

# EDINBURGH TRAM INQUIRY Selected Ex Tie Employees (SETE) Group Closing Submissions



(Revised) Beltrami & Co 10.05.18

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# TRI00000289\_C\_0001

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#### Key to references used in this document:

#### EXAMPLE 1

#### John Smith transcript 123.12-124.2 (Monday 1 January)

- Found in transcript of oral evidence of witness named at passage from page 123, line 12 to page 124, line 2
- Date provided only where witness provided evidence over more than one day

#### EXAMPLE 2

#### ABC00000123\_0001 para 1 or c1 or Q1

- Inquiry document: Haymarket reference number, followed by four digit page number where appropriate
- Paragraph number included where document is a report or statement which contains said numbering
- Clause number included where the document is a contract or other agreement
- Question number included where the document is a witness statement in question and answer format

# **INTRODUCTION**

The Selected Ex Tie Employees (SETE) group of Core Participants comprises the following people:

- **Steven Bell**, Chartered Civil Engineer. Former Managing Director of Track Group within First Engineering. Now Engineering Director with Amey Rail Limited.
  - > TIE Engineering & Procurement Director Sep 2006-Dec 2007
  - > Tram Project Director Jan 2008-Oct 2011
- **Susan Clark**, held various roles in British Rail, Railtrack and Network Rail before joining TIE as Project Director for the EARL project.
  - > Tram Programme Director/Deputy Project Director Aug 2006-Oct 2011
- Mark Hamill, Head of Risk Management for two entities prior to joining TIE.
   Latterly Vice President Risk Management at ADAC and now Project Director with Turner & Townsend.
  - > TIE Risk Manager May 2007-Dec 2010

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- Tom Hickman, former Zone Planning Engineer with First Engineering and Central Planner with BP Grangemouth. Senior Project Control Engineer with Turner & Townsend before joining TIE.
  - > TIE Programme Manager May 2007-Oct 2011
- Richard Jeffrey, Chartered Civil Engineer, former Managing Director of Edinburgh Airport Limited and former President of Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce.
  - > TIE Chief Executive Apr 2009-Jun 2011
- David Mackay, former Chief Executive of John Menzies plc and former Chairman of Scottish Rugby.
  - > TIE Chairman Nov 2008-Nov 2010
  - > TEL Chairman Feb 2006-Nov 2010
- Core Participant status was also granted to **Frank McFadden**, but as his written evidence has not been produced and no oral evidence has been required of him, it is not proposed to make any submissions on his behalf.

The submissions contained in this document extend only to the involvement of these individuals in the Edinburgh Tram Project. None of these submissions is intended to cover the acts or omissions of TIE as an organisation or as a limited company. However, standing that the named individuals formed a significant section of TIE's management at certain periods of the project, reference is made at various sections to actions taken, positions adopted, strategies pursued or efforts made by TIE as an organisation, insofar as these may reflect upon said individuals.

These submissions are intended to be read as supplementary to the oral and written evidence to the Inquiry which has been given by each member of the group:

- Bell written evidence TRI00000109, TRI00000257, TRI00000267, oral evidence Tuesday 24 October, Wednesday 25 October
- Clark written evidence TRI00000112, TRI00000258, oral evidence Wednesday 25 October
- Hamill written evidence TRI00000042, oral evidence Thursday 19 October
- Hickman written evidence TRI00000147, TRI00000255, oral evidence Wednesday 25 October
- Jeffrey written evidence TRI0000097, TRI00000172, oral evidence Wednesday 8 November, Thursday 9 November
- Mackay written evidence TRI000000113, TRI000000158, TRI00000173, oral evidence Tuesday 21 November

Likewise these submissions do not specifically reiterate matters which are already detailed in the Inquiry Statement of Main Documents and Events (TRI00000127).

There are approximately 17,000 Inquiry documents available to representatives of the Core Participants on the Haymarket electronic database. Each member of the group was personally provided with a smaller subset of these documents on a steelnet account when preparing their witness statements. When they came to provide their oral evidence, members of the SETE group were at times directed to various documents of which they had not been given prior notice via steelnet. Their answers should accordingly be considered in light of that factor, particularly where the whole of a document provides context to the selected passages which were put in evidence.

These submissions are only able to comment on documentary material which has been made available via Haymarket. It is noted that the volume of material originating from TIE and CEC on that database significantly outweighs the material from any of the contractors.

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# (1) GOVERNANCE AND REPORTING LINES

## <u>1A – Governance structure</u>

The formal governance for the tram project appears to have been at least complex, and arguably confused in some respects. However in the view of **David Mackay** as Chairman of the TIE, TEL and Tram Project Boards, it nevertheless worked in practice, with the TPB as the "workhorse" of the project where all the major stakeholders came together <sup>1</sup>. This sentiment was echoed by a number of others including Graeme Bissett<sup>2</sup>, **Richard Jeffrey** <sup>3</sup>, Tom Aitchison <sup>4</sup>, Kenneth Hogg <sup>5</sup> and Neil Renilson <sup>6</sup>. An audit of governance by Deloitte in February 2009 noted that:

"The governance arrangements which were developed as part of the business case for the Edinburgh Tram Project appear to have been operating effectively. No control weaknesses were noted in relation to the current governance structure."<sup>7</sup>

The "churn" in senior personnel at TIE cannot have been advantageous to the project. Mackay as Chairman, Jeffrey as Chief Executive and **Steven Bell** as Project Director each inherited responsibility from predecessors who departed for a variety of reasons,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> David Mackay transcript 3.15-4.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Graeme Bissett transcript 90.18-91.9 (Tuesday 31 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 5.4-8.17 (Wednesday 8 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 9.6-9.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Kenneth Hogg transcript 90.2-90.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Neil Renilson transcript 24.19-24.25 (Thursday 14 December)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> CEC00111617\_0004

few of which seem to have been positive <sup>8</sup>. In each case, the inherited responsibilities also carried with them a number of inherited problems – problems which were "baked in" to the project <sup>9</sup>.

The Council's reliance on TIE to deliver the tram project depended in large part upon the advice provided to TIE by their solicitors DLA <sup>10</sup>. To that extent, the fact that DLA were apparently "stood down" in 2007 during the Infraco procurement process has been highlighted as a matter of concern. The decision to stand down DLA appears to have been made by the then Executive Chairman of TIE Willie Gallagher, unbeknown even to Matthew Crosse, who was then the Project Director <sup>11</sup>. Mackay was likewise unaware at the time that this had occurred <sup>12</sup>, as it was never reported to the Board (see the various TPB minutes throughout the period which are silent on the issue). The decision to stand DLA down was later highlighted - and criticised - in a "Lessons learned" paper prepared by Bissett and into which Mackay had input in June 2008 <sup>13</sup>.

There has been some scrutiny of the formation of the approvals committee (comprising Gallagher, Renilson and Mackay <sup>14</sup>) to sign off the Infraco contract on behalf of TIE, TEL and the TPB. It appears from the evidence of each that whilst this committee met formally on 13 May 2008 <sup>15</sup>, its approval was based on detailed papers and representations from individuals in TIE regarding the particular issues. These

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See also TRI00000113\_0043 para 153

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> CEC00376412\_0003, TRI00000097\_0004 para 8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 27.15-28.3, 191.20-192.16, 194.19-195.4; Tom Aitchison transcript 37.15-37.19, 76.9-

<sup>76.13, 81.6-81.9</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript 17.5-17.22

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 12}\,{\rm TRI00000113}\_0006$  para 13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> CEC01344688\_0012, TRI00000113\_0004 para 9 & para 13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> CEC01515189

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> CEC01289240

representations had been made in the days and weeks running up to the date of approval, the individuals being in frequent contact during this period <sup>16</sup>. By the time that this committee was asked to give its approval, the contract had already been subject to approval earlier in the same day by the Council's Policy and Strategy Committee <sup>17</sup> and endorsed by the Council Executive <sup>18</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> David Mackay transcript 51.7-51.14, 53.9-54.2, 60.3-61.18; William Gallagher transcript 137.17-138.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> CEC01222172, David Mackay transcript 54.15-54.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> CEC01222438

## <u>1B – TIE reports to CEC</u>

Several Councillors expressed frustration about the level of information coming from TIE<sup>19</sup>. Generally however, these Councillors considered that they had sufficient information to make their decision to proceed with the project <sup>20</sup>. There was a recognition in CEC <sup>21</sup> and even amongst Councillors of a chronic problem with leaks of confidential information <sup>22</sup>, which was blamed on the "anti-tram elements" <sup>23</sup>.

In any event, TIE's principal reporting line was to the CEC officers (and TEL). In turn, the CEC officers had responsibility to report to the elected members <sup>24</sup>. It is therefore significant that TIE provided CEC officers with considerably more information than those officers passed on to Councillors. Whilst TIE was often given the opportunity to comment on Council reports, it had no editorial control, and the content was entirely a matter for the CEC officers <sup>25</sup>. The leader of the Council was concerned on discovering, via the Inquiry, that Council officers had rather more frank and detailed information about, for instance, the risks inherent in the incomplete design than was apparent in the Final Business Case <sup>26</sup>. A confidential briefing note circulated to CEC Directors in December 2007 <sup>27</sup> set out the information which CEC officers had at that time

<sup>21</sup> Nick Smith transcript 59.22-60.3 (Thursday 14 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> eg Lesley Hinds transcript 6.3-6.11 (Wednesday 6 September), Ewan Aitken transcript 122.11-122.14. Specific criticisms of TIE's reporting in relation to the later disputes is covered in Section 8D below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Jennifer Dawe transcript 72.17-72.24, Lesley Hinds transcript 22.6-23.13 (Wednesday 6 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Jeremy Balfour transcript 138.3-138.14, Lesley Hinds transcript 73.19-73.20 (Wednesday 6 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Jennifer Dawe transcript 53.12-53.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> TRI0000097\_0006 para 14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> TRI0000097 0007 para 19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Jennifer Dawe transcript 166.8-166.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> CEC01397539, CEC01398245\_0091

concerning virtually all of the issues which were to continue to bedevil the project. Significant sections of that note set out the following:

"3.2 It is currently unclear to CEC as to the scope of the works, the timescale of the project, and the allowance for incomplete detailed design and implication for gaining approved designs (technical and prior approvals). All the above can have potential impacts of time and costs and under this form of contract potential major cost implications because of delay and disruption to the position at financial close.

3.3 This form of contract was adopted "fixed price" on the basis of complete approved designs however as this is not where we are this current position requires to be reflected in the QRA and contingency allowance.

3.4 The under lying concern is that while it may be achievable to reach a financial close of £498m, this will result in a major challenge in managing this during the contract. It has been confirmed by tie that the extension of time from the current target would have a significant impact on overhead costs on this form of contract.

3.5 There is also a physical limit to accelerating the works because of the constraints of maintaining traffic movement in the city centre, hence lost time to extension of time may not be compressed...

6.2 There have been problems with Utilities adhering to the MUDFA programme and misadvising of where utility pipes/cables are active...

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7.1 BBS are presently unhappy with accepting the novation of the SDS contract as effectively SDS are not bound to process the designs within specific timescales, whereas BBS are timebound in terms of project delivery.

7.2 They will carry the financial risk of delay if SDS fail to deliver approved drawings on time. They have therefore asked tie whether there are any approvals which the Council would be willing to take back the risk on.

7.3 The Council has always sought tie to procure a fixed price contract. Inevitably, the absolute fixing of the price by BBS would require finalised approved drawings. For whatever reason, tie and SDS have failed to obtain approvals for the drawings to date.

7.4 Accordingly, the present price must be based on unapproved drawings. If the Council accepts the risk re the approvals rather than BBS this will likely lead to (i) inappropriate pressure being put onto planning colleagues to approve drawings simply to stop an delay and added expense to the project; and (ii) the Council being left to foot the bill for any consequent delays...

7.10 The fact that the design is incomplete will increase the risk of variation orders, delay to MUDFA and subsequent delay to Infraco and have a knock on effect to the TRO process.

14.1 tie project managers are worried by the lack of progress on key aspects of the contract, which suggests the Council should be also."

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When Infraco came with a last minute price increase on 30 April 2008, CEC Legal were well aware of the position (albeit that it was not communicated to Councillors), and Colin Mackenzie posed the question: "Are members being properly served by officers?" <sup>28</sup>. Mackenzie similarly had expressed the view in March 2008 that the Chief Executive of the Council should report to Councillors on the material changes since the FBC <sup>29</sup>.

The former Provost was "shocked" to discover that CEC officers were aware of the problems with the project "long before we were" <sup>30</sup>. Later in January 2010, Nick Smith of CEC Legal sent a briefing email to the incoming Alistair Maclean saying:

"be very careful what info you impart to the politicians as the Directors and tie have kept them on a restricted info flow. Given current sensitivities it is critical that this remain in place" <sup>31</sup>.

To the extent that this comment is critical of TIE, it evinces a misunderstanding of TIE's role in the structure which, as noted above, was to report to CEC officers rather than to elected members.

There were also however claims from some CEC officers that TIE were not always forthcoming with information. The Director of Corporate Services noted that part of TIE's frustration was that CEC had to take account of the public's views, whereas TIE had a more businesslike approach <sup>32</sup>. Maclean claimed to have experienced resistance and/or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> CEC01241689

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> CEC01399016, see also CEC01256710

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Lesley Hinds transcript 23.8-23.14 (Wednesday 6 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> CEC00473789

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Jim Inch transcript 108.20-109.1

dilatoriness from TIE when he sought a copy of the Infraco contract <sup>33</sup>, though he was forced to concede that in fact CEC already possessed a copy <sup>34</sup>. In turn however, the CEC Executive and CEC Legal resisted providing a copy of the contract to Councillors<sup>35</sup>.

The outgoing Director of City Development did not have concerns about TIE reporting <sup>36</sup>. The outgoing Council Solicitor likewise did not agree with her staff that there was a lack of transparency from TIE <sup>37</sup> and, on the contrary, felt that CEC officers were reluctant to share information that would have assisted TIE in driving the timetable forward <sup>38</sup>.

Whilst supportive of his colleague Nick Smith, whose enquiries had been described by **Richard Jeffrey** as "unhelpful and symptomatic of the CEC input lacking focus" <sup>39</sup>, Maclean conceded that he understood that TIE wished for there to be a single conduit for information requests by CEC, and that it did not make sense for CEC Legal to ask legal questions of TIE which could have been asked directly of DLA <sup>40</sup>. DLA were instructed by Jeffrey to provide CEC with any information it wished to have <sup>41</sup>.

Nick Smith noted that as Chief Executive Jeffrey was "much more open with CEC" than his predecessor Willie Gallagher <sup>42</sup>. The Director of City Development echoed this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Alastair Maclean transcript 39.12-39.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Alastair Maclean transcript 40.2-40.13. There is some doubt however over who in CEC actually read it – see Section 7C below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> CEC00037338, Alistair Maclean transcript 74.4-74.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Andrew Holmes transcript 110.24-111.9 (Wednesday 29 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 76.13-77.16, 78.9-79.14, 81.20-81.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 79.3-79.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> CEC00098050

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Alastair Maclean transcript 206.11-206.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 35.12-35.19, CEC00097692

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> CEC00482550

sentiment <sup>43</sup>, as did the Tram Monitoring Officer (TMO)<sup>44</sup>, who further noted that reporting on financial matters had improved when **David Mackay** as interim Executive Chairman got together with the CEC Chief Executive Tom Aitchison to effect better communication <sup>45</sup>, and that **Steven Bell** as Project Director was always able and willing to provide additional information if it was asked for <sup>46</sup>.

The TMO further confirmed that his periodic updates to the Council's Internal Planning Group (IPG) stemmed from information provided mainly from Bell (and/or Jeffrey and Mackay) <sup>47</sup>. These reports (which were FOISA exempt) show that information passed from TIE to the CEC officers that was not explicit in the TPB reports, which had a wider circulation and were susceptible to leaks <sup>48</sup>. For instance, as early as February 2009, the IPG report noted that:

"TIE has been involved over recent days in negotiating with BSC over some very significant claims. The financial impact of these claims could be substantial and, if a formal contract resolution process is required to deal with them, further programme delay is likely" <sup>49</sup>.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> "I found [Richard Jeffrey's] approach to be refreshingly open and direct" (TRI00000108\_0057 Q68(d); "I felt we started to get a much more forthright and realistic view of the status of the project." (TRI00000108\_0059 Q70)
 <sup>44</sup> Marshal Poulton transcript 123.15-123.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Marshall Poulton transcript 59.8-59.13, TRI00000022\_0058 para 170. Aitchison noted that Mackay "was always firmly of the view that TIE and the Council should try and work closely together" (TRI00000022\_0058 para 170).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Marshall Poulton transcript 79.23-80.2, 81.9-82.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Marshall Poulton transcript 80.21-80.24, 120.3-120.13, 122.20-123.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See e.g. TRI00000113\_0057 para 206

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> CEC00867662\_0010

March 2009's IPG report, following the dispute in Princes Street, provided a full summary of the strategic options being considered by TIE (with cost forecasts) including:

- termination: "this option presents very significant uncertainties";
- settlement: "likely to be a very (likely prohibitively) expensive option indeed";
- replacing Bilfinger;
- pursuing disputes through DRP: "DRP can only be a short term solution";
- truncation of the route; and
- project cancellation <sup>50</sup>.

Subsequent IPG reports from 2009 through 2010 relayed information from TIE not only on costs but also on more detailed exploration of truncation options <sup>51</sup>, negotiation of a potential On Street Supplementary Agreement (OSSA) <sup>52</sup> and on the strategic options under Project Pitchfork <sup>53</sup> and latterly Project Notice and Project Carlisle <sup>54</sup>. These, together with the DRP updates in the IPG reports, are considered further in Section 8 below.

<sup>52</sup> CEC00469787\_0003, CEC00450032\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> CEC00892626\_0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> CEC00677450\_0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> TIE00896564\_0003,CEC00462004\_003, CEC00236405\_0003, CEC00236872\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> CEC00271534\_0003, CEC00224208\_0003, CEC00242752\_0003

## <u>1C – Involvement of Transport Scotland</u>

"It is unhelpful to have a project of this nature where the Government's main transport agency is disengaged." – Richard Jeffrey <sup>55</sup>

With the exception of those who actually made or implemented the decision, there was broad consensus amongst the witnesses who gave evidence that the withdrawal of Transport Scotland (TS) in 2007 had a negative impact on the tram project. **David Mackay** was one of the voices on the TPB at the time strongly arguing in favour of Transport Scotland's continued involvement <sup>56</sup>.

This "hands off" approach was not followed in practice once disputes arose. Deputy First Minister John Swinney accepted that in March 2009 he instructed Mackay to get the Princes Street dispute "sorted" <sup>57</sup>, and subsequently the minister had regular discussions with Mackay and **Richard Jeffrey** in 2010 <sup>58</sup>, before ultimately meeting with representatives of the consortium and thereafter instructing the Council to go to mediation <sup>59</sup>.

As a separate issue, John Ramsay from TS criticised the reports coming from TIE, but his sentiments do not appear to have been shared by his superiors (Ainslie McLaughlin, Bill Reeve, Malcolm Reed), all of whom themselves had direct contact with their counterparts in TIE. Despite Transport Scotland's official withdrawal, these senior

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> TRI0000097\_0008 para 28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> TRS00004547\_0002. See also TRI00000113\_0042 para 150. Mackay also recruited Damian Sharp, who had been involved with the project on the TS side, to work for TIE in order to avoid losing his experience: TRI00000113\_0043 para 151.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> John Swinney transcript 110.20-111.11; David Mackay transcript 95.23-96.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> John Swinney transcript 127.3-127.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> John Swinney transcript 135.23-136.1; see Section 10A below

executives continued to meet with Mackay and Jeffrey and to be updated on the issues with the project <sup>60</sup>.

Ramsay conceded that TS got a more open working relationship with TIE when the relationship with the consortium deteriorated <sup>61</sup>. Whilst he initially suggested this improved relationship had only started to happen in 2010 <sup>62</sup>, he cited emails from as early as March 2009 as examples of this <sup>63</sup>. From TIE's perspective, the involvement of more senior members of TS such as Reeve and McLaughlin provided more active support than Ramsay's approach of criticising from the sidelines <sup>64</sup>.

In any event, Ramsay conceded that TS did receive information above and beyond the formal four-weekly reports, particularly at Quarterly Review meetings in which they were provided with the 'actuality' on costs <sup>65</sup>. This is particularly illustrated by looking at two documents considered in evidence, the first being the formal report issued to TS in November 2009. There it is stated <sup>66</sup>:

"We continue in this report to reflect an outturn estimate of £527.1m. However, given the commercial uncertainties with BSC and continuing delays to the project it is now considered unlikely that the full scope of Phase 1a will be completed within the available funding envelope of £545m. Until the key issues are resolved

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Ainslie McLaughlin transcript 160.10-160.18 (Tuesday 26 September), Richard Jeffrey transcript 12.20-13.8 (Wednesday 8 November), TRI00000097\_0008 para 26-27, David Mackay transcript 80.14-81.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> John Ramsay transcript 14.12-14.18 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> John Ramsay transcript 14.19-15.10 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> John Ramsay transcript 16.15-17.9, TRS00016963

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 13.20-14.25 (Wednesday 8 November), David Mackay transcript 146.5-146.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> John Ramsay transcript 96.2-96.13 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> CEC00681325\_0007

through the contractual and legal process, it will not be possible to forecast accurately a revised budget outturn."

Ramsay's complaint was that the outturn estimate above (and the accompanying text) had remained unchanged for some months. However, in the same month Jeffrey, **Steven Bell** and Stewart McGarrity also attended a Quarterly Review between TS and CEC. At that meeting the TIE representatives indicated privately that an outturn cost of £600m-£620m was by that stage more "realistic" <sup>67</sup>.

According to Ramsay, CEC officers tended to agree with TIE that until they had a handle on things to produce a new, realistic AFC, they would not reveal increasing costs to Councillors (though CEC officers and TS remained aware) <sup>68</sup>. At the previous Quarterly Review in June 2009, the CEC officers present had been:

"firmly of the view that quoting another AFC figure at this juncture isn't going to be helpful" <sup>69</sup>.

Ramsay conceded that the issue was not that Transport Scotland were not being given cost forecasts but that these forecasts were not being made "officially" <sup>70</sup>. The reason for this, however, is perhaps obvious in light of previous discussion about leaks and confidentiality; it would have been injurious to TIE and CEC (and the public purse) if an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> TRS00005121\_0003: Unlike the TPB Papers or TS four weekly reports, the minutes of this meeting were marked as FOISA exempt

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> John Ramsay transcript 218.17-219.20 (Wednesday 27 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> TRS00005116\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> John Ramsay transcript 51.11-51.16 (Thursday 28 September)

increased cost forecast - taking account of the contractual disputes – had been leaked into the public domain for the contractor to exploit <sup>71</sup>.

There were also contemporaneous concerns within TIE that Ramsay's criticisms were disingenuous - when he complained in May 2010 that:

"there are parts of the report that barely change from month to month regardless of developments"<sup>72</sup>

McGarrity sent a note to Jeffrey (copied to Alan Coyle of CEC) in the following terms 73:

"You have been giving the Minister / B. Reeve regular briefings on where we are and the uncertainties we face. They have had the Pitchfork Report and the briefing on it. Steve and I have been through to Glasgow and have taken Jerry Morrissey and Ramsay through the cost estimates for the Pitchfork Option 3 in great detail. The attached note is written as if none of that has taken place and maybe a marker needs put down that we agreed long ago with them not to speculate on final outturn and programme in the formal periodic report until we had some certainty."

In response, Coyle said:

"I have a list of issues with Mr Ramsay over the last few months where he has not been acting in the spirit of supporting the project."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> TRI0000097\_0043 para 249

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> CEC00374576\_0003

<sup>73</sup> CEC00374576\_0001

All of this tends to suggest that the issue lay more with Mr Ramsay himself than it did with TIE's reporting.

Ramsay's specific complaints about TIE's reporting of the outcomes of adjudications are further addressed in Section 8F below. His complaint about reporting in relation to programme is dealt with in Section 5C.

## (2) **PROCUREMENT**

TIE's procurement strategy was proposed to minimise cost through disaggregation of the project and through novation to transfer risk contractually <sup>74</sup>, based on the model that the then Project Director Ian Kendall had used for the DLR project <sup>75</sup>. However in the view of Professor Flyvberg:

"the risk mitigation effect of the Edinburgh Tram project's procurement strategy was untested at the final business case stage and in hindsight might be considered optimistic."<sup>76</sup>

According to Stuart Fair's assessment of the strategy:

"the highly complex contractual position, in reality, set the conditions which ended with conflict, delay and a significant recalibration of outcomes."<sup>77</sup>

and:

"The project itself was beset with many difficulties from the very start, and looking at the evidence, it felt like these initial difficulties set the scene, and the die was cast for significant problems to arise, and they emerged from these initial difficulties and weaknesses."<sup>78</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> TRI00000264\_0019 para 3.10, TRI00000265\_0019 para 7.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> TRI00000043\_0004 para 9, CEC01348426\_0012 para 10.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> TRI00000265\_0012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> TRI00000264\_0083 para 5.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Stuart Fair transcript 132.18-132.22

Kendall's immediate successor Andy Harper considered that the procurement model was:

*"unnecessarily complex as it relied on multiple contractual novations, which from experience seldom work well."*<sup>79</sup>

However Harper considered that his remit was to drive the process forward but, in doing so, not to revisit Kendall's procurement process <sup>80</sup>. This may have contributed to 'lock-in' at the project level, as described by Fair <sup>81</sup>.

Generally speaking, none of the SETE group were directly involved in either the development of the procurement strategy nor in the Infraco procurement process <sup>82</sup>. **David Mackay** concurred with the general consensus that the strategy, particularly to disaggregate the contracts, was a mistake <sup>83</sup>. It led to various problems being "baked in" to the project <sup>84</sup> by the time he and then **Richard Jeffrey** took the helm at TIE.

**Steven Bell** did not formally transition to his role as Project Director until the first quarter 2008, with some overlap occurring at that time with his predecessor Matthew Crosse. It was intended that Crosse would remain responsible for the procurement phase and that Bell would be responsible for the delivery phase <sup>85</sup>. Bell was however involved to some extent in negotiation of two agreements at the tail end of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> TRI00000043\_0004 para 9

<sup>80</sup> TRI0000043\_0016

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> cf WED00000645\_0003, TRI00000264\_0011 para 1.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Steven Bell and Susan Clark were members of the Infraco tender evaluation panel. However that involved implementing a strategy which had already been agreed, rather than developing it: TRI00000109\_0007, TRI00000112\_0017

<sup>83</sup> TRI00000113 paras 4, 9, 16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> CEC00376412, CEC00679607\_0001, TIE00894394 pages 5-6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript **7.22-8.1**, TRI00000109 para **2.1**, **5.1** 

procurement process, namely the Citypoint Agreement in March 2008 <sup>86</sup> and the Kingdom Agreement in April <sup>87</sup>. He had not been involved in the Rutland Square Agreement in February <sup>88</sup>, which was concluded by Crosse on behalf of TIE <sup>89</sup>.

The Citypoint Agreement is considered in Section 5A below. Bell's limited involvement in the negotiation of the Infraco contract and in particular Schedule Part 4 is considered in Section 7 and Appendix 2.

The Kingdom Agreement was the ultimate result of a last minute demand for a price increase by Bilfinger Berger announced by telephone on 30 April 2008 <sup>90</sup>. Bell doubted the credibility of the consortium's justifications for this increase given that no such issues had been flagged during a meeting between the parties two weeks earlier <sup>91</sup>. In evidence, Scott McFadzen of Bilfinger suggested that this demand was borne out of increasing alarm that this was "not going to be a good project" given the lateness of the design and MUDFA and the consequent likelihood of disputes emerging <sup>92</sup>. This does not accord with the reasons given by the consortium at the time, which were that the additional £12m was as a result of "fluid market conditions" <sup>93</sup>. McFadzen's written

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> CEC01463888. It should be noted that in providing his statement, Bell confused the Citypoint Agreement with the earlier Rutland Square Agreement in February (TRI00000109\_0043 para 29.1)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> WED0000023

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Steven Bell transcript 62.20-62.25 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> CEC01284179\_0005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> CEC01274958

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> TRI00000109\_0060 para 46.3, CEC01338847\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 111.21-12.7

<sup>93</sup> CEC01275063\_0002, see also Richard Walker transcript page 103.19-104.13 and TRI00000037\_0105 para 321

<sup>94</sup> TRI0000058\_0048 para 168

doubts about the credibility of the consortium's claims appear therefore to have been well founded.

The process by which the Kingdom Agreement was negotiated is set out in the 'Record of Recent Events' which formed part of the Close documents. This set out that the alternatives to reaching agreement with Bilfinger on the additional payment (introducing a new civils contractor to work with Siemens, returning to the unsuccessful bidder, or full scale reprocurement) were all forecast to be more costly options <sup>95</sup>.

The agreement ultimately reached comprised a phased incentivisation payment of £4.8m, and a further compensation payment of £3.2m in the event that Phase 1b did not proceed. In return, Infraco withdrew a number of outstanding issues, provided indemnities, waived rights to time relief or payment from events during the four months preceding contract award, capped road reconstruction costs at £1.5m (see Section 6C) and accepted the risk of changes from early release of IFC information <sup>96</sup>. Accordingly, to offset the increased cost, conditions 3-8 of the Agreement provided (according to the CEC Executive):

"a range of negotiated improvements in favour of tie Ltd and the Council in order to reduce the risk of programme delays and minimise exposure to additional cost pressures, as well as better contractual positions"

to offset the increased cost. 97

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> CEC01338847 pages 6-8. See also TRI00000113\_0038 para 137, CEC01231125, TIE00359941.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> WED0000023

<sup>97</sup> CEC01246115, TRI00000109\_0065 para 51

It was suggested during the Inquiry hearing that the incentivisation payment did not appear to be dependent upon completion by a certain date <sup>98</sup>. However, the payment was specified to fall due on completion "as detailed on the Contract Programme in Schedule Part 15" <sup>99</sup>. Schedule Part 15 set out clearly the sectional completion dates to be achieved <sup>100</sup>.

<sup>98</sup> Michael Flynn transcript 83.3.83.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> WED000023\_0001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> USB00000080. See also TRI00000109\_0064 Q50.

# (3) **DESIGN**

### <u>3A – TIE management of SDS</u>

It is uncontroversial to say that the lateness of design was a perennial problem for the project. The problems appear to have begun almost from the inception of the SDS contract in 2005: Alistair Richards considered that the problems originated with the appointment of Parsons Brinckerhoff instead of Faber Maunsell and Mott McDonald who had taken the design through the parliamentary process <sup>101</sup>. Both **Steven Bell** and **Susan Clark** inherited some responsibility for design issues around 2007 due to Ms Clark's promotion to deputy Project Director and Bell's 'troubleshooting' role as Engineering and Procurement Director.

Notably, David Crawley and Tony Glazebrook were recruited in 2007 to resolve the issues with SDS which Crawley had identified <sup>102</sup> in a review commissioned by Bell <sup>103</sup>. They then dealt with a number of critical issues which had led to a complete blockage and the SDS team temporarily leaving Edinburgh <sup>104</sup>. These issues were unpicked through to July of that year at which point design progress appears to have picked up again <sup>105</sup>. Meanwhile Damian Sharp, who was the TIE Design and Consents Manager from 2007 to 2011, noted both the SDS underperformance <sup>106</sup> and the extent to which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> TRI00000116\_0004 Q4a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> TRI0000030\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> CEC01811257, Matthew Crosse transcript 30.25-31.21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> David Crawley transcript 19.8-19.11, TRI00000109\_0019 Q9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> David Crawley transcript 19.12-19.19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Damian Sharp transcript 143.1-7 – a view shared by others in TIE: Matthew Crosse transcript 54.19-54.23, Graeme Barclay transcript 62.2-62.23

they were being held up by decisions being needed from others <sup>107</sup>, particularly CEC who were asking for things which were inconsistent with the Tram Design Manual <sup>108</sup>. Trudi Craggs, one of Sharp's predecessors in the role, noted that a lack of engagement by CEC may have cost the project six to nine months in delay in the earlier stages <sup>109</sup>.

SDS were likewise critical of CEC as the major party responsible for delay to the whole programme<sup>110</sup>, noting that CEC as the planning authority were "holding everything up" whereas TIE were trying to move the project along <sup>111</sup>. On TIE's side, Glazebook entirely shared the sentiment that CEC:

"directed its energies into constant interference and rejection of offered design"<sup>112</sup>.

SDS also conceded their own poor management and performance <sup>113</sup>.

Post financial close in May 2008 responsibility for progressing the design passed to the Infraco under the novation agreement, which is covered in Section 3C below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> Damian Sharp transcript 143.1-7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Damian Sharp transcript 154.12-155.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> CEC02084810\_0003. Echoed by Steve Reynolds of SDS: TRI00000069\_0032 para 107.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> TRI0000069\_0091 para 267

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> TRI00000069\_0090 para 265-266, Jason Chandler transcript 24.12-24.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> TRI0000039\_0005 Q8.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> PBH00020993, PBH00028568

#### <u>3B – Provision for design risk</u>

In the course of the Inquiry there has been discussion of the adequacy of the provision for design delays in TIE's risk allowance at financial close. In particular, it has been highlighted that there was a suggestion by the Council's 'B team' for a £25 million risk premium to cover this issue. The evidence which was led suggested that this was discussed with **Steven Bell** and **Susan Clark**, amongst others. It should be noted however that neither Bell nor Clark were asked about this issue in either written or oral guestions.

A provision of £3.3m to cover delay in submission of SDS designs was included in the risk allowance. Donald McGougan raised this issue at the February 2008 TPB meeting, where it was noted that neither the consortium nor the failed bidder had been prepared to take on this particular risk <sup>114</sup>.

The suggestion for a further risk premium over and above this appears to have been made by Duncan Fraser following his review of the Draft Final Business Case. In particular, he felt that the risk allowance of £3.3m for the late arrival of IFC drawings was insufficient given the likelihood of changes, and that neither Bell nor Clark, who met with him to discuss the issue, convinced him otherwise <sup>115</sup>. Accordingly he proposed a risk premium of £25m, which he said that they were unhappy with <sup>116</sup>.

<sup>114</sup> CEC01246825\_0006

<sup>115</sup> Duncan Fraser Transcript 84.17-85.2

<sup>116</sup> Duncan Fraser Transcript 85.21-86.1.

This proposal was inserted by Fraser into a draft Council report for 20 December 2007<sup>117</sup>, following a suggestion to his superior Andrew Holmes <sup>118</sup>. Holmes however instructed him to remove it <sup>119</sup>, resulting in a 'compressed' report <sup>120</sup>. In evidence, Holmes indicated that he would have questioned how the £25m figure was made up <sup>121</sup>. He claimed not to recall any discussion about the issue at the IPG meeting <sup>122</sup> despite Fraser's comment in the email:

"At the last IPG I raised this topic however there was a concern about such a statement being minted." (sic) <sup>123</sup>

Two months later, on 28 February 2008 there was an exchange in CEC Legal between Colin Mackenzie and Gill Lindsay where the latter stated that:

*"I believe that the residual risk re SDS may be very significant... the previous level of £3m is appearing to me grossly undervalued"* <sup>124</sup>.

Despite this, Lindsay together with other senior CEC officers recommended to Tom Aitchison that the contract be concluded in May, with the provision for design risk remaining at the same level.

<sup>117</sup> CEC01384000

<sup>118</sup> CEC01383667

<sup>119</sup> Duncan Fraser Transcript 86.2-86.4

<sup>120</sup> CEC01384036

<sup>121</sup> Andrew Holmes Transcript 34.16-34.19. According to Fraser's B Team colleague Rebecca Andrew, "[t]here was no science to the £25m figure" (TRI00000023\_0040 Q39(3)).

<sup>122</sup> Andrew Holmes Transcript 35.4-35.10

<sup>123</sup> CEC01383667

<sup>124</sup> CEC01400987

Mackenzie in evidence said that he shared these concerns <sup>125</sup>. On 10 April 2008, Mackenzie sent an email to Andy Conway with concerns about delay to the approvals process for Russell Road Bridge <sup>126</sup>. In evidence he said this might have had a potential cost of £2 million <sup>127</sup>.

In the report to the IPG, a figure "in excess of £2m" was given as the cumulative cost for delay in approvals at three locations on the critical path, namely Haymarket Tramstop and Gogar Depot in addition to Russell Road Bridge<sup>128</sup>. Mackenzie's concern was that this amounted to a significant portion of the £3.3m allowance in the budget. He nevertheless instructed the recipients of the email, which was shared widely within CEC, not to discuss the matter with TIE <sup>129</sup>. The email exchange notes that Conway had an 'unsatisfactory' exchange with Damian Sharp on the issue, albeit that Sharp was not questioned in relation to this matter.

Mackenzie conceded that CEC moved forward "with their eyes fully opened in relation to that risk" <sup>130</sup>. The terms of the IPG report noted above confirm this. The Council's Chief Executive said the £2m figure was in any event exaggerated <sup>131</sup> and the actual cost was much lower; he considered that appropriate financial provision had been made for the risk <sup>132</sup>. Likewise the Council's Finance Director was content that this potential £2m risk was covered within the £3.3m allowance <sup>133</sup>: TIE and CEC were clear that they

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<sup>125</sup> Colin MacKenzie Transcript 70.16-70.19

<sup>126</sup> CEC01401109

<sup>127</sup> Colin Mackenzie Transcript 82.14-82.18

<sup>128</sup> CEC01246992\_0005

<sup>129</sup> CEC01401109\_0006

<sup>130</sup> Colin Mackenzie Transcript 109.24-110.1

<sup>131</sup> Tom Aitchison Transcript 113.2-113.10

<sup>132</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 114.1-114.5

<sup>133</sup> Donald McGougan Transcript 22.24-23.7 (Thursday 30 November)

would not, as client, initiate any post-contract changes; normal design development was a risk for the contractor (see section 7 below); and CEC had supplemented staff for approvals <sup>134</sup>. In addition there were three significant areas of provisional sums specifically earmarked to cover Forth Ports, Picardy Place and Murrayfield <sup>135</sup>.

Mackenzie noted that TIE assurances on the £3.3m allowance came from Stewart McGarrity<sup>136</sup>. An email of 29 November 2007<sup>137</sup> shows that it was McGarrity who suggested that Fraser meet with Clark and Bell to discuss the issue. McGarrity's written comments on the proposed £25m premium were:

"Alarm bells all over the place – what additional £25m???" 138

In his own evidence, McGarrity noted that it was important to differentiate between design evolution and changes in scope <sup>139</sup>, as he had commented in relation to paragraph 3.3 in the same document:

## "there is no ability to absorb scope changes here"<sup>140</sup>.

He understood that Fraser's proposed £25m was to cater for design scope changes as described in that paragraph <sup>141</sup>. Whilst an allowance could have been added for scope changes by CEC, McGarrity's view was that this should not have been incorporated into

<sup>134</sup> Donald McGougan Transcript 46.4-46.15 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>135</sup> Donald McGougan Transcript 47.4-47.10 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>136</sup> TRI0000054\_0082, para 172

<sup>137</sup> CEC01383999

<sup>138</sup> CEC01384000\_0003

<sup>139</sup> Stewart McGarrity transcript 130.19-131.2 (Tuesday 12 December)

<sup>140</sup> CEC01384000\_0002

<sup>141</sup> Stewart McGarrity transcript 133.7-133.8 (Tuesday 12 December). This is also the understanding of Bell and Clark.

TIE's budget <sup>142</sup>. Accordingly the report to the Council by CEC officers in December 2007 set out that:

"The risk contingency does not cover major changes to scope... Changes to the programme could involve significant costs, not currently allowed for in the risk contingency" <sup>143</sup>.

<sup>142</sup> Stewart McGarrity transcript 134.11-134.17 (Tuesday 12 December)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> CEC02083448\_0007 para 8.16

#### <u>3C – Infraco management of SDS</u>

Following contract close in May 2008, responsibility for progressing the design – and thus for managing the designer - passed to the Infraco under the SDS Novation agreement <sup>144</sup>. Whilst the design had been 66% complete at November 2007 <sup>145</sup> (in line with the original estimate in the draft Interim Outline Business Case <sup>146</sup>), by November 2010, a full three years later, it was still only 80% complete <sup>147</sup>. It was unclear to TIE what BSC was doing to manage SDS. Evidence of their actions was sought but never provided <sup>148</sup>. In October 2008 SDS highlighted issues with the absence of Siemens trackform and OLE design and low volume of activity on BSC design development <sup>149</sup>. By May 2009, SDS noted that changes were still being instructed and it was accordingly not possible to define an end date <sup>150</sup>. In the same month, there was concern within Siemens that it was late in its review of the SDS design <sup>151</sup>.

According to Bilfinger's Project Director, Parsons attempted to evade responsibility <sup>152</sup> and were "slow and under-resourced" <sup>153</sup>. He was of the view that Parsons:

"were just fee earning when they could... they were probably putting some reasonably lightweight guys on it because they did not think it really mattered."<sup>154</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> CEC01880421

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> CEC01023764\_0012

<sup>146</sup> CEC01875336\_0054 para 5.7.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> TIE00896978\_0009

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Damian Sharp transcript 170.20-170.22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> CEC01149381

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> PBH00003626

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> SIE00000211

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> TRI0000058\_0044 para 156

 $<sup>^{153}\,\</sup>text{TRI00000058}\_0012$  para 42

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> TRI00000058\_0008 para 28

The poor performance by Parsons continued after novation <sup>155</sup>. According to Martin Foerder however, there was "not a high motivation to get things done" on Bilfinger's part, standing the contractual disputes <sup>156</sup>. It also appeared that Infraco changed many designs to suit their own design and risk agenda <sup>157</sup>.

Around December 2009, Bilfinger entered into a side agreement with SDS, which was not intimated to TIE despite the requirements of clause 11.5 of the Infraco contract <sup>158</sup> and formal requests by DLA <sup>159</sup>. The motivation to reach such an agreement appeared to stem from a recognition by Infraco of:

"BB/Siemens failure to provide design information, carry out the CIDR etc in time and in accordance with the current design programme. This could result in Infraco being exposed under the Infraco contract if as a result of the OSSA or success in the adjudications, TIE instructs or Infraco become obliged to proceed with the works – for which there is no design at this time as a result of Infraco failures" <sup>160</sup>.

There was also a desire:

"to have SDS 'on side' to assist with future ND claims" <sup>161</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> TRI00000058\_0052 para 178

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 69.14-69.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> TRI00000039\_0034\_para 58(6)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> CEC00036952\_0034

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> e.g. CEC00337893

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> CEC00328711\_0002 (emphasis added)

<sup>161</sup> ibid

Clause 9 of the agreement required SDS to take all measures and provide all information which Infraco required to obtain TIE's acceptance that:

"identified design changes not yet instructed by TIE... are TIE changes under the Infraco contract" <sup>162</sup>.

SDS were accordingly incentivised to assist Bilfinger in substantiating claimed changes for which Bilfinger sought additional costs. DLA raised concerns with Parsons directly on this issue, noting that:

"Our clients remain seriously concerned over the programme and cost implications of the unusually high volume of design changes or alleged design changes that are still appearing and causing claims relating to design development." <sup>163</sup>

TIE ultimately served Infraco with Remediable Termination Notices both in relation to this unapproved side agreement <sup>164</sup> as well as for the failure by the Infraco to deliver an assured integrated design <sup>165</sup>.

By the time of Mar Hall in March 2011, there were 2872 open technical approval comments on the design, which were reduced after mediation to 85 in a matter of two weeks <sup>166</sup>. Damian Sharp was closely involved in this process on the TIE side and formed the clear view that BSC knew what they were going to do to clear the majority of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> TRI00000011\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> CEC00337893

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> CEC02084521

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> CEC02084522

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> CEC02083973\_0118

these items, but were withholding from doing so for tactical reasons: it was not feasible for the number of drawings to have been produced in that timescale <sup>167</sup>. Martin Foerder admitted in his witness statement that SDS had been incentivised to finish off design without TIE's knowledge <sup>168</sup>, but equally confirmed that the consortium did not progress design between October 2010 (when it downed tools <sup>169</sup>) and March 2011 <sup>170</sup>.

In a March 2011 report commissioned by TIE, Acutus concluded that:

"late delivery of design is a most significant source of delay and appears to be the dominant cause of delay to the overall delivery of the Infraco works in most, if not all, parts of the tram route" <sup>171</sup>.

This is covered further in Section 4B below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> Damian Sharp transcript 178.6-181.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> TRI0000095\_0052, para 162, Martin Foerder transcript 95.2-95.22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> TIE00409574

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 162.10-162.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> WED00000533\_0114 para 13.1.1.

# (4) UTILITIES

## 4A – Problems with MUDFA

Whilst the impact of MUDFA delays on the Infraco construction programme is considered in Section 4B below, there is a broad consensus that significant difficulties were experienced with utilities diversions on the project. It was recognised that significant effort was put into MUDFA by TIE <sup>172</sup>. TIE had a dedicated Commercial Manager (John <u>Casserly</u>) and Construction Director (Graeme Barclay) for the MUDFA works. Both **Steven Bell** and **Susan Clark** held responsibility in their supervisory roles. It is of significance to note that:

- Cooperation by the statutory utility companies (SUCs) in providing records and approvals was less than satisfactory <sup>173</sup> and their records were inaccurate <sup>174</sup>.
- This led to a number of unexpected finds during the course of the works <sup>175</sup>, including double the number of expected utilities found <sup>176</sup>, and various other issues like archaeological remains and a leper colony <sup>177</sup>. Risks associated with MUDFA were consistently flagged up in reports to CEC <sup>178</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> Duncan Fraser transcript 23.16-23.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript 119.11, Andrew Malkin transcript 188.12-188.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> James McEwan transcript 164.14-164.16, Graeme Barclay transcript 24.19-24.22, TRI00000112\_0045 Q74, TRI00000109\_0011 Q7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> Steven Bell transcript 177.15-177.20 (Tuesday 24 October), Susan Clark transcript 134.7-134.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> Graeme Barclay transcript 30.21-31.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> TRI00000109\_0022 Q11(1)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 4.18-4.20, 8.21-8.23, 88.10-88.16, 93.8-93.13

- Ground-penetrating radar had been employed by SDS to scope out potential difficulties but it was not entirely reliable <sup>179</sup>. Digging trial holes gave a clearer picture but was wholly impractical to carry out along the whole route, so the focus was on areas which appeared to be congested based on the records <sup>180</sup>. TIE contra-charged SDS for trial holes which it instructed the MUDFA contractor to carry out <sup>181</sup>.
- The congested utilities and unexpected finds led to a 180% increase in the scope of the works <sup>182</sup>, from an initial 27 kilometres to almost 50 kilometres during the period of TIE's involvement in the project <sup>183</sup>.
- The unexpected finds and increase in scope meant that even though the MUDFA works had a contingency allowance of 87% (£35m against a budget of £40m), a "substantial amount of money" <sup>184</sup>, that allowance proved nevertheless to be inadequate <sup>185</sup>. The initial 'float' in the programme was also consequently eroded<sup>186</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> Graeme Barclay transcript 39.21-39.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Graeme Barclay transcript 40.9-40.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Graeme Barclay transcript 39.1-39.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> Dave Anderson transcript 132.19-133.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> TRI00000109\_0157 para 131

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 89.19-89.20, CEC01559075\_0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> John Casserley transcript 63.17-64.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>186</sup> SWT00000056\_0004, CEC01018359\_0035

- The design for the utilities diversions produced by the SDS subcontractor Halcrow was itself late <sup>187</sup>, going back to the period predating Bell and Clark's involvement <sup>188</sup>.
- There was poor performance by Carillion <sup>189</sup>, leading to TIE winding down their involvement and awarding outstanding sections of the work to other contractors<sup>190</sup>. The work handed over to Clancy Dowcra amounted to 57% of the diversions in Section 1a of the route, whilst Farrans were contracted to carry out 100% of the diversion work in Section 7b <sup>191</sup>.
- Carillion sought to blame their poor performance on, amongst other things, resourcing issues <sup>192</sup>, citing the delays in design <sup>193</sup>. However the terms of the MUDFA contract made clear that the drawings would not be complete at the outset <sup>194</sup> and that the contractor and the designer were required to work together to achieve an efficient design and buildability <sup>195</sup> and to provide support to TIE and the designer to obtain approvals and agreement with the SUCs <sup>196</sup>. Carillion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> Steven Bell transcript 177.7-177.11 (Tuesday 24 October), Susan Clark transcript 139.10-139.22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript 6.24-6.25, 7.22-7.25, 8.1, 12.21-12.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> TRI00000024\_0063 para 201, CEC01145983, James McEwan transcript 162.5-162.22, 164.17-164.21, 167.7-167.19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> CEC00245907\_0006, TRI00000109\_0143 para 114. There appears to have been some confusion as to the extent of this, it having been suggested that fresh contractors were brought in to complete less than 4% of the work (see Graeme Barclay transcript 74.17-74.22, 75.10-75.25, 76.1-76.6). However, the 96% completion figure given in August 2009 was explicitly related to the work which was left in Carillion's hands *after* this exercise; prior to this 22% of the overall utilities diversion work was incomplete (CEC00843272\_0055).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> Graeme Barclay transcript 74.11-74.25, CEC00843272\_0055, CEC00739552\_0014

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> Andrew Malkin transcript 118.16-118.25, 119.21-119.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> Andrew Malkin transcript 156.9-156.25, 158.15-158.25, 159.1-159.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> CAR00000300 Sch 1 c2.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> CAR00000300 Sch 1 c2.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>196</sup> CAR00000300 Sch 1 c2.41.5

also sought to allocate blame on other issues which were contractually their responsibility <sup>197</sup>.

- Utilities diversion work was subject to strict traffic management constraints and city embargoes at different times of year <sup>198</sup>.
- Due to the difficulties experienced, Carillion sought to move to a cost plus contract <sup>199</sup>. This was rebuffed by Bell who held them to their original obligations<sup>200</sup>. Carillion were granted extensions of time <sup>201</sup>, but this related to the additional work standing the increase in scope noted above and did not imply that Carillion were not at fault <sup>202</sup>.
- Utilities conflicts in areas already worked on by Carillion were subsequently established by Turner & Townsend <sup>203</sup>. It should be noted that the settlement agreement between TIE and Carillion in November 2010 had specifically set out that:

"this Agreement does not settle and TIE shall not be deemed to have waived any liability or obligation of the MUDFA contractor to TIE arising out of or in respect of any defects in the MUDFA works"<sup>204</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Such as the lack of hazard reports – Andrew Malkin transcript 183.6-183.14, CAR00000340 Sch 1 c2.42, c5.1.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> Steven Bell transcript 177.1-177.20, 187.20-187.23, 190.6-190.8 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>199</sup> CAR00000301, Graeme Barclay transcript 71.1-71.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> CAR00000340, James McEwan transcript 165.21-166.4, Graeme Barclay transcript 72.1-72.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> CAR00000194, CAR00000163, CAR00000145

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> Graeme Barclay transcript 111.1-111.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Julian Weatherley transcript 76.5-76.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> TIE00094413\_0002 c5.1

## 4B – Impact of MUDFA delays

In April 2009, TIE instructed Acutus, an independent construction consultancy, to assess two claims by BSC, both relating to the delay associated with the MUDFA works <sup>205</sup>.

Acutus noted that BSC made claims supported only by selective information despite the requirements of the contract<sup>206</sup>; BSC impacted MUDFA delays into the baseline programme, but did not take into account other events<sup>207</sup>. By Acutus' assessment, other factors appeared to be more significant in delaying the work including, significantly, the lack of progress on design<sup>208</sup>. By the time of these claims, responsibility for production of the design lay with the consortium, and TIE had little visibility on the issue<sup>209</sup>. By obtaining an extension of time based on utilities delays, BSC could protect itself against liability for delays in producing the design<sup>210</sup>.

When submitting INTC 429 in October 2009 for £4.3m of additional costs relating to the MUDFA Rev 8 programme, BSC claimed that MUDFA was "the dominant cause of delay on the project" <sup>211</sup>. Acutus noted that this was a questionable claim not least because

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> Robert Burt of Acutus found **Bell** and **Clark** "to be very professional and conscientious individuals, who cared strongly about the project, its successful completion and that the rights and the obligations of each party to the contract were adhered to" (TRI00000146\_0044 para 128). His colleague lain McAlister found Clark, **Hickman** and Bell all "to be particularly hard working and conscientious... They all appeared to me to be people who really cared about the project and gave of their all to try to resolve the difficulties it faced." (TRI00000122\_0023 para 52)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 170.21-171.14 (Tuesday 21 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 172.2-172.6 (Tuesday 21 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Ian McAlister transcript 172.10-172.23 (Tuesday 21 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> TRI00000122\_0019

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 181.17-182.4, 182.21-183.4 (Tuesday 21 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> DLA00001692

there were 428 notified changes which preceded it <sup>212</sup>. It was apparent to Acutus that there were areas where work was not impacted by the MUDFA delays but nevertheless had not been commenced by Infraco <sup>213</sup>.

The Acutus report in December 2009 concluded that Infraco was not fulfilling its obligations under the contract, by failing to commence work and failing to substantiate change notices:

"Infraco's failure to notify, record and include in its claims delays for which it carries liability are distorting the delay analyses it is presenting. It would appear that such actions and inactions give rise to overstated claims for entitlement to extension of time."<sup>214</sup>

Acutus produced another report in June 2010 <sup>215</sup>, to assess concurrent delays and the extent of TIE's liability. The investigations indicated that both parties to the Infraco contract bore some responsibility for delays (MUDFA being the significant element to TIE's account) <sup>216</sup>, albeit that this investigation was based on incomplete information, particularly a lack of information available to TIE about the design <sup>217</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 175.7-175.8 (Tuesday 21 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 172.10-172.16 (Tuesday 21 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> CEC00583955 para 1.4.3, Iain McAlister transcript 203.5-203.13 (Tuesday 21 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> CEC00330652

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 172.20-172.24 (Tuesday 21 November); Robert Burt transcript 153.19-153.24, 155.3-155.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 172.12-172.19 (Tuesday 21 November); Robert Burt transcript 147.1-147.5

A further draft report by Acutus in March 2011<sup>218</sup> was prepared in anticipation of adjudication on INTC 536, BSC's further – and significantly larger - estimate of £42.8m for utilities delays to July 2010<sup>219</sup>:

- Acutus' analysis showed that there was far greater delay than that claimed in the INTC estimate, which indicated that factors other than MUDFA were in fact dominant. For instance, the projected delay to the Sectional Completion Date for Section B claimed by Infraco was 286 days, whereas the actual progress on design and construction - based on Infraco reports - gave a projected delay on the same section of 537 days <sup>220</sup>.
- Acutus observed that INTC 536 incorporated eight prior INTCs on specific areas of the route which had already been covered by INTC 429<sup>221</sup>.
- Acutus further noted that the adjudicator's decision on INTC 429 (to award 154 days extension in Section A and nil in Section B<sup>222</sup>) remained binding on the parties as there had been no changed circumstances or further utilities delays in those sections <sup>223</sup>: however, Infraco had claimed for longer extensions on these sections in INTC 536.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> WED0000533

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> Iain McAlister transcript 7.18-8.14 (Wednesday 22 November), BFB00003297\_0087

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> WED0000533 para 1.8.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> WED0000533 para 5.2.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> CEC00310163\_0002. TIE had offered 180 days (six months) costs (DLA00001717).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> WED00000533\_0011 para 1.9.2

Acutus also found that Infraco had inflated their claims in Section C (Phase 1a construction complete) and Section D (Open for Revenue Service) despite the adjudicator having previously awarded nil for each of those sections <sup>224</sup>.

Acutus considered that the dominant causes of delay on the project were not therefore the utilities diversions but rather the late delivery of design <sup>225</sup>, together with Infraco's refusal to commence work on available sites pending resolution of disputes <sup>226</sup>. This is at odds with the position of BSC as indicated above.

TIE obtained senior counsel's Opinion that the contractor would have no entitlement to an extension of time if the dominant cause of delay was the contractor's risk event <sup>227</sup>. This was accordingly reflected in TIE's mediation statement, drafted by McGrigors:

"Infraco could be carrying out works across a significant portion of the route – but are not... Clause 65.11 provides that 'notwithstanding the occurrence of a Compensation Event, the Infraco shall continue to carry out the Infraco works'... Infraco's claims in relation to INTC 536 are rejected in their entirety. The true causes of delay in connection with the project are the responsibility of Infraco."<sup>228</sup>

BSC's position nevertheless appears to have been conceded by CEC at Mar Hall<sup>229</sup>, which is considered further in Section 10B below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> CEC00310163\_0002, WED00000533\_0012 para 1.10.4. Infraco had claimed 257 days in these Sections (WED00000533\_0017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> WED00000533 para 13.1.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> WED00000533 para 1.8.4, para 11.7.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>227</sup> TIE00095607\_0016 para 36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> BFB00053300 para 5.8, 7.3.1, 8.1, 8.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> WED0000134\_0234.

## (5) **PROGRAMME**

### 5A – Consideration of pausing procurement programme

It has been generally recognised that at the latter stages of the programme to procure the Infraco and Tramco, both the design and the utilities diversions were delayed. Accordingly, several individuals suggested that a pause in the procurement programme may have been beneficial in order to allow these elements to catch up. This first appears to have been proposed by Trudi Craggs in 2006 and again in 2007. On each occasion Ms Craggs suggested that **Susan Clark** was one of those against such a pause <sup>230</sup>. On both occasions however, that opposition was echoed by others, including the Project Director Matthew Crosse <sup>231</sup>, Clark's superior.

David Crawley also suggested an extension of the procurement programme in 2007, but was told by Crosse that this was not acceptable and that there was a political imperative to keep to the programme <sup>232</sup>. This was echoed by the Chief Executive Willie Gallagher as well as **Steven Bell** at that time <sup>233</sup>.

Tony Glazebrook also proposed a pause in the programme to Crosse, feeling that the latter's demeanour indicated that he felt unable to do so <sup>234</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> Trudi Craggs transcript 108.12-108.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> Trudi Craggs transcript 109.19-109.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> David Crawley transcript 50.14-50.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> David Crawley transcript 79.8-79.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Tony Glazebrook transcript 158.19-158.22

Steve Reynolds likewise formed the impression from speaking with Crosse that there was a political need to move forward <sup>235</sup>. In an internal email in January 2008 Reynolds noted:

"The sensible course of action which everyone except TIE understands is to delay novation to the point where the design is nearer 100% complete – to be fair even Gallagher sees this as a potential option. The likes of Crosse and Gilbert though are being more blinkered – driven largely by their desire to be clear of Edinburgh as soon as the BBS ink is dry on the deal."<sup>236</sup>

Crosse himself explained that the importance of sticking to the programme was because costs would go up as delays increased <sup>237</sup>. The decision to proceed followed from the Parliamentary decision in mid 2007 and the Audit Scotland review <sup>238</sup>. Clark confirmed that there was concern that a pause in the programme might lead to one or more of the bidders dropping out <sup>239</sup> in a situation where there were only two parties competing for the Infraco contract. Once BBS became the preferred bidder, pausing the programme would likewise cause (in Bell's words):

"pressure against the Infraco price if the process was extended significantly"<sup>240</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Steve Reynolds transcript 30.12-30.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup> PBH00033339\_0001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript 124.13-124.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>238</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript 125.13-125.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>239</sup> Susan Clark transcript 173.11-173.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> TRI00000109\_0033.

Gallagher indicated that prolongation costs and operating costs would have made the option to pause financially unviable <sup>241</sup>. Jim McEwan considered that the potential supply chain cost increases from any pause would likely be in the tens of millions <sup>242</sup>.

Outwith TIE, CEC's Chief Executive confirmed that there was a tone at the end of 2007 that Councillors wanted to move forward quickly <sup>243</sup>. Had the contract been paused for completion of the design, the tram may never have been built <sup>244</sup>. CEC's Finance Director echoed this sentiment <sup>245</sup>, as did the Director of City Development <sup>246</sup>.

Accordingly whatever the views of Clark or Bell, the decision to proceed appears to have been a decision taken at a higher level. In any event, this issue was in the main discussed without reference to the fact that the procurement process itself overran by four months from January to May 2008 <sup>247</sup> (during which time design and MUDFA works continued). The Citypoint agreement in March 2008 accordingly moved back the OFRS date in recognition of this <sup>248</sup>, which meant that there was in fact a three month extension to the programme <sup>249</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Willie Gallagher transcript 47.2-47.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> TRI0000057\_0041 Q36(5)

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 243}$  Tom Aitchison transcript 100.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 147.5-148.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>245</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 20.2-20.4 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> Andrew Holmes transcript 102.3-102.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> TRI00000109\_0026 Q16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> CEC01463888

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> CEC02086755

### 5B – Consideration of pausing construction programme

Once the delivery phase of the project commenced, there appears to have been a further proposal to "pause" the project, when Jochen Keysberg suggested to **David Mackay** around December 2008 that construction could be suspended until design and utilities diversions were complete, in order to enable repricing and reprogramme <sup>250</sup>. Keysberg's evidence was that he foresaw the only alternative as moving to a cost plus contract <sup>251</sup>. This is illuminating as to Bilfinger's state of mind going into the Princes Street dispute a couple of months later <sup>252</sup>.

According to Keysberg, demobilising for six months to a year would have been "cleaner" and could have cost less, despite the costs associated with demobilisation, subsequent remobilisation, and a year's delay <sup>253</sup>. He resisted the suggestion that Bilfinger would have sought to renegotiate the contract following any such pause <sup>254</sup>. The credibility of that position requires to be judged in light of the consortium's later attempts to move all on street works to a cost plus basis <sup>255</sup>.

Mackay's recollection was that Keysberg had suggested shutting down for up to two years, and that this proposal came at a time when only one kilometre of the whole route was "fettered" <sup>256</sup>. As such it did not appear to be an attractive proposal and Mackay's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> Jochen Keysberg transcript 37.10-37.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> Jochen Keysberg transcript 37.18-38.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> See Section 8B below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>253</sup> Jochen Keysberg transcript 38.20-39.21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> Jochen Keysberg transcript 40.2-40.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>255</sup> e.g. TIE00031089

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> David Mackay transcript 105.2-105.3, CEC00131076\_0001. See also BFB00053300\_0010 para 6.3

fears related to the likely increase in price when the contractor eventually returned <sup>257</sup>. Stewart McGarrity echoed this, suggesting such a move would have simply given the contractor an opportunity to review the price altogether <sup>258</sup>. McGarrity agreed with Mackay that stopping at that stage would not have assisted in resolving the issues, and echoed the point that there was work available to be done at that time <sup>259</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>257</sup> David Mackay transcript 105.13-105.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> Stewart McGarrity transcript 87.15-88.8 (Thursday 14 December)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>259</sup> Stewart McGarrity transcript 88.15-88.17 (Thursday 14 December)

#### <u>5C – Reports on programme</u>

John Ramsay in his statement to the Inquiry was critical of TIE's reporting on programme, suggesting in particular that:

"references by TIE to subsequent revisions viz Rev 1 or Rev 3 were always irrelevant... it was reported that BSC were reporting against a Rev 3A project programme and that TIE were reporting against a Rev 1 programme. This was typical TIE nonsense." <sup>260</sup>

The issue however appears to be Ramsay's failure to understand his brief. In oral evidence he admitted that he was unaware of the provisions in the Infraco contract that meant TIE had to approve programme variations <sup>261</sup>, and that he did not know whether the Infraco's programme had been approved <sup>262</sup>. This was despite the report (which he criticised) clearly stating that it had not <sup>263</sup>. He therefore conceded that TIE were in fact reporting against the only agreed programme <sup>264</sup>.

**Susan Clark** later explained that BSC's programme Rev 3A was not agreed as it could have resulted in additional costs <sup>265</sup>, for which no justification had been provided. By contrast, Infraco were obliged under the contract to produce a mitigated programme <sup>266</sup> which they failed to do for a considerable period of time <sup>267</sup>. This led to difficulties

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> TRI0000065\_0043

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> John Ramsay transcript 115.23 (Thursday 28 September), CEC00036952\_0140 c60.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>262</sup> John Ramsay transcript 116.13 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>263</sup> CEC00113638\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>264</sup> John Ramsay transcript 117.13 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Susan Clark transcript 176.12-176.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>266</sup> CEC00036952\_0140 c60.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>267</sup> Susan Clark transcript 165.5-165.7

experienced by **Tom Hickman** as TIE's programme manager in being able adequately to report on programme to Transport Scotland <sup>268</sup>. Martin Foerder conceded that BSC were contractually obligated to report against the agreed programme <sup>269</sup> but nevertheless attempted to justify the Infraco's departure from this contractual obligation on the basis that this programme was "unrealistic" <sup>270</sup>.

This apparently led to a further difficulty after mediation following TIE's removal from the project. Infraco's Rev 3A programme was used as the new contractual baseline <sup>271</sup>, but it did not align with the programmes for design or utilities diversion <sup>272</sup>. The assumptions underpinning Infraco's Rev 3A programme also transferred risk from Infraco to CEC <sup>273</sup>. TIE's chairman Vic Emery also considered this programme "too long" <sup>274</sup>, despite being one of the key parties at Mar Hall who agreed to it.<sup>275</sup>

<sup>274</sup> Vic Emery transcript 70.4-70.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> TIE00248213, Tom Hickman transcript 196.25-197.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>269</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 117.7-117.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 117.9-117.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> TRI00000103\_0008 Q6.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> WED00000103\_0061

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> WED00000103 0019

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> See Section 10B below

# (6) **RISK**

#### 6A – External review of risk

Duncan Fraser recommended that Turner & Townsend carry out a review of project risk in September 2007 and asked **Susan Clark** to set up an introduction <sup>276</sup>. Rebecca Andrew said that Clark was concerned that this additional brief would distract TIE staff from urgent work which was required to meet the deadlines for the Final Business Case<sup>277</sup>. **Steven Bell** was concerned about the publication of the notice seeking tenders for this brief given the sensitivity of the work <sup>278</sup>.

Clark asked the OGC team to include a review of risk as part of their remit <sup>279</sup>. She considered this appropriate as the OGC team had carried out previous reviews of the project and were familiar with the issues <sup>280</sup>. Matthew Crosse, at that time the Project Director, spoke with Malcolm Hutchison of the OGC team and indicated to Fraser (and to Fraser's superior Donald McGougan) that the OGC team could carry out the work and that if CEC approved, Turner & Townsend could be stood down <sup>281</sup>.

Andrew claimed in her statement that TIE put "pressure" on CEC officials on this issue<sup>282</sup>, and in her evidence clarified that her conversation with Clark had led her to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> TIE00663266

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> Rebecca Andrew transcript 52.23-53.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>278</sup> TIE00678245

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>279</sup> TIE00663266

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>280</sup> Susan Clark transcript 147.23-148.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>281</sup> TIE00633266

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>282</sup> TRI0000023\_0027

speculate that someone within TIE spoke to either McGougan or Holmes <sup>283</sup>. However as is noted above, Crosse openly copied McGougan into correspondence with Fraser, and as such Andrew's speculation appears to be misplaced.

Despite concerns being expressed by Fraser and Andrew about the OGC team conducting the review, their superiors were all content:

- Holmes did not agree with Andrew that CEC was unable to perform a monitoring or assurance role, particularly given that he and McGougan sat on the TPB, where the risk register was assessed on a continuous basis <sup>284</sup>. He considered that the instruction of the OGC team to carry out the risk review was reasonable given the OGC team's experience <sup>285</sup>.
- McGougan was happy about the review being conducted by the OGC team rather than Turner & Townsend given that the OGC team were a specialist body well practised in such reviews, who had conducted prior gateway reviews at a time when Transport Scotland had been the client <sup>286</sup>. The OGC team had previously given red and then amber reviews of the project, so there was no suggestion that this was a toothless body that would simply accept what was put to them <sup>287</sup>.
- Tom Aitchison indicated that the matter was not brought to his attention at the time but that he took comfort from the project going through the OGC reviews

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>283</sup> Rebecca Andrew transcript 61.21-62.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> Andrew Holmes transcript 21.20-22.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> Andrew Holmes transcript 18.24-19.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>286</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 144.3-144.13 (Wednesday 29 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 147.4-147.12 (Wednesday 29 November)

and it appeared that TIE were trying to follow national guidelines in requesting this supplementary risk report <sup>288</sup>.

Whilst Mike Heath of the OGC team conceded that it was possible that Turner & Townsend could have gone into greater detail in such a review, the time required to do that may have created a further programme risk <sup>289</sup>.

In any event Andrew's evidence was that she took comfort from the OGC report which was ultimately produced <sup>290</sup>. The OGC team concluded that:

"the tools that are being used to identify, monitor and manage the risks in the project... are impressive. The registers are kept up to date and there is a process for key risks to be highlighted... We recommend that there is continuing high level focus on the management and mitigation of key risks and that the very good work that is being done by the risk manager [**Mark Hamill**] is effectively used and acted upon" <sup>291</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 80.1-80.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>289</sup> Mike Heath transcript 93.10-93.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>290</sup> Rebecca Andrew transcript 60.2-60.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> CEC01562064\_0007

#### <u>6B – Optimism Bias</u>

According to the original TIE Risk Manager Mark Bourke, allowance for Optimism Bias (OB) is primarily for the early stages of projects. As projects progress, OB has been shown to reduce, through risk management <sup>292</sup>. Stewart McGarrity echoed this, pointing out that the level of OB reduces as the project approaches financial close, as the scheme becomes better defined <sup>293</sup>. Similar points were made by Willie Gallagher <sup>294</sup>, Geoff Gilbert <sup>295</sup> and Matthew Crosse <sup>296</sup>: the allowance for Optimism Bias came to be replaced by the Quantified Risk Allowance as the project matured, where the risks are understood and analysed more effectively and in more detail than by the 'simplistic' inclusion of Optimism Bias <sup>297</sup>.

The reduction of OB was broadly in line with guidelines at that time in the Treasury Green Book <sup>298</sup>, the STAG guidance <sup>299</sup> and the Mott MacDonald review <sup>300</sup>. Professor Flyvberg's criticisms of these various guidelines is based upon better data being available subsequent to the period in which the Edinburgh tram project evolved <sup>301</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> Mark Bourke transcript 34.10-34.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> TRI00000059\_0042 Q43, Stewart McGarrity transcript 8.7-8.15 (Tuesday 12 December)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> TRI0000037\_0062 para 206

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>295</sup> TRI0000038\_0071 para 192

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>296</sup> TRI0000031\_0053 para 157

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> Mark Bourke transcript 39.7-39.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> CEC02084256 pages 33-34, 89, TRI00000059\_0020 Q14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>299</sup> CEC02084489

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>300</sup> CEC02084689 page 32-33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>301</sup> Bent Flyvberg transcript 48.5-48.12, 52.1-53.2, 112.3-113.4

In respect of TIE's risk management, Flyvberg noted that:

"the approach taken to estimates, risk and optimism bias in the Edinburgh tram project was generally similar to the approach of other projects of a similar nature at the time. Equally, the mitigation measures planned and the work to understand risk were similar to those of other projects" <sup>302</sup>.

By the time that **Mark Hamill** was appointed as Risk Manager therefore, Optimism Bias no longer formed part of the project cost forecasts, as he was advised by his immediate predecessor <sup>303</sup>. This was made explicit in the Final Business Case where it was stated:

"By the time of the DFBC, OB was effectively eradicated, as per the findings explained in the Mott MacDonald Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK."<sup>304</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>302</sup> TRI00000265\_0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>303</sup> TRI00000042\_0009 Q19. He had initially sought an explanation for this: TIE00350236

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>304</sup> CEC01395434\_0178 para 11.42

#### 6C – Reductions to the risk allowance

Between the Final Business Case and financial close the risk allowance was reduced in line with the closing out of procurement risks. The Council's IPG report in December 2007 noted that the £49m risk allowance would reduce to £34m due to those risks being closed out <sup>305</sup>.

In February 2008 TIE's Finance Director Stewart McGarrity outlined a proposed reduction to be presented to the TPB, from £48.9m at FBC to a lower figure of £30.3m at Close <sup>306</sup>. This reduction was matched by an increase in Infraco and Tramco costs <sup>307</sup>. The Risk Manager **Mark Hamill** queried this reduction as he did not have sight of the negotiations with Infraco which justified this level of reduction, and in any event identified potential new risks which might need to be catered for:

"Stewart, my main concerns here are that (a) we are reducing the risk allowance while the risk has not actually been transferred or closed and (b) the new risk allocation is not sufficient for the risks which tie will retain. I cannot overstate how anxious I am to ensure that the final QRA truly reflects the actual risk profile at financial close." <sup>308</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>305</sup> CEC01398245\_0092

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>306</sup> CEC01423172

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>307</sup> CEC01423173

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>308</sup> CEC01489953

McGarrity was unhappy with Hamill's expression of these concerns and told him to follow the instructions he was given <sup>309</sup>, a sentiment echoed by Geoff Gilbert who was leading on the procurement negotiations <sup>310</sup>. By mid April 2008 <sup>311</sup> the anticipated risk allowance at Close had increased again to £32.3m <sup>312</sup>, which was notified to CEC.

Immediately following Close in May 2008 there was a reconciliation of the risk allowance for the Project Control Budget (PCB), to reflect the last minute price demands by the Infraco and the SDS provider. On 15 May 2008 Graeme Bissett sent round an internal TIE email saying:

*"after all the twists and turns of the last fortnight, we need to arrive at a final form settled base cost and risk contingency"* <sup>313</sup>.

According to Bissett:

*"It wouldn't have been doing the Council much use if we'd come up with a different allocation when it was entirely judgmental"*<sup>314</sup>.

In response, McGarrity provided a reconciliation from the last reported estimate of £508m to the PCB of £512m, noting a £1.1m reduction in the allowance to "fund" the SDS increases (Figure 1). He instructed Hamill to "adjust the QRA accordingly" <sup>315</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>309</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 42.1-42.12. It should be noted that McGarrity considered Hamill "all the way through his employment at TIE to be a consummate professional." Stewart McGarrity transcript 53.13-53.15 (Tuesday 12 December)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>310</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 43.3-43.8, 43.21-44.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>311</sup> CEC01245223

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>312</sup> CEC01245225

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>313</sup> CEC01295328

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>314</sup> Graeme Bissett transcript 165.2-165.4 (Tuesday 31 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>315</sup> CEC01295328, CEC01295329

FIGURE 1:	McGarrity	spreadsheet
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FORECAST THIS PERIND         minute         minute <th colspa="&lt;/th"><th>PHASE</th><th></th><th>AFC P1</th><th>PCB</th><th>Deltas</th><th>Deltas Analysis</th><th>alysis</th><th></th></th>	<th>PHASE</th> <th></th> <th>AFC P1</th> <th>PCB</th> <th>Deltas</th> <th>Deltas Analysis</th> <th>alysis</th> <th></th>	PHASE		AFC P1	PCB	Deltas	Deltas Analysis	alysis	
SPERIOD         Seven         <						Infraco	SOS		
anagem         65,884,280         65,884,280         0           burces         6,856,832         0         0         2,4371,612         2,857,259         2,455,905           cmericex         24,371,614         2,637,259         2,455,905         0         2,455,905           cmericex         24,507,469         2,455,906         0         2,455,905         2,455,905           cmericex         243,597,469         247,259,301         3,450,000         4,800,000         4,300,000         4,105,905           cmericex         243,242,706         0         4,800,000         4,105,905         4,800,000         4,105,905           cmericex         247,569,391         241,575,286         5,905,905         4,800,000         1,105,905         and £35           cmericex         247,569,391         20,441,711         -1,905,905         4,800,000         -1,105,905         and £35           cmericex         41,575,286         5,905,905         4,800,000         -1,105,905         and £35           cmericex         512,017,007         4,000,000         0         -1,105,905         and £35           cmericex         3,341,932         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000		FORECAST THIS PERIOD							
barres         6,856,832         0         24,371,614         26,827,519         2,455,905           Interface         24,371,614         26,827,519         2,455,905         2,455,905           Interface         24,371,614         26,81,755         0         1         2           Interface         24,307,469         20,581,175         0         1         2	1101	Total Project manageme	65,884,280	65,884,280	0				
24,371,614         26,827,519         2,455,905         2,455,905           interface         2,631,262         0         0         0           other cor         20,581,175         20,581,175         0         0         0           values         24,307,469         0         444,843         0         0         0           values         243,809,301         20,581,175         0         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,542,706         0         48,00,000         1,105,905         48,542,707         4,000,000         4,800,000         1,105,905         30,441,711         -1,905,905         4,800,000         4,800,000         0         4,535           is         47,55,914         512,017,007         4,000,000         0         4,000,000         0         0         4,000,000         0         0         4,000,000         0         4,000,000         0         1,00,00         0         1,00,00         0         4,000,000         0 <td>1102</td> <td>Total other resources</td> <td>6,856,832</td> <td>6,856,832</td> <td>0</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	1102	Total other resources	6,856,832	6,856,832	0				
nagemet         2,631,262         0            Interface         24,4843         20,581,753         0            Valuer cor         20,581,763         20,581,763         0             Valuer cor         20,581,765         0               Valuer cor         20,581,776         0                Valuer cor         243,809,301         24,259,301         3,450,000         4,800,000         -1,350,000         £135m.           Valuer cor         32,347,616         30,441,711         -1,905,905         4,800,000         1,105,905         -1,105,905 <td< td=""><td>1103</td><td>Total design</td><td>24,371,614</td><td>26,827,519</td><td>2,455,905</td><td></td><td>2,455,905</td><td></td></td<>	1103	Total design	24,371,614	26,827,519	2,455,905		2,455,905		
Interface         444,843         0           biller cor         20,581,175         0         0           24,507,469         48,542,706         0         48,542,706           243,809,301         247,259,301         3,450,000         48,00,000         -1,350,000           243,809,301         247,259,301         3,450,000         48,00,000         -1,350,000           32,347,616         30,441,711         -1,905,905         4,800,000         -1,105,905           32,347,616         30,441,711         -1,905,905         -8000,000         -1,105,905           508,017,007         512,017,007         4,000,000         -1,105,905         -800,000           508,017,007         6,872,314         6,872,314         0         -1,300,000         -1,105,905           5,953,565         3,301,992         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -4,8 agree           1,087,553         935,765         935,765         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -4,3 agree           2,000,000         1,200,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -4,3 agree         -4,3 agree           1,14,220         2,000,000         -1,300,000         -1,3	1104	Total traffic managemet	2,631,262	2,631,262	0				
Wher cor         20,581,175         0         4         4         4         507,469         4,507,469         0         4         4         4         4         508,017         343,809,000         4,802,000         4,800,000         -1,350,000         £13,501         343,809,001         247,259,301         3,450,000         4,800,000         -1,350,000         £13,501         30,000         21,3501         30,000         21,3501         30,000         21,3501         30,000         4,800,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,105,905         300,000         -1,300,000 <t< td=""><td>1105</td><td>Total 3rd party interface</td><td>444,843</td><td>444,843</td><td>0</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>	1105	Total 3rd party interface	444,843	444,843	0				
b         4,507,469         0         4,507,469         0           243,542,706         48,542,706         0         4,800,000         4,300,000         4,300,000         4,300,000         and 525           1s         475,699,391         58,039,910         58,039,910         58,039,910         4,800,000         1,105,905         4,800,000         -1,105,905         and 525           1s         475,693,391         481,575,296         5,905,905         4,800,000         -1,105,905         and 525           1s         475,693,311         30,441,711         -1,905,905         4,000,000         -1,105,905         and 525           508,017,007         4,000,000         0         4,000,000         -0         -1,105,905         -1,200,000         -1,200,000         -1,200,000         -1,200,000         -1,200,000         -1,200,000         -1,200,00	1106	Total land and other cor	20,581,175	20,581,175	0				
Itilities         48,542,706         48,542,706         0         48,00,000         4,300,000         £135m.           243,809,301         247,259,301         3,450,000         4,800,000         -1,350,000         and £35           1s         475,669,391         30,441,711         -1,905,905         4,800,000         -1,105,905	1107	Total Insurance	4,507,469	4,507,469	0				
243,809,301         247,259,301         3,450,000         4,800,000         -1,350,000         £1,35m           15         475,669,391         481,575,296         5,905,905         4,800,000         1,105,905         and £35           15         475,669,391         481,575,296         5,905,905         4,800,000         1,105,905         and £35           15         508,017,007         512,017,007         4,000,000         1,105,905         4,000,000         0           16,872,314         0,872,314         0         4,000,000         0         0         0           1,087,563         1,087,563         1,301,992         0         4,000,000         0         0         4,3 agree           1,087,563         1,087,563         0,087,563         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         As agree           1,14,220         2,000,000         1,500,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         As agree           2,000,000         1,500,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         -1	8011	Total MUDFA / Utilities	48,542,706	48,542,706	0				
58,039,910         58,039,910         0         481,575,296         5,905,905         4,800,000         1,105,905         and £35           32,347,616         30,441,711         .1,905,905         4,800,000         .1,105,905         .900<	1109	Total Infraco	243,809,301	247,259,301	3,450,000	4,800,000	-1,350,000	£1.35m = £1m for Construction Supp	
Is         475,669,391         481,575,296         5,905,905         4,800,000         1,105,905           32,347,616         30,441,711         -1,905,905         -800,000         -1,105,905           508,017,007         512,017,007         4,000,000         -1,105,905         -800,000         -0           508,017,007         512,017,007         4,000,000         -4,000,000         -0         -           6,872,314         6,872,314         0         -4,000,000         0         -0         -           5,654,277         8,644,277         8,644,277         8,644,277         0,000,000         -1,300,000         -4,300,000         -	1110	Total Tramco	58,039,910	58,039,910	0			and £350k for Picardy Place design t	
32,347,616         30,441,711         -1,905,905         -800,000         -1,105,905           508,017,007         512,017,007         4,000,000         4,000,000         0           6,872,314         6,872,314         0         4,000,000         0           3,301,992         0         8,644,277         8,644,277         0         4,300,000           1,087,565         935,765         935,765         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000           1,144,220         1,14,220         0         -1,300,000         0         -4,000,000           27,093,7647         2,000,000         1,500,000         -1,300,000         0         -4,000,000           2,000,000         1,500,000         -1,000,000         -1,000,000         0         -4,000,000		Total Base Costs	475,669,391	481,575,296	5,905,905	4,800,000	1,105,905		
508,017,007         512,017,007         4,000,000         4,000,000         0           6,872,014         6,872,014         6,872,014         0         0         0         0           3,301,992         0,01,992         0         0         0         0         0         0           6,872,014         5,872,014         6,872,014         0,872,014         0         <	T44	Total Risk	32,347,616	30,441,711	-1,905,905	-800,000	-1,105,905		
6,872,314         6,872,314         0           3,301,992         3,301,992         0           8,644,277         8,644,277         0           1,087,563         1,087,563         0           935,765         935,765         0           11,24,220         1,300,000         -1,300,000           124,220         1,24,220         0           21,000,000         1,200,000         -1,300,000           22,000,000         1,500,000         -1,300,000           2,000,000         1,500,000         -1,000,000           2,000,000         1,500,000         -105,905		Total Ph1a	508,017,007	512,017,007	4,000,000	4,000,000	0		
6,872,314         6,872,314         0           3,301,992         3,301,992         0           8,644,277         8,644,277         0           1,087,563         1,087,563         0           935,765         935,765         0           1,124,220         0         -1,300,000           1,24,220         0         -1,300,000           124,220         124,220         0           22,000,000         1,200,000         -0           22,000,000         1,500,000         -1,300,000         0           22,000,000         1,500,000         -500,000         -1,000,000           409,769         303,864         -105,905         1,000,000	Risk Allowa	Ince Analysis:							
3,301,992         3,301,992         0           8,644,277         8,644,277         0         -1,300,000         As agree           1,087,563         1,087,563         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         As agree           1,087,563         1,087,563         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000           114,220         124,220         0         -1,300,000         0         0           27,097,000         124,220         0         -1,300,000         0         0           22,000,000         1500,000         -500,000         -1,300,000         0         0           22,000,000         1,500,000         -500,000         -500,000         -1,105,905         -1,105,905	Infraco/Tram	co Delivery	6,872,314	6,872,314	0				
8,644,277         8,644,277         0         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         As agree           1,087,563         1,087,565         0         0         -1,300,000	Design & Cor	Isents	3,301,992	3,301,992	0				
6,653,659         5,353,659         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         As agree           1,087,563         1,087,563         0	MUDFA		8,644,277	8,644,277	0				
1,087,563         1,087,563         0           935,765         935,765         0           915,765         935,765         0           124,220         124,220         0           27,937,847         26,637,848         -1,300,000           2,000,000         2,000,000         0           2,000,000         1,500,000         0           409,769         303,864         -105,905	General Prog	ramme Delay	6,653,659	5,353,659	-1,300,000	-1,300,000		As agreed take full £1.3m out of gene	
935,765 935,765 0 124,220 0 124,220 0 124,220 0 12,000,000 2,000,000 0 1,500,000 -1,500,000 -500,	Land comper	sation	1,087,563	1,087,563	0				
318,058         318,058         0           124,220         0         -1,300,000         0           27,937,847         26,637,848         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         0           2,000,000         2,000,000         0         -1,300,000         0           2,000,000         1,500,000         -500,000         -500,000         -500,000           409,769         303,864         -105,905         1,000,000         -1,105,905	TROS		935,765	935,765	0				
124,220         124,220         60         -1,300,000         0           27,937,847         26,637,848         -1,300,000         0         -1,300,000         0           2,000,000         2,000,000         1,500,000         -500,000         -500,000         -500,000           2,000,000         1,500,000         -500,000         -500,000         -500,000         -1,105,905	Network Rail		318,058	318,058	0				
27,937,847         26,637,848         -1,300,000         -1,300,000         0           frace pric         2,000,000         2,000,000         0         -500,000         0           2,000,000         1,500,000         -500,000         -500,000         -500,000         -500,000           409,769         303,864         -105,905         1,000,000         -1,105,905	Other		124,220	124,220	0				
fraco pric 2,000,000 2,000,000 0 2,000,000 1,500,000 -500,000 -500,000 -500,000 409,769 303,864 -105,905 1,000,000 -1,105,905	<b>QRA</b> Total		27,937,847	26,637,848	-1,300,000	-1,300,000	0	NB	
2,000,000 1,500,000 -500,0000,00	Non-delivery	of VE included in infraco pric	2,000,000	2,000,000	0			SDS Incentive £1m assume	
409,/69 303,864 -105,905 1,000,000 -1,105,905	Extent of Roa	id Reinstatement	2,000,000	1,500,000	-500,000	-500,000		No provision for 'Consents Support' (£575k) in the SDS Base Costs	
	Unspecified i	Risks (Contingency)	409,769	303,864	-105,905	1,000,000	-1,105,905	<ul> <li>Contingency of £304k availa</li> </ul>	

Hamill was not at the time aware of the detail of the last minute price increases <sup>316</sup> and was accordingly unsure precisely what was being asked of him <sup>317</sup>. McGarrity's spreadsheet outlined a £1.9m reduction to the risk allowance comprising £800k in Infraco risks and £1.1m in SDS risks. At the same time the Infraco costs had increased by £3.45m and design costs by £2.45m. McGarrity's reconciliation involved a £1.3m reduction in the general delay figure in the QRA plus a £500k reduction in roads reallocation and £100k in contingency <sup>318</sup>. The net result of McGarrity's reconciliation was to reduce the overall risk allowance to £30.4m, a similar figure as he had proposed in February.

Hamill pointed out to McGarrity that the QRA could not be changed simply by reducing one number <sup>319</sup>, as the QRA was the product of software run through Monte Carlo simulations that produced a probabilistic average as its output <sup>320</sup>. Changing one number would require the software to be re-run, which would produce marginally different results for the other figures even though the inputs – and the risk profiles themselves – had not changed. To reflect McGarrity's changes, Hamill accordingly required to "hard enter" the new number <sup>321</sup>. Hamill again raised the concern that he did not have an explanation for the changes, McGarrity told him that they reflected what had been agreed in the negotiations <sup>322</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>316</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 50.21-51.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>317</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 51.23-52.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>318</sup> CEC01295329

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>319</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 58.14-59.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>320</sup> TRI0000042\_0004 Q7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>321</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 59.9-59.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>322</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 59.21-60.4

Accordingly Hamill produced a spreadsheet as instructed to incorporate the £1.3m reduction to the figure for general delay as outlined by McGarrity. In his covering email Hamill reiterated the point that:

"it is not possible to reduce the value of one risk in QRA without affecting all the others. This is because the P80 allocation is driven by the total mean sum. Therefore, in order to get round this problem I have basically 'pockled' the spreadsheet and hard-entered some values" <sup>323</sup>.

This manual solution was required because the excel spreadsheet would otherwise automatically generate a new set of figures across the whole QRA despite the agreed reduction being attributed only to the figure for general delay <sup>324</sup>. The manual adjustment was not however artificial as it reflected a reduction in the transfer of risk in the contract negotiations <sup>325</sup>.

In the same email Hamill went on to say:

"This solves the problem and helps us get the final result past CEC as I doubt they will notice what I have done. I will revert to normal practise for future QRAs however in this instance I think this is the best way to do it in order to avoid unnecessary scrutiny from our 'colleagues' at CEC. Please confirm you are

<sup>323</sup> CEC01288043

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>324</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 61.14-62.10, Steven Bell transcript 19.18-19.21 (Wednesday 25 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>325</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 64.19-64.25, Steven Bell transcript 25.12 (Wednesday 25 October)

content with this approach or otherwise... I will take no response as acceptance."326

This was reflective of the mood which Hamill sensed between TIE and CEC at the time, in that he felt some CEC employees would not have been unhappy if the project had not got over the line <sup>327</sup>. CEC personnel had also in the past manually entered different numbers on excel spreadsheets which had been shared with them. This had resulted in the formulas within the spreadsheets being "messed up" <sup>328</sup> and resulting in multiple versions circulating with different figures. This led to Hamill asking that CEC be provided with pdfs or hard copies to prevent such disruption <sup>329</sup>.

It should be noted that other adjustments to the risk allowance had also been made manually, including the addition of £4.4m of risks over and above the QRA figure <sup>330</sup>. These additional risks had been identified by **Steven Bell** and others particularly to cover the risk of non-delivery of Value Engineering savings and for road reinstatement<sup>331</sup>. Each of these had separately been entered as £2m risks as a matter of judgement (based on work by Quantity Surveyors <sup>332</sup>), without incorporation into the QRA for probabilistic output. It should be noted however that the QRA output is no less dependent on manual inputs, which are themselves equally a matter of judgement <sup>333</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>326</sup> CEC01288043

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>327</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 62.12-63.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>328</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 67.3-67.19, Steven Bell transcript 27.22-28.4 (Wednesday 25 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>329</sup> TIE00351419

<sup>330</sup> CEC01295329

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>331</sup> Steven Bell transcript 9.13-9.19 (Wednesday 25 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>332</sup> Steven Bell transcript 10.20-11.13 (Wednesday 25 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>333</sup> These manual additions to the QRA are also significant as it was erroneously suggested to Graeme Bissett that the risk allowance was being reduced from £32.3m to £26.6m (Bissett transcript 183.22), whereas the actual reduction was from £32.3m to £30.4m – the £26.6m figure related only to the QRA, which was supplemented

CEC was aware that these items were manual adjustments and had no issue with that<sup>334</sup>.

The road reinstatement figure was one of those which was reduced in McGarrity's reconciliation above, from £2m to £1.5m. The justification for this lay in the Kingdom Agreement negotiated immediately before financial close<sup>335</sup>, where the costs arising in connection with Pricing Assumption 12 were specifically capped at £1.5m <sup>336</sup>. This and the other related improvements in the risk profile were outlined in the Close document 'Financial Close Process and Record of Recent Events' which set out how the Kingdom Agreement impacted positively also on the risk provisions for general programme delay, design delay and contamination risk <sup>337</sup>. The report set out the recommendation for the £1.3m reduction in the risk allowance which then appeared in McGarrity's subsequent spreadsheet <sup>338</sup>.

Accordingly whilst it may never have been made explicit to CEC that the QRA spreadsheet had been manually adjusted rather than re-run, the reduction in the risk allowance was clearly signaled in the Close documents, which made explicit that the £1.3m reduction was a recommendation based on judgement and evaluation <sup>339</sup>.

CEC were likewise aware of the manner in which TIE were adjusting the risk allowance to meet increased consortium costs. In mid April 2008, McGarrity sent Alan Coyle and

by the manually added risks as noted above (CEC01295329).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>334</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 23.20-24.1 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>335</sup> Steven Bell transcript 16.15-16.20 (Wednesday 25 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>336</sup> WED0000023 c 7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>337</sup> CEC01338847\_0004

<sup>338</sup> CEC01338847\_0006

<sup>339</sup> CEC01338847\_0006

others in CEC a cost analysis spreadsheet, from which Coyle identified that the £1m increase in Tramco costs had been matched by a similar reduction in the QRA <sup>340</sup>. Coyle's assessment of this to Colin Mackenzie in CEC Legal was:

"The reduction in the QRA was taken from the unspecified risk pot, therefore no science was applied as per the usual QRA mechanism. I guess the reduction from £33m to £32m is no big deal... the OGC gateway review 3 guys had said the previous level of circa £50m would have been in line with industry norm, and given the procurement risks which reduce the figure will be closed at Financial Closed (sic) I guess it makes sense" <sup>341</sup>.

It was also noted during the Inquiry that the statistical confidence level used to develop the QRA was reduced from P90 to P80 (ie from a 90% confidence level to an 80% confidence level). Whilst McGarrity did not recollect the reason for this reduction, it appears from an email sent to him by Hamill that the reduction was McGarrity's proposal<sup>342</sup>, and that was Hamill's recollection <sup>343</sup>. P90 was in any event unusual, and according to Hamill most large capital projects would have a P80 and a P50 <sup>344</sup>. This is entirely supported by the fact that Turner & Townsend used P80 figures when they took over project management in 2011, similarly stating that P80 was standard for this type

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>340</sup> CEC01247693\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>341</sup> CEC01247693\_0001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>342</sup> TIE00351419

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>343</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 57.19-57.21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>344</sup> Mark Hamill transcript 58.11-58.13

of project <sup>345</sup>. P80 and P50 figures were also used by Hamill's predecessor Mark Bourke<sup>346</sup>.

Professor Flyvberg also noted that:

*"the P90 adopted by the project is an unusually high level of confidence; the DfT guidance suggest P80 as the conservative value"*<sup>347</sup>.

Faithful & Gould also noted that P80 was normal <sup>348</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>345</sup> CEC01932700\_0020, TRI00000103\_0022 Q29

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>346</sup> TRI00000110\_0019

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>347</sup> TRI00000265\_0025

<sup>348</sup> CEC01727000 para 5.3.3

## 6D – Close Report and risk transfer

In March 2008 Andrew Fitchie sent an email to TIE management (including **Steven Bell** and **Susan Clark**) enclosing 'DLAP version of the Close Report' <sup>349</sup>. The report included the following paragraph:

"In broad terms, the principal pillars of the contract suite in terms of programme, cost, scope and risk transfer have not changed materially since the approval of the Final Business Case in October 2007. It is felt that the process of negotiation and quality control has operated effectively to ensure the final contract terms are robust and that where risk allocation has altered this has been adequately reflected in suitable commercial compromises." <sup>350</sup>

The same passage appeared in the final version of the Report on Infraco Contract Suite<sup>351</sup>. Meanwhile in the Close Report, it was stated that:

"[t]he increase in Base Costs for Infraco is a result of a negotiated position on a large number of items... and substantially achieving the level of risk transfer to the private sector anticipated by the procurement strategy." <sup>352</sup>

It has been suggested by Inquiry counsel that these statements inaccurately reflect the terms of Schedule Part 4. That Schedule is discussed further in Section 7 below but it should be noted that since this is a DLA approved draft, it supports the contention that

<sup>349</sup> CEC01463884

<sup>350</sup> CEC01463886\_0004

<sup>351</sup> CEC01338851\_0001

<sup>352</sup> CEC01338853\_0004

Bell and others in TIE management believed - on the basis of legal advice <sup>353</sup> - that Schedule Part 4 was drafted in such a way as to properly reflect TIE's intention behind the Wiesbaden Agreement and to ensure that Infraco carried the risk for normal design development. It is submitted that Fitchie's claim that he identified the report as inaccurate at the time <sup>354</sup>, but did nothing to correct it over these two months <sup>355</sup>, is not credible.

It is of note that the Close Report goes on to state that:

"[c]rucially the price includes for normal design development... meaning the evolution of design to construction stage and excluding changes of design principle shape form and outline specification as per the Employer's Requirements." <sup>356</sup>

This again reflects the understanding of TIE management as to the effect of Schedule Part 4 standing DLA's advice. It also contains other relevant caveats in line with this understanding:

"tie/CEC will bear any incremental construction programme cost consequences of SDS failure to deliver design outputs in a timely and sufficient manner... TIE will bear the incremental cost and programme consequences associated with a delay in granting consents or approval... and/or the cost and programme

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>353</sup> e.g. Willie Gallagher transcript 114.4-114.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>354</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 182.8-182.15 (Tuesday 10 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>355</sup> See for instance DLA letter prior to Close (CEC01033532)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>356</sup> CEC01338853\_0026

consequences of changes to design principle shape form and outline specification (as per the ERs) required to obtain the consent or approval." <sup>357</sup>

"[R]isk allowance does not provide for the costs of significant changes in scope from that defined in the ERs... any such changes falling into these categories would give rise to an increase in the cost estimate." <sup>358</sup>

As will be discussed in Section 7C below, CEC Legal had an opportunity to consider the terms of the contract including Schedule 4 prior to Close but apparently did not do so. Colin Mackenzie understood based on reports from DLA that not all risk had been passed to Infraco and that the risks of mismatch in design and the risk from outstanding approvals were being borne by TIE/CEC <sup>359</sup>. The Council's 'B Team' accordingly prepared a report for the CEC Directors at the end of April identifying the lack of alignment between the contract and version 31 of the design programme <sup>360</sup> and in light of that querying TIE's £3.3m cover for design consents and approvals <sup>361</sup>. CEC Legal had been aware of this issue since at least March 2008, when Graeme Bissett had sent Gill Lindsay a short paper <sup>362</sup> outlining *inter alia*:

 "uncertainty" around the alignment of the ERs, the SDS design and the Infraco proposals, which SDS were reviewing;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>357</sup> CEC01338853\_0027

<sup>358</sup> CEC01338853\_0028

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>359</sup> Colin Mackenzie transcript 64.8-64.19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>360</sup> CEC01222467\_0001, and see Section 7D below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>361</sup> CEC01222467\_0002, and see Section 3B above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>362</sup> CEC01474538

- road reinstatement identified as the most significant area of misalignment, for which an additional £2m had been added to the risk allowance <sup>363</sup>;
- delay on post close consents "this is the one significant change in the risk profile retained by the public sector since December".

Accordingly the recommendation from Lindsay and others for the Council's Chief Executive to authorise TIE to issue the Notice of Intention to Award the Infraco contract noted that:

"negotiations have required and provided for a 3 month extension to the programme and a range of adjustments to the risk allocations. Many of these adjustments to risk allocation are positive, reflecting the reduced risk contingency. There are some which do pass additional risk to the public sector. Of these, the most important is considered to be SDS. As you are aware, this has been a very difficult point for tie to negotiate and they have provided for the best deal which they advise us is currently available to themselves and the Council. In essence, the contractor BBS will accept the design risk for SDS to a high financial ceiling, whereas the Council and tie must remain financially liable for delay by SDS in relation to the provision by them of information for a range of consents and approvals. Both tie and the Council have worked diligently to examine and reduce this risk in practical terms and tie advises that the new risk contingency contains suitable adjustment for this residual risk." <sup>364</sup>

<sup>363</sup> See Section 6C above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>364</sup> CEC02086755

In light of the above it is submitted that TIE discharged its reporting obligations to the CEC Executive in advising of the relevant risk issues, as TIE understood them and supported by TIE's advisors. The extent to which CEC Executive reports to Councillors<sup>365</sup> reflected this is a separate issue, not impacting on any member of the SETE group. TIE's reports were made on the understanding that Schedule Part 4 was "competent" <sup>366</sup>, which ultimately proved not to be the case. As was noted by CEC's Director of Finance, it was only later during the disputes with Infraco that the question of normal design development came to the fore <sup>367</sup>, an issue addressed further in Sections 7 and 8 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>365</sup> e.g. CEC00906940

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>366</sup> Stewart McGarrity transcript 179.1-179.6 (Tuesday 12 December)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 25.24-26.8 (Thursday 30 November)

#### 6E – Consideration of risk register by DPD

In April 2007 **David Mackay** raised a concern at the TPB about the extent of risk reporting and discussion at TPB meetings. Following discussion, the Board agreed to delegate detailed discussion of these issues to the DPD subcommittee <sup>368</sup>. Whilst the point was never put to Mackay by the Inquiry, it was suggested to Matthew Crosse that this could be viewed as consideration of risk being "demoted", a suggestion with which Crosse did not agree <sup>369</sup>, as he considered that the DPD was the appropriate forum for such detailed discussions, with a high level report then being made to the TPB <sup>370</sup>. The then risk manager Mark Bourke agreed with this, saying that for the subcommittee to have a "deeper consideration" of risk would not necessarily disconnect the Board from understanding of the important issues <sup>371</sup>. The Primary Risk Register was created to present a "top slice" of the critical and "showstopper" risks to the Board <sup>372</sup>. It should also be noted that the DPD was composed of very senior officials including the SRO and the Project Director plus TIE's Executive Chairman and Finance Director, amongst others<sup>373</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>368</sup> CEC01015822\_0008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>369</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript 58.22-59.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>370</sup> Matthew Crosse transcript 100.25-101.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>371</sup> Mark Bourke transcript 4.18-4.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>372</sup> Mark Bourke transcript 33.10-33.15

<sup>373</sup> TRS00002699\_0014

# (7) SCHEDULE PART 4

### 7A – Evolution of Pricing Assumption 1

**Steven Bell's** involvement in the negotiations surrounding Schedule 4, commencing when he became Project Director in early 2008, was limited both by (a) the terms already agreed at Wiesbaden in December 2007 and (b) the close ownership of negotiations on the TIE side by Geoff Gilbert, assisted by Bob Dawson and from early 2008, Dennis Murray. Frequently Bell was not present at critical meetings nor included in electronic exchanges. An internal audit of the process later instructed by Richard Jeffrey, named "Project Challenge" <sup>374</sup> found amongst other things that Bell had little part to play <sup>375</sup>. It is clear from the chronology of the evolution of Pricing Assumption 1 (PA1) that Bell never led any of the discussions and was only intermittently copied into relevant exchanges.

This chronology is set out in detail in Appendix 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>374</sup> TRI00000102\_0203 para 7.386

<sup>375</sup> TRI00000102\_0204 para 7.393

### 7B – Legal advice on Schedule 4

Informed by the advice from both the TIE commercial team and by DLA, **Steven Bell's** understanding of PA1 – in common with other parties (see Section 7D) - was that normal design development would be at Infraco's cost.

The evidence of Andrew Fitchie, both orally and in his witness statement <sup>376</sup> was generally to the effect that he advised various persons within TIE, including Bell, of the potential dangers arising from the pricing assumptions in Schedule Part 4. This claim is of doubtful credibility for a number of reasons:

- Nowhere amongst the significant volumes of documentary material is there any evidence of this important advice being provided in writing <sup>377</sup>;
- None of the persons at TIE who were allegedly in receipt of this advice recall it being given, including Bell himself <sup>378</sup>, **David Mackay** <sup>379</sup>, Geoff Gilbert <sup>380</sup>, Bob Dawson<sup>381</sup>, Graeme Bissett <sup>382</sup>, Willie Gallagher <sup>383</sup> and Stewart McGarrity <sup>384</sup>.
- Fitchie never referred to the fact that he had provided this advice, for instance when McGrigors were later instructed to effectively audit the evolution of

<sup>376</sup> TRI00000102\_0183 para 7.282 et ff

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>377</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 86.20-86.25 (Tuesday 10 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>378</sup> Steven Bell transcript 51.3-53.2 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>379</sup> David Mackay transcript 64.7-64.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>380</sup> Geoff Gilbert transcript 204.15-204.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>381</sup> Bob Dawson transcript 44.2-44.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>382</sup> Graeme Bissett transcript 133.25-134.4 (Tuesday 31 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>383</sup> Willie Gallagher transcript 114.8-114.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>384</sup> Stewart McGarrity transcript 168.16-168.23 (Tuesday 12 December)

Schedule 4 during Project Challenge in 2010<sup>385</sup>. Indeed he never indicated to Brandon Nolan that he had warned TIE about the dangers in Schedule 4 and in fact held a different view from Nolan on how the Schedule, and PA1 in particular, operated <sup>386</sup>.

 This alleged advice is directly in contradiction to the assurances provided by DLA in writing to CEC at the time of contract close – for instance DLA's letter to CEC on 12 May 2008, in which it is stated:

"No issues have arisen since we last reported which have resulted in any adverse risk alteration to risk balance." <sup>387</sup>

 As indicated in Section 6 above, Fitchie had also approved <sup>388</sup> the statements in the Close Report that:

"In broad terms the principal pillars of the contract suite in terms of programme, cost, scope and risk transfer have not changed materially since the approval of the Final Business Case" <sup>389</sup> and that "[c]rucially the price includes for normal design development." <sup>390</sup>

• When disputes arose in 2009 with the contractor over PA1, Fitchie responded to an email exchange with TIE in which he conspicuously failed to make any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>385</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 168.17-170.7 (Tuesday 10 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>386</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 128.14-129.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>387</sup> CEC01033532

<sup>388</sup> CEC01463884

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>389</sup> CEC01463886\_0004

<sup>390</sup> CEC01463886\_0041

comments in line with the alleged advice that he had provided pre-contract <sup>391</sup>. By contrast, he said in that email:

"Nowhere is there, in my opinion, is there (sic) wording or a combination of provisions in the Infraco contract that Infraco is not responsible for the production of design or that it can escape the financial consequences of financial inadequacies." <sup>392</sup>

 In his written statement, Fitchie confirmed that the April 2009 TPB minutes <sup>393</sup> correctly recorded that:

> "DLA Piper were confident of TIE's position with regard to the principle (sic) areas of contractual disagreement" <sup>394</sup>.

This however flies in the face of his claim in oral evidence that he had previously advised TIE of the dangers of Schedule 4.

 The briefing which DLA provided to senior counsel for opinion on these matters in May 2009 indicated that:

"Instructing solicitors are of the view that the changes in design from BDDI to IFC stages may not, of themselves, give rise to an entitlement on the part of Infraco to additional time and/or payment" <sup>395</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 173.17-174.9 (Tuesday 10 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>392</sup> CEC00851679

<sup>393</sup> CEC00633071\_0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>394</sup> TRI00000102\_0249 para 8.33; see also Andrew Fitchie transcript 43.1-43.22 (Tuesday 10 October).

<sup>395</sup> CEC00962477\_0008

"inclusion of the drafting phrase 'normal design development'... should logically be construed to imply that not every change in design from BDDI to IFC will be sufficient to trigger the ND mechanism" <sup>396</sup>.

• The same briefing also indicated that:

"Instructing solicitors consider that refinement of a design, rather than an alteration to an essential element will, in most cases, be insufficient to be deemed abnormal development." <sup>397</sup>

Fitchie could not explain this contradiction of his stated position <sup>398</sup>.

Senior counsel's subsequent Opinion <sup>399</sup> in June 2009 indicated that not every change from BDDI to IFC would constitute a Notified Departure, and what constitutes normal design development is a matter of professional opinion and judgement. It is reasonably clear that this advice led to TIE's strategy of pursuing BDDI-IFC arguments at DRP, yet again Fitchie was unable to provide an explanation for this contradiction of his stated position <sup>400</sup>.

Indeed in his written statement Fitchie pointed out that this Opinion:

and

<sup>396</sup> CEC00962477\_0010

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>397</sup> ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>398</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 52.12-53.3 (Wednesday 11 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>399</sup> CEC00901460. This contains a watermark in Nick Smith's name indicating that it was in the possession of CEC Legal.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>400</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 56.12-58.20 (Wednesday 11 October)

#### "did not differ materially from DLA Piper's advice" <sup>401</sup>.

- In November 2009, DLA provided advice to TIE that the adjudication decisions on Gogarburn and Carrick Knowe - which supported Infraco's position on PA1 – were erroneous and should be challenged <sup>402</sup>.
- In oral evidence, Fitchie did not appear to appreciate the genesis of the problems with PA1, particularly in the redraft on 19 March 2008, which rendered normal design development redundant on a literal reading <sup>403</sup>. Fitchie thought there was nothing significant about this redraft <sup>404</sup>. Similarly, his email at the time raised other issues with the draft but nothing about PA1 <sup>405</sup>.
- Fitchie's claim is at odds with his concurrent (and equally implausible) claim that he did not provide advice on Schedule 4 since he was not involved in its negotiation – contradicted by each of the individuals at TIE who relied on his advice and by DLA being assigned as legal Quality Assurance for Schedule 4 <sup>406</sup>.

It is also crucial to note that whilst Transport Scotland obtained legal advice from Dundas & Wilson on the Infraco contract in June 2009, to be told that the contract was

<sup>401</sup> TRI00000102\_0250 para 8.36

<sup>402</sup> DLA00001382

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 403}$  See Appendix 2 and figure  $\underline{6}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>404</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 135.23-136.2 (Tuesday 10 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>405</sup> CEC01489543

<sup>406</sup> CEC01399321

"not fit for purpose" <sup>407</sup>, TS apparently did not share this advice with either TIE or CEC. Dundas & Wilson further noted that the Infraco contract was in such a form as:

"may tend to encourage disputes... the provisions relating to Change and the strict time limit encourage notification of changes which if not accepted may create a hostile atmosphere and divert management from the important task of delivery." <sup>408</sup>

Coming as it did immediately prior to the period in which TIE engaged in a number of DRPs under the contract, it is reasonable to assume that this advice, contradicting the advice received from DLA as the contract's authors, may have had a significant impact on TIE/CEC strategy, had it been made available. The first time TIE actually received legal advice to the effect that PA1 might not support the arguments which had been fostered by DLA came following the initial adverse adjudication decisions. This is covered in Section 8 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>407</sup> TRI0000065\_0041

#### 7C – Actions and understanding of CEC Legal

The position of Andrew Fitchie discussed above is of particular importance given that CEC did not obtain independent legal advice on the contract. This decision was taken by Gill Lindsay (contrary to recommendations from her staff <sup>409</sup>) on the basis that she was content with the assurances which were provided by DLA <sup>410</sup> and that separate advice for CEC would have been unnecessary and caused delay <sup>411</sup>.

Lindsay's evidence was that her staff did not have particular concerns warranting such a review, they just did not want to be personally blamed for something going wrong <sup>412</sup>. Lindsay instructed Nick Smith to carry out a review of Schedule Part 4 in August 2007<sup>413</sup>, which he refused to do because of time constraints <sup>414</sup> despite his continuing involvement up until contract close nine months later. This refusal does not appear to have been communicated to Lindsay either by Smith or his line manager Colin Mackenzie <sup>415</sup> and was in spite of her continuing instructions for them to focus on the tram project and interface with DLA <sup>416</sup>, from which she saw no product from them beyond a single sheet of paper <sup>417</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>409</sup> Nick Smith transcript 152.11-152.15 (Wednesday 13 September), CEC00013273\_0001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>410</sup> CEC01031217

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>411</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 13.23-14.13. Donald McGougan agreed – Donald McGougan transcript 138.13-139.8 (Wednesday 29 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>412</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 29.11-29.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>413</sup> CEC01567527

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>414</sup> CEC01564795

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>415</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 50.16-50.22, 52.23-53.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>416</sup> CEC01400439, Gill Lindsay transcript 72.12-74.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>417</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 51.3-51.16

Smith claimed that he did not even read the draft Schedule Part 4 provided to him by TIE in mid April 2008 <sup>418</sup>, despite conceding that the problems with the drafting would have been apparent to him had he read it at that time <sup>419</sup>. Lindsay did not read that draft of Schedule Part 4 either <sup>420</sup>. By contrast, Mackenzie confirmed that he had read Schedule Part 4 prior to the end of April 2008 <sup>421</sup>, and was surprised to hear that Smith claimed not to have read it <sup>422</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>418</sup> CEC01245223

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>419</sup> Nick Smith transcript 3.12-3.16, 17.15-19.4 (Thursday 14 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>420</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 133.21-134.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>421</sup> Colin Mackenzie transcript 154-7-154.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>422</sup> Colin Mackenzie transcript 157.9-157.13

#### <u>7D – Normal design development</u>

**Steven Bell's** evidence was that he understood that the effect of Schedule 4, and of PA1 in particular, was that the contractor would bear the risk of normal design development <sup>423</sup>. This is in line with the understanding of Geoff Gilbert who was the principal negotiator on the TIE side <sup>424</sup> and which was supported by DLA as evidenced by their representations to CEC on the transfer of risk, notwithstanding the position now adopted by Andrew Fitchie in his evidence <sup>425</sup>.

Even in areas where the design was at an early stage, it did not automatically follow that development of that element of the design would fall beyond normal design development, since SDS required to achieve the Employers Requirements (ERs), which Infraco likewise had an obligation to build <sup>426</sup>. In specific areas where design was lacking e.g. Burnside Road or Picardy Place, provisional sums were set aside <sup>427</sup>.

Whilst Bell was not present at Wiesbaden, he saw a copy of the Wiesbaden Agreement shortly after it had been signed <sup>428</sup>. His reflection at the time that it was clearly intended to ensure that normal completion of designs was contractor's responsibility; if it was beyond that then it was a client change. He read this to mean that significant changes would be beyond normal design development. The contract set out the ERs and he would accordingly expect the contractor to achieve those Requirements. He did not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>423</sup> Steven Bell transcript 30.6-30.10 (Tuesday 24 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>424</sup> TRI0000038\_0112, para 283

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>425</sup> See Section 7B above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>426</sup> Steven Bell transcript 62.8-62.22 (Wednesday 25 November), see also CEC00034842\_0012 para 46 for Infraco's acceptance of this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>427</sup> Steven Bell transcript 111.9 (Tuesday 24 October), Stewart McGarrity transcript 118.20-119.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>428</sup> Steven Bell transcript 27.3-27.10 (Tuesday 24 October)

expect very small dimensional changes to equate to something that was beyond normal design development <sup>429</sup>.

Further, Bell read the revised Infraco civil proposals in February 2008 as being entirely in accordance with the obligations he understood them to have undertaken. Throughout the proposals the following phrase appears:

"Design to be completed and all consents and approvals obtained." 430

This showed that Bilfinger were affirming in their proposals that they would complete the design, which Bell took as a positive affirmation of their obligations <sup>431</sup>.

Bell's evidence as to his understanding and belief is entirely in accordance with his statements and actions at the time. In an internal email from Bell to the senior TIE team in mid April 2008 he stated that:

"the logic behind the November 'freeze' allows for all normal design development at no extra cost" <sup>432</sup>.

It is also noted that this same understanding was shared by his deputy **Susan Clark** - she answered the same question by saying:

"BBS are contractually obliged to construct to the designs that SDS produce and get consented. We have been identifying significant changes as design has progressed to ensure that we have made financial provision — eg Burnside

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>429</sup> Steven Bell transcript 30.6-32.2 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>430</sup> CEC01450027

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>431</sup> Steven Bell transcript 82.15-83.21 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>432</sup> CEC01297322

Road. Normal design development is a BBS risk as described in Schedule 4 of the Infraco contract" <sup>433</sup>.

It is also of note that if a literal reading of PA1 is preferred, rendering the concept of normal design development redundant, then Pricing Assumption 9 would also be redundant, since it refers back to the same concept of normal design development as defined in PA1 <sup>434</sup>. Moreover, if normal design development is redundant such that the Infraco was only obliged to build in accordance with the BDDI, then Pricing Assumptions 13 and 19 would also both be entirely redundant, as they each specify particular works and structures in which the Infraco is only obliged to build to the BDDI <sup>435</sup>.

Furthermore, Bell's understanding of the commercial intent behind PA1 is supported by the evidence of the various witnesses for the contractor, all of whom envisaged that the provision for normal design development in the clause would cover minor changes. This commercial intent was not borne out by interpretation of the clause in subsequent adjudications, where for example in the adjudication on Carrick Knowe, pigeon proofing (which was required under the ERs but did not feature in the BDDI) was held to constitute a Notified Departure <sup>436</sup>. Infraco did subsequently make concessions about minor changes <sup>437</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>433</sup> CEC01355447

<sup>434</sup> USB0000032\_0006

<sup>435</sup> USB0000032\_0007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>436</sup> CEC00479383\_0024 para 7.71; Steven Bell transcript 81.18 (Wednesday 25 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>437</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 165.12-165.22

Scott McFadzen commented on a paper connected to the Rutland Square Agreement in which it is stated that:

"The design information which provided the basis for BBS's price will be a pricing assumption under Schedule 4. The risk of design 'creep' accordingly lies with TIE."<sup>438</sup>

McFadzen said that design creep was not the same as completion of incomplete design<sup>439</sup> – indeed design creep is what TIE sought to guard against in response to Duncan Fraser's proposed risk premium for changes <sup>440</sup>. Gilbert similarly indicated that the wording of PA1 was intended to protect BBS from 'scope creep' <sup>441</sup>. The document further notes:

"Infraco will take the risk in relation to design quality... TIE will hols (sic) the Infraco harmelss (sic) under the Infraco contract in respect of time and costs incurred as a result of the late delivery of the design by SDS which exceeded the liquidated damages recoverable from SDS under the SDS contract. Recovery of liquidated damages will be an Infraco risk."

McFadzen in his evidence explained his understanding of the provision for normal design development in PA1 by reference to the fact that the contractor was trying to limit design risk to normal design and build risk, so that normal design development would

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>438</sup> CEC01284179\_0027

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>439</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 95.15-96.11

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 440}$  See Section 3B above

<sup>441</sup> Geoff Gilbert transcript 111.3-111.20

cover for example a minor increase in section depth <sup>442</sup>. The purpose of the clause was to try to guard against for example a bridge being made wider to accommodate a footway<sup>443</sup>. Whilst the definition of normal design development excluded shape and form, it included increase in section size and increases in reinforcement, which were considered to be the normal risks a contractor would expect to take in a design and build contract <sup>444</sup>. McFadzen considered that the wording was clear in order to achieve this <sup>445</sup>.

Richard Walker gave an example of normal design development as a drip channel on the side of a concrete soffit moving a few inches, but changes of shape or profile would fall outwith the definition <sup>446</sup>.

According to Jochen Keysberg, normal design development as far as Bilfinger was concerned would include for example getting three more steel bars in a concrete foundation, but not changing the whole shape or type of construction. It was the borderline of normal development which was subject of "many debates" <sup>447</sup>. If the construction methodology changed, or if quantities changed "dramatically", that was not normal design development, but there was:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>442</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 87.7-87.14

<sup>443</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 87.15-87.19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>444</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 88.13-88.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>445</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 88.18-88.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>446</sup> Richard Walker transcript 73.16-74.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>447</sup> Jochen Keysberg transcript 27.13-27.19

*"certainly somewhere a grey area between what is design development and what is a change"* <sup>448</sup>.

For Pinsent Masons, Ian Laing's evidence was that he recalled asking technical people within Bilfinger what normal design development meant and not getting a consistent answer <sup>449</sup>. He considered that normal design development was a matter for technical experts, as there may be ways in which the design changed which were not changes of principle, shape, form or specification <sup>450</sup>. Despite the wording, Laing considered that there remained the possibility for development of design that was not a change to design principle &c and thus not "caught" by PA1 <sup>451</sup>.

For Siemens, Michael Flynn explained normal design development by reference to what it would not include: if there was a fundamental shift in design because it would not work then the original costing may no longer be appropriate <sup>452</sup>. Looked at as a whole, PA1 provided that for those items which had already been designed, there should be no redesign <sup>453</sup>. Flynn was also directed to the minutes of a BBS meeting on 5 June 2008, shortly after contract close in which it is noted:

"Everyone to read 1<sup>st</sup> part of Sch 4 to understand BBS strategy towards design changes. The difference in the design programme version 26 and the in Schedule Part 4 already mentioned version 31 (sic) has already been notified to tie... a dedicated change team is being built... 24 changes have been notified."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>448</sup> Jochen Keysberg transcript 28.3-28.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>449</sup> Ian Laing transcript 23.10-23.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>450</sup> Ian Laing transcript 26.15-26.21, 35.5-35.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>451</sup> Ian Laing transcript 35.17-36.13. See also Section 8D below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>452</sup> Michael Flynn transcript 49.22-50.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>453</sup> Michael Flynn transcript 50.14-51.3

Notwithstanding all of this, the minutes go on to note:

"For legal clarity TIE's acknowledgement of base case assumptions and expected changes of these has been embedded into Schedule Part 4. However, normal design development remains BBS risk." <sup>454</sup>

It is accordingly submitted that, notwithstanding the problems now identified with the wording, the understanding of those on both sides of the contractual negotiations, at the time of execution, was that the contractor was responsible for the costs associated with normal design development, which was understood to cover minor changes to existing design. For Bell (and for TIE), the costs for any anticipated changes beyond that were anticipated to be provided for within the risk allowance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>454</sup> SIE00000228 pages 4-5 (emphasis added)

#### <u>7E – Other Pricing Assumptions</u>

A number of the other Pricing Assumptions were discussed in the course of **Steven Bell's** evidence <sup>455</sup>. There were 43 pricing assumptions in total. Bell accepted that Pricing Assumption 2, that the SDS design was aligned with the Infraco programme, was not correct <sup>456</sup>. In parallel to this, Pricing Assumption 4, that the Schedule 15 programme was the same as the design delivery programme in the SDS agreement, was also incorrect as SDS were 13 months behind schedule <sup>457</sup>. This led to the first Notified Departure and is dealt with in Section 7F below.

Bell believed that Pricing Assumption 3 was correct (that the SDS deliverables complied with the Infraco proposals and the ERs), and that despite workshops being held after close to align certain items, there were no fundamental misalignments <sup>458</sup>.

Regarding Pricing Assumption 11, that Infraco shall not encounter any below ground obstructions of voids, Scott McFadzen for Bilfinger highlighted this Pricing Assumption as one which was known not to be true at the time of contract close <sup>459</sup>, and which was more significant than the alignment of the design programme <sup>460</sup>. Bell indicated that provision was made for this in the risk allowance <sup>461</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>455</sup> These are found in Schedule 4 (USB00000032) at pages 6-9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>456</sup> Steven Bell transcript 146.22-147.3 (Tuesday 24 October); see Section 7F below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>457</sup> Steven Bell transcript 148.8-148.17; see also TRI00000112\_0039 Q64

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>458</sup> Steven Bell transcript 147.4-148.7. Cf Ian Laing's evidence (see Section 7F below).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>459</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 144.13-145.1. Note that McFadzen erroneously recalled this as being PA12 (transcript 150.14-150.17)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>460</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 165.6-165.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>461</sup> Steven Bell transcript 150.21-151.3

A separate risk provision was made for roads reconstruction <sup>462</sup> in respect of Pricing Assumption 12, following discussion between Bell and McGarrity <sup>463</sup>. Bell had ultimately preferred the Infraco trackform proposal to the SDS recommendation after the parties had worked together to a technical conclusion. The concerns about voiding turned out not to be as significant as SDS had feared, and this was a separate issue from the problem in Princes Street, which was about the interface between the road surfacing and the head of the rails <sup>464</sup>.

Pricing Assumption 24 was that the MUDFA works would be completed in accordance with the requirement of the Infraco programme; Bell considered at the time that there was a medium level risk that this would not be achieved <sup>465</sup>. MUDFA formed the largest single item in the risk allowance <sup>466</sup>. Graeme Bissett did not agree with the proposition that it would have been clear at contract close that the MUDFA works would not be complete in time, and recalled that the revised MUDFA programme was being adhered to <sup>467</sup>.

Pricing Assumptions 9, 13 and 19 have been dealt with in Section 7C above. No issues have been identified or raised with witnesses in respect of the remaining 33 Pricing Assumptions, which accordingly are assumed to have been considered to be correct at the time of contract close.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>462</sup> TIE00126755

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>463</sup> Steven Bell transcript 95.9-95.14, 99.19-100.1, 111.18-113.18 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>464</sup> Steven Bell transcript 154.18-155.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>465</sup> Steven Bell transcript 156.10-156.22, see also TRI00000112\_0039 Q64

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>466</sup> TIE00126755

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>467</sup> Graeme Bissett transcript 156.22-157.21 (Tuesday 31 October)

#### 7F – Misalignment and Notified Departures

On 26 March 2008 Ian Laing emailed **Steven Bell** and others regarding the possibility of an immediate Notified Departure (ND)<sup>468</sup> based on the update of the design programme from v26 to v28, which would be a departure from Pricing Assumption 4. In evidence Laing indicated that this was only a possible ND because in order for the contractor to notify that there has been an ND, there had to be a financial impact, which required analysis of the new version of the design programme <sup>469</sup>.

This was likewise recognised by Jim McEwan's reaction to this email which he sent to Andrew Fitchie (copying in Bell):

*"only where the change can be shown to materially change the Infraco programme critical path should we be liable for potential additional charges".* <sup>470</sup>

Bell reiterated this point in his evidence – for Infraco to be entitled to additional money, it had to show that there was a time or cost implication to the change  $^{471}$ .

Following this on 2 April 2008, Laing altered clause 3.2 of Schedule 4 to acknowledge that certain of the Pricing Assumptions were based on facts which were known to be incorrect <sup>472</sup>. He did this specifically because he had not received a response from TIE in relation to the potential ND to which he had alluded <sup>473</sup>. The only other Pricing Assumption which Laing identified as presenting a risk of an ND arising was Pricing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>468</sup> CEC01465933

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>469</sup> Ian Laing transcript 40.1-40.12

<sup>470</sup> CEC01465933

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>471</sup> Steven Bell transcript 88.6-88.23 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>472</sup> CEC01423747

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>473</sup> Ian Laing transcript 45.1-45.6

Assumption 3, namely that the SDS design complied with the ERs <sup>474</sup>. Laing did not anticipate that the ND mechanism would lead to the large number of claims which eventuated <sup>475</sup>. Nor did he hear anyone saying to TIE what the contractor thought that the associated additional costs were likely to be <sup>476</sup>.

Fitchie's advice to TIE was to negotiate with BBS on the programme update prior to contract close as:

"the Notified Departure mechanism is too blunt and will permit BBS to include everything that they estimate is going to affect them to be priced and to be granted relief. That Estimate is bound to be all encompassing and conservative".

Fitchie suggested that TIE required:

"to capture as many identified key changes that tie knows will be required and to attempt to fix them and agree their likely programme and/or cost impact with BBS prior to contract award, or at the least identify the reasonable range of programme and cost impacts." <sup>477</sup>

McEwan's position was that Fitchie's proposal was pragmatically impossible: if TIE could have captured and fixed all the changes then the issue would not have arisen in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>474</sup> USB00000032\_0006, Ian Laing transcript 40.22-41.14. Like Bell, he acknowledged the work of the alignment workshops to resolve this issue – see Section 7E above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>475</sup> Ian Laing transcript 46.5-46.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>476</sup> Ian Laing transcript 50.6-50.8

<sup>477</sup> CEC01465933

the first place <sup>478</sup>. His view was rather that TIE had to get SDS and Infraco aligned through novation <sup>479</sup>.

By contrast, Geoff Gilbert proposed that TIE needed to:

"a) confirm the agreements made with SDS on how the differences between v26 and v28 will be dealt with e.g. where and how they have agreed to pull back those dates. b) identify the impact of these mitigations and any unmitigated changes from V26 on the BBS critical path. This presumably shows that their critical path is unaffected. Then agree this position with BBS. c) include the agreed SDS mitigations in the Programme Schedule" <sup>480</sup>.

Bell confirmed that TIE's response was in effect a combination of the two approaches suggested by McEwan and Gilbert, by both seeking to be satisfied that there was adequate provision in the risk allowance or Provisional Sums, and by seeking to reduce impacts and minimising the circumstances which could lead to NDs <sup>481</sup>.

Ultimately the design programme was updated from v26 to v31 at close, rather than v28 as anticipated by Laing's email. TIE's approach to the issue is partly illustrated by a schedule circulated by **Tom Hickman** on 5 May 2008 <sup>482</sup> in which the design programme change from v26 to v31 was broken into constituent parts and analysed for potential programme impact: 15 of the 78 elements of the programme were considered to have an impact or potential impact, whilst the remaining 63 would have no impact –

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>478</sup> James McEwan transcript 184.2-184.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>479</sup> James McEwan transcript 184.9-184.12, CEC01465908

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>480</sup> CEC01465933

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>481</sup> Steven Bell transcript 104.18-105.6 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>482</sup> CEC01294479

as some were forecasting an improved date <sup>483</sup> and others were not on critical path and retained substantial float before Infraco were due to build <sup>484</sup>. Whilst the programme change would give rise to an ND, it would only result in additional money or time if such were due <sup>485</sup>.

It appears from a BSC report that there was an agreed mitigated impact from the v26v31 slippage of 38 days <sup>486</sup>. It is unclear from the information available how exactly this 38 days impact led to a BSC claim for an additional £6.5m <sup>487</sup> under INTC1 <sup>488</sup>.

Bell accepted that Fitchie's advice, whilst focused on this particular Notified Departure, was equally applicable to other potential NDs <sup>489</sup>. Accordingly he and Dennis Murray went through the 'backup' documentation to Schedule 4 in order to assess and quantify estimates <sup>490</sup>, and wherever there was a known area where an ND was likely (for instance roads reconstruction or MUDFA works), they attempted to crystallise the issue and either make provision in the risk allowance or sought to minimise the impact through mitigating actions <sup>491</sup>.

Bell did not however expect "wholesale" design development changes as ultimately became a significant matter of dispute <sup>492</sup>. He expected that there would be some items

485 ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>483</sup> TRI00000255

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>484</sup> TRI00000257

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>486</sup> CEC01169379 0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>487</sup> CEC00951737\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>488</sup> The sum ultimately agreed was £3.5m - BFB00003297\_0069. It therefore appears that Fitchie was correct to predict that Infraco's estimate would be "all encompassing and conservative".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>489</sup> Steven Bell transcript 91.6-91.16 (Tuesday 24 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>490</sup> Steven Bell transcript 92.15-92.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>491</sup> Steven Bell transcript 99.10-99.15 and see Section 6C above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>492</sup> Steven Bell transcript 95.15-95.17

that would be beyond normal design development, from which Infraco should rightly be protected, e.g. third party requirements by CEC or Forth Ports, which in some circumstances may have been paid by the third party <sup>493</sup>. Other elements were driven by ground condition uncertainty, where likely there were likely to be changes <sup>494</sup>. Most of the structures had a "reasonable degree of development" but around e.g. Murrayfield there was less design at November 2007 and may have been higher risk of something being beyond normal design development <sup>495</sup>. There was an allowance of £3.3m for design items beyond normal design development and additional areas where separate allowance had been made under Provisional Sums <sup>496</sup>.

Bell accordingly expected potentially "dozens" of NDs over the course of the project, which would be covered by the relevant provisions in the risk allowance, but did not expect the many hundreds of INTCs which eventuated <sup>497</sup>. By comparison, Joachim Enenkel of Bilfinger anticipated "a few" NDs, but not the number that ultimately occurred<sup>498</sup>. By contrast, Scott McFadzen claimed that in discussions with Bell and others it was known that there would be "a lot" of NDs but not how many or what their value would be <sup>499</sup>.

Nick Smith gave evidence that he had no knowledge of the concept of NDs prior to contract close <sup>500</sup>. However this stood in contrast with the documentation which he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>493</sup> Steven Bell transcript 96.12-97.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>494</sup> Steven Bell transcript 97.6-97.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>495</sup> Steven Bell transcript 97.13-97.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>496</sup> TIE00126755

<sup>497</sup> TRI00000109\_0059 Q45(2)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>498</sup> Joachim Enenkel transcript 134.20-135.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>499</sup> TRI00000058\_0050 para 173

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>500</sup> Nick Smith transcript 150.4-150.9 (Thursday 14 September)

received prior to close <sup>501</sup>, to which his only response was that he did not always read the emails he received <sup>502</sup>.

Gill Lindsay did not recall if she thought at the time there was a risk of more than one ND and said she was only aware of the one which was highlighted in a letter from DLA<sup>503</sup>, relating to the update of the design programme <sup>504</sup>. She accepted however that the advice letter she received from DLA <sup>505</sup> on 28 April 2008 discussed NDs, pricing assumptions and changes all in the plural <sup>506</sup>.

Donald McGougan understood that there would be an immediate ND based on the SDS delays impacting the Infraco programme, and that TIE had quantified this in their risk allowance <sup>507</sup>. He acknowledged that he did not however include this in his report to Council <sup>508</sup> on 1 May 2008 and conceded that it perhaps should have been <sup>509</sup>.

Colin Mackenzie was likewise aware that there was likely to be an ND shortly after execution <sup>510</sup>. He acknowledged that, standing his alleged concerns about the risk pot being "on the low side" <sup>511</sup>, he should have sought clarification on the likely number and value of NDs <sup>512</sup>:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>501</sup> CEC01312358 and attachments

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 502}$  Nick Smith transcript 150.21-151.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>503</sup> CEC01312368

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>504</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 146.19-146.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>505</sup> CEC01312368

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>506</sup> Gill Lindsay transcript 148.23-149.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>507</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 33.6-33.19 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>508</sup> CEC00906940

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>509</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 33.20-34.2 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>510</sup> Colin Mackenzie transcript 96.13-96.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>511</sup> Colin Mackenzie transcript 93.14-93.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>512</sup> Colin Mackenzie transcript 97.9-97.12

## (8) **DISPUTES**

#### 8A – Contractor behaviour

The repeated price increases by the contractor between preferred bidder stage and contract close have been addressed in Section 2. Infraco's management of SDS post-contract is covered in Section 3. Over and above this, there are various aspects of the contractor's behaviour post financial close which informed TIE's commercial and contractual strategy.

Infraco failed to mobilise or sign up subcontractors quickly or effectively, despite a £45m mobilisation payment <sup>513</sup>. This was conceded by Scott McFadzen <sup>514</sup> who attempted to excuse the fault by saying that it was a complicated contract to subcontract <sup>515</sup> and that Bilfinger were "new on the block" in the Scottish construction industry <sup>516</sup>. It appears however to have been suggested by Colin Brady of Bilfinger that there were instructions not to mobilise and instead to build claims based on design and delay <sup>517</sup>. This was confirmed by TIE's observations on the ground: whilst Infraco's technical and construction teams on site were built up gradually, the commercial team of 30 claims staff came onsite immediately <sup>518</sup>. This is also entirely in line with Richard Walker's strategy as noted by Steve Reynolds prior to contract close:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>513</sup> TRI00000109\_0083 Q65(1), TRI00000112\_0046 Q76(1), Mike Heath transcript 110.9-110.22, Dave Anderson transcript 181.17-181.22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>514</sup> TRI0000058\_0053 para 185

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>515</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 169.7-169.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>516</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 170.7-170.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>517</sup> TRI00000102\_0247 para 8.21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>518</sup> TRI00000085\_0089 para 207, TRI00000108\_0095 Q124, SIE00000228\_0004 (see quote on page 82 above).

"Walker has mused that if TIE understood the likely true cost of building the scheme then it would be cancelled... This is Richard's view of the strategy he has adopted to retain as much flexibility pre-contract with a view to securing substantial variations post-contract." <sup>519</sup>

Accordingly there was never a partnership ethos <sup>520</sup>.

Moreover, Infraco frustrated the change process by delaying in producing estimates. When estimates were produced, they were excessive: by 2011 the average agreed value was just over half (52%) of what Infraco had originally estimated <sup>521</sup>, amounting to a reduction of £22.5m <sup>522</sup>. This practice of habitually over-billing was undoubtedly a significant factor in drawing out disputes over changes which might otherwise be agreed in principle <sup>523</sup>, particularly where Infraco refused to carry out any work pending resolution <sup>524</sup>. The failure to provide estimates in time effectively frustrated the programme <sup>525</sup>. This is well exemplified by TIE's letter to BSC in February 2010 highlighting that of 518 change notices which had been submitted by Infraco as at that time, only 47 estimates had been provided within the time set down in the contract, and 304 had not been submitted at all <sup>526</sup>.

Bilfinger further overloaded the change process by submitting numerous changes for relatively small sums. From Bilfinger's own schedule, it is apparent that 140 INTCs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>519</sup> PBH00035854\_0003 c2.1.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>520</sup> Damian Sharp transcript 193.13-194.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>521</sup> TRI00000109\_0079 Q61

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>522</sup> TIE00086026\_0011

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>523</sup> TRI00000141\_0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>524</sup> Damian Sharp transcript 192.20-192.22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>525</sup> Dave Anderson transcript 146.15-146.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>526</sup> CEC00574090

submitted by Infraco were for single digit thousands of pounds, and 34 for less than £1000, the lowest claim being for a mere £45. By the time of mediation in March 2011, 296 INTCs still had no estimate, despite the INTCs in question having been issued as early as May 2008 <sup>527</sup>. There appeared to be disquiet at this tactical approach on the part of Bilfinger's partners, Siemens noting that the huge number of changes made the process unmanageable <sup>528</sup>:

"Siemens wanted Bilfinger Berger to proceed with small value changes 'at risk' in order to mitigate delay and/or enable progress Off-Street sections of the works."<sup>529</sup>

Whilst obstructions such as MUDFA undoubtedly impacted on certain on street sections, Infraco refused even to work off-street where they were unobstructed <sup>530</sup> and refused to consider mitigating actions <sup>531</sup>. Whilst Infraco considered that the re-sequencing proposed by TIE to mitigate delay actually amounted to acceleration for which they were entitled additional costs <sup>532</sup>, the post-mediation report by Turner & Townsend likewise noted that Bilfinger had not acted to mitigate the impact of any delays <sup>533</sup>.

Jim Donaldson of Bilfinger noted that Infraco originally worked on the job in a cooperative manner, but from 2009 there was a change "from on high" to work to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>527</sup> BFB00003297 – See change register pages 69-91. The £45 claim is INTC 384 on page 83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>528</sup> SIE00000190

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>529</sup> TRI00000171\_0044 para 90

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>530</sup> David Mackay transcript 91.8-91.15, Dave Anderson transcript 181.17-182.3 and see Section 4B above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>531</sup> Steven Bell transcript 29.22-30.5 (Wednesday 25 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>532</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 83.19-84.9

<sup>533</sup> WED00000103\_0045

strict terms of the contract <sup>534</sup>. There is a tension between Infraco's claim to have been strictly observing the change provisions in the contract whilst at the same time flaunting those provisions by submitting late estimates or no estimates at all.

This strategy by the civils contractor is exemplified by Keysberg's declaration to **Richard Jeffrey** that:

"this contract allows us to hold you to ransom" 535.

Infraco's later suggestion that they had only priced for "a three wheeled car" <sup>536</sup> does not sit well with their public reports that they had undertaken the tram project as a "turnkey" contract <sup>537</sup>. The strategy appears to have been influenced by the economic downturn in 2008 with the significant consequent impact on the construction industry and Bilfinger's decision to take a stricter line with the risk management in their civils business following a series of difficulties in Norway, Doha, Cologne and Canada <sup>538</sup>. When in February 2009 Bilfinger announced that they would not commence work on Princes Street and advised of additional costs of between £50-£80m (see Section 8B below), the Council's Transport Convenor noted:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>534</sup> James Donaldson transcript 112.3-112.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>535</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 64.2-64.15. Keysberg did not accept making this comment: Jochen Keysberg transcript 50.13-50.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>536</sup> TRI00000097\_0051 para 302

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>537</sup> CEC00867402, CEC00901595\_0002, http://www.bilfinger.com/fileadmin/corporate\_webseite/investor\_relations/ berichterstattung/2008/ en/Bilfinger\_ZB\_300608\_eng.pdf pg5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>538</sup> TRI00000085\_0155 para 360, TRI00000025\_0081 para 235-238, TIE00032924\_0002, TIE00032719, CEC00901595, CEC00488524\_0014, CEC00010631, CEC02084346\_0047, <u>CZS00000086\_0001</u>

"The fact that this sum bears a great similarity to the amount that BB have lost on a job in Norway is obviously coincidental, but it is not Edinburgh's place to help them balance their books."<sup>539</sup>

In September 2010, TIE issued a Remediable Termination Notice in respect of Infraco's conduct, amounting to one hundred identified breaches of the contract, including failure to complete the works in accordance with the contract (clause 7.3.1), failure to manage SDS (clause 11.4), failure to provide estimates (clause 80.3), breach of confidentiality (clause 101.1), and failure to mitigate (clause 119) <sup>540</sup>.

By contrast, Martin Foerder claimed that if **Steven Bell** had acted on issues raised email by Jeffrey in an email <sup>541</sup> following a meeting in May 2009 with Foerder and Miguel Berrozpe, then there may not have been two years of disagreements <sup>542</sup>. Jeffrey's email noted a lack of trust between TIE and BSC, the consortium's desire for an OSSA, and the disagreement over responsibility for design changes. Jeffrey however highlighted that the fundamental problem was the unfinished design, which was Bilfinger's responsibility <sup>543</sup>, and commented that Bilfinger were "determined to drag everything out". Jeffrey suggested mediation to resolve these matters <sup>544</sup>, which is what happened one month later, and is covered in section 10A below. The disagreement over responsibility for design changes was a central focus of the DRP process and is considered in Section 8D.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>539</sup> CEC00900879. See also TIE00032719, CEC00852883, TRI00000025\_0082 para 237-238

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>540</sup> CEC02084525 pages 12-19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>541</sup> CEC00985815

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>542</sup> TRI00000095\_0041 para 129-131

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>543</sup> See Section 3C above

<sup>544</sup> CEC00985815

#### <u>8B – Princes Street dispute</u>

On 22 October 2008, Bilfinger's Project Director Colin Brady attended a meeting of the TPB, at which he noted that bus lane access on Princes Street would require to be resolved prior to work starting. One direction bus access was later agreed at this "amicable" meeting <sup>545</sup>.

On 12 January 2009, TIE accordingly issued a Change Notice for a contingency bus lane <sup>546</sup>, which was discussed at a meeting between the parties on the same date, at which time matters appeared to be proceeding without issue <sup>547</sup>.

In a meeting on 10 February 2009 with **Steven Bell** and Stewart McGarrity, Richard Walker (accompanied by Robert Sheehan and others) announced that unless the construction programme was paused for six months to a year, Bilfinger would only work on a cost plus basis until design and utilities diversions were complete <sup>548</sup>. At this time Princes Street was closed in anticipation of works commencing on 21 February <sup>549</sup>. At the same meeting, Walker indicated that he anticipated additional project costs of between £50m and £80m <sup>550</sup>.

The day after this meeting, Infraco prepared an estimate for the bus lane change <sup>551</sup> amounting to £8000. On 13 February TIE issued Change Order 21, to a value of £6500

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>545</sup> CEC01053731\_0007, David Mackay transcript 106.12-106.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>546</sup> CEC01032608\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>547</sup> CEC00354163\_0001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>548</sup> TIE00089656\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>549</sup> TRI00000127\_0107 para 12.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>550</sup> TIE00089656\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>551</sup> CEC01032608\_0002

(agreeing the estimated actual costs but disputing the method of calculating preliminaries, head office overheads and profit) <sup>552</sup>.

On 18 February Sheehan emailed Bell indicating that Infraco did not have exclusive licence to Princes Street "inter alia due to maintaining a bus route" and that prior agreement on the estimate was required before work could commence. As such Infraco did not consider itself contractually obliged to work on Princes Street, but would consider any "proper instruction" to commence work, providing that said instruction contained:

"clear details on reimbursement of our actual costs and overheads, prelims and profit – further that TIE accept the risks associated with proceeding with the works under these circumstances" <sup>553</sup>.

Sheehan reiterated the following day that Infraco would only proceed on a "demonstrable cost" basis <sup>554</sup>.

On 19 February TIE instructed Infraco to proceed under clause 80.15 notwithstanding the disputed amount of £1500<sup>555</sup>. Infraco did not accept this instruction and demanded the £1500 in dispute before doing any work <sup>556</sup>. In evidence Martin Foerder claimed that TIE's introduction of a bus lane was "unforeseen" <sup>557</sup> and that TIE refused to issue a

<sup>552</sup> ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>553</sup> CEC00867153 0002

<sup>554</sup> CEC00998523

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>555</sup> CEC01032608 0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>556</sup> TRI00000072 0057 para 104

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>557</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 15.17-15.21

change order <sup>558</sup>, both claims being demonstrably false standing the chronology outlined above. Foerder also suggested that the real problem was the MUDFA diversions <sup>559</sup>, but was forced to concede that there was no mention of these issues in Sheehan's emails<sup>560</sup>.

**David Mackay** expressed the feeling within TIE by suggesting this positioning by Infraco - whilst Princes Street was shut for works to commence - was an obvious tactic<sup>561</sup> by which the city was being "held to ransom" <sup>562</sup>. In the face of such tactics, Mackay came under pressure both from CEC and from the Deputy First Minister John Swinney to "get it sorted" <sup>563</sup> despite Mackay's fear that any concessions on Princes Street would result in the same issue being exploited again in future <sup>564</sup> – as proved to be the case.

Whilst Swinney suggested in evidence that his instruction to "get it sorted" did not imply any need for an immediate solution and that a protracted process such as adjudication would have been palatable <sup>565</sup>, this appears incredible, and not only because it conflicts with his own statement that he was pressurising TIE and CEC was to get the project moving <sup>566</sup> and with his earlier oral evidence to the same effect <sup>567</sup>. The Transport Minister Stewart Stevenson wrote to the Council Leader Jenny Dawe (copied to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>558</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 194.10-194.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>559</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 12.21-13.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>560</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 192.8-192.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>561</sup> David Mackay transcript 95.5-95.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>562</sup> David Mackay transcript 96.15-96.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>563</sup> David Mackay transcript 95.23-96.8, John Swinney transcript 111.6-111.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>564</sup> David Mackay transcript 95.23-96.5, TRI00000113\_0079 para 291

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>565</sup> John Swinney transcript 112.13-113.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>566</sup> TRI00000149\_0075 Q219

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>567</sup> John Swinney transcript 90.15-90.20

Mackay) at the end of February 2009 seeking reassurance that there would be an "early settlement" of the dispute <sup>568</sup>. Dawe confirmed that both the Council and Ministers wanted the issue "sorted quickly" and that she informed the Council's Chief Executive Tom Aitchison of the Council's view <sup>569</sup>. There was accordingly pressure on TIE from both Councillors, Council officers <sup>570</sup> and government to get the issue resolved as soon as possible.

Aitchison was in daily contact with Mackay on the issue <sup>571</sup> and stated that he was pleased with Mackay's resolution of the issue by reaching agreement in principle on a supplementary agreement <sup>572</sup>, which Aitchison verbally authorised at the time <sup>573</sup>. Aitchison expressed the view that if TIE had not taken this "pragmatic" decision, he did not know what would have happened to the project <sup>574</sup>. Swinney telephoned Mackay to thank him for resolving the dispute <sup>575</sup> and Aitchison sent a letter of thanks "for finding a way out" <sup>576</sup>.

Inquiry counsel appeared to suggest to Mackay during his oral evidence that the proposal to work on a cost plus basis was made unprompted by TIE <sup>577</sup>. Whilst Mackay's recollection of events (unaided by any documentation) was imperfect, this suggestion is clearly shown to be incorrect both from the terms of the meeting with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>568</sup> CEC01891494\_0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>569</sup> Jennifer Dawe transcript 172.16-173.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>570</sup> TRI00000019\_0120 para 460

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>571</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 153.19-153.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>572</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 153.24-154.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>573</sup> TIE00690752

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 574}$  Tom Aitchison transcript 154.13-154.22

<sup>575</sup> David Mackay transcript 97.21-97.24

<sup>576</sup> CEC00990488

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>577</sup> David Mackay transcript 107.11-107.13, 140.16-140.19, 143.23-143.24

Walker on 10 February and Sheehan's emails on 18 and 19 February <sup>578</sup>. BSC thereafter wrote to TIE on 6 March proposing to secure progress by amending the Infraco contract <sup>579</sup>, which TIE initially rejected, suggesting that clause 65 could be used to cover extension of time and additional costs <sup>580</sup>. Bilfinger then issued a public statement, in breach of the contract's confidentiality provisions <sup>581</sup>. Mackay was clear that his agreement to the PSSA was a reluctant one made under enormous pressure<sup>582</sup>. Ultimately the PSSA resulted in a 17% premium on costs, after Infraco had claimed 65%<sup>583</sup>.

Whilst the PSSA did unlock the dispute, the work then completed by the consortium on Princes Street proved to be defective. Walker blamed these defects on rain <sup>584</sup>, though as Bell pointed out, the work took place over several months, during which time inclement weather could be expected <sup>585</sup>. In fact it appears that the problem appears to have been with the composition of the asphalt used, together with poor workmanship<sup>586</sup>. Infraco accepted responsibility for the defects <sup>587</sup> and the asphalt was replaced with concrete <sup>588</sup>, at Infraco's cost.

- <sup>580</sup> CEC01033117
- <sup>581</sup> CEC01034100

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>578</sup> David Mackay transcript 159.17-159.25; Sheehan's email of 19 February proposing demonstrable costs is also detailed in the Inquiry Statement of Main Documents and Events para 12.3 (TRI00000127\_0107).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>579</sup> CEC01033118

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>582</sup> David Mackay transcript 97.15-97.20, 98.17-98.22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>583</sup> David Mackay transcript 98.12-98.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>584</sup> TRI00000072\_0077 para 136

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>585</sup> Steven Bell transcript 41.13-41.21 (Wednesday 23 October)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>586</sup> CEC00441829, CEC00279667, CEC02084518 pages 2-3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>587</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 49.16-49.19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>588</sup> James Donaldson transcript 150.23-151.10

### 8C – TIE's strategic options

It has been suggested to witnesses by Inquiry counsel that TIE may not have had a 'Plan B' if the strategy of pursuing disputes through adjudication failed <sup>589</sup>. This is incorrect. First, the use of the DRP procedure was never 'Plan A'. Early disagreements with Infraco had been the subject of informal negotiation and discussion, with escalation where required <sup>590</sup>. When the major dispute over Princes Street emerged in early 2009, TIE not only agreed the PSSA as a way forward but also set up the Project Management Panel (PMP) as a mechanism to resolve outstanding issues <sup>591</sup>. When that proved ineffective, TIE went to mediation with Infraco <sup>592</sup> in the summer of 2009. Only when that process failed to resolve the issues <sup>593</sup> was the DRP process initiated<sup>594</sup>.

Secondly, the DRP process was never the only strategic option which TIE pursued. TIE engaged in a number of workstreams simultaneously under the umbrella of Project Pitchfork, including consideration of:

- truncation of the route (becoming Project Carlisle and later Project Phoenix),
- the possible ejection of Bilfinger from the consortium, and
- termination either by agreement (Project Separation) or unilaterally for breach (Project Notice) <sup>595</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>589</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 94.8-94.13, 120.5-120.10 (Wednesday 8 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>590</sup> Steven Bell transcript 42.10-44.4 (Wednesday 25 October), CEC00167376\_0007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>591</sup> CEC00167376\_0008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>592</sup> See Section 10A below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>593</sup> CEC00376412\_0015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>594</sup> With TPB approval: CEC00167376\_0008. See also CEC00750538.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>595</sup> For which see Section 9 below

By April 2010, the strategies being developed by TIE also included: consideration of an OSSA <sup>596</sup>; instructions to proceed under clause 80.13; an audit of BSC's management of the design; an offer of Extension of Time; the "Siemens 33 initiative" to resolve identified key issues; and assertive application of the contract <sup>597</sup>.

These options had been discussed with CEC as early as March 2009 following the Princes Street dispute <sup>598</sup>, at which time it was noted that:

"DRP can only be a short term solution to problems in the hope that commercial settlement in TIE Ltd's favour brings about a positive change in attitude of BB"<sup>599</sup>.

By January 2010 CEC Legal considered that whilst the attritional approach through DRP would not work, the alternative of a commercial settlement would require money that "we simply don't have" <sup>600</sup>. The idea that "the money would have run out" if TIE had simply accepted the contractor's claims was echoed by Transport Scotland <sup>601</sup>.

The Council's Chief Executive approved the use of the DRP process, noting that TIE were concerned about the public purse and the budget, and were not acquiescing to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>596</sup> CEC00368373 is TIE's rejection of BSC's OSSA proposal, as not meeting Best Value.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>597</sup> CEC00236405\_0003. Appendix 1 below sets out an abbreviated timeline showing the extent to which the DRP process overlapped with mediation, Project Carlisle and the use of RTNs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>598</sup> CEC00892626\_0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>599</sup> CEC00892626\_0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>600</sup> CEC00473790. On the impact of Jeffrey's arrival, Stewart McGarrity commented: "Richard brought a fresh perspective and renewed vigour and leadership to the engagement with Infraco and the strategies/steps being taken to resolve matters... He was instrumental in sourcing much of the additional legal and technical expertise TIE brought on board in an attempt to progress matters from mid 2009." (TRI00000059\_0238 Q45)

<sup>601</sup> TRI0000061\_0020 para 49

unsubstantiated claims <sup>602</sup>. The full history of the disputes and TIE's strategy is outlined in the Project Resolution Report to the TPB in December 2010, which notes:

"without DRP, Infraco would continue with damaging obstinacy and no resolution on either entitlement or value would be reached unless TIE simply conceded across the board to demonstrably inflated claims... not deploying DRP would have meant ignoring the proper contractual mechanism."<sup>603</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>602</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 160.9-160.16

<sup>603</sup> WED00000641\_0028

### 8D – Legal advice on disputes

Andrew Fitchie claimed that he advised TIE to deploy contractual remedies to resolve issues with SDS <sup>604</sup>, which was not favoured by **Steven Bell** <sup>605</sup>. This claim is however directly contradicted by the written advice of his then partner Fenella Mason, who said that serving a contractual notice on SDS would create an adversarial relationship, to the detriment of the project <sup>606</sup>.

Fitchie also claimed that he advised that TIE should have gone to DRP on the Infraco contract in summer 2008, shortly after financial close <sup>607</sup>. Again however this is at odds with DLA's written advice in February 2009, which stated at that time:

"DLA are of the opinion that TIE's objectives would need to be considered in detail and clearly focused before any dispute was referred to adjudication" <sup>608</sup>.

DLA advised that senior counsel's Opinion be obtained first <sup>609</sup>. This was accordingly done, with DLA preparing a brief for senior counsel as discussed in Section 7B above. The positive advice by DLA and Calum MacNeill QC <sup>610</sup> in the summer of 2009 led to TIE's use of DRPs on the disputed sections of the contract <sup>611</sup> following the unsuccessful attempts at mediation. It should also be noted that the idea of going

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>604</sup> Andrew Fitchie transcript 37.4-37.12 (Wednesday 11 October), TRI00000102\_0099 para 5.138

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>605</sup> TRI00000102\_0102 para 5.157, TRI00000102\_0105 para 5.169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>606</sup> CEC01881982. TIE escalated issues with SDS, with Willie Gallagher initiating high level discussions with Tom O'Neill, Parsons Brinckerhoff's Vice President in the USA – CEC01826306, CEC01387400\_0011, TRI00000037\_0041 para 141, TRI00000109\_0027 Q16(2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>607</sup> TRI00000102\_0248 para 8.25, 8.32

<sup>608</sup> CEC01032828\_0003

<sup>609</sup> CEC01032828\_0004

<sup>610</sup> CEC00901460

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>611</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 90.24-93.15 (Wednesday 8 November)

straight to dispute procedures was contrary to the policy of the Council when it took over the running of the project post mediation <sup>612</sup>.

TIE's strategy was informed by the legal advice it received, not only from DLA and senior counsel but also from McGrigors, whom **Richard Jeffrey** instructed in order to challenge the existing advice <sup>613</sup>. In August 2009 McGrigors produced a paper opining that the question of whether a Notified Departure has occurred is a question of fact (and specifically engineering judgement) as to whether the IFC drawings represent normal design development and do not reveal changes of design principle, shape, form or specification<sup>614</sup>.

Despite Brandon Nolan's evidence that he saw significant problems with PA1 from the outset <sup>615</sup>, this position was reiterated by McGrigors in October 2009:

"The Infraco will therefore not be entitled to a Mandatory TIE change where the change has arisen as a result of design development of the BDDI... Whether change falls within design development will be a question of fact, and in particular, engineering development."<sup>616</sup>

Accordingly TIE had supportive advice from both firms and from senior counsel going into the adjudications on Carrick Knowe and Gogarburn: nobody pointed out to TIE at that time that PA1 was fundamentally flawed or that the concept of normal design development was redundant on a literal reading. As such it is understandable that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>612</sup> See Sue Bruce transcript 161.24-162.16 and Section 11C below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>613</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 207.21-208.6 (Wednesday 8 November), Brandon Nolan transcript 118.2-118.6

<sup>614</sup> CEC00805685

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>615</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 115.17-116.2

<sup>616</sup> CEC00797337\_0005 para 34

Jeffrey considered the adverse decisions in Carrick Knowe and Gogarburn a "surprise"<sup>617</sup>.

According to Nolan, focus thereafter went into considering the words carefully in their context to see if some formulation could be arrived at objectively to avoid a situation where every BDDI to IFC change was a Notified Departure <sup>618</sup>. There was recognition that this would have a huge impact on price, albeit that it was not time critical at that point because Infraco were proceeding with the works <sup>619</sup>.

DLA's advice on the Carrick Knowe and Gogarburn decisions was that the adjudicator had got it wrong, and suggested that the appropriate remedy was to obtain senior counsel's Opinion (again) on a potential challenge <sup>620</sup>. A summary produced by DLA in December 2009 showed various areas of disagreement on contractual interpretation between DLA, McGrigors and Richard Keen QC <sup>621</sup>. This left TIE in a "very unclear position" <sup>622</sup>.

Keen produced an Opinion in January 2010 which set out that:

- the Construction Works Price was not limited to what appeared on the BDDI, contrary to the adjudication decision <sup>623</sup>;
- where work was not depicted on BDDI but was called for in the ERs, a Notified

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>617</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 139.8-139.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>618</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 139.12-139.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>619</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 139.21-139.24

<sup>620</sup> CEC00479430

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>621</sup> CEC00651408

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>622</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 129.13-129.20 (Wednesday 8 November)

<sup>623</sup> CEC00648853\_0007

Departure did not occur <sup>624</sup>; however

 the Infraco interpretation of PA1 argued at the adjudication was to be preferred to the TIE interpretation, ie any change to shape, form, principle or specification falls outwith normal design development <sup>625</sup>.

The latter view was at odds with the position of both DLA and McGrigors that the Infraco interpretation led to a commercially absurd result <sup>626</sup>.

The same month, Mr Wilson reached an alternative analysis of PA1 in the Russell Road adjudication, noting that "something has gone wrong with the language" <sup>627</sup>. McGrigors followed this with a report in February 2010 saying the same thing and arguing that a literal interpretation would allow Infraco to recover costs for changes they promoted or changes necessary to meet their obligations under the ERs <sup>628</sup>. The report also noted that court action to challenge the adjudications would take many months <sup>629</sup>, a point echoed by Nolan in his oral evidence <sup>630</sup> who considered that there would be greater practical benefit in obtaining a different outcome in another adjudication than in challenging the original adjudication <sup>631</sup>.

<sup>624</sup> ibid

<sup>625</sup> CEC00648853\_0008

<sup>626</sup> CEC00651408 para 2.6

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 627}$  CEC00034842\_0020, para 100

<sup>628</sup> CEC00618945 para 5-7

<sup>629</sup> CEC00618945 para 51

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>630</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 156.20-157.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>631</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 157.4-157.8

The argument that something had 'gone wrong' with the words was continued in McGrigor's further report in March 2010 <sup>632</sup>. McGrigors sought to expand on this argument by instructing an English QC, Helen Davies <sup>633</sup>. The advice from Davies in April 2010 was that a literal reading of PA1 would "emasculate" the concept of normal design development and was unlikely to have been the intent, but considered the prospects of a court ruling in TIE's favour as "uncertain" <sup>634</sup>.

Crucially, the evidence of Ian Laing, as the consortium's principal lawyer, supports the argument that parties did not intend to emasculate the concept of normal design development. Despite being the author of the redraft of PA1 in March 2008, he did not consider that the effect of that redraft was to render normal design development redundant:

"I still read the document, rightly or wrongly, as indicating that there are – there is the possibility of a development of design which is not a change in the design principle, shape, form and/or specification that would not be caught by this Pricing Assumption". <sup>635</sup>

The McGrigors report in March additionally advised that there was a "strong argument" that TIE were entitled to instruct Infraco to progress work under clauses 34 and 80 even where there was a dispute <sup>636</sup>. McGrigors produced a further paper to this effect <sup>637</sup> in May 2010. Unfortunately Lord Dervaird did not agree, leading to another significant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>632</sup> CEC00591754 para 7.1

<sup>633</sup> CEC00592602

<sup>634</sup> CEC00323249

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>635</sup> Ian Laing transcript 36.8-36.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>636</sup> CEC00591754 para 1.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>637</sup> CEC02083927 contains the paper at page 6: see Brandon Nolan transcript 159.20-160.9

adverse decision in August 2010 in the adjudication on the Murrayfield Underpass <sup>638</sup>. McGrigors produced written advice following further consultation with Richard Keen QC disagreeing with Lord Dervaird's interpretation of clause 80, but noting that prospects of challenge in court were limited <sup>639</sup>.

<sup>638</sup> BFB00053462

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>639</sup> CEC00098393 para 2. See also Keen's Opinion in September 2010 (CEC00034598)

### 8E - Dispute Resolution Procedure

The early decision on Carrick Knowe <sup>640</sup> was undoubtedly disappointing for TIE <sup>641</sup> particularly in light of the legal advice TIE had received <sup>642</sup>. However, TIE obtained comfort <sup>643</sup> from the contrary analysis of Pricing Assumption 1 by a different adjudicator in the Russell Road decision:

"65. I do not agree that on a proper construction the Construction Works Price can be construed as being solely for the Works shown on the BDDI or any similar alternative construction.

100. It appears that something has gone wrong with the language of s3.4.1.1 as, on the face of it, on a literal reading some part must be redundant to give it meaning. I consider that the formulation advanced by TIE most nearly expresses the true intention of the parties.

101. As to 'normal' development, I consider that this is the progression towards the Employer's Requirements as would be expected by an experienced contractor and his designer.

102. I agree with tie that the word 'amendment' can only apply to something shown on the BDDI drawings not an addition to achieve compliance with the Employer's Requirements being the overriding obligation.

<sup>640</sup> CEC00479431

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>641</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 107.3-107.5 (Wednesday 8 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>642</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 79.24-81.2 (Wednesday 8 November), see Section 8D above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>643</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 9.1-9.10 (Thursday 9 November)

103. On any of the definitions of design principle, shape, form and/or specification discussed, Infraco took the 'narrow' view that almost any detailed change was an amendment. It will be seen that I do not agree with the concept advanced by Infraco of 'reasonable' changes being excluded from the Pricing Assumption in order to give it meaning."<sup>644</sup>

In the subsequent decision on Tower Place Bridge, TIE accepted as a starting point that there had been a Notified Departure. Whilst Inquiry counsel suggested that this demonstrated a loss of confidence by TIE in its arguments <sup>645</sup>, this was a situation where TIE sought a rebate from Infraco for the Change as less work was required <sup>646</sup>. As a result of the adjudication, Infraco required to pay £180k to TIE, whereas the contractor had initially claimed additional money amounting to £595k <sup>647</sup>.

The savings through the DRP process were significant; the process reduced claims totaling £24m down to £11.2m (see Figure 2 overleaf) <sup>648</sup>. The overall figure for claims submitted by Infraco up to May 2011 totaled £46.5m across 868 change notices, whereas agreed settlement amounted to a little over half that at £24.2m <sup>649</sup>. The Council's Chief Executive believed that TIE was right to pursue the DRPs for the savings obtained <sup>650</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>644</sup> CEC00034842 pages 14, 20, 21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>645</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 30.6-31.4 (Thursday 9 November)

<sup>646</sup> TRI00000109\_0148 Q120


<sup>647</sup> CEC00373726

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>648</sup> Based on Audit Scotland report ADS00046 pages 21-22

<sup>649</sup> TIE00086026\_0011

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>650</sup> Tom Aitchison transcript 168.18-168.20

## FIGURE 2: Audit Scotland chart of INTCs



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The Lord Dervaird decision on Murrayfield Underpass <sup>651</sup> was nevertheless a significant blow to TIE's strategy (albeit not a 'knockout blow' according to advice from senior counsel <sup>652</sup>). It effectively spelled the end of TIE's use of DRPs, which was "overtaken" by events and the use of other strategies <sup>653</sup>, namely the issue of RTNs <sup>654</sup> and efforts to agree a settlement price for a reduced scope <sup>655</sup>.

<sup>651</sup> BFB00053462

<sup>652</sup> CEC00098393\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>653</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 38.19-38.25 (Thursday 9 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>654</sup> See Section 9 below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>655</sup> See Section 10 below

# 8F – DRP reporting

Several councillors recalled being told that TIE was "winning" the adjudications when that later did not appear to be the case <sup>656</sup>. Some alleged that this suggestion came from **Richard Jeffrey's** briefings <sup>657</sup>. This was characterised as "a deliberate and coordinated campaign" on TIE's part by the former Council Leader Donald Anderson <sup>658</sup>. It is significant however that during the period in question, Anderson was working as a consultant for the consortium <sup>659</sup>. In the face of various forensic evidence including various sets of TPB papers <sup>660</sup>, and an email from Jeffrey to party leaders <sup>661</sup> in April 2010, Anderson agreed that these reports were accurate <sup>662</sup> and was forced to concede that he actually had "no idea" what TIE had told Councillors <sup>663</sup>.

Three of the five Councillors who voiced this recollection (Dawe, Whyte, Cardownie) were recipients of the aforementioned email from Jeffrey, which set out that:

"Some of these issues have been decided at adjudication, which BB are claiming TIE have 'lost'. It is true that we did not get all the results at adjudication we would have liked, however it is also true that the results do not support BB's extreme view of their entitlements either... In our duty to secure best value for public money expended... we cannot and will not simply hand over public money

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>656</sup> Lesley Hinds transcript 30.12-30.23, Euan Aitken transcript 124.2-124.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>657</sup> Jennifer Dawe transcript 62.12-63.4, Iain Whyte transcript 84.11-84.19, Steve Cardownie transcript 94.6-94.16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>658</sup> Donald Anderson transcript 217.14-218.1 (Wednesday 6 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>659</sup> Donald Anderson transcript 195.7-195.11 (Wednesday 6 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>660</sup> CEC00416111\_0006, CEC00473005\_0047, CEC00223543\_0027, TIE00896978\_0003

<sup>661</sup> TRS00010706

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>662</sup> Donald Anderson transcript 30.22-31.3, 32.21-33.2, 33.21-34.9 cf 36.22-37.11 (Thursday 7 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>663</sup> Donald Anderson transcript 25.16-25.25 (Thursday 7 September)

with no justification in order to buy progress which, for absolute clarity, we have already paid for".

The Council's Transport Convenor, who sat on the TPB, recalled Jeffrey saying that the decisions in Gogarburn and Carrick Knowe had gone against TIE <sup>664</sup>, and being told that on Russell Road, TIE had lost on principle but had made a saving on costs <sup>665</sup>.

It was suggested that Shepherd & Wedderburn had concluded that TIE had put a positive gloss on some of the outcomes <sup>666</sup>, but it should be noted that the summary which Shepherd & Wedderburn were analysing came not from TIE but from DLA <sup>667</sup>. There has also been focus by the Inquiry on the use of the phrase "finely balanced" to describe the outcome of the adjudications. That expression appears in a report from Council officers and not from TIE <sup>668</sup> – indeed the report was drafted by Nick Smith of CEC Legal <sup>669</sup> who had read the decisions himself and who had confirmed to the Transport Convenor that TIE's summary of the DRPs provided by **Steven Bell** <sup>670</sup> was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>664</sup> Gordon Mackenzie transcript 76.16-77.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>665</sup> Gordon Mackenzie transcript 84.14-84.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>666</sup> CEC00013525, Nick Smith transcript 105.24-106.7 (Thursday 14 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>667</sup> CEC00006489, CEC00006490, Nick Smith transcript 107.22-108.1 (Thursday 14 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>668</sup> CEC02083184, Donald McGougan transcript 78.5-78.18 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>669</sup> TRI00000280\_0001. Smith indicated in evidence that the phrase "finely balanced" came originally from Richard Jeffrey (Nick Smith transcript 86.7-86.9). It appears that Jeffrey may have been attempting in June 2010 to curb Smith's original description of progress as "positive" (WED00000652\_0001 – "Richard confirmed that positive is too strong a word... Finely balanced, robust and constructive are better"). In any event, Smith used the phrase again in a further report in October 2010 despite further decisions having been received in the interim. (TRI00000280\_0002)

<sup>670</sup> CEC00242593

"broadly accurate" <sup>671</sup>. It was likewise Council officers who determined that the adjudication decisions should not be released to elected members <sup>672</sup>.

Looking at the formal TIE reports, in January 2010 TIE reported that the adjudicator in Gogarburn/Carrick Knowe:

"found largely in favour of the position taken by BSC" <sup>673</sup>.

It was suggested by Inquiry counsel that this was inaccurate as the decision was "entirely" in favour of BSC <sup>674</sup>, however it is clear looking at the Carrick Knowe decision that the adjudicator himself stated:

"the responding party have only been partially successful" 675

and several items in dispute were found not to be Notified Departures <sup>676</sup>.

In the same report it is stated that Russell Road resulted in a "significant saving" on the estimate provided by BSC:

"and the adjudicator agreed with TIE on many of the principles in dispute" <sup>677</sup>.

It is submitted, contrary to the position put to witnesses by Inquiry counsel <sup>678</sup> that the latter suggestion is accurate <sup>679</sup>. A full report on Russell Road was promised the next

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>671</sup> CEC00242585

<sup>672</sup> CEC00012776, Alastair Maclean transcript 175.3-175.13

<sup>673</sup> CEC00472988\_0008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>674</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 180.24-181.4 (Wednesday 8 November)

<sup>675</sup> CEC00479431 para 7.76

<sup>676</sup> CEC00479431 para 7.62, 7.70, 7.74

<sup>677</sup> CEC00472988\_0008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>678</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 184.15-185.12 (Wednesday 8 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>679</sup> See the parts quoted in Section 8E above

month but was not followed up <sup>680</sup>, which Bell has accepted as an oversight that should have been corrected <sup>681</sup>.

The report to Transport Scotland in May 2010 merely indicated that the DRP on Tower Place Bridge had been "useful in reducing costs" <sup>682</sup>. John Ramsay complained that the outcome was not detailed <sup>683</sup>. It should be noted however that this was a decision in which it was agreed between parties that a Notified Departure had occurred and the sole issue was costs: the adjudicator determined that Infraco required to rebate TIE, despite having claimed additional money <sup>684</sup>.

The August 2010 report <sup>685</sup> said of Lord Dervaird's decision on Murrayfield Underpass only that it "gives some useful interpretation", and Ramsay claimed that he could not discern from this that TIE had lost <sup>686</sup>. Bell conceded that this report could have been amplified, but there was concern about setting out in a publicly available report how damaging the decision had been for TIE <sup>687</sup>. In any event Jeffrey pointed out that Transport Scotland were briefed at various levels on the disputes <sup>688</sup> and that someone as immersed in the project as Ramsay could not have been as ignorant of the issues as he professed to be <sup>689</sup>.

<sup>680</sup> CEC00474413

<sup>681</sup> TRI00000267 Q3

<sup>682</sup> CEC00113637\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>683</sup> John Ramsay transcript 90.17-90.24 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>684</sup> CEC00373726

<sup>685</sup> CEC00021014\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>686</sup> John Ramsay transcript 102.19-103.14 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>687</sup> TRI00000267 Q3

<sup>688</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 103.19-104.7 (Thursday 9 November), TRI00000097\_0043 para 249

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>689</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 104.25-105.11 (Thursday 9 November)

One of the fundamental dilemmas experienced by TIE was between full disclosure to Councillors and the maintenance of commercial confidentiality <sup>690</sup>. CEC officers were however fully appraised <sup>691</sup>, as can be seen from the IPG reports, which contained an outline each month of DRPs including outcome and cost forecasts (covered in Section 8G below). Generally the IPG reports contained detail noted to be absent from the TPB or TS reports, including in relation to Russell Road <sup>692</sup> and Murrayfield Underpass <sup>693</sup>. These reports demonstrate that TIE was passing this information outwith the formal documentation, which was susceptible to FOISA requests <sup>694</sup>. TIE also produced a (FOISA exempt) report to the TPB in December 2010 which set out all of the adjudication decisions in considerable detail <sup>695</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>690</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 18.3-20.20 (Thursday 9 November), Donald McGougan transcript 190.16-191.3, CEC00373764\_0031

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>691</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 20.10-20.15 (Thursday 9 November)

<sup>692</sup> CEC00450032\_0005

<sup>693</sup> CEC00012472\_0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>694</sup> TIE received many such requests: TRI00000109\_0183

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>695</sup> WED0000641 pages 30-36

### 8G – Financial forecasts

A further criticism by John Ramsay was that Transport Scotland were interested in the costs associated with and flowing from the DRPs <sup>696</sup>. He conceded that the June 2010 report <sup>697</sup> on the reduction of claims through the DRP process (from £18.2m to £7.6m) was helpful, but that Transport Scotland also required to understand the impact of the disputes on the overall cost of the project <sup>698</sup>. In that vein it was recognised by the Council's Finance Director that it was very difficult for anyone to report properly on the Anticipated Final Cost (AFC) given the scale of the disputes <sup>699</sup>. Looking again however at the Council's IPG reports, it can be seen that TIE did provide this financial information to the Council throughout the period, albeit that this information is not recorded in the TPB reports (the former unlike the latter being FOISA exempt) <sup>700</sup>.

As early as March 2009, TIE provided outturn forecasts for various of the strategic options being considered at that time in the wake of the dispute on Princes Street. Of termination it was said:

"this option presents very significant uncertainties" 701

on price, whilst of negotiated settlement it was noted:

*"in essence this is what BB want and is likely to be a very (likely prohibitively)* expensive option indeed" <sup>702</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>696</sup> John Ramsay transcript 95.22-96.1 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>697</sup> CEC00113638

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>698</sup> John Ramsay transcript 96.2-7 (Thursday 28 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>699</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 132.7-132.16 (Wednesday 29 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>700</sup> Marshall Poulton transcript 170.4-17

<sup>701</sup> CEC00892626\_0004

By contrast TIE was able to forecast the scenario where Bilfinger were replaced and the project completed with an alternate civils contractor as being in the range of £573m-£593m. Pursuing the disputes through the DRP meanwhile gave an estimated outturn cost of £571m, though it was noted that:

#### "DRP can only be a short term solution" <sup>703</sup>.

By November 2009, TIE had provided CEC with outturn forecasts for various truncation options <sup>704</sup>, whilst the base case estimate for the project had increased to £595.8m <sup>705</sup>. In addition, TIE had provided estimates of the likely costs arising from all matters in DRP, taking account of both the TIE view and the BSC view.

In answer to Ramsay's complaint, it should be noted that the forecasts produced (£23.2m on the TIE view and £44.9m on the BSC view) are not simply an aggregation of the particular costs associated with each individual DRP (these total £3m on the TIE view and £14m on the BSC view) but an assessment of the overall impact of the DRPs on the final project costs <sup>706</sup>, as:

*"the value of a DRP principle may significantly differ from the value of the DRP dispute itself"* <sup>707</sup>.

This is further illustrated by the report for the following month, where £4.4m was added to the project forecast following "a significant re-evaluation of the design related issues"

<sup>702</sup> ibid

<sup>703</sup> CEC00892626 0005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>704</sup> CEC00677450 0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>705</sup> CEC00677450 0005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>706</sup> CEC00677450 0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>707</sup> CEC00677450 0005

in light of the Gogarburn and Carrick Knowe decisions  $^{708}$ , notwithstanding that the particular costs associated with those decisions were thought to amount only to  $£580k^{709}$ .

By August 2010, by which time many of the DRP decisions had been received, the IPG report notes:

"the majority of these DRPs are by their nature, changes to scope and therefore not included in the original project budget. However, they are included in the revised cost estimates prepared by TIE."<sup>710</sup>

The Council's Finance Director noted that it was difficult if not impossible for anyone to accurately forecast a revised budget outturn whilst the key items remained in dispute given the flaws at the heart of the contract <sup>711</sup>. He noted that TIE were not as successful in the adjudications as had been envisaged given the legal advice received, and that exhausting that process led to the move for mediation <sup>712</sup>, which is covered in Section 10 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>708</sup> CEC00469787\_0003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>709</sup> CEC00469787\_0006, Marshall Poulton transcript 171.9-171.23

<sup>710</sup> CEC00242752\_0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>711</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 73.11-73.18 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>712</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 73.24-74.8 (Thursday 30 November)

# (9) TERMINATION

# 9A - Strategy & legal advice

It appears that there were differences in opinion between TIE and CEC in relation to the possibility of terminating either the Infraco contract as a whole, or else Bilfinger's involvement in it. Alistair Maclean of CEC Legal in particular expressed his view that TIE were by October 2010:

"hurtling down a termination path" 713.

That view is not supported by a more objective examination of the contemporaneous evidence.

Termination first appears to have been considered in the wake of the Princes Street dispute, as can be seen from the IPG report of March 2009. This set out TIE's strategic options including termination, which was noted as presenting:

"very significant uncertainties" 714.

A year later, TIE's Pitchfork report set out that the issues around the termination option:

*"include the probable loss of the project, the waste of public investment and the likely risk of expensive litigation"*<sup>715</sup>.

<sup>713</sup> TRI00000055\_0018 para 54

<sup>714</sup> CEC00892626\_0004

<sup>715</sup> CEC00167376\_0010

It went on to note:

"The termination option assumes cessation of the project for the foreseeable future. It is possible that full re-procurement of the infrastructure could be executed, but there are material uncertainties about funding availability, timescales, market appetite and therefore costs." <sup>716</sup>

Similarly, the Council's Director of City Development noted that termination would be extremely difficult and with huge liabilities <sup>717</sup>. As noted by **Richard Jeffrey**, termination was a "nuclear option", which TIE did not want to jump to before trying other options, particularly where legal advice suggested that the contract did provide levers to force Infraco performance <sup>718</sup>.

Maclean however suggested that Jeffrey briefed the Labour group of Councillors on 12 October 2010 by saying that there was a "cast iron right" to terminate the contract according to senior counsel's advice <sup>719</sup>. This suggestion, denied by Jeffrey <sup>720</sup> and unsupported by any other evidence, is directly at odds with the email Jeffrey sent to Maclean and others the very next day. In that email, Jeffrey said that termination would be likely to end up:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>716</sup> CEC00167376\_0015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>717</sup> TRI00000108\_0060 Q71(c)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>718</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 74.11-74.25 (Wednesday 8 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>719</sup> Alistair Maclean transcript 24.19-24.25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>720</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 47.22-48.8 (Thursday 9 November)

"in the courts, which is expensive, lengthy and risky for all parties, with no certainty of outcome." 721

Earlier, in August, Jeffrey had expressed concern about Maclean's colleague Nick Smith apparently being keen to terminate:

"My concern is that Nick Smith sees termination as the 'cleanest' option, it appeals to him to get a definitive ruling on who is right and who is wrong, ignoring the practical consequences of termination. Hopefully Andrew [Fitchie] can calm things down with CEC Legal tomorrow."<sup>722</sup>

Furthermore, in November 2010 Jeffrey wrote to Maclean and others indicating that:

"we are all agreed that terminating the contract now is not the preferred way forward." <sup>723</sup>

In the same month, Jeffrey also wrote to Councillor Balfour (copied to the Council's Chief Executive) saying:

"I will not make a recommendation to terminate the contract unless and until I am satisfied that such a course of action represents the best course... I have urged you all to be careful not to give the impression that termination is a foregone conclusion." <sup>724</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>721</sup> CEC00012737\_0005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>722</sup> CEC00210811\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>723</sup> CEC00013441

<sup>724</sup> CEC00014240

Part of the strategy employed by TIE in the latter part of 2010 was the issue of Remediable Termination Notices (RTNs) under the Infraco contract, a strategy supported by CEC <sup>725</sup>. Tony Rush, who was involved in the preparation of these notices, considered that the nomenclature was unfortunate, as they were merely a step in the process of contractual enforcement <sup>726</sup>, intended as much to strengthen TIE's position for settlement as they were to lead to termination of the contract <sup>727</sup>.

BSC's response to the RTNs was twofold – they both denied their validity and simultaneously produced rectification plans <sup>728</sup>. It was noted that Richard Keen's opinion in November 2010 was that it would be unsafe to rely on the issued RTNs due to problems in their formulation <sup>729</sup> – advice which came as a surprise and a source of frustration to TIE <sup>730</sup> not least because Keen had been involved in their drafting and had:

#### "appeared comfortable with the approach taken... and raised no concerns" <sup>731</sup>.

Maclean also suggested that TIE's contractual enforcement should have focused on BSC's failure to produce the design whereas he suggested that the RTNs had been served for "other things" <sup>732</sup>. When presented with TIE's issued RTN for failure to

<sup>725</sup> CEC00242889

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>726</sup> Anthony Rush transcript 159.3-159.7, see also TRI00000109\_0156 Q130

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>727</sup> WED0000641\_0046

<sup>728</sup> TRI00000127\_0008

<sup>729</sup> TIE00080959\_0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>730</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 107.5-107.10 (Thursday 9 November)

<sup>731</sup> CEC00207814

<sup>732</sup> TRI00000055\_0031 para 79

produce an assured design for on street works <sup>733</sup>, Maclean was however forced to concede he had been wrong <sup>734</sup>.

As will be explored in the next section, it appears that CEC may have inflated the projected costs of termination in order to justify the price paid for settlement at Mar Hall. CEC appears to have been more reluctant than TIE to consider the termination option, as evidenced not only by Maclean (who was one of the core CEC team at Mar Hall in agreeing the settlement <sup>735</sup>) but also by Colin Smith's report in January 2011, two months prior to the mediation, in which he proposed to concentrate on settlement (Project Phoenix) and develop the termination option (Project Separation) merely as "a negotiating lever" <sup>736</sup>. Alan Coyle, who worked closely with Smith from that point onward, agreed that Smith had already rejected the notion of termination before detailed calculations had been carried out on the relative merits of the two options <sup>737</sup>.

Consideration of the termination option is also likely to have been affected by the "extraordinarily high" quotation <sup>738</sup> given by Andrew Fitchie for the potential legal costs associated with terminating <sup>739</sup>.

Audit Scotland, in a report in February 2011, suggested that CEC and TIE would have to:

"consider fully the consequences of... terminating the contract with BBS" 740.

<sup>733</sup> CEC02084522

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>734</sup> Alastair Maclean transcript 95.11-96.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>735</sup> Vic Emery transcript 7.15-7.19

<sup>736</sup> CEC02083835\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>737</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 72.19-75.9 (Friday 22 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>738</sup> Brandon Nolan transcript 194.19-194.21

<sup>739</sup> CEC00043521

In his report to the Inquiry, Stewart Fair concluded that inadequate consideration had been given to termination <sup>741</sup>. It is therefore of note that John Swinney considered that settlement was far preferable to termination as the latter would:

"blight the city for years"742.

Indeed, Swinney considered that he had a veto and that he would not have permitted the contract to be terminated <sup>743</sup>.

<sup>740</sup> ADS00046\_0008

<sup>741</sup> TRI00000264 pg5 para 1.12, pg11 para 1.18, 1.19, pg31 para 3.38-3.51


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>742</sup> TRI00000149\_0097 Q286

<sup>743</sup> ibid Q287

# 9B - Financial forecasts

In early March 2011, in preparation for Mar Hall, TIE prepared a 'deckchair' spreadsheet estimating the potential costs of settlement via Project Phoenix as against termination and reprocurement <sup>744</sup>. This set out the following estimates for project outturn costs:

Whole of Phase 1a -	Continue 'as is':	£821m
Whole of Phase 1a –	Project Phoenix:	£763m-£830m
Whole of Phase 1a –	Terminate & re-procure:	£716m-£790m
To St Andrews Square -	- Project Phoenix:	£682m-£749m
To St Andrews Square -	- Terminate & re-procure:	£645m-£698m





<sup>744</sup> TIE00355078

Accordingly for both completion of the whole route and for truncation, TIE's estimates projected that Project Phoenix would cost more than termination and reprocurement. These figures were prepared by TIE's commercial and financial teams (Dennis Murray, Stewart McGarrity, Gregor Roberts) together with QS firms Cyril Sweett and Gordon Harris Partnership (GHP) <sup>745</sup> and with input from Acutus on extension of time (EOT) <sup>746</sup>.

Alan Coyle, who was embedded in TIE from CEC's finance team for this purpose, stated that he had a good understanding of the financials <sup>747</sup> but equally said that he did not have the knowledge to assess whether the numbers were correct <sup>748</sup>. These comments are difficult to reconcile with each other, and the latter is especially difficult to square with the purpose of his secondment.

Colin Smith, who appears to have discounted the possibility of termination before these numbers were compiled <sup>749</sup>, disagreed with **Richard Jeffrey** and **Steven Bell** about the TIE figures on the first day at Mar Hall <sup>750</sup>. In a CEC report prepared in June 2012, Smith criticised the TIE figures, on the basis that they failed in his view to include for items such as 'bad project premium', settlement costs, and other significant risks totalling £150m <sup>751</sup>. The net result of Smith's reconciliation of the figures was retrospectively to justify CEC's preference for settlement over termination.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>745</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 181.1-181.7 (Thursday 14 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>746</sup> TRI00000249\_0012 Q23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>747</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 170.22-171.3 (Thursday 14 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>748</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 188.17-188.24 (Thursday 14 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>749</sup> CEC02083835\_0002 and see Section 9A above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>750</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 170.24-171.3 (Friday 22 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>751</sup> WED0000134 pg234-235

It has not been possible from available material to discern the justification for the £150m figure put forward by Smith. Indeed it is completely at odds with a spreadsheet compiled in June 2011 by Coyle (who worked closely with Smith in the period) and provided to Councillors in order to reach a decision on the settlement agreement <sup>752</sup> which gave the anticipated cost of termination and reprocurement at £1,144m. This was approximately £300m above the figure suggested by Smith's later report. When asked to explain the difference, all Coyle could say was that there were "further risks" that "hadn't been thought of" <sup>753</sup>.

There is no clear basis or justification for the figures in Coyle's spreadsheet. Coyle utilised various figures created by Smith, including:

- £80m 'settlement premium',
- £106m 'primary' risk,
- £40m 'bad project' risk,
- £25m inflation risk,
- £77.5m 'specified and exclusion' risk, and
- £10m 'systems' risk

TIE's commercial director Dennis Murray, having seen these figures for the first time via the Inquiry, noted that they are all unexplained and seem "extraordinarily high" <sup>754</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>752</sup> CEC02085613

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>753</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 171.1 (Friday 22 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>754</sup> TRI00000249\_0018 Q27

It appears impossible to reconcile these numbers for risk and settlement costs, totalling £342m, with the £150m Smith accuses TIE of failing to include for the very same items. It is also difficult to reconcile the £262m of additional risk items with Smith's evidence to the Inquiry in which he said that the premium for 'walking away' was the only problem with the Separation forecasts prepared by TIE <sup>755</sup> (which he rejected on no more than "gut instinct" <sup>756</sup>). Smith claimed that the Pricing Assumptions in Schedule 4 formed the basis for the additional risk items he created <sup>757</sup>, but it is difficult if not impossible to discern any nexus between those pricing assumptions and either 'bad project' premium, settlement costs or inflation. Regarding the £80m settlement premium, Smith gave two mutually contradictory explanations for how he arrived at that figure, one being that he added a "broad brush" £50m for settlement, £20m for demobilisation and £10m for further claims <sup>758</sup>, the other being that £80m was simply taken as 10% of the overall project cost of £800m <sup>759</sup>.

The Coyle £1,144m estimate for termination and reprocurement also included £54m paid under MOV4 <sup>760</sup>. This payment flowed from agreement at Mar Hall and comprised payments which were contentious. It therefore would not have been paid in the event of termination being pursued instead - however, by the time that the Council were asked to vote on the matter, MOV4 was a *fait accompli* <sup>761</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>755</sup> Colin Smith transcript 29.1-29.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>756</sup> Colin Smith transcript 40.22-41.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>757</sup> Colin Smith transcript 48.18-49.19

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 758}$  CEC02085613 item 59, Colin Smith transcript 109.9-109.19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>759</sup> Colin Smith transcript 111.5-111.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>760</sup> CEC02085613

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>761</sup> See Section 11A below

Additionally, the Coyle estimate included £82m paid to Infraco for EOT/Preliminaries. This figure is allegedly drawn <sup>762</sup> from a report by McGrigors in June 2011 <sup>763</sup>, but in that report McGrigors emphasised that Infraco could not recover both preliminaries and additional delay costs for the same period as that would lead to double recovery <sup>764</sup>. McGrigors' preferred figure for payment of EOT/preliminaries was £54m <sup>765</sup>.

Coyle also set the cost of putting the project on hold at £22m (irrespective of whether the project was reprocured or mothballed), again citing McGrigors' report <sup>766</sup>. However McGrigors actually put this cost at £11.9m (based on TIE figures) and explicitly stated that this was a cost which only applied if there was no reprocurement <sup>767</sup>.

Coyle likewise cited the McGrigors report for the suggested £199m cost for a new contractor, whereas the report actually gave that cost as £185m <sup>768</sup>.

Lastly it is noted that the McGrigors report does not contain anything which substantiates Smith's £262m for additional risks or £80m settlement premium – both being over and above full payment to Infraco for preliminaries, EOT and outstanding changes. Taking both Coyle's 'errors' and Smith's "gut instinct" numbers into account (see figure 4 overleaf), Coyle's figures for termination and reprocurement include approximately £400m of costs not included by McGrigors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>762</sup> CEC02085613 footnote 6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>763</sup> USB00000384

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>764</sup> USB00000384\_0006 para 1.10(d)


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>765</sup> USB00000384 para 11.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>766</sup> CEC02085613 footnote 6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>767</sup> USB00000384\_0053 para 17.1-17.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>768</sup> USB00000384 para 15.2. This figure was based on an exercise conducted by TIE, and is itself higher than the figure of £178m based on Cyril Sweet's assessment (para 15.3).

## FIGURE 4: Coyle's £1.14bn



Coyle suggested in evidence that TIE "ignored" the views of its own experts <sup>769</sup>. It is believed that he was referring to the difference between TIE's deckchair spreadsheet and the numbers generated by GHP. Those differences are reconciled in a spreadsheet, included in Smith's report <sup>770</sup>, which notes that:

- GHP erroneously understated the Infraco Phoenix price by £39m;
- GHP deducted the £40m on street costs from their calculation, which TIE included as relevant (since the comparison was for costs to St Andrews Square);

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>769</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 53.17-54.24 (Friday 22 September)

<sup>770</sup> WED00000134\_0243

• GHP also included no sum to cover exclusions from the Phoenix price, which TIE costed at £20m - and Smith costed even higher at £80m <sup>771</sup>.

Perhaps a significant factor in CEC's decision not to pursue the termination option was that it considered that the Council would be unable to borrow to cover the costs because there would be no asset to borrow against <sup>772</sup>. Stewart Fair's report to the Inquiry is critical of this purported justification for selecting settlement over termination<sup>773</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>771</sup> WED0000134\_0235

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>772</sup> CEC02044271 para 3.36, TRI0000060\_0272

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>773</sup> TRI00000264\_0033, para 3.42

# (10) MEDIATION

### <u>10A – Moves toward mediation</u>

Three months after resolution of the Princes Street dispute and the establishment of the PMP, TIE and Infraco held a mediation "marathon" at the end of June 2009<sup>774</sup>. This covered all of the main issues in dispute at that time, including consideration of an OSSA <sup>775</sup>, design misalignment <sup>776</sup>, extension of time <sup>777</sup>, evaluation of change <sup>778</sup>, agreement on BDDI drawings <sup>779</sup>, and Hilton Hotel car park <sup>780</sup> (the latter of which was to become the subject of the first adjudication). This mediation was unsuccessful <sup>781</sup> and it is submitted that the principal difference from the later mediation at Mar Hall was that in June 2009, CEC were not offering a substantial sum of money over and above the existing budget in order to resolve the issues in dispute.

Agreement ultimately could not be reached in relation to a proposed OSSA, principally because the Infraco proposal did not in TIE's view meet Best Value obligations and because it removed Infraco's responsibility for concurrent delay <sup>782</sup>.

In 2010 TIE and BSC attempted to reach resolution via Project Carlisle, led by Tony Rush for TIE <sup>783</sup> and Michael Flynn for Siemens <sup>784</sup>. From TIE's perspective, the main

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>774</sup> TRI00000097\_0021 para 121; TRI00000109\_0119 Q95

<sup>775</sup> CEC00951732

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>776</sup> CEC00951734

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>777</sup> CEC00951737

<sup>778</sup> CEC00951736

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>779</sup> CEC00951740

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>780</sup> CEC00951735

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>781</sup> TRI00000097\_0025 para 145

<sup>782</sup> CEC00368373

reasons that Carlisle did not achieve resolution were: first, that the price was higher than TIE considered justifiable <sup>785</sup> and secondly, that the Carlisle offer contained a number of rewritten pricing assumptions and so was not going to provide cost or programme certainty in a situation where the design – under the supervision of the contractor – remained incomplete <sup>786</sup>.

The renewed move to mediation in late 2010 came at the direction of CEC <sup>787</sup> and Scottish Ministers <sup>788</sup>. However, John Swinney noted that it would have been very difficult to have gone to mediation earlier, before exhausting the contract provisions <sup>789</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>783</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 45.10-45.14 (Thursday 9 November)

<sup>784</sup> TRI00000141\_0003

<sup>785</sup> CEC00337646

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>786</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 46.16-46.25 (Thursday 9 November). A full summary of the Carlisle negotiations is set out in WED00000641 pages 40-45. TIE's Carlisle 2 counter offer can be found at CEC00129943.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>787</sup> Jennifer Dawe transcript 184.19-185.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>788</sup> John Swinney transcript 135.2-135.4, TRI00000149 Q275, Q318, Q325

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>789</sup> TRI00000149\_0116 Q360

# <u> 10B – Mar Hall</u>

According to CEC's Director of Finance, the Council went into mediation with the key concern being to come out with a solution that would deliver an asset, against a background where all legal avenues other than termination had been pursued, and the ruling from Lord Dervaird meant that TIE could not force the contractor to work <sup>790</sup>.

For CEC, termination was less desirable than a settlement to complete the tramline <sup>791</sup>. Termination was therefore effectively disregarded by CEC as an alternative <sup>792</sup>. In **Richard Jeffrey's** words:

*"if you took the view that litigation would be a catastrophic outcome then you could use that justification for almost any price you liked."* <sup>793</sup>

This position was effectively crystallised on the eve of the mediation by Colin Smith's addition of £150m of additional hypothetical costs to the TIE estimates on termination<sup>794</sup>. It is of note that the opening statement by the Council's new Chief Executive Sue Bruce emphasised that:

*"I approach these next few days <u>determined</u> to reach an agreement which will deliver the tram system"* <sup>795</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>790</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 83.8-83.15 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>791</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 83.24-84.4 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>792</sup> Vic Emery transcript 39.4-39.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>793</sup> Richard Jeffrey transcript 74.6-74.10 (Thursday 9 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>794</sup> See Section 9B above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>795</sup> CEC02084575\_0003 (emphasis in original)

It appears to be a matter of consensus that Bruce was the principal decision maker at Mar Hall, supported by TIE's new Chairman Vic Emery <sup>796</sup>, plus Ainslie McLaughlin from Transport Scotland <sup>797</sup>, and advised by Colin Smith <sup>798</sup>, Brandon Nolan of McGrigors, Alistair Maclean <sup>799</sup>, Tony Rush and Nigel Robson <sup>800</sup>. Jeffrey as Chief Executive of TIE was effectively "frozen out" of the process <sup>801</sup>.

In reaching settlement, CEC appear to have proceeded on the basis of conceding the Infraco argument <sup>802</sup> that MUDFA was the principal cause of delay <sup>803</sup>. This is despite having provided substantial criticisms of Infraco's £42.8m claim for utilities-related delay in TIE's opening mediation statement in line with the conclusions reached by Acutus <sup>804</sup>. Emery had described this consortium claim as:

# "disproportionately high and unreasonable" 805.

CEC also appears to have backed down from its initial criticism that Siemens' Project Phoenix price had effectively doubled from the original contract price <sup>806</sup>. A few days prior to the mediation, Nolan had written to Infraco's representatives saying:

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>796</sup> Alastair Maclean transcript 119.2-119.12, Steven Bell transcript 52.20-53.2 (Wednesday 25 October), Anthony Rush transcript 182.20-183.5, Brandon Nolan transcript 195.25-196.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>797</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 85.5-85.10 (Thursday 30 November)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>798</sup> Dave Anderson transcript 184.4-184.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>799</sup> Vic Emery transcript 7.3-7.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>800</sup> Anthony Rush transcript 182.13-183.9, Vic Emery transcript 16.14-17.5, WED00000582

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>801</sup> WED00000582, Richard Jeffrey transcript 68.12-18 (Thursday 9 November), Anthony Rush transcript 183.10-13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>802</sup> BFB00053260\_0012 para 5.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>803</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 114.20-115.3, Vic Emery transcript 77.1-11, Colin Smith transcript 42.4-17, WED00000134\_0234

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 804}$  BFB00053300 pages 13-15, WED00000533, and see Section 4B above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>805</sup> TRI0000035\_0010 Q36

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>806</sup> TRI0000035\_0007 Q27, CEC02084575\_0013

*"It is not clear what the basis for this increase is. There is no Schedule Part 4 PA1 issue in relation to Siemens' work which has undergone little change since tender."* 

However, CEC ended up agreeing a deal which only involved a modest reduction in Siemens inflated price <sup>808</sup>, and which additionally paid for all Siemens equipment <sup>809</sup> despite some items later being cancelled <sup>810</sup>. Siemens in any event sought to later recover the discounted amount by including the difference in their on street price <sup>811</sup>.

It appears that on the eve of the mediation that CEC agreed a 'trigger point' of £740m for all project costs as being the ceiling above which a Phoenix deal would not be entered into with the consortium <sup>812</sup>. Alan Coyle confirmed that the proposed deal two days later was within that trigger point <sup>813</sup> despite it actually coming out slightly higher at £743.5m on his calculations <sup>814</sup> (see figure <u>5</u> overleaf). More pertinently however, his calculations assumed an on street price of £22.5m, whereas the agreement was actually for a target sum of £39m <sup>815</sup>, which put the deal well above the trigger point. The target sum later increased further <sup>816</sup>.

808 SIE00000184

<sup>810</sup> Vic Emery transcript 83.15-83.25

813 ibid

<sup>807</sup> BFB00094604\_0004

<sup>809</sup> CEC02084685

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>811</sup> See Section 11B below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>812</sup> WED0000582\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>814</sup> WED00000134\_0250

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>815</sup> CEC02084685

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>816</sup> See Section 11B below

# FIGURE 5 – Coyle's Mar Hall spreadsheet

Airport - St Andrew Square - CAF Re-Novate (CEC Proposal) 11/03/2011

	CEC (9/3/11) £m	BSC Counter (9/3/11) £m	CEC Counter 1 (9/3/11) £m
BSC PPP	384.0	. 404.0	362.5
TR Exclusions	80.0		
Airport to Haymarket (Infraco) (Current Contract Arrangements)	304.0	404.0	362.5
Haymarket to St Andrew Sq (Target Cost/Pain Gain Share)	20.5		22.5
Infrastructure	324.5	404.0	385.0
CAF	61.0	65.0	62.0
Primary Risk	29.0	29.0	
Contingencies	25.0	25.0	30.0
Delay	25.0	25.0	
fotal Budget "Final Account"	464.5	548.0	477.0
Non BSC Costs to date	236.5	236.5	236.5
Project Management Costs to go	30.0	30.0	30.0
	266.5	266.5	266.5
fotal Project Costs	731.0	814.5	743.5
ess Agreed Funding			545.0
SAP			198.5

It appears to be a matter of consensus that **Richard Jeffrey** and **Steven Bell** expressed disagreement with the deal which was struck as being too generous to the consortium <sup>817</sup>. Surprisingly however, Emery indicated in his evidence that nobody

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>817</sup> e.g. Alan Coyle transcript 88.2-11, Steven Bell transcript 53.8-25 (Wednesday 25 October), Richard Jeffrey transcript 72.6-12 (Thursday 9 November), Anthony Rush transcript 184.24-185.2, Dennis Murray transcript 106.7-106.16

actually considered the deal to represent good value <sup>818</sup>. CEC's Directors of Finance and City Development were "disappointed" with the final price, which seemed £50m to £75m too high based on Rush's analysis <sup>819</sup>. This is despite Rush having apparently come up with the settlement figure <sup>820</sup> which was effectively reached by splitting the difference between CEC's original offer and Infraco's counter offer <sup>821</sup>.

By contrast, the TIE position as represented by Jeffrey and Bell was based on the numbers produced in a paper by TIE's commercial manager Dennis Murray and his QS team <sup>822</sup>. Smith claimed that he did not recall having figures from Murray at the mediation <sup>823</sup> and that Bell had not provided "granularity" for TIE's figures which he had requested at a meeting in January <sup>824</sup>. However Smith's own record of that meeting show only that he asked Bell to provide a copy of the contract, a copy of the programme and sets of meeting notes <sup>825</sup>. Murray was clear in his evidence that his paper was the basis of all the discussions he was involved in up to and at Mar Hall <sup>826</sup>. In any event, Bell did provide further information on TIE's figures right up to the days immediately prior to the mediation <sup>827</sup>, including a detailed breakdown and analysis of the Phoenix proposal <sup>828</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>818</sup> Vic Emery transcript 49.16-49.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>819</sup> Donald McGougan transcript 89.8-89.9 (Thursday 30 November), TRI00000108\_0106 Q140(f)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>820</sup> Anthony Rush transcript 179.8-179.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>821</sup> Vic Emery transcript 60.18-61.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>822</sup> Dennis Murray transcript 65.11-65.18, TIE00106500

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>823</sup> Colin Smith transcript 79.24-80.6

<sup>824</sup> Colin Smith transcript 21.4-21.15

<sup>825</sup> CEC02083835\_0006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>826</sup> Dennis Murray transcript 63.19-65.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>827</sup> e.g. TIE00355077, TIE00355078

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>828</sup> CEC02084639 and attachments

# <u>10C – Analysis of settlement figure</u>

Dennis Murray built up a settlement estimate based on the contract price plus the value of all changes (current and anticipated) and additional sums for delay and extension of time<sup>829</sup>. These figures presupposed that Infraco's claims that a change had occurred were correct in each case <sup>830</sup>. This added up to £247m under TIE's estimates of the value of the changes and delays <sup>831</sup>, and £280m under Infraco's estimates <sup>832</sup>. TIE's estimates of value had been supported by an independent assessment carried out by Cyril Sweett, which gave very similar figures based both on the Schedule 4 rates and on market rates <sup>833</sup>. However even using the higher valuations given by Infraco, this is still very far short of the £362.5m agreed at Mar Hall <sup>834</sup>.

No justification for this agreed figure appears to have been provided at any time, nor indeed does it appear to be capable of justification. Breakdowns prepared by CEC have provided mutually contradictory explanations of how this figure was supposedly built up. A cost summary in November 2012 produced by Coyle indicated that the figure comprised £204m for the off street work, £25m for settlement of off street claims, £82m for settlement of on street claims, and £49m for settlement of system wide work <sup>835</sup>. This is in contrast to a different version produced by Coyle in the same month which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>829</sup> Dennis Murray transcript 67.13-68.2, TIE00106500\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>830</sup> Dennis Murray transcript 72.6-72.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>831</sup> TIE00106500\_0015, Dennis Murray transcript 99.19-100.2


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>832</sup> TIE00106500\_0016, Dennis Murray transcript 100.10-100.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>833</sup> Dennis Murray transcript 86.20-87.3, TIE00106500\_0021

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>834</sup> CEC02084685, Dennis Murray transcript 104.8-105.16 – between £79 million and £115 million higher, as described by Inquiry counsel.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>835</sup> BFB00101644 (attachment to BFB00101643)

recorded that the £49m was for MOV4 mobilisation and materials payments, the £82m was for EOT claims, £98m for systems wide costs and £131m for the off street works<sup>836</sup>.





<sup>836</sup> CEC01952969 footnote 6 (attachment to CEC01952968)

Emery considered that the price for off-street work and claims for changes and delay was likely to have been grossly inflated in a similar manner to the consortium's ultimate on street price <sup>837</sup>. Bruce suggested that the circa £160m of additional money paid to the consortium in terms of this deal was inevitable standing "TIE's track record on adjudications" <sup>838</sup>. However this materially ignores not only Murray's numbers and the conclusions of Acutus in relation to the causes of delay (as noted above) but also the fact that the final value of all agreed changes to that point in time was 52% of the original amounts claimed by Infraco <sup>839</sup>. The combined value of all changes claimed by Infraco, including their contentious claims for delay and extension of time, totalled £146m <sup>840</sup>. Even that, as the high end figure, is less than the amount effectively paid under the deal. In that context it is noteworthy that Bruce's reply to Jeffrey's protests over the price was:

# "This is about more than money" 841.

In her opening mediation statement, Bruce had noted that whilst the original contract price amounted to £12.9m per kilometre (comparable to the system in Manchester), the Phoenix proposal equated to a cost of £33.4m per kilometre, which would make the Edinburgh tram system:

"by some way the most expensive tram system of its type anywhere in the world"<sup>842</sup>.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 837}$  Vic Emery transcript 107.22-108.2, and see Section 11B below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>838</sup> Susan Bruce transcript 55.19-55.23, 58.8-9

<sup>839</sup> TIE00086026\_0011

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>840</sup> BFB00003297\_0091

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>841</sup> TRI00000097\_0060 para 354

Jeffrey had made this same point a few days earlier <sup>843</sup>. The final deal came out at around £30m per kilometre. When asked whether this or the original £13m per kilometre was closer to the industry norm, Bilfinger's Project Director was unable or unwilling to provide a direct answer <sup>844</sup>. This can perhaps be compared with his previous unsatisfactory response to why the consortium's proposed price for Phase 1b of the project tripled from £49.7m to £134m:

"There was not a great deal of time spent to fine tune any exact costing" 845.

CEC's Director of City Development shared Jeffrey's views that the Phoenix price was excessively high <sup>846</sup> and that the outcome at Mar Hall appeared to give the consortium everything that they wanted <sup>847</sup>.

The extension to the programme agreed "pursuant to Project Phoenix" <sup>848</sup> moved the construction completion date from March 2011 <sup>849</sup> to March 2013 <sup>850</sup>, an extension of 24 months. This extension of time, to complete work on a truncated route, compared unfavourably with the fact that the existing work was already overdue on a programme which had originally been 32 months (from May 2008 to January 2011 <sup>851</sup>) for the whole of the Infraco construction works to Newhaven <sup>852</sup>.

850 BFB00053258\_0167

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>842</sup> CEC02084575\_0013

<sup>843</sup> TIE00685894\_0002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>844</sup> Martin Foerder transcript 152.5-153.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>845</sup> TRI00000095\_0044 para 135

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>846</sup> TRI00000108\_0103 Q136

<sup>847</sup> TRI00000108\_0106 Q140(c)

<sup>848</sup> CEC02084685

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>849</sup> WED00000641\_0017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>851</sup> The original extension from January 2011 to March 2011 was in Revision 1 of the programme.

In similar vein, Councillor Whyte noted that the cost of the infrastructure element of the Mar Hall deal seemed as high as the cost of starting from scratch despite the amount of work which had already been done <sup>853</sup>. However Councillors were simply presented with the deal on a "take it or leave it" basis <sup>854</sup>, informed by Coyle's inflated costs for the alternative of termination <sup>855</sup>.

This date was unaffected by the adjudication decision on MUDFA delay in July 2010 (WED00000641\_0017).

<sup>852</sup> TRI00000112\_0064 Q113(1)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>853</sup> Iain Whyte transcript 97.10-97.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>854</sup> Iain Whyte transcript 98.10-98.16, Jeremy Balfour transcript 143.9-143.16, Steve Cardownie transcript 134.11-134.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>855</sup> See Section 9B above

# <u>10D – Analysis of total project costs</u>

The cost of apparent capitulation at Mar Hall should be compared to the combined cost of the problems which led to that point. On the basis of Murray's calculations, TIE's estimate of all changes (current and anticipated) was approximately £41 million, plus £13m of costs under the PSSA and £73m in preliminaries to cover delay <sup>856</sup>, giving a total cost for accrued issues up to Mar Hall of £127m.

By comparison, the deal at Mar Hall agreed a figure of £362.5m versus Murray's overall total of £247m (see Section 10C above), an increase of £115.5m. To that £115.5m premium the following figures should also be added:

- £30m of costs under MOV4 over and above the amount recommended by TIE<sup>857</sup>,
- £32m of on street costs over and above that recommended by TIE <sup>858</sup>, and
- £11m of costs for reprogramming paid by CEC despite Turner & Townsend's recommendation that it was not due <sup>859</sup>.

This puts the total cost of settlement at approximately £188m over and above the £127m attributable to the issues which existed pre-mediation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>856</sup> TIE00106500\_0015. Sum of £41m composed of £13.6m changes agreed, £19.5m changes to agree, and £8m changes not notified, the latter based on information from Infraco (Dennis Murray transcript 78.24-79.13).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>857</sup> See Section 11A below. It is conceded however that this £30m may fall to be treated as part of the £115.5m premium on the price at Mar Hall, and not an addition to it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>858</sup> See Section 11B below

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>859</sup> See Section 11C below

The above comparison does not include the cost of inflation against the amount borrowed to finance the Mar Hall deal, which totalled £182m <sup>860</sup>, nor additional tram-related sums excluded from the tram budget totalling £44m <sup>861</sup>.

Stuart Fair also identified further sums 'missing' from CEC's official final cost of £776m, including CEC's legal costs of £2.3m<sup>862</sup>, and unclear accounting treatment of £59.9m of historical claims including aborted costs of Phase 1B and assets beyond St Andrews Square <sup>863</sup>. Fair also noted that the 'final' figures produced by CEC were net of VAT <sup>864</sup>.

It is difficult properly to consider the benefit/cost attributable to the reduction in scope. Truncation to Picardy Place was forecast to realise a saving of £66m when considered in November 2009 <sup>865</sup>. By contrast, to build the current route to Newhaven as originally planned was forecast to cost £145m in the 2015 business case (£31m per kilometre)<sup>866</sup>. It is also difficult to compare like for like since the Mar Hall deal included for design and materials to Newhaven (with no breakdown) <sup>867</sup>. Siemens' Carlisle price involved only a £3m reduction in costs for on street work despite the reduction in scope <sup>868</sup>, whilst Bilfinger's Carlisle price of £234m <sup>869</sup> compares unfavourably with the contract Construction Works Price (for the whole Infraco scope to Newhaven) of £238m <sup>870</sup>.

- 867 CEC02084685
- 868 CEC00183919\_0030

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>860</sup> John Connarty transcript 39.1-39.7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>861</sup> John Connarty transcript 31.15-32.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>862</sup> TRI00000264\_0070 para 3.145

<sup>863</sup> TRI00000264\_0070 para 3.147

<sup>864</sup> TRI00000264\_0070 para 3.148

<sup>865</sup> CEC00677450\_0004

<sup>866</sup> CEC02084232\_0035

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>869</sup> CEC00183919\_0011

<sup>870</sup> USB0000032\_0004

# (11) POST SETTLEMENT

It has been suggested, particularly by those who were either responsible for or benefitted from the settlement agreement, that the project worked well after mediation, and after TIE were removed from the project. It has been noted by several observers that the improvement in relations with the contractor had been 'bought' by the circa £160m extra paid over to the contractor under the terms of the agreement. The Council's Transport Convenor noted that:

"if the contractor has got what they want, things are made a lot simpler" <sup>871</sup>.

Meanwhile, CEC's Director of City Development noted that increased profit and reduced risk under the settlement agreement undoubtedly improved BSC's behaviour<sup>872</sup>. Nevertheless, he raised concerns in August 2011 that Infraco were using the same tactics as they had in the lead up to contract close in 2008 and were seeking to unpick matters agreed at mediation <sup>873</sup>.

In any event, the rosy picture is inaccurate or at least incomplete, as a number of issues arose post Mar Hall. As expressed by Colin Smith:

"There were many bumps in the road... I wouldn't want anyone to take the view that it was plain sailing from March 2011 to May 2014."<sup>874</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>871</sup> TRI00000086\_0157 para 485. See also TRI00000113\_0075 para 279.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>872</sup> TRI00000108\_0114 para 151b

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>873</sup> CEC01733343

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>874</sup> Colin Smith transcript 169.17-169.20

For instance, despite agreeing a final settlement, Infraco gave notice of 352 changes after Mar Hall <sup>875</sup>. In the final account, Infraco obtained even more money than was agreed in the final settlement terms, with almost £15m paid for changes <sup>876</sup>, including a £4.5m payment for delay in signing the agreement <sup>877</sup> and £6.4m for the value engineering changes <sup>878</sup> which Turner & Townsend had advised CEC that Infraco were not entitled to <sup>879</sup>.

Other issues are dealt with in greater detail below.

<sup>875</sup> TRI00000072\_0086 para 155, TRI00000095\_0101 para 295

<sup>876</sup> WED00000101\_0004

<sup>877</sup> WED00000101\_0005

<sup>878</sup> WED00000101\_0008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>879</sup> See Section 11C below

# <u>11A – Minute of Variation 4</u>

Part of the agreement reached at Mar Hall involved early payments to Infraco under Minute of Variation 4 (MOV4) to the Infraco contract <sup>880</sup>. These payments totalled £49m. They were characterised as a mobilisation payment <sup>881</sup> though this may have been a fiction: Martin Foerder considered that the payment was actually a settlement sum to get Infraco back to a cash neutral position <sup>882</sup>.

The payments were made prior to approval of the deal by Councillors <sup>883</sup>; indeed the May 2011 report to Councillors failed to mention the £27m which had already been paid by that time <sup>884</sup>. A total of £36m was paid prior to MOV4 even being signed <sup>885</sup>, those payments being certified by Colin Smith and approved by the Council's Finance Director <sup>886</sup> despite significant concerns being expressed by **Richard Jeffrey** and **Steven Bell** <sup>887</sup>. TIE's chairman Vic Emery indicated that no-one at CEC was addressing TIE's concerns <sup>888</sup>.

McGrigors, which drafted the Minute, noted that:

<sup>880</sup> CEC01731817

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>881</sup> e.g. by Colin Smith CEC01927616. Compare this with the terms of the Minute itself, which set out payments of £27m and £13m for materials and equipment, and a £9m payment for unspecified purposes. (BFB00096810 pages 10-11).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>882</sup> TRI00000095\_0090 para 272

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>883</sup> Alistair Maclean transcript 137.2-137.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>884</sup> CEC01914650, Alistair Maclean transcript 137.24-138.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>885</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 124.3-124.6 (Friday 22 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>886</sup> Alan Coyle transcript 124.13-125.17 (Friday 22 September)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>887</sup> TIE00687649, TIE00687654, TIE00686805, CEC02086878, CEC02086879, TIE00687929, CEC02087177, TIE00687801

<sup>888</sup> CEC02087193

"[t]here was considerable debate in relation to what the various payments... were intended to be in respect of." <sup>889</sup>

Jeffrey intimated that TIE's assessment was that £19m was a more reasonable sum to pay than the £49m set out in MOV4, noting that the draft provided for:

*"time based payments for preliminaries unconnected with progress and without substantiation required."* <sup>890</sup>

An earlier adjudication decision by Lord Dervaird had established that preliminaries under the original contract were a time based cost not dependent on achievement of milestones (para 16) but also that Infraco were required to substantiate their claims (para 17). In response to a request for clarification from Infraco, Lord Dervaird indicated that these should be valued in accordance with the rates in Schedule Part 5:

"together with any adjustments or variations made thereto" <sup>891</sup>.

McGrigors advised TIE that Schedule Part 5 was:

"progress-related... The starting point is therefore, to take the information in Schedule Part 5 and assess this against progress".<sup>892</sup>

CEC however do not appeared to have followed this advice. CEC's payments of these sums, without approval of the TPB or proper governance <sup>893</sup>, led to the resignation *en masse* of TIE's non executive directors <sup>894</sup> shortly followed by Jeffrey himself <sup>895</sup>.

<sup>889</sup> CEC02087178\_0007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>890</sup> TIE00687649\_0002, see also CEC02087177\_0002

<sup>891</sup> BFB00053489\_0008

<sup>892</sup> CEC02084588

TIE's concerns went beyond simply the amount of money paid over under MOV4. In an email on 14 April 2011 Bell set out to the CEC Executive a comprehensive analysis of issues with the proposed agreement, including:

- That the proposed self-certification process hindered TIE's statutory duties and removed Infraco's deliverables obligations and requirements for record keeping;
- The role, accountabilities and responsibilities of Smith as the Certifier were not compatible with the mechanics suggested by MOV4;
- There was no linkage of payment to completion of design, and no obligation to substantiate or opportunity to amend the value once certified;
- The payments (leaving aside that Bell could not objectively support their value) were not linked to completion of the design and there was no obligation to substantiate or amend them by reference to any milestones;
- The proposed moratorium was 'one sided', and given that TIE had previously served an RTN for Infraco's general conduct <sup>896</sup>, the proposed prohibition on raising future RTNs on the same grounds would inhibit any action against Infraco's bad conduct in future.

Bell's conclusion was that the proposed agreement was not "equitable" and that CEC needed to understand:

"the size of the potential concessions they are signing up to" 897.

<sup>893</sup> TRI00000089\_0056 para 15

<sup>894</sup> TIE00620232

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>895</sup> TRI00000097\_0061 para 376

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>896</sup> CEC02084525, WED00000641\_0050. See Section 8A above.

<sup>897</sup> TIE00686636

Bell later sought confirmation from Dave Anderson (by then the project SRO) accepting that payment had been arranged by CEC solely on the basis of Smith's certification, and that execution of MOV4 would result in the project cost exceeding the budget available to TIE and TEL under the Operating Agreements <sup>898</sup>.

Sue Bruce claimed that Bell's concerns were analysed and debated <sup>899</sup> but dismissed them on the basis that whilst she considered Bell to be a "very competent engineer", he wasn't:

"personally aligned to the mediation and post-mediation direction of travel" 900.

Ultimately she appeared disdainful of the fact that Bell was raising issues and asking 'awkward' questions <sup>901</sup>.

Infraco later sought uplift for additional preliminaries in August 2011. TIE's position as expressed by Bell was that:

"As far as TIE is aware (and no resource vouching is made by Infraco) there is no additional resource introduced to carry out the MOV4 scope and consequently the fixed period costs for preliminaries should be paid as time elapses. Infraco has claimed percentages to cover 'additional' preliminaries as if it were a change but claims this is only a mechanism utilised for cash flow purposes. If preliminaries were payable in addition to the fixed amounts in the Pricing Schedule then the resources should be claimed and vouched in the same way as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>898</sup> CEC02086879\_0003. He had sought legal advice from McGrigors in relation to this issue: TIE00687794.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>899</sup> TRI00000084 0030 para 96

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>900</sup> TRI0000084 0033 para 105

<sup>901</sup> ibid

the labour plant and materials are. It is interesting to note this has not been done and BBUK has preferred a percentage adjustment which requires no evidence."<sup>902</sup>

Smith nevertheless certified the additional payments <sup>903</sup>.

Alistair Maclean claimed that Councillors were given "very fulsome" briefings <sup>904</sup> in relation to MOV4, though that is contradicted by the stark omissions in the report he prepared in May 2011 as noted above. The Council's Transport Convenor noted by contrast that post mediation, CEC officers effectively took Councillors: 'out of the loop'<sup>905</sup>.

- 904 Alistair Maclean transcript 78.21-79.17
- 905 TRI0000086\_0126 para 385

<sup>902</sup> TIE00357031\_0001

<sup>903</sup> TIE00357030

# <u>11B – On Street target sum</u>

Whilst the Mar Hall agreement had resulted in a fixed price for the off street works, the sum for on street work was merely a 'target sum' <sup>906</sup> and thus subject to further revision by the consortium. Predictably, this target increased, from £39m at Mar Hall to £53.4m by August 2011 <sup>907</sup>. The amount ultimately agreed was £47.3m <sup>908</sup>, despite CEC originally having a lower target of £22.5m <sup>909</sup> against TIE's calculation of £19.2m <sup>910</sup>. As noted in section 10B above, the CEC executive used the sum of £22.5m (and not the agreed figure of £39m) both in its calculation of the overall cost of the deal against its 'trigger point' <sup>911</sup> and in the cost reported to the Council in June <sup>912</sup>.

The independent report commissioned by CEC from Faithful & Gould in August 2011 concluded that Infraco's price was "extremely high", "not value for money" and "grossly inflated" <sup>913</sup>. It recommended a reduction of £15m <sup>914</sup>. Despite reference to Faithful & Gould in the report from the CEC Executive to Councillors <sup>915</sup>, these conclusions were omitted. The Transport Convenor noted that these phrases would have "jumped out" to any Councillor and that there would have been "uproar" <sup>916</sup>.

- <sup>907</sup> CEC01727000\_0010 para 4.2.2.1
- 908 CEC02085642
- 909 CEC02085608
- <sup>910</sup> CEC02084657
- 911 WED00000134\_0250
- <sup>912</sup> Sue Bruce transcript 79.19-80.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>906</sup> BFB00053262\_0002 para 6.3

<sup>913</sup> CEC01727000\_0005 para 2.6, 2.7

<sup>914</sup> CEC01727000\_0016 para 4.2.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>915</sup> TRS00011725\_0002

<sup>916</sup> TRI0000086\_0153 para 475-477

Vic Emery agreed with Faithful & Gould's assessment but was not aware of CEC doing anything to address these concerns <sup>917</sup>. He was not confident that the £47.3m ultimately agreed represented best value <sup>918</sup>.

Both TIE and Faithful & Gould criticised Bilfinger's on street sum for a number of reasons:

- Bilfinger used an average of all subcontractor tenders rather than the lowest quote, and then added back the difference between this figure and their own estimate, thus inflating their price by £3m <sup>919</sup>;
- Bilfinger asked their subcontractors to price a worst case scenario, but Bilfinger's own proposal did not, meaning they could have been entitled to costs for changes, estimated at £6m <sup>920</sup>;
- Bilfinger had uplifted their previous rates by 15% <sup>921</sup>;
- Bilfinger had priced logistics and traffic management at £4.5m, significantly higher than a *pro rata* calculation (based on Princes Street costs) of £800k <sup>922</sup>;
- Bilfinger had added preliminaries amounting to 50% of the construction work <sup>923</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>917</sup> TRI00000035\_0028 para 91

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>918</sup> TRI00000035\_0034 para 122

 $<sup>^{919}\,\</sup>rm CEC01727000$  para 4.2.2, TIE00691425\_0001

 $<sup>^{920}\,\</sup>text{CEC01727000}$  para 4.2.2, TIE00691425\_0002

<sup>921</sup> CEC01727000 para 4.2.2

<sup>922</sup> TIE00691425\_0002

<sup>923</sup> TIE00691425\_0003

Meanwhile, the increase from £39m appeared largely to be as a result of Siemens inflating their price by £14m, that being the amount by which they had required to discount their Phoenix price in reaching agreement at Mar Hall. The clear view was that Siemens were simply adding this reduction back into the target sum <sup>924</sup>. TIE's commercial team had assessed the value of Siemens on street work at £4.5m <sup>925</sup>, whilst Faithful & Gould noted that the original cost per kilometre would have resulted in costs of only £960k <sup>926</sup>.

Sue Bruce apparently agreed that Siemens should not be allowed to recover their premediation losses in this way <sup>927</sup> as it was "a contradiction with the overt agreement" <sup>928</sup>. This is difficult to reconcile with CEC nevertheless agreeing the final on street price of £47.3m. Colin Smith, who was responsible for this agreement, said that he does not know how the original target sum of £39m was reached <sup>929</sup>, making his claim to have worked to ensure best value in agreeing the final price of £47.3m <sup>930</sup> questionable. **Steven Bell** noted that Smith was:

"very quiet and a little uncomfortable when this was discussed in general forum with Siemens and Bilfinger" <sup>931</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>924</sup> TIE00688781, TIE00688885, TIE0068878, TIE00688914

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>925</sup> TRI00000249\_0018 para 28. Siemens immediately reduced their price by £6m in response to initial TIE criticisms (TIE00691425\_0003).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>926</sup> CEC01727000 para 4.2.3

<sup>927</sup> TRI00000084\_0048 para 154

<sup>928</sup> TIE00688914

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>929</sup> Colin Smith transcript 73.5-73.8

 $<sup>^{930}\,\</sup>rm{TRI00000143}\_0067$  para 265

<sup>931</sup> TIE00691220\_0001

CEC's Director of City Development considered that the cost of the settlement agreement <sup>932</sup> signed in September 2011 was "excessively high" <sup>933</sup>. Turner & Townsend, which replaced TIE following the settlement agreement, noted that the pricing for on street works was an "unfavourable arrangement" for CEC <sup>934</sup>. The final actual cost rose to £51.6m <sup>935</sup>.

- 933 TRI00000108\_0114 para 150d
- 934 WED00000103\_0017
- 935 WED00000101

<sup>932</sup> BFB00005464

# <u>11C – Turner & Townsend</u>

Following the settlement agreement, Turner & Townsend were brought in by CEC to replace TIE in project management, at a cost of £7m <sup>936</sup>. It appears that Turner & Townsend raised a number of similar concerns to those which had been raised by TIE, including concerns over the terms of the settlement agreement, the Infraco programme and the pricing for on street works <sup>937</sup>.

There seems to have been friction between Turner & Townsend's management of the project and CEC's apparent policy of appeasement, for example:

- When Infraco complained about Turner & Townsend raising issues with the contract in December 2011, Sue Bruce remarked that "this did not sound like the current client instructions to Turner & Townsend" <sup>938</sup>.
- In February 2012 Infraco again complained that "the approach taken by Turner & Townsend... did not seem to be in the spirit of the settlement agreement", again for raising a contractual challenge. Sue Bruce said she would "re-affirm" to Turner & Townsend that "it was important that the good relationship continued" <sup>939</sup>.
- In September 2012 Turner & Townsend advised CEC that Infraco had no contractual entitlement to a payment of £6.45m being sought for changes associated with a value engineering reduction in the programme <sup>940</sup>. By February

<sup>936</sup> TRI00000108\_0112 para 148b

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>937</sup> WED00000103 and see Sections 5C and 11B above

<sup>938</sup> CEC01890994 0005

<sup>939</sup> CEC01942260 0004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>940</sup> CEC02017359 pg4, pg22

2013 Turner & Townsend advised that Infraco still had not provided sufficient information to demonstrate that costs had actually been incurred and were refusing to provide any further information, however CEC instructed Turner & Townsend to certify these amounts regardless <sup>941</sup>.

In August 2011, the Council had voted to truncate the tram route at Haymarket<sup>942</sup>. As a result of this, Transport Scotland withheld the remaining funding <sup>943</sup> of £72m, which was reinstated only when the Council effectively overturned this vote <sup>944</sup>. Following this reversal, Infraco's programme was amended <sup>945</sup> from Rev 3A to Rev 4 and a payment was agreed in respect of this programme change <sup>946</sup>. Later in April 2013 Turner & Townsend advised that Infraco had not provided sufficient information to demonstrate that costs were actually incurred in respect of this programme change <sup>947</sup>. However CEC nevertheless approved payment of the full £4.5m in respect of this issue in January 2014 <sup>948</sup>.

<sup>941</sup> CEC02085657\_0026

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>942</sup> Described as a "very political" decision – Iain Whyte transcript 99.6

<sup>943</sup> TRS00031263

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>944</sup> Ainslie McLaughlin transcript 195.3-195.9

<sup>945</sup> CEC02031937

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>946</sup> Colin Smith transcript 164.17-166.5

<sup>947</sup> CEC02027146\_0025

<sup>948</sup> CEC02072604\_0008

# (12) BONUSES

The issue of bonuses within TIE has been highlighted at various points in the Inquiry. **Richard Jeffrey** as CEO recommended to the remuneration committee that bonuses should not be paid to any staff within TIE <sup>949</sup>. He himself never received any bonus <sup>950</sup>.

Jeffrey during his time also instigated an investigation by Anderson Strathern into the payment of bonuses which may have been made around the time of financial close, which he intimated to McGougan and McLean at CEC <sup>951</sup>.

**David Mackay**, in his role as interim Executive Chairman of TIE prior to Jeffrey's arrival, had overseen a change to the way in which bonuses were paid at TIE, thus reducing the overall level of bonuses <sup>952</sup>. CEC's Director of Corporate Services considered that Mackay and Jeffrey were both sympathetic to CEC's concerns about bonuses and took appropriate action <sup>953</sup>. Mackay himself never received any bonus <sup>954</sup>.

**Steven Bell** and **Susan Clark** were both entitled to bonus payments. However they both deferred their bonus payment due for the financial year 2008/2009 (i.e. covering financial close) until completion of the project <sup>955</sup>.

<sup>949</sup> CEC00314582, TRI00000097\_0036 para 206

<sup>950</sup> TRI00000097\_0061 para 366

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>951</sup> CEC00013342, TRI00000097\_0007 para 23-25. The SETE group's representatives have been advised that Anderson Strathern's conclusions cannot be discussed as CEC Recovery Limited (formerly TIE) has claimed legal privilege over the advice received.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>952</sup> Jim Inch transcript 159.24-160.2

<sup>953</sup> Jim Inch transcript 160.19-160.23

<sup>954</sup> TRI00000113\_0104 para 376

<sup>955</sup> CEC00114444

# **APPENDIX 1 – CHRONOLOGY OF DISPUTES**

20 March 2009 -	PSSA
3 June 2009 -	MOV2
29 June 2009 -	Mediation 'marathon'
13 October 2009 -	Adjudication: Hilton Hotel
16 November 2009 -	Adjudication: Carrick Knowe/Gogarburn
4 January 2010 -	Adjudication: Russell Road
23 April 2010 -	MOV3
18 May 2010 -	Adjudication: Tower Bridge
24 May 2010 -	Adjudication: Track drainage
16 July 2010 -	Adjudication: Incomplete MUDFA works
29 July 2010 -	BSC Project Carlisle Offer
7 August 2010 -	Adjudication: Murrayfield Underpass
9 August 2010 -	First RTNs issued by TIE
24 August 2010 -	TIE Project Carlisle Counter Offer
11 September 2010 -	BSC Project Carlisle 2 <sup>nd</sup> Offer
22 September 2010 -	Adjudication: Depot Access Bridge
24 September 2010 -	TIE Project Carlisle 2 <sup>nd</sup> Counter Offer
29 September 2010 -	BSC cease all works other than Depot
26 November 2010 -	Adjudication: Landfill Tax
13 December 2010 -	Adjudication: Subcontracts
24 February 2011 -	BSC Project Phoenix Offer
2 March 2011 -	Adjudication: Preliminaries
8 March 2011 -	Mar Hall mediation
20 May 2011 -	MOV4
15 September 2011 -	MOV5

# APPENDIX 2 - CHRONOLOGY OF EVOLUTION OF PRICING ASSUMPTION 1

# 27 November 07

Preferred bidder weekly progress meeting<sup>i</sup>:

"GG and MC echoed WG earlier concerns and need to firm up on prices to take confidence level to the high ninety %... BBS were uncertain if the information was sufficiently complete enough to achieve firm prices".

# 7 December 07

Email from Gilbert to McFadzen<sup>ii</sup>, seeking clarification on a number of issues. **Bell** is copied into Gilbert's email but not the response from McFadzen on 10 December 07:

"The whole concept of re-pricing on the basis of these measurement issues, is not working. We need to discuss this asap."

Gilbert replies (copying Crosse but not Bell) proposing a meeting with McFadzen, Walker and Flynn to discuss the impasse.

# 11 December 07

Letter from Gallagher to Walker<sup>iii</sup> :

"We ask you to consider fixing your price, save for a very few notable exceptions where for example the design itself is absent."

Email from Gilbert to Crosse & **Bell** <sup>iv</sup> attaching proposal for settling a deal<sup>v</sup>, proposing up to £10m:

"for BBS to take pricing risk for the scope and risks that are included in the deal... Technical scope - BBS take design development risk".

## 12 December 07

Walker's letter of response to Gallagher<sup>vi</sup>:

"In those locations where the design is absent, we are not able to fix our price... In areas where design is partial, we have made reasonable assumptions based upon our experience and the existing design information provided. Notwithstanding material design changes we have a high level of confidence in our pricing".

A schedule is attached identifying provisional sums totalling £8m.

## 13 December 07

Gallagher reply to Walker "requiring" a fixed price<sup>vii</sup>.

Gallagher and Crosse attend meeting at Wiesbaden. It is agreed that BBS would take the design development risk<sup>viii</sup>. McFadzen noted from Walker's report of the meeting that it appeared that BBS had "agreed to take on a bit more risk than I thought we should, and that was the basis for me assisting with the writing up of the agreement", and that the exact terms of the verbal agreement were not clear<sup>ix</sup>.

# TRI00000289\_C\_0172

# 17 December 07

Crosse emails Walker<sup>x</sup> with a draft written agreement<sup>xi</sup>. At clause 3.3:

"BBS included in their price for the construction cost risk in the development and completion of detailed designs being prepared by SDS, save for: (a) Any future changes to elements of the design for civils works that are substantially different compared to those forming the current scheme being designed by SDS..."

Walker forwards email exchange between himself and McFadzen to Crosse<sup>xii</sup>; McFadzen in particular is critical of elements of the draft agreement, without any reference to clause 3.3.

## 18 December 07

A marked up version of the draft agreement<sup>xiii</sup> is sent by Gilbert to McGarrity, McEwan, Richards and Crosse<sup>xiv</sup> appending to clause 3.3 the note:

"Design must be delivered by the SDS in line with our construction delivery programme previously submitted"

but does not otherwise alter the wording.

Email from Walker to Gilbert<sup>xv</sup>:

"I have concerns that this amount was the amount envisaged when we thought SDS design would be complete at novation. Obviously this is not now the case and I believe the  $\pounds$ "m will need to be increased in the Infraco contract."

#### 19 December 07

Email from Walker to Gilbert<sup>xvi</sup>:

"our firm price including the additional £8m to fix the 'variable' sums noted in our tender is based on all the additional information which we received from SDS via the 4 No. CDs. The last of which was delivered to us on 25th. November 2007. We therefore insist that our contract be related to this."

Gilbert's response is:

"Don't understand what this really means and will call now to discuss".

Agreement reached in subsequent discussion between McFadzen, Walker, Gilbert and Crosse.xvii

Minutes of the TPB meeting at which **Bell** is present<sup>xviii</sup> note that McGarrity explained that:

"the contract price was based on the Wiesbaden deal... a premium had been included in the contract price to firm up previous provisional sums."

The powerpoint presentation for the same meeting<sup>xix</sup> set out McGarrity's presentation that: *"BB taking detailed design development risk"*.

Email from Gilbert to Walker<sup>xx</sup> attaching further draft<sup>xxi</sup> which adds to clause 3.3 the words: *"as typically represented by the drawings issued to BBS with the design info drop on 25/11/07".* 

# TRI00000289\_C\_0173

# 20 December 07

Email response from Walker<sup>xxii</sup>:

"We still have issues with accepting design risk. We have not priced this contract on a design and build basis always believing until very recently that design would be complete upon novation. With the exception of the items marked provisional which we have now fixed by the way of the 8 million we cannot accept more drain (sic) development other than minor tweaking around detail. Your current wording is too onerous. Trust we can find a solution."

Gilbert forwards this to Crosse and Bell with the note "!!!!!!!".

Meeting later that morning between the parties, at which the final agreement was signed. Attendees on the TIE side were Crosse, Gilbert and Dawson<sup>xxiii</sup>.

Gilbert emails McGarrity (copying in Bell)<sup>xxiv</sup> attaching a copy of the signed Wiesbaden Agreement<sup>xxv</sup> – clause 3.3 reads:

"The BBS price for civils works includes for any impact on construction cost arising from the normal development and completion of designs based on the design intent for the scheme as represented by the design information drawings issued to BBS up to and including the design information drop on 25th November 2007... For the avoidance of doubt normal development and completion of designs means the evolution of design through the stages of preliminary to construction stage and excludes changes of design principle, shape and form and outline specification".

Gilbert testified that the latter phrase was agreed with Walker to protect BBS from 'scope creep'.xxvi

## 13 January 08

Email Dawson to Gilbert<sup>xxvii</sup> with initial draft of Schedule 4<sup>xxviii</sup>. This contains none of the Wiesbaden wording on design development.

## 15 January 08

Meeting between BBS/Pinsents and TIE/DLA<sup>xxix</sup> – Bell not present. The minutes state:

"BBS stated that they qualified their bid such that they would not take any risk in respect of the SDS programme (Post Meeting Note – No such Qualification found). BBS want stronger control and incentivisation of the SDS performance. BBS want tie to take risk on SDS programme performance... GG explained that details of what the contract price represents will be defined in detail in Schedule 4. Any changes from this will be a tie change."

## 16 January 08

Dawson email to McFadzen and Flynn<sup>xxx</sup> attaching draft above<sup>xxxi</sup>.

# 1 February 08

Email from Walker to Gilbert, copying in **Bell** xxxii:

"Bilfinger Berger's business model does not permit the liability for risks that do not belong in our Industry or risks which are unable to be assessed and quantified. The pricing assumptions have been based on the information given that tie would deliver the Design in accordance with their Procurement Strategy ie complete at Novation... Tie have not delivered the Issued for Construction Detailed Design in accordance with the Procurement Strategy and therefore the Risk Profile has changed for BBS, Tramco and SDS. It is this which is giving rise to the current difficulties and apparent shifting of position."

#### 4 February 08

Email from McFadzen to Dawson & Gilbert<sup>xxxiii</sup> attaching a draft Schedule 4, prepared by Laing which bears no relation to the earlier Dawson draft. This includes "base case assumptions" that the design will:

"not, in terms of design principle, shape, form and/or specification, be amended from the Base Date Design Information", defined as the design issued to Infraco by 25/11/07<sup>xxxiv</sup>.

#### 6 February 08

Comments by Dawson on the above assumption<sup>xxxv</sup> suggest that the November BDDI date is "a bit early", suggest adding "materially" before amended and ask "what about any specific issues that we know about, such as VE?". Andy Steel further comments:

"Given that a substantial amount of design requires to be presented, reviewed etc this clearly will not happen."<sup>xxxxi</sup>

Steel also noted in respect of the wording for the Notified Departure concept:

"Can't be just any departure or all risk will come back to TIE".

Bell was not included in either of these exchanges, though McEwan, McGarrity, Crosse and Fitchie were, with reference to a meeting taking place on this date to discuss.

#### 7 February 08

Rutland Square Agreement<sup>xxxvii</sup> signed by Crosse for TIE, fixing the price except in respect of changes to the ERs and "the resolution of the SDS residual risk issue", defined in clause 4 as:

"provision of adequate design information, and particularly earthworks design by SDS and the recovery by the BBS consortium of costs and expenses from SDS in the event that their designs are inadequate".

Bell not present. Paragraph 2.5 of the schedule to the agreement amends Schedule Part 4 but not in respect of the base case assumption on design.

## 11 February 08

Email from Dawson to Walker<sup>xxxviii</sup> suggesting a meeting to discuss Schedule 4, with himself, Gilbert, Murray and DLA on the TIE side. Walker responds the following day saying:

"Schedule 4 was clearly dealt with, why is Bob trying to re engage. The matter is closed". Gilbert's reply copies in Bell for the first time and outlines elements of Schedule 4 which are not yet concluded, without reference to the base case assumption on design.

#### 12 February 08

Email from Fitchie to Laing regarding their private conversation about "the need to get Schedule 4 on the table quickly"<sup>xxxix</sup>.

## 14 February 08

Email from Dawson to Murray<sup>xi</sup> attaching Gilbert's notes of meetings on Schedule 4<sup>xii</sup>, noting that there should be an exception to the assumption that the BDDI will not be amended to cover "design development… words as Wiesbaden Agreement".

#### 19 February 08

Email from McFadzen to TIE, including Bell<sup>xiii</sup> attaching BB's design due diligence report<sup>xiiii</sup>: Executive summary notes the design is:

"incomplete and will require substantial further development", noting 40% of the detailed design has not been issued. As a consequence "novation is considered to present significant and unforeseeable risks to the project".

Email from Dawson to McFadzen and Flynn<sup>xliv</sup> with a further draft of his original version of Schedule 4<sup>xlv</sup>. This now includes assumptions regarding design and that the price:

"includes for any impact thereon arising from the normal development and completion of designs based on the design intent"

as represented by 25/11/07 design drop; that the design will not:

"in terms of design principle, shape, and/or specification be materially amended from the drawings forming the infraco proposals"

and defining normal design development in line with the Wiesbaden Agreement.

#### 22 February 08

Email from Laing to Gilbert, Fitchie & Dawson<sup>xlvi</sup> with a marked up version of the TIE draft of Schedule  $4^{xlvii}$ , suggesting rewording from what is included in the price to a series of statements as to the assumptions upon which the price is based:

"This approach will require an alteration to the way in which many of the pricing assumptions are expressed but has no impact on the commercial intention".

Fitchie forwards this to **Bell** and others on 25 Feb 08, without any substantive commentary<sup>xlviii</sup>.

# 26 February 08

Email from McFadzen to Crosse<sup>xlix</sup> with the revised Infraco civil proposals<sup>1</sup>, which Crosse forwards to Bell.

"It is BBS's intention that the design will, where possible, be subject to change where (1) it is not in accordance with BBS pricing assumptions, Part 1 of Schedule 4... and/or (2) it is not in accordance with BBS Programme Assumptions."

Throughout the proposals it is noted: "Design to be completed and all consents and approvals obtained".

## 27 February 08

Meeting between TIE and BB regarding the civils proposals<sup>li</sup>. Bell not present. TIE opening comment "Proposal fails to meet expectations. Not precise, opens up opportunity to propose changes in the future". Under Section heading 'Structures', TIE ask "Does price include acceptance of emerging current design?" BB reply: "Price based on design at 25<sup>th</sup> Nov". TIE ask "Is priced based on Design information up to 25th Nov 2007 except where assumptions are qualified by previous 27 [drawings] plus cross sections previously discussed", no response recorded.

## 3 March 08

Email from Gilbert to **Bell** & McEwan<sup>lii</sup>:

"there seems to be confusion on the relationship between IPs and Sch 4 – we need to be careful that we don't compromise the position for post contract by linking them too strongly".

Paper attached<sup>liii</sup>: on Sch 4 pricing:

"Identification if item must be agreed at contract award or if it can be addressed by change control post award – nothing can go to post award... Material impact (if any) on risk transfer – no difference with preferred bidder position".

Email from Dawson to Gilbert & Laing<sup>liv</sup> attaching a revised draft Schedule 4<sup>Iv</sup> for discussion at meeting following day. Bell not copied. Gilbert then sends agenda to meeting<sup>Ivi</sup> to various recipients including **Bell**. The agenda includes "definition of 'normal design development'."

## 7 March 08

Citypoint Agreement between Walker, Flynn, **Bell** & McEwan: price increase of £8.6m for various terms including "Acceptance by BBS of any SDS design quality risk and consequent time impact"<sup>Ivii</sup>.

## 9 March 08

Email from Fitchie to senior TIE team including **Bell** <sup>Iviii</sup> enclosing the Close Report<sup>lix</sup> and Risk Matrix. Close Report states:

"In broad terms, the principal pillars of the contract suite in terms of programme, cost, scope and risk transfer have not changed materially since the approval of the Final Business Case... and that where risk allocation has altered this has been adequately reflected in suitable commercial compromises."

# TRI00000289\_C\_0177

# 10 March 08

Email from Dawson to BBS and lawyers (Bell note copied)<sup>ix</sup> with agreed wording of clause 3.4:

"The Construction Works Price has been fixed on the basis of inter alia the Base Case Assumptions noted herein. If now or at any time the facts or circumstances differ in any way from the Base Case Assumptions (or any part of them) such Notified Departure will be deemed to be a Mandatory tie Change in respect of which tie will be deemed to have issued a tie Change on the date that such Notified Departure is notified by either Party to the other."

## 11 March 08

Email from Bissett to senior TIE team including **Bell**<sup>|xi</sup> with updated Close Report<sup>|xii</sup> which states:

"The only material change in the Risk Allocation Matrices between Preferred Bidder stage and the position at Financial Close in in respect of the construction programme costs associated with any delay by SDS in delivery of remaining design submissions into the consents and approvals process beyond Financial Close".

# 12 March 08

Email from Dawson to BBS and lawyers<sup>1xiii</sup> attaching updated version of Schedule 4<sup>1xiv</sup>. Bell not copied.

## 13 March 08

Email from Moir of Pinsents to Dawson, Gilbert & Fitchie<sup>lxv</sup> attaching markup of TIE's draft from 3 March<sup>lxvi</sup>. Pinsents have not in this draft altered the phrase "materially amended" in PA1 despite having deleted the word "materially" in draft of 22 February 08.

## 19 March 08

Email from Laing to Dawson and others<sup>lxvii</sup> attaching BBS mark-up of Schedule 4<sup>lxviii</sup> – Clause 3.4 has been altered from a provision that the price includes for impact arising from normal design development to a prohibition on the design changing other than developments arising from normal design development. *The net effect of the rewording and reordering of the clause makes the definition of normal design development redundant on a literal reading: see figure 7 overleaf.* 

Email from Fitchie to **Bell** and others. His commentary on said draft raises no issues with PA1<sup>lxix</sup>.

## 20 March 08

Email from Hecht of DLA to various parties including **Bell**<sup>1xx</sup> attaching a clean version of the draft Schedule 4 as updated<sup>1xxi</sup>, without any advice on the import of the changes.

## 26 March 08

Email from Laing to **Bell** and others highlighting that there may be an immediate Notified Departure based on the change in design programme from v26 to v28, which contravenes PA4<sup>lxxii</sup>.

# TRI00000289\_C\_0178

# 31 March 08

Laing sends followup email seeking confirmation that TIE understand and agree that the change in design programme will lead to an immediate Notified Departure from PA4<sup>bxxiii</sup>.

# 01 April 08

Email from Laing to various parties including **Bell**<sup>lxxiv</sup> attaching the final draft of Schedule 4<sup>lxxv</sup> in which PA1 is not updated from the previous draft of 19 March 08. However, clause 3.2 is amended by Laing in line with his intimation of the immediate Notified Departure from PA4.

# 22 April 08

Email from Murray to McGarrity, Fitchie & **Bell** <sup>lxxvi</sup> attaching Schedule 4 for Quality Assurance Review. The Quality Control spreadsheet for financial close<sup>lxxvii</sup> notes that the finalisation of Schedule 4 is for Gilbert, Dawson and Murray, with the main QA review by McGarrity and the secondary review by **Bell**, together with review by DLA.

# FIGURE 7: 19 March 2008 redraft

3.4	Pricing Assumptions in respect pricing of the Construction Works Price are:
a)Des	sign
	∃1The design prepared by the SDS Provider will not (other Infraco Construction Works Price includes for any impact thereonthan amendments arising from the normal development and completion of designs): based on the design intent for the scheme as represented by Base Date Design Information.
	<ul> <li>For the avoidance of doubt normal development and completion of designs means the evolution of design through the stages of preliminary to construction stage and excludes changes of design principle, shape and form and outline specification.</li> </ul>
	Subject to the above, the Design Prepared by the SDS Provider will not:
	<u>∃1.1</u> in terms of design principle, shape, form and/or specification be amended from the drawings forming the Base Date Design Information (except in respect of Value Engineering identified in Appendices C or D),
	<u>∃1.2</u> be amended from the drawings forming the <u>Base Case Design</u> <u>Information Infrace Proposals</u> as a consequence of any Third Party Agreement (except in connection with changes in respect of Provisional Sums identified in Appendix B) and
	∃ <u>1.3</u> be amended from the drawings forming the <u>Base Case Design</u> <u>InformationInfrace Proposals</u> as a consequence of the requirements of any Approval Body.
	For the avoidance of doubt normal development and completion of designs means the evolution of design through the stages of preliminary to construction stage and excludes changes of design principle, shape and form and outline specification.

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<sup>i</sup> CEC01328042_0002 para 4
" CEC01494152_0002
<sup>III</sup> CEC01481843
<sup>iv</sup> TIE00087524
<sup>v</sup> TIE00087525
vi CEC00547788_0003
vii CEC00547779
viii Matthew Crosse transcript 143.21-144.2, William Gallagher transcript 76.3-76.8,
   cf Richard Walker transcript 57.8-57.20
<sup>ix</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 74.21-75.5
<sup>x</sup> CEC01494927
<sup>xi</sup> CEC01494928_0003 c3.3
<sup>xii</sup> CEC01494961
xiii CEC01430735_0003
xiv CEC01430733
<sup>xv</sup> CEC00547735
<sup>xvi</sup> CEC00547732
<sup>xvii</sup> Scott McFadzen transcript 79.7-80.4
xviii CEC01363703_0005
xix CEC01483731 0005
<sup>xx</sup> CEC00547738
<sup>xxi</sup> CEC00547739_0003 c3.3
<sup>xxii</sup> CEC00547740
xxiii CEC00547737, Scott McFadzen transcript 83.25-84.2
xxiv CEC01431385
<sup>xxv</sup> CEC01431387_0003 c3.3
xxvi Geoff Gilbert transcript 111.17-111.20
xxvii CEC01495585
xxviii CEC01447446
xxix CEC01529968
<sup>xxx</sup> CEC01447268
xxxi CEC01447269
xxxii CEC01489538
xxxiii CEC01448377
xxxiv CEC01448378_0002
<sup>xxxv</sup> CEC00592615
xxxvi CEC01448356_0002
xxxvii CEC00205642_0003 c4
xxxviii CEC00592619 0002
xxxix CEC01540594
<sup>xl</sup> CEC01448861
xli CEC01448862
<sup>xlii</sup> CEC01449440
xliii CEC01449100_0003
<sup>xliv</sup> CEC00592621
<sup>xlv</sup> CEC00592622_0005
<sup>xlvi</sup> CEC01449876
xlvii CEC01449877_0005
xlviii CEC01449710
xlix CEC01491360
<sup>I</sup> CEC01450027
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<sup>li</sup> TIE00078797 <sup>lii</sup> CEC01450122 <sup>IIII</sup> CEC01450123\_0004 <sup>liv</sup> CEC01450182 <sup>Iv</sup> CEC01450183 <sup>lvi</sup> CEC01450185 <sup>Ivii</sup> CEC01463888 <sup>Iviii</sup> CEC01463884 lix CEC01463886\_0004 <sup>Ix</sup> CEC01450544 <sup>lxi</sup> CEC01428730 <sup>lxii</sup> CEC01428731\_0028 lxiii CEC00592628 <sup>lxiv</sup> CEC00592629 <sup>Ixv</sup> CEC01545414 <sup>lxvi</sup> CEC01545415 <sup>Ixvii</sup> CEC01451012 <sup>lxviii</sup> CEC01451013\_0007 c3.4 <sup>lxix</sup> CEC01489543 <sup>lxx</sup> CEC01451053 <sup>lxxi</sup> CEC01451054 <sup>lxxii</sup> CEC01465933\_0003 <sup>lxxiii</sup> CEC01465933\_0002 lxxiv CEC01423746 <sup>lxxv</sup> CEC01423747 <sup>lxxvi</sup> CEC01374219 <sup>Ixxvii</sup> CEC01399321