13 hence the scope is likely to change, hence provision 14 should be made for this." 15 Geoff Gilbert replied on behalf of tie. If we go 16 over the page, please, at the top of the page, at the 17 end of his reply, Mr Gilbert stated: 18 "The overall scope of the scheme is surely now 19 fixed, is it not?" 20 Then we asked your views on that, and you explain: 21 "This appears to reflect the gulf between what some 22 people wished to believe and the chaotic reality. There 23 always seemed to me to be a significant gulf between the 24 so-called "Commercial" people and those of us charged with 25 delivering the project. From my viewpoint, their ever 187 1 increasing numbers achieved nothing except to add fuel 2 to the fire of confusion." 3 Mr Glazebrook, if you had received in this email 4 from Duncan Fraser at the time and if he had asked 5 exactly the same question: is the scope likely to 6 change, and if so, should provision be made for that; 7 what would you have replied? 8 A. I'm not sure if "scope" is the right word. I'm not sure 9 if Duncan actually meant the detail of the works. The 10 overall scope was understood. I'm not sure where he's 11 coming from here. 12 But one thing I'm sure of is to expect to get price 13 certainty in the situation the design was at at the time 14 was completely unrealistic. 15 Q. Why was that? 16 A. If the design is incomplete and the processes are 17 flawed, it's inevitable that there's no way that any 18 contractor could possibly know what they're letting 19 themselves in for with any degree of certainty. It's 20 just impossible, and that's exactly what happened. 21 Q. Thank you. 22 Now, go back again to your statement, please, at 23 page 28. It concerns question 48, towards the top of 24 the page. 25 Again, in sub-answer 1, I think you touched upon 188 1 this. We asked for your views on these matters and you 2 said: 3 "It would have been remarkable to expect price 4 certainty when design was unfinished and approvals and 5 acceptance not completed." 6 Then in answer 2 we had asked: 7 "If final design packages were not expected until 8 late 2008, what was your understanding in relation to 9 how BBS could undertake due diligence on the design and 10 provide a fixed price?" 11 You replied: 12 "I have no idea. At the time I was astonished to 13 hear this." 14 Just for clarification, what was it you were 15 astonished to hear at the time? 16 A. That anyone could expect to produce a fixed price on an 17 incomplete design. The only way in which you can end up 18 with a fixed price in that situation is to price in 19 a load of risk. 20 Q. But presumably that wasn't a matter you were dealing 21 with, as in the engineering team? 22 A. Exactly so. 23 Q. Did you ever express your views in that regard to anyone 24 else in tie? 25 A. Without a doubt. 189 1 Q. To who? 2 A. Within my team, probably or possibly to Geoff, 3 Geoff Gilbert. I mean, the nature of some of the 4 communications in the project was that it was not always 5 easy to get time with people that were making some of 6 these decisions. 7 Secondly, the decisions were often made -- and again 8 it was a fait accompli. There was no reversion, no 9 possibility of going back. 10 So sometimes I would have drawn the conclusion that 11 it was almost a waste of energy to say anything because 12 nothing would change. 13 Q. Thank you. 14 Again, just sticking with your statement, in 15 sub-question 3, we asked: 16 "What was your understanding in relation to whether 17 changes to programme or scope were likely post Infraco 18 financial close/SDS novation?" 19 You replied: 20 "Whatever the Board thought, it was absolutely 21 inevitable that changes would occur. It could hardly 22 have been otherwise when the design was incomplete and 23 in virtually constant flux due to the ineffective 24 organisational arrangements." 25 Do you wish to add anything to that or does that 190 1 essentially sum up your views at that time? 2 A. Nothing to add. 3 Q. Can I take you, please, to a separate document. The 4 document is DLA00006338. This is a document produced by 5 Bilfinger Berger, a "Design Due Diligence Summary Report 6 from February 2008. 7 Do you recall seeing this document at the time? 8 A. No. No recollection of seeing that. 9 Q. I think you were sent it by the Inquiry as part of our 10 questions, I think; is that correct? 11 A. Possibly. I don't recall it. 12 Q. What I would like to do, please, is go to page 3. Now, 13 I'm not going to read this out because we looked at this 14 document this morning with Mr Crawley. But you'll see, 15 Mr Glazebrook, from the first paragraph, if we can blow 16 that up, we can see from the last sentence that this due 17 diligence process was based on relevant design 18 information received by BBS on 14 December 2007. 19 In the paragraph beneath that, in the last sentence, 20 in the paragraph, a reference to: 21 "According to the SDS document tracker, more than 22 40% of the detailed design information has not 23 been issued to BBS at all by the above-mentioned cut-off 24 date." 25 Would you have been in general agreement with that, 191 1 if you had seen this document at the time? 2 A. Most probably it looks about right, yes. 3 Q. Then what I would like to do, Mr Glazebrook, is just 4 give you a minute to read through the rest of page 1 and 5 I'll ask you whether, if you had seen this document at 6 the time, you would have been in broad agreement with 7 what's set out. 8 So maybe we can blow up the page so you can see it 9 better. 10 I'll give you a minute just to read on. (Pause) 11 A. Yes, I think that's a fair statement. My recollection, 12 though, is that there was a lot of ground investigation 13 and GI information available, because I do recall being 14 surprised that, as I remember, Bilfinger Berger 15 commented that there was insufficient GI to enable them 16 to proceed without risk on the basis of existing SDS 17 designs. And I was surprised at that, but how that was 18 resolved, I don't know. 19 But it looks like a fair comment, the whole page, 20 yes. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Can I just clarify, there's reference 22 in that page to pavement design. When you speak 23 about -- when we speak about pavement design, are they 24 in fact speaking about what we could call the road? 25 A. Well, it was more than that. The road bit was probably 192 1 the most complex, not necessarily for ground type 2 reasons, but because of trying to fit everything in 3 without too many conflicts. There are always conflicts. 4 So you have to make some derogations from specification. 5 But, I mean, in general, this is a fair statement, 6 I think. 7 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: No, I'm just seeking clarification as 8 to whether, when reference is made to the pavement, it's 9 not the pavement as the layman would think of it, rather 10 the road? 11 A. Well, actually seeing these words, full pavement 12 reconstruction, I recall now there was some issue around 13 should it be full reconstruction or should the pavements 14 be left and just do the works in the road. I don't 15 know -- I don't quite now how that arose or how it was 16 resolved, but I recall it as an issue. But it wasn't 17 one that we dealt with. I think that was one that the 18 Council dealt with. 19 Had there been full reconstruction, it would have 20 been clearly more costly, of the pavements. So it was 21 probably a balance between cost and practicality. In 22 other words, if you're doing a lot of work in the road, 23 it's highly likely you will damage or interfere with 24 pavements. 25 So it's equally likely that some elements of the 193 1 Council might have said: you've got to reconstruct from 2 building wall to building wall; whereas other elements 3 might have said: to minimise costs we will just do the 4 road and accept repairs on the pavement. But I don't 5 recall how that was resolved. I was not involved. 6 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Thank you. 7 MR MACKENZIE: Mr Glazebrook, in the paragraph stating: 8 "Over a large extent of the project, the tram line 9 runs at grade on existing roads ..." 10 It then goes on to refer to: 11 "... retain as much existing road construction as 12 possible. However, the necessary pavement surveys have 13 not been carried out. Therefore, the current design 14 does only allow for full pavement reconstruction and no 15 overlay." 16 I think the chair is suggesting that in that 17 paragraph, we see reference to "pavement", we should 18 read that as "road", "road surveys". So: 19 "... the necessary road surveys have not been 20 carried out. Therefore, the current design does only 21 allow for full road reconstruction and no overlay." 22 What is your views on that suggestion? 23 A. I'm afraid I don't know quite what that particular 24 sentence is getting at. I don't know what it meant by 25 "overlay", for instance. 194 1 Q. Does overlay usually refer to roads or to pavements? 2 A. I don't know, but probably more likely roads. 3 Q. Thank you. 4 Move on, please, if we may, to page 9. We see under 5 the conclusion a number of paragraphs. Could I again 6 please just ask you to read that to yourself and then 7 I'll ask you again at the end whether you broadly agree 8 with what -- sorry, if you had seen this document at the 9 time, if you would broadly have agreed with what's set 10 out. 11 A. Sure. (Pause) 12 That looks like a fair statement in all respects. 13 Q. Thank you. 14 Now, I think your position is that you were not sent 15 or shown this document at the time; is that correct? 16 A. I don't recall seeing it. 17 Q. I think that was Mr Crawley's position as well. 18 Now, do you consider that the tie commercial and 19 procurement team were in a position to know whether what 20 was contained in this report was correct or not without 21 checking with you and Mr Crawley? 22 A. Well, that's exactly the question. You would have 23 expected them to, but I don't recall that ever happening 24 and I don't understand why it didn't. 25 Q. But in answer to the question, do you consider that 195 1 tie's commercial and procurement team were in a position 2 to know whether what was contained in this report was 3 correct or not without checking with you and Mr Crawley? 4 A. I don't see how they could have done. 5 Q. Back to your statement, please. If we can go to 6 page 29. In question 50, a slightly different matter. 7 We had referred to an email in February 2008 from 8 Andy Steel of TSS in relation to the design review 9 process and the problems. In sub-question 2 we had 10 said: 11 "Had the design that had been completed by this time 12 been properly reviewed? Was it ever properly reviewed?" 13 You explained: 14 "Much design was reviewed. In engineering terms 15 much was acceptable. The principal causes of rejection 16 arose from CEC who claimed that it was not to standard, 17 didn't meet planning "requirements" (the latter 18 seemingly driven by subjective, not traceably objective, 19 judgment), conflicted with street features etc etc 20 . Effective specification and teamwork would 21 have prevented this situation arising." 22 Why did you put the word "requirements" in quotes 23 after "planning"? 24 A. If things are subjective, it's hard to see how they are 25 requirements. They might be called requirements by 196 1 somebody, but really a requirement is something which is 2 stated, rather than not stated and then rejected. 3 I think the frustrating thing to me and my team was 4 that, you know, it was evident to us that in CEC there 5 were many really good people, really, really good 6 people, in planning and in roads. I mean, one I would 7 name immediately, Andy Conway, whose name has come up, 8 he was absolutely superb, and he was exactly the sort of 9 person who, if he had been given the freedom to 10 collaborate with his great skill and judgment and 11 experience of resolving conflicts and subjective issues, 12 he would have been able to bring to closure very quickly 13 design issues, but I don't know whether he was prevented 14 from doing that. But certainly when he contributed to 15 discussions, he was exceptionally helpful. 16 It's just a shame we couldn't have had more of that 17 level of collaboration throughout the project, and 18 indeed, when we had planners in to talk to them, to try 19 and break this cycle of submission, rejection, 20 submission, rejection, they too were extremely helpful. 21 But we weren't able to sort of harness that positive 22 problem solving on a consistent and frequent basis. 23 Q. I suppose the question there, Mr Glazebrook, is whether 24 CEC knew what they wanted at the outset, but felt they 25 couldn't specify that perhaps for reasons of fettering 197 1 discretion, or whether at the outset, CEC weren't 2 entirely sure of what exactly they wanted and that's why 3 they couldn't say to the designers? 4 A. Absolutely. But in a situation like that, the way to 5 resolve that, to square that circle, is to say to the 6 designers: do something, don't complete it, don't submit 7 it, and then let's have a chat about it, and then you 8 can square off the corners very quickly. That would 9 have been an effective way of doing it. 10 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Do you know the extent to which other 11 agencies were involved in the planning process, such as 12 Historic Scotland, for instance? 13 A. I know they were involved and the cycle lobby and ADM 14 and Forth Ports and so on, but I don't recall that they 15 came up with issues that were either insurmountable or 16 resolvable in some way. I don't recall there being 17 particular problems on that score. 18 I know that one example with Historic Scotland was 19 building fixings, but that was fairly reasonably and 20 easily resolved between my team and them. 21 So I don't see that they were -- I don't recall that 22 they were an inhibiting factor of any significance. 23 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: I'm just wondering whether the 24 involvement of an organisation such as Historic Scotland 25 might inhibit Edinburgh planners from agreeing something 198 1 in advance, as it were. 2 A. That's certainly possible. I don't recall it coming up 3 as a specific issue, but that could be, yes. 4 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. On that issue, Mr Glazebrook, 5 I think it's right to say there were a number of 6 locations along the tram route where third parties may 7 have not been entirely clear as to what they wanted at 8 the outset. So by way of example, Forth Ports, 9 Haymarket, SRU at Murrayfield, the question of the rail 10 interchange out at Gogar was something new, and also the 11 RBS Gogarburn tram stop and airport. Is that fair to say 12 that in these locations the design was dependent on 13 third parties? 14 A. Exactly so, yes. I think in general the third parties 15 were not too hard to deal with. I mean, I remember one 16 big critical issue right at the outset when we were 17 involved was the alignment around Balgreen Road to 18 Murrayfield, in particular whether it should be at low 19 level adjacent to house gardens or whether it should be 20 high level adjacent to Network Rail, and it was 21 presented to us as an absolutely fundamentally 22 insurmountable issue. 23 But in fact it took just one meeting with 24 Network Rail in Glasgow to resolve the issue. So that 25 was one example of why it seemed hard to understand why 199 1 these critical issues had become so critical when, if 2 the right people got together and talked, the answer 3 emerged quite easily. 4 Q. Thank you. On to page 30 of your statement, please. At 5 question 52, we set out certain emails. And the top one 6 is an email dated 26 March 2008. You advised that: 7 "The sole item to be discussed at a forthcoming 8 meeting with BBS in relation to Design Construction was 9 "Jointly to answer the question: how will BBS construct 10 where design has not yet been design-assured by SDS?" 11 And a couple of paragraphs down, Ralf Honeck from 12 BBS noted: 13 "We confirm again that BBS will not start 14 construction without having a design approved by 15 relevant authorities and issued for construction." 16 Then in sub-question 1, we asked for your views on 17 these matters, and you said: 18 "It is self-evident that to start construction with 19 incomplete design is unwise." 20 To pause there, what would have been your view at 21 the time on awarding a construction contract with 22 incomplete design? 23 A. Foolish. It can't be absolutely 100 per cent complete. 24 It never can be. But when it was so far from 25 100 per cent completion was deeply unwise. 200 1 Q. Then going on in your response, you say: 2 "Effective teamwork would have smoothed this 3 turbulence. The absence of these factors allowed the 4 Infraco to claim endlessly for changes. The disconnect 5 between the commercial and engineering teams, together 6 with further escalating role unclarity and ad hoc and 7 on the hoof staffing and organisational changes further 8 contributed to the fires of confusion and cost 9 escalation." 10 Now, you say there was a disconnect between the 11 commercial and engineering teams. Do you know how had 12 that arisen? 13 A. I don't know how it had arisen. It's possible -- I have 14 been thinking about this recently. It's possible that 15 the commercial teams either were -- didn't want to -- 16 I don't mean this sarcastically -- display their lack of 17 understanding of engineering issues and thought that 18 disputes could be resolved just by sort of finance 19 person talking to finance person. Because quite a few 20 finance people came on late, maybe they didn't 21 understand, you know, who did what and who to go and 22 seek advice from. But we have the situation where there 23 was an engineering team, my engineering team, Bob Bell's 24 project management team, as he called it, and the 25 finance team. So there were three teams, all sort of 201 1 vying for some sort of completion of each element of 2 design. 3 In the case of finance, they might have just had an 4 imperative, which would not be unreasonable, to just 5 minimise the cost. In the case of project management, 6 it might have been an imperative to get the thing done 7 to programme. 8 In the case of engineering, our imperative was to 9 get the right thing done in the right way so the thing 10 would actually last, the constructed elements of the 11 project would last, for the intended timescale without 12 having to be re-engineered or anything like that. 13 So inevitably, in an incomplete design, there will 14 be those conflicts between cost, programme and content, 15 and that's exactly what transpired. 16 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Could I ask you, looking at this page 17 up on the screen, you're speaking above the question, it 18 refers to an email dated 28 March, presumably from you, 19 where you're seeking guidance from Mr Bell. And you 20 noted that you were not party to recent discussions with 21 Bilfinger Berger and Siemens in relation to the SDS 22 novation. And were "left with the feeling that BBS has 23 some undeclared agenda within their stance on this 24 issue". 25 What did you mean by that? 202 1 A. Yes. That's not my -- that's not because I came to that 2 conclusion. There seemed to be a sort of rising tide of 3 the embattled positions perhaps on both sides, on the 4 tie side that BBS were playing some sort of game. As 5 I say, this wasn't from me, this was words and vibes 6 that I picked up from being within the buildings down in 7 Edinburgh Park, and that's more or less what I'm saying 8 there. I was left with a feeling, it wasn't my 9 generated feeling, it was things that people said, that 10 led me to the unfortunate conclusion that sort of battle 11 lines were being drawn where they needn't have been. 12 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: So you're really quoting what you 13 have heard and -- 14 A. Yes. 15 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Taking it on board? 16 A. Yes. I was sad to hear that, very sad, because 17 certainly at the level I worked with, the engineers in 18 Siemens and Bilfinger Berger, they were excellent. 19 There was no -- I perceived no funny agenda or desire to 20 inflate prices at all. None of that at all. 21 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: Is this a convenient -- 22 MR MACKENZIE: Perhaps I should clarify one matter, my Lord, 23 before finishing this, if I may. You referred to Bob 24 Bell's project management team. I don't think we have 25 heard about that team before. Did that team come in 203 1 after the award of the Infraco contract? 2 A. Yes, I think so. I can't recall the exact time. I do 3 recall though when somebody came and told me, it might 4 have been Bob himself, that there were going to be these 5 project managers for each engineering discipline. 6 I recall saying: but why? 7 Q. That was my next question. 8 A. What benefit will that bring? And the answer would have 9 been along, as I recall, along the lines of: well, 10 that's to look at -- just, Tony, to keep the programme 11 on track. 12 But in fact I think it's the nature of -- if 13 somebody has an expertise, and they come on to deliver 14 an element of the project, in this case project 15 management on behalf of tie, they might see something 16 that they think is suboptimal and have a desire from 17 their experience to change it, without perhaps realising 18 that the very thing that they're doing is to actually 19 affect the programme that we're supposed to be managing. 20 It's just how people work. If they're given that sort 21 of freedom and nobody stops them, that's what they will 22 do. 23 MR MACKENZIE: Thank you. That may be an appropriate place 24 to pause, my Lord. 25 CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY: We will adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow 204 1 morning. Ms Fraser will explain to you when to come to 2 the building. 3 A. Fine. Can I leave my papers here? 4 (4.35 pm) 5 (The hearing adjourned until Thursday, 5 October 2017 at 6 9.30 am) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 205 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR DAVID CRAWLEY (affirmed) ..........................1 4 5 Examination by MR MACKENZIE ...................1 6 7 Questions by CHAIR OF THE INQUIRY ...........116 8 9 MR TONY GLAZEBROOK (sworn) .........................119 10 11 Examination by MR MACKENZIE .................119 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 206